

《論 説》

# Japan's Security Policy in Postwar and Japanese People's Value

— Process in Establishment, Transformation, and  
Expansion of the Japan-US Security System —

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## Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM	ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AIRA	Act on Iraq Special Measures for Iraq Reconstruction Assistance

AMF	Asian Monetary Fund
ANZUS	Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASCO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASMIRA	Act on Special Measures for Iraq Reconstruction Assistance
ATSML	Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CBM	Confidence-Building Measures
COC	Code of Conduct
CSF	Coastal Safety Force
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DC	Defense Council
DH	Defense Intelligence Headquarters
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	US Development of Defense
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DSG	Defense Strategic Guidance
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
EASR	East Asia Strategy Report
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Guideline	Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation
HC	House of Councilors (the Upper House)
HR	House of Representative (the Lower House)
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JFEO	Japan Federation of Economic Organizations
JGSDF	Japan Ground SDF
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LCSMHRA	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and

	Reconstruction Assistance
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MD	Missile Defense
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSA	Mutual Defense Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPO	National Defense Program Outline
NPR	National Police Reserve
NSC	National Security Council
NTP	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PKF	Peace Keeping Force
PPH	Power Projection Hub
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SACO	Japan-US Special Action Committee
SALTI	Strategic Arms Limitation Talk
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDCF	Security and Defense Cooperation Forum
SDF	Self-Defense Force
SPJ	Socialist Party of Japan
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SOC	Standard Operation Code
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
THAAD	Theater High Altitude Area Defense
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

UNCLOS	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	UN Development Program
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPACA	UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Act
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization
US	United States of America
USFJ	US Force Japan
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Preface

In July 2014 the Abe government decided a major policy change over Japan's security after the Second World War.<sup>(1)</sup> The LDP and the Komeitō of the ruling parties changed the interpretation of Constitution from the past, and agreed to expand the range of SDF's activities. The decision is currently associated with dealing with the development of the DPRK's nuclear bomb and long-range missiles. In 2017 the Abe Cabinet posts the defense expenditure of 2018 to the maximum, and purchases US-made defense equipment. Japan is accelerating its reliance on the US. We can see the three points in the decision.

The first is coping with terrorists, rescuing Japanese people overseas, expanding PKO and humanitarian aid activity.

The second allows the limited exercise of collective self-defense rights which was considered unconstitutional since then.

The third is that the SDF aggressively supports the backward support of foreign army activities.

The current LDP wishes to expand the activities of SDF as much as possible under the existing Constitution (or amending Constitution). However the Ministry of Defense and the SDF expect to limit to activities within the scope of present Constitution and the SDF Law. In other words they want to abide by constitutional interpretation of the past.

So what is the most important controversy? It is a question about the right of collective self-defense. In addition to the execution of the conventional individual self-defense right, Prime Minister Abe said, "An armed attack on the US closely related to Japan was made, this threatened the existence of our country, and how to interpret that there

is a danger that rights will be overturned from the root". Put another way, Japan will activate the right of self-defense if the US, an alliance for Japan, is directly connected to a situation that threatens the existence of Japan when it is subjected to an armed attack. Changes in Japan's security policy can also be considered as the history of the increase in Japan's cooperation with the US since the end of Second World War and the conclusion of the Japan-US Security Treaty. I would like to point out only two questions here.

One question is the definition of a 'new situation' or a 'changing reality'. If the government declares that 'this situation or a reality is a threat to the existence of our country', it will be possible to exercise the right of collective self-defense. That measure admits the government's discretion too widely. Its control requires clarification to make the civilian control by the both Diets function. Conventionally the Japan-US Security Treaty has been applied to the north of the Philippines geopolitically. The changes in government policy have expanded the geographical range.

Another question is the establishment of permanent law concerning dispatch of SDF overseas. Japan can positively carry out backward and legislative supports of foreign (mainly the US) troops abroad. Constitution prohibits war as the invocation of national rights. Does the government explain the contradiction between Constitution and government's security policies in the same way? Will such laws be control measures abroad?

Two points will alter the Japan-US security system so far. The change of the Japanese government in 2015 is not what began now. The postwar Japan's security policy has converted in accordance with changes in the international environment and relations between the two countries.

Japan's security policy is the history of repetition of response from Japan in response to the request for increased cooperation from the US to Japan, and in response thereto. However Japan's security policy has not progressed as expected by the both governments of Japan and the US. Following the war experience, Japanese people after the Second World War have acquired norms that have not existed before the war. It is 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. These norms are completely different from the 'militant character' of Japanese people before the Second World War, and have taken control in the security policy according to 'norms' in the postwar.

In this paper I will investigate the transition of Japan's security policy after the Second World War and the values of the Japanese people affecting policy. I will deal with the following issues in this paper.

Part 1 describes the transition of Japan's security policy since the end of Second World War. Both governments of Japan and the US have sought to survive, strengthen and expand the Japan-US Security Treaty even after the end of Cold War from the establishment of the Japan-US security arrangements during the Cold War. In particular the nature of the Japan-US alliance has been transformed at each stage from requests of the US to responses of Japan.

In Part 2 after the end of Cold War, Japan became proactive international contributions from the international community. Traditionally the Japanese governments have contributed mainly to economic cooperation to overseas, but lately the SDF has been dispatched overseas and has been active. This policy is a view that asserts that it is a so-called 'normal state' by the realists.

In Part 3 after the Cold War, especially in East Asia, international

politics has changed greatly. We should pay attention to changes in circumstances of international politics in the beginning of 21 century, and must carefully investigate whether Japan has responded them. This confirmation will strengthen the LPD's 'realistic' security policy of Japanese governments in Part 4, and will be a necessary condition to consider the approach to the US block further.

In Part 4 the Japanese governments have conventionally judged the right to collective self-defense as unconstitutional. However, in 2014, the Abe government declared the rights of collective self-defense constitutional, and further strengthens active cooperation with bilateral alliance with the US.

In the following from Part 1 to Part 4 we would like to examine postwar history of security by the two perspectives. I consider how the political culture and view of Japanese people affect the security policy by the LDP governments in the postwar period in Part 5. In addition I think about the problem of realist security in Part 6.

In most of elections after the war, despite the fact that the LDP chosen by the electorate is located at the government party, the people basically support the government's economic policy, but the conservative politician's security policy is not necessarily agreed with the people's view. Why is that circumstance? It may relate to the realistic orientation of the LDP in international relations. I will clarify this situation and relationship.

In Part 5 how have the Japanese people understood Japan's security policy since the Second World War? They have institutionalized the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' learned by the war experience and defeat of Second World War. These cultural norms have constrained

the security policy of the LDP governments. I argue that the values of the Japanese people have influenced the Japanese governments' security policy with reference to the argument of Katzenstein [cf. Katzenstein, 1996]. However I would like to argue more about the motives of the value of Japanese people he does not pay attention to.

In Part 6 we have to be aware of ambiguity about safety, and here we consider the problem in conservative's realism. This theoretical examination will verify the idea that forms the basis of the present Japan's security policy. In particular I would like to review realism in international political theory and reality politics.

Finally, in Conclusion, as summary and thesis of this paper, we are confident that institutions and norms will influence the bilateral security policy and regime of Japan and the US.

Realism tends to be linked with traditional policy in the balance of power. It is 'hard balancing' which is one of the theories some realists and deterrentists believe. Is this 'hard balancing' applicable to the current international political situation surrounding Japan? I would like to propose contemporary power equilibrium as a principle of security policy as a revision of balance of power. I will re-consider this theory in the Appendix. It is 'soft balancing'. It will be considered that the policy based on this theory is an effective means in the current security environment.

Introduction

1 Japan in the era of post-Cold War

In the early 1990s people in the world were skeptical at the end of the Cold War [cf. *The Economist*, January 8, 1994:19-21; *The Economist*, July 16, 2005: 25-27]. We gradually confirm that the Cold War has ended differently from present situation and response. However in a changing situation after the Cold War the world is facing an uncertain future. The reason why the post-Cold War era is uncertain is also the difference between Europe and Asia after the Cold War. Although it is a cognitive disparity to international politics after the Cold War, if contrasting the differences of the international order is compared, the following contrasting appearance is drawn [cf. Oka, 1958: 16-50].

Table 1-1: Post-Cold War situation in Europe and Asia

Europe	Asia
① Progress of European integration (i.e. European Union) ②International organization by multilateral organizations (i.e. All European Security Cooperation Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ③ Non hegemonic law order (change in nationalism)	①Inadequate or absent of international cooperation organization / institution ②Geopolitics focusing on two countries ③Balance of power versus hegemonic order

International politics is analyzed in two views. One of them is a ‘view of cycle’. It is based on a ‘system of power’. The Great Powers have generated and changed in history of battles. In other words the world politics is a power politics. The other is a ‘structural theory’. This view thinks of the structural change in building a common security in the

trend of multination, democratization and internationalization. The latter pursue the framework of multilateral cooperation (see Table 1-1).

For example the PRC's behavior is looking at international relations with the idea of the Cold War-like balance of power. The PRC confirms that firstly following the collapse of the USSR, strengthening self-confidence with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), secondly providing the opposing power to the US by the SCO, thirdly trying to adjust the relationship of power by geopolitical balance, and fourthly there exists recognition that maintains the balance of power in the international politics and is positioned at its center. In recent years the PRC has greatly enhanced the naval strength and the surrounding countries pose a threat. Its range of activity extends oversea along the coast of the PRC to the South China Sea from the western Pacific. At that time, there was also a case where a helicopter of the PRC army gets abnormally close to the MSDF destroyer who was in charge of monitoring.

In this situation a sense of crisis that could deprive Japan of territorial rights has developed around Japan. Japan launched strengthening the defense of the Senkaku Islands at the end of 2010 as part of a new 'Japan-US defense operation guidelines' concretely included an increase in the deployment of SDF troops to the Nansei Islands (the southwest islands of Japan) and the defense of remote islands in Japan.

The PRC nervously disturbs such movement of the Japan and has a strong interest in the contents of the 'Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation ('Guideline') between Japan and the US. It is undesirable for the international community to be antagonistic between the world's second and third largest economies, and also in the region of the same

East Asia. It is no doubt that Japan and the PRC are one of the most important partners of each other. The PRC also thinks with Japan “If you compete against each other and you get along you will benefit jointly, you get hurt each other”. The PRC will maintain its stance of emphasizing strategic reciprocity relations with Japan. Japan must positively appeal the necessity of confidence building measures.

The approach to this task specifies the policy of Japanese diplomacy. Japan may have more active involvement with multilateral international organizations (i.e. the UN). Of course the reality is not always exactly the case. In other words as dealt with in this paper, Japan has prioritized safety and peace centered on the bilateral relations with US (see Table 1-2).

Regardless of changes in the international environment since 1960, Japan's pro-the US line has not changed the following four factors [Asai,<sup>(1)</sup> 1989: 10].

Firstly the Japan-US security system relies on the US military for Japan's security.

Secondly the Japan-US security system actively supports the global strategy of the US.

Thirdly the Japan-US security system supports the US policy in international relations, and plays a complementary role for its implementation.

Fourthly the Japan-US security system props up the international leadership of the US as the hegemonic position of the Western side.

Does the Japan-US alliance after the Second World War truly fall basically in line with the national interests of Japan? How should the

bilateral relations be assessed?

I would like to argue about the 'safety and peace' in postwar Japan.

Table 1-2: Trends in the Japan-US relations over the Japan-US security arrangements

Classification by period	Contents of Japan-U.S. Relations over the security system
Former Japan-US Security Treaty Convention (1951-59)	Prime Minister Yoshida concluded with light armed staff and US military presence in the US re-armed request. Japan was 'expected to be gradually responsible for defending its own country', and in 1952 the National Police Reserve was reorganized into security forces. in 1953 'preliminary negotiation of Ikeda-Robertson talks', in 1954 'MSA (mutual defense agreement)' concluded. As a result, Japan has an obligation to enhance defense capability in exchange for military aid, and the Agency of Defense / SDF have been established.
Present Japan-US Security Treaty (1960 - )	The previous treaty was unilateral such as providing a base unilaterally without specifying the Japanese defense obligation of the US, but it was revised in the current treaty. While admitting the right to collective self-defense, the Japanese government has no duty to defend when the US is attacked by the third country, because of its involvement with Constitution. Approve the offering of bases to the US forces in Japan, etc. (Article 5 and 6) as an alternative measure. Then the Japanese government announced the 'Three Principles' of arms export, the 'Three Non-nuclear Principles', exclusive defense, and banning the exercise of collective self-defense rights.
Consolidation of Japan-US alliance and sharing roles (1970-80s)	With the progress of Détente (easing of tension), the US seeks a responsible division of role (so-called Burden Sharing) to Japan due to Japan's economic power. In 1978, the withdrawal of the US military stationed cost (so-called 'compassion or sympathy' budget in Japanese) began, and research on joint use / joint operation plan of the US military and the SDF was started with the determination of guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation. During the 1980s so-called the 'New Cold War' period, the Japan-US Alliance was emphasized, and in 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone advocated the blockade of three straits because of influence by the USSR navy. He promised to President Reagan that Japanese islands became like 'an to the weapons to the US was decided as an exception of the 'Three Principles' of arms export, and in 1987 within the defense cost in 1% of GNP.

After the Cold War (1990 - )	In the international contribution to the Gulf War, Japan supported multinational forces to \$ 13 billion, and in the following year the SDF overseas dispatch is accepted under the UN PKO Cooperation Act. 'Re-definition of Security' was made in the Japan-US Security Joint Declaration in 1996, and the scope of application was extended as the Security Treaty is the basis for maintaining the stability of the Asia-Pacific Region. In fact the scope and role of the Japan-US Security system will expand. In the 1997 new guidelines formulation, Japan-US joint dealing in emergency situations around Japan, and in 1999 so-called Emergency-at-periphery law and so on had been enforced. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Combat Service Support to the US military is expanding in the Act on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures (in 2001) and the Special Measures Law for Supporting Iraq (in 2003). Improvement of emergency legislation such as Legislation to define the nation's response to foreign military attack (Armed Attack Situation Act in 2003), Civil Protection Law (in 2004) was concretized.
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## 2 The persistence of bilateralism in the Japan-US relations

The security relations after the Second World War in Japan have developed under the successive LDP regimes, facing political pressures from both the domestic and the US under political leaders, active proposals for military security policy will be clarified, but the dominant pattern of security relations is not based on adaptive feelings to the US but based on US pressure. It is thought that it has been achieved. Even if many anti-militarist policies are rejected by hawkish leaders such as Kishi, Nakasone, Koizumi, and Abe, Japan will still prohibit exporting weapons and dispatch the SDF overseas only under the UN [Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson, 2012: 151-152; cf. Kraus and Pemple, 2004; cf. Pyle, 2007].

As a result since the end of Cold War, along with the domestic and foreign political transformations, the Japan-US alliance has tied the US military strategy more closely to Japan and the people. This strategy has already been adapted to the US at several stages of the Cold War, such as

joint training of USFJ and SDF, security of maritime traffic channels and export of defense technology. From this experience it has been decided to re-define the role of Japan-US Security Treaty, revised the 'Guidelines', and supported the 'War on Terrorism'. In particular Japan has enacted new laws related the 'War on Terrorism', and it has become possible to cooperate with the US globally, not locally. In addition it was decided to ease arms export prohibition.

Even though the security environment since the 9/11 terrorist attacks implies an active will to support the adaptive role towards the US to SDF, despite changes and restraints on military affairs, domestic society, especially norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' remain strongly in Okinawa. However as these norms continue to weaken, and bilateralism of Japan and the US is strengthened as the result of post-Cold War, the Japanese governments need to consider both points in determining Japan's security policy.

Japan's security policy is based on the following three basic elements in the Japan-US security system [Asai, 1989: 124; cf. Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 2006]. Firstly Japan will develop self-defense capability that can hold oneself up by Japan own bootstraps when small-scale military invades. Secondly the massive invasion of normal forces is dealt with the appui of the US military. Thirdly if there is a possibility of an attack by a nuclear weapon, it depends on deterrence by nuclear forces of the US.

In the Cold War period the policy of the Japanese governments adaptively responded to the changes in accordance with the benefits recognized by Japans and people, unlike the policy formation that simply responds to changes in the structure of the international system. That is the national interests for Japan. For example in the mid-1950's, in the case

of normalization of the Japan-USSR relation, structural changes in the international system, and the pressure from the US can explain the failure to sign policies and peace treaties for the Northern Territories (the Hoppo Ryodo). After the Cold War dealing with the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991 can confirm the existence as a norm of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' when forming external policies. The former (normalization of the Japan-USSR relation) proves the power of the US influencing the policy direction of Japan and that the latter (dealing with the Gulf War) demonstrates the norms to force policy makers and give power.

Likewise dealing with Japan's 'War on Terrorism' is not a complete military role but rather a means of institutionalization of international relations through economic power and the limited role of the SDF supporting the US army. It can be confirmed that the preference of the policy formation continues. This indicates a weakening of the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. For example the dispatching SDF in Iraq showed that the other countries were involved in battle but proves resistance to arrange the full military capability of SDF. The end of the mission of refueling in the Indian Ocean in the times of the DPJ government, and the assertion of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan suggest the importance of Japan's international contributions institutionalized through non-military means.

However, as seen in the case of Nakasone, Koizumi, and Abe, some of the Japanese Prime Ministers have played a remarkable role in strengthening the ties between bilateral securities. Although the trial of the DPJ had aimed the difficulty of transitioning to an equal relationship with the US in the security relation such as Futenma from failing to transferring the US military base to this. It is embedded in institution and

norm in the relation of Japan and the US in economic, political, and security bilateralism, as well as elements of inequality. It has maintained a dominant norm at the policy formation level in both countries. Indeed the limited number of instances of Japanese policy-making agencies that carry out the inconsistent profits contrary to the institutions and norms of bilateralism and make decisive efforts to achieve in reality are sustained vulnerability facing US pressure.

Needless to say the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism', and economic developmentalism have embedded in the Japanese society; they provide policy makers with alternative ways of carrying out policies despite the US pressure. As the Cold War ended, the norms tended to gradually compensate bilateralism, even though it would not refuse directly. As with bilateral between Japan and the US, and former initiatives of the US, the structure of international system and changes in the intention of US would create new opportunities in this regard to carry out multilateral initiatives [Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson, 2012: 154].

## Part 1 Postwar history of security in Japan

### 1 Discussion of Japan's defense in the era of Cold War

#### (1) The establishment of the Japan-US security regime

After the Second World War the Allies (mainly the US), which occupied Japan, changed its direction to occupation policy with Japan as 'anti-communist barrier' as part of 'anti-the USSR containment policy' since the Cold War started full-fledged around 1947. In June 1950 the UN troops were organized around the US Army due to the outbreak of the Korean War and the US forces in Japan were also dispatched to the Korean Peninsula. Japan was also a backing support base for food and ammunition at the same time as the frontline base.

In August 1950 the Commandant of General Headquarters (GHQ) McArthur commanded the Japanese government to establish the National Police Reserve (later the Police Reserve Force, and then the SDF) and started Japan's 'rearmament'. In September 1951 Japan ratified the Peace Treaty in San Francisco with 48 Western countries such as the US other than the countries of the Communist camp and returned to the international community. At that time Japan also signed the Japan-US security treaty (the former Security Treaty) between Japan and the US. The US signed the former Japan-US Security Treaty that freely uses the US military bases in Japan even after Japan's independence, but has no obligation to defend the Japanese mainland. This Security Treaty consists of the preamble and five articles, and the main point is that the US military will continue to station in Japan after independence.

In recognition of the fact that Japan's original defense capability is not sufficiently built, it recognizes that the UN Charter admits the right of

self-defense in each country, and then as a provisional measure for defense, Japan would like the US military to stay in Japan. Also the US expects Japan to improve its own defense capabilities. This Security Treaty will come into effect as soon as the effect of the peace treaty comes into force [cf. Otake, 1998: ch.2, 1, ch.3, 2].

Table1-3: Security Treaty between the US and Japan in 1951

Article 1. Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Pearce and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the security of Japan against attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

Article 2. During the exercise of the right referred to in Article 1, Japan will not grant without the prior consent of the right referred to in America, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third Power.

Article 3. The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Article 4. This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Government of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Article 5. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

In 1953 the US adopted the 'New Look Strategy' which opposed the USSR with the capacity of the massive military retaliation by reducing

overseas stationed forces to cut military expenditures following the Armistice of Korean War. The Japan-US Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the US (MSA) signed in 1954 obliged Japan to increase its defense capability in exchange for military assistance. As a result Japan will develop defense capability with 'a range not exceeding the minimum necessary for self-defense'. The Agency of Defense and the SDF were established in 1954. In May 1957 the basic policy of national defense was decided at the Cabinet meeting.

Table 1-4: Defense policy basic policy in 1957

Basic policy: The purpose of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect invasion beforehand, eliminate it in the event of invasion, in order to preserve the independence and peace of our country based on democracy. The basic policy for achieving this object is defined as follows.

- ① We support the activities of UN, and realize world peace.
- ② We establish the foundation necessary for stabilizing civilian life, enhancing patriotism, and guaranteeing the security of the state.
- ③ We develop self-defense capability gradually in accordance with the national power, efficient defense capability to the necessary limit.
- ④ With respect to invasion from outside, we will deal with this with the security system with the US as the basis until the UN can play a function effectively to prevent this in the future.

Prime Minister Kishi aimed at revising the contents of the Japan-US Security Treaty on an equal footing with the US in February 1957. The point of issue is to what extent the SDF gets involved if Japan and the US fight a common enemy. In the draft of the US-side's new security treaty, the scope of joint defense was 'Pacific Region'. Stated in a different fashion, Japan will be in charge of defense obligations throughout the Pacific Ocean on the high seas. Japan objected to 'overseas dispatch' that the Constitution prohibits.

Therefore instead of concession to Japan in the joint defense with the

US, the US added the so-called 'Far East Article'<sup>(1)</sup>. The provision, although not directly related to Japan, is the content that the US can use the military bases and facilities of the US in Japan for safety and peace in the Far East. In other words the 'Far Eastern Article' becomes a key to the Far East strategy of the US. At this time both of Japan and the US did not specify a definite range of 'Far East Article'. The new (present) Security Treaty not only co-defended the two countries with military threats but also has a wide range of cooperative relationships in politics and economics. 'The Prior Consultation System'<sup>(2)</sup> on carrying of nuclear weapons by the US, the US military's direct sorting out from Japan, the deployment of the US forces, and the US forces and changes in equipment in Japan, etc. was also included.

In June 1960 the present Security Treaty between Japan and the US has been concluded, and the previous Security Treaty has expired. The new one clearly states the defense obligation and deleting the article of civil war in previous one.

On 20 May, 1960 the Kishi government led by the LDP independently adopted the new Security Treaty ('Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America'). In the Treaty it was stipulated that Japan and the US should take bilateral defense obligations against armed attack on Japan.

Many Japanese leaders (e.g. Kishi and Sato) in the fifties and sixties supported the US requests for Japan's assumption of regional role in containing Communism and would have increased Japanese military capabilities, but they were constrained by domestic political pressures [Burger, 1996: 321].

The Security Treaty presupposes the collective security system of the

UN but since Japan prohibits holding 'Military Forces' under Constitution, while maintaining safety with the military power of US, it guarantees the US military action in the Far East region.

Table1-5: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between US-Japan in 1960

Article 1. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article 2. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They seek to eliminate collaboration between them.

Article 3. The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and affective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

Article 4. The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the East is threatened.

Article 5. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6. For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval force of

facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

Article 7. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United State of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

Article 9. The Security shall between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

Article 10. This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

The Article 5 of Security Treaty obligates Japan and the US to jointly deal with 'armed attack against one of the areas under the administration of Japan'. However Japan has no defense obligation to attack the US mainland and military bases outside the Japanese territory. Otherwise phrased, that is the system that 'the US protects Japan unilaterally' system. Regarding the right of collective self-defense that can be counterattacked jointly when allies are attacked by the third-party nation, the Japanese government interpreted that 'Japan has a right of the collective defense but its exercise is prohibited by Constitution'. It is

said that this treaty expresses a 'unilateral agreement'. So as its alternative measure, Japan was obliged to provide a military bases, facilities and equipment of the US in the Article 6. Both countries tried to balance the burden.

Table1-6: Contents and Issues of Articles 5 and 6 of the Japan-US Security Treaty

issues	consideration of issue	disputes in issue
The obligation of joint defense (Article 5)	According to Article 9 of Constitution, Japan can exercise the right of self-defense only for attack on Japan itself (right to individual self-defense). Just in this article, the obligation for joint defense is stipulated only for 'the territory under the administration of Japan'. If Japan is attacked, the US will be under co-defense obligation, but even if the US is attacked, Japan will have no co-defense obligation.	In Japan (including territorial airspace and sea), in case of attacking against the USFJ, Japan also has a joint defense obligation, it is not an exercise of the collective self-defense prohibited by Constitution. Also when a war occurs in a single action by the US, if the USFJ is attacked, it will automatically get caught up in that war.
The scope of the 'Far East' (legal status of USFJ: Article 6)	According to the unified view of Japanese Government (on February 1960) on the scope of the 'Far East', it is said that "the USFJ can contribute to defense against armed attacks to the USFJ using bases and facilities in Japan".	The scope of the 'Far East' is not the same as the range that the US military can act on, and if the crisis in the vicinity of the 'Far East' threatens the 'the same territory', the USFJ can mobilize to the area assumed assaults on territories (for example the Gulf War in 1991). There is criticism that it is virtually unlimited.
Prior consultation system (reciprocal agreement: the Article 6)	The Prior Consultation System consists of ①important revision in the arrangement of USFJ, ② important changes in equipment (for example bringing in nuclear weapons, etc.), ③use of bases for combat operations from Japan (excluding the Article 5 joint action).	Until now there has been no example of prior consultation, and even during the Gulf War, the USFJ also was not considered objective to prior consultation because of the 'order during the mobilization'.

## (2) The 'Mitsuya Research'

In 1965 the SPJ revealed 'emergency researches' within the SDF

supposing the Second Korean War in future.

It was called 'Desk Study on Integrated Defense on the Second Korean War', so was a top secret research by some executives of the Joint Staff Council in the SDF to control it. Among them, the influence and countermeasures (i.e. 'legal preparations') on Japan when the second Korean War broke out were examined in the matters of national policy associated with the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the prospect of another war.

How did the SDF regulate and control the lives of people in case of emergency? It was planned to establish human mobilization, material mobilization, regulation and control of the people's living for the purpose of total national mobilization.

Personnel mobilization was divided into six categories: ①recruitment of the general public, ②compulsory operation of workers, ③strike restriction at the production site of defense supplies, ④use of public and private research institutes/researchers for defense purposes, ⑤compulsory control of traffic and communication, ⑥induction to public opinion.

Physical mobilization included seven categories: ①strengthening the development of the defense industry, ②exporting and managing defense production and repairing facilities, ③securing defense resources, ④controlling the distribution of defense supplies, ⑤coercion control of traffic and communication, ⑥research of defense, ⑦patent control on use and property rights.

Securing of the people's livelihood can be divided into seven categories: ①control of people's living, food, clothing and shelter, ②establishment of self-sufficiency of daily necessities, ③compulsory evacuation, ④

countermeasures of war damage, ⑤enactment of legislations covering emergencies, and civil and criminal code (temporary suspension or modified form of present legal system), ⑦cooperation with government.

The 'Mitsuya Research' was the first comprehensive emergency study after the foundation of the SDF. The joint defense of Japan and the US was also examined in the 'Basic Research-4 relations of military cooperation with the US', which is a part of the 'Mitsuya Research'. How would the USFJ cooperate with the SDF during the emergency in Korean Peninsula? As preparation for the strategy, the plan would consider ①accumulation of supply supplies, ②preparation of dispatch units, as well as patrols, research on air defense alert and cooperation from civilians to the US military as a precautionary measure, and ③ supplementing fuel and ammunition, and cooperation such as medical goods, sanitation and transportation.

The SPJ raised a strenuous objection that this emergency studies infringed the civilian control of the SDF. The Agency of Defense explained itself to put the fire that it was a research within the SDF in its own terms. The 'Mitsuya Research' was not made a formal decision. The situation on the Korean Peninsula has greatly influenced the cooperation of the two countries. In the process of experiencing the Korean War, the US has reconfirmed the role of Okinawa as a salient base. In sum the 'Mitsuya Research' within the SDF presupposed another Korean warfare.<sup>(3)</sup>

Civilian control is civilian democratic control of the military. The actual situation in Japan is rather bureaucratic control by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance, etc. rather than democratic control by the government and Diets that Japanese voters elect. This is because there is a dispute about the SDF. It is pointed out that the sense of peace

rooted in the Japanese people hindered the public understanding of the military problems such as civilian control. In other words it can be said that the 'Mitsuya Research' was ahead of the Japan-US security system since the 1990s.

### (3) NDPD (National Defense Program Outline)

In the 1960s the defense capability of SDF has been gradually increased in a manner to take a positive approach to the threat to Japan. The defense budget increased with high economic growth. It means necessary defensive cost. In 1972 the US entered into a disarmament treaty with the USSR (SALT I: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I), and the era of reducing tension (*Détent*) had begun. In the domestic market the economy showed shadow due to the oil crisis, the people expressed dissatisfaction with the increase in defense budget. In 1973 LDP led government recognized the limit of defense buildup and began reviewing on defense of Japan. The government, LDP and opposition parties conflicted and no conclusion came. The Agency of Defense at the day understood the situation of world as 'reducing tension (*Détent*)', which is an 'era of peace', and insisted on the 'de-threatening world'. The way of new defense capability evolved into the days of Prime Minister Miki. Miki examined the adequacy of defense expenses with the Sakata, the Secretary of the Agency of Defense, to develop defense policy. Firstly they established NDPD on how far Constitution should possess defense capability [cf. Otake, 1983; Sadou, 2015: ch.3. 1, 2].

In the international political situation of the time, Japan's defense was supposed to be the minimum necessary mainly on the premise of warning system in peacetime. This idea was called 'fundamental defense

capability'. Put another way, Japan's defense capability was explained to be 'one that responds a limited and small invasion independently'. The result is the NDPO, 'National Defense Program Outline'. They thought that it would be a way to gain public understanding to show the standards on how far the SDF could act. In 1976 the NDPO became the fundamental policy of Japan's defense. The idea of the NDPD is in the concept of 'fundamental defense capability'.

From the 1960s to the 1970s Japan's defense policy was based on the concept of 'demand required defense capability' to meet the necessary formal requirements. It adopted a method to increase the strength according to the scale of the threat, and strengthened Japan's capacity against the threatening country (in this case the USSR). On the contrary the concept of 'fundamental defense capability' was a different policy from the concept of the 'demand defense capability'. In other words it was a system that did not proportionally reinforce the capability by interlocking with 'threat'. Furthermore the concept of 'fundamental defense capability' was policy-based 'quantitative criteria' and the number of concrete weapons and the sum of cost up to the defense expenditure was quantified in the appendix on the NDPO. It also showed a new development of defense plan different from the past, and at the same time it changed the recognition of defense policy.

Although Japan's presenting the numerical value of the defense capability was significant, the NDPO had not been necessarily respected principal and criteria of 'quality problems' in its contents.

We must consider the point that security is affected by international politics, economics and international relations. It also has to be taken into considerations: how the idea of self-defense is supported by allies, how it

is positioned in relation to the UN, how it is affected by changes in the international situation. In the 1980s the quantity of equipment was the same as the qualitative improvement, but the situation changed completely. The 'fundamental defense capability' cannot be decided only by its own country. Because 'fundamental defense capability' was thought only with the defense that Japan considers necessary, depending on the transition of the international environment, Japan's defense capability will be forced to change the policy. In fact the circumstances occurred in the 1980s. Full-fledged military acted concerned between Japan and the US led to emergence of the form of 'Guideline (Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation)'.

#### (4) Formulation of 'Guideline'

Until 1973 Okinawa was under the rule of the US. The US air force bombed North Vietnamese villages, soldiers, goods, ammunition, etc. The US attacked from the base of Okinawa to Vietnam. Furthermore in November 1969 Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon agreed to make restitution of Okinawa at the Japan-US meeting at summit. At that time Sato took a step forward about 'prior consultation' when the US military made sortie across Japanese border from the base in Japan. It is supposed that armed attack against the DPRK has a serious impact on Japan's security. In the case of a direct attack by the US Japan will deal promptly and positively and also made remarks on Taiwan's safety. Japan gave new convenience to the US based on the so-called 'Far East Article'. Sato's remarks were understood to have approved the free use of USFJ residing in Japan during emergencies in Korea and Taiwan.

At that time the threat of the USSR was increasing around Japan, but

concrete measures on the management to the joint action of Japan-US for the first half of the 1970s remained undeveloped. The Japan-US Security Treaty was supposed to be dealt with jointly in the emergency to Japan. However it was not decided how the Japan and the US actually repudiate the attack. In 1976 the Japanese government stipulated a new framework for defense policy. The NDPD based on the concept of 'fundamental defense capability' that can deal with small scale invasion on its own, and determined the policy to suppress defense expenses within 1% of GNP.

In November 1978 the 'Guideline' was agreed, which provides concrete guidelines for defense cooperation among the defense officials of Japan and US. In order to effectively manage the Japan-US Security Treaty, both Japan and the US have formulated and decided co-defense systems and joint plans, such as strategy, information, combat service support, etc. Based on the Article 5 of Security Treaty, it was decided that the SDF would defend mainly in the territory of Japan and the surrounding sea and airspace for the first time, and the USFJ would be responsible for the defense of armed force.

The 'Guideline' stipulated the role sharing in the case of Japanese emergency, the attack on the US and the defense in Japan. That made clear the character of the military alliance with the USSR as a virtual enemy with regard to the Japan-US security arrangements. In order to respond to 'Burden Sharing (sharing of responsibility)' by request from the US, Japan has released the cash to fund the US a part of expense of USFJ in Japan" (so-called *omoiyari yosan* in Japanese, 'compassionate or sympathy budget')

In 1979 the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the Détent collapsed. In the US President Reagan appeared and began to reinforce armaments.

The so-called 'New Cold War' began. Japanese government declared the Sea Shipping Lane Defense in the 1000 international nautical mile in 1981. In 1983 Japan also announced that in an emergency, 'blocking the three straits (Tsushima, Tsugaru, Soya)' will prevent from the actions of the USSR sea-air powers. In 1985 mainly in the US Congress, as a result of falling to the debtor country in terms of the balance of payments, demand for sharing of defense was emphatically insisted into Japan.

Prime Minister Suzuki during the visit to the US in May 1981 formally announced the policy of Japan's defense of sea shipping lanes to the US. "We will keep it as a range of self-defense of our country, at least in light of the Constitutional interpretations, within a range of several hundred miles around Japan, and about 1000 nautical miles for sea shipping lanes". In August 1982 Japan-US negotiation among official levels was held in Hawaii, and both parties agreed to conduct joint research on sea shipping lane defense. On the US side if Japan assumed the defense of sea shipping lanes, the US thought that the 7th Fleet of the US could be devote to problems on the urgent and deterrent actions on the Korean Peninsula. On the standpoint that Japan relied on overseas for most of the supplies, the defense of the sea shipping lane was important, and in that respect too, the interests of Japan and the US matched to some extent. The defense of sea shipping lanes was the first step toward the 'Guideline', and the joint military exercises between Japan and the US became more conscious of the actual war. In other words the Japan-US security system entered an era in which the military power of Japan and the US took joint action in the high seas.

## (5) Move to the transformation of Japan's Defense in the 1980s

How the NDPD had been treated in the new Japan-US security system then? The anti-submarine patrol aircraft P3C could be said as a symbol of the era when Japan's defense capability was enhanced. A P3C costed 10 billion yen, and Japan was the country holding 97 anti-submarine patrol aircrafts, following the US (412 aircrafts) and the USSR (175 aircrafts).

By the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 the Reagan administration worked with the Western allies in order to combat against USSR. Suzuki and Reagan's summit meeting was held in May 1981. The US requested Japan to secure the safety of the sea shipping lanes due to the threat of the USSR navy and air force. Suzuki promised and declared to defend the sea shipping lanes from Japan to 1000 nautical miles after the meeting.

The US government highly appreciated Suzuki, asking Japan to enhance military capability in the sky and sea by purchasing 125 P3Cs and 70 warships. This was a huge figure that exceeded the contents in the NDPD. When the US began demanding to reinforce Japan's defense capability, the term 'fundamental defense capability' was described no longer since 1980, instead of it the word 'potential threat' began to stand out regarding it. The Japanese government had increased the number of P3Cs twice in the 1980s: initially scheduled to be 45 aircrafts, then 75 in 1982, finally 100 in 1985. In addition to the P3Cs Japanese government purchased the latest weapons with the best performance at that time from the US one after another. Approximately 180 aircrafts or Defense Force's main F 15 fighter planes were deployed. Aegis ships equipped with the latest air defense missiles in the US were decided to hold 4 ships. The SDF began to participate in the joint training with the US Navy for

the defense of sea shipping lanes (Joint Practice of the Rim Pak Pacific). For the training the SDF dispatches the number of naval escort next to the US, and P3C aircrafts. In the 1980s the proportion of weapons purchasing expenditure in defense budget continued to increase (16.4% in 1976, 27.4% in 1990), the limit of defense budget in GNP 1% determined at the same time as NDPD in 1987 was broken.

Amid transition of the international political situation in the 1980s, how did the NDPD and 'fundamental defense capability' change and improve? The later was greatly altered in the 1980s. The budget for the JGSDF was reduced from 1967 to 1985, but the budget of JMSDF and JASDF increased. According to the budget of the SDF in 1967 it was 38% on the JGSDF, 39% on the JMSDF, 23% on the JASDF, but it was 26% on the JGSDF, 39% on the JMSDF and 35% on the JASDF in 1985.

The concept of the 'fundamental defense capability' in the 1980s disappeared. Said differently, the NDPD deviates from the real state of defense capability in the 1980s. Japan has been obliged to become a defense-only policy by the Article 9 of Constitution. Ultimately in the 1980s the co-military requests of Japan from the US have altered the 'fundamental defense capability'. In the defense of sea shipping lanes and air defense on the Ocean, the defense capability which did not match with the defense-only policy required new weapons. The capability of military in each country shifted to the submarine, so the weapons system also had to reform. Therefore it was emphasis that put on JMSDF for defense expenses. The change in circumstances shifted to the defense capability from the concept of the 'fundamental defense capability' to the new one in the 1980s. Nationally technological progress on aviation needs expensive weapons.

From this time on the term 'potential threat' began to reappear in place of the word 'fundamental defense capability' in the Defense White Paper. The USSR navy actively took military actions in the Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, and Japan Sea. The USSR submarines can launch ballistic missiles throughout the US. The US had modified own defense policy from the Far East Asia region to the US's mainland by another Japan-US security regime. Otherwise phrased, the geopolitical importance of the Japanese archipelago became clear. Joint military training based on Japan-US cooperation and procurement of weapons was required by the US. Therefore the reality of NDPD should be modified or altered significantly as required comply with that in the 1980s. It was the Japan-US joint military defense for anti-USSR that was separate from the defense of Japanese mainland.

## 2 The situation surrounding Japan since the end of Cold War

### (1) Japan's defense policy in the post-Cold War Era

After the disappearance of the Cold War structure, what has become of the new defense policy in Japan? In August 1994 the 'Commission on Defense for Japan', the Prime Minister's advisory body, submitted a report to Prime Minister Murayama. The 'Commission' was composed of experts in the businessmen, academics and former bureaucrats, and had considered Japan's defense capability after the Cold War. The 'Commission' proposed 'The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan'. The 'Commission' set a new task for the SDF. It was caused confusion to the ruling party or the Diets.

The 'Commission' showed one direction to review the NDPO. In the 'Commission' the concept of 'fundamental defense capability' expressing

the basic idea of NDPO was used again. Although the possibility of armed conflict between countries decreased after the disappearance of the USSR, the 'Commission' emphasized that the conflict needs to be' defense capability to prepare for various dangers and emergencies hidden in unstable and unpredictable circumstances. In addition the 'Commission' suggested that the SDF needed to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations and so on, as a request of the post-Cold War, and made international contributions, for which reason it was recommended that equipment with long distance transport capability should also be adopted.

Table 1-7: the defense issue in the 'Commission'

1. Review of the NDPO formed since 1977
2. Emphasize amendments of the PKO cooperation Act towards more international contributions
3. Co-operation and co-training with neighboring countries to making the CBM
4. Conclusion of mutual exchange agreement with the US in services
5. Joint development and production of weapons with other countries (developed countries)
6. Appreciation of reconnaissance satellites to enhance information functions
7. SDF with 240,000 personnel and new SDF reserve
8. Reduce total numbers of P3C, minesweeping boats, fighter planes following the disappearance of the USSR
9. Reviews and Approvals to introduce air refueling tanker
10. Improvement of ballistic missile defense capability
11. Elimination and Consolidation of army posts
12. Assistance of defense industries

Immediately after the Cold War the defense cooperation of Japan and the US was at a crossroads. Japan and the US jointly developed as Japan's FS-X following F1, but after its compiled after the Cold War, so the point of discussion between Japan and the US as to what fighter plane Japan would adopt. In addition the scheme of TMD is a defense system that

shoots down enemy missiles with the system developed by Japan-US would be expected over 1 trillion yen. The Agency of Defense started investigating at 20 million yen from April 1995. The Japan-US joint training is also active in the backward regional support such as maintenance and refueling, the ASDF and the USFJ in Japan have jointly developed and are providing fuel to the US military. After the Cold War the importance of the joint Japan-US security system remains unchanged. The US reviews Japan's defense capabilities for effectiveness.

According to the 'Commission' the term, 'fundamental defense capability', is used again as the minimum state of defense as an independent country. If international relation and military strategy change, the 'Commission' explained that they juggled about defense capability. They insisted that the 'fundamental defense capability' should be interpreted diversely. This definition differs from the conventional one.

## (2) Realization of 'threat' after the Cold War and Japan-US cooperation

How should we consider the defense since the Cold War? The concept of 'fundamental defense capability' of NDPO broke up from the previous concept of 'required defense capability'. The 'fundamental defense capability' claimed by the 'Commission' had to be different from the former concept of 'fundamental defense capability' if the latter did not realize its definition and reality. There are many parts other than the SDF playing a role in safety and peace. In the environment and resource, it is not always necessary to deal with military things.

After the Cold War non-military fields also respond a threat. The 'fundamental defense capability' is a military part, and it should be developed to more non-military things.

However in reality, the introduction of FS-X and TMD is called out, and Japan-US cooperation is emphasized. It is getting. 'Threat' and defense policy are linked to inextricably defense and military industry. At the end of the Cold War, the US military industry has been struggling how to change the direction in future. There is also a change in response of the US government after the Cold War. The logic to establish TMD must have a 'threat' somewhere. For example new threats should be found in the Middle East region, the DPRK and so on, and it must be defined as 'threat'. The problem of the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands) is interpreted like a 'threat' to the Japanese sea shipping lane and freedom of high sea on which the US insists.

In 1994 the DPRK's allegations on nuclear development urged Japan to deal with the emergency in 'Far East'. US Secretary of State Department Perry asked Japan for defense cooperation in the emergency of the Korean Peninsula. The 'Guideline' in 1978 is the result of having seriously to think about dealing with 'emergency' by the Agency of Defense. However because the Crisis in Korean Peninsula was temporarily avoided in June 1994, at that time Japan did not have to give a specific response to the US.

In June 1994 the Murayama coalition cabinet (the LDP, the SPJ, and the Sakigake) was established, and Japanese politics changed a lot. "I am aware of Constitution as being a necessity for self-defense, the minimum necessary for self-defense; the SDF is a minimal achievement organization (Prime Minister Murayama's remarks at the HR meeting in July 1994). This remark means that the conflict between the LDP and the SDP over the Japan-US Security Treaty has ended. 'The role that the Japan-US security arrangements play for the peace and security of the

Asia-Pacific region as a whole is quite large,' Murayama said in January 1995 before visiting the US as following. Although the SDP insisted on the dangers that the US military would act from the USFJ's bases in Japan for the 'peace and security in the Far East' of the Security Treaty, it plans to expand the role of the Japan-US security system to the 'Asia-Pacific region as a whole'. In 1995 the Agency of Defense reviewed and revised the NDPO for the first time since 1976 and expanded it to the Japan-US defense cooperation in emergency situations around Japan in addition to Japan's own emergency.

In March 1996 the PRC carried out military exercise near the ROC main island. In next month the US-Japan joint declaration by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto was announced. A review of the 'Guideline' was officially agreed. In September 1997 the 'Guidelines for New Japan-US Defense Cooperation' ('Guideline' in 1997) was announced, and a conclusion was drawn on issues that were frequently considered since the Gulf War.<sup>(5)</sup>

Table 1-8: Basic Policy on Security of the Japanese Government in 1997

Basic Policy	Contents and Government View	Point of Problems
Right of collective self-defense	Individual self-defense rights will oppose armed attacks from other countries alone in their own countries. The right to collective self-defense can fight back against attacks against allies even if their country is not directly attacked. It bases on Article 51 of the UN Charter. The government opinion states that Japan also has the right to collective self-defense, but its exercise is not permitted under Constitution.	There is criticism that takes military action in PKO activities or cooperative relationship with the US military in the new guideline falls under the exercise of collective self-defense rights.
Exclusive	'Defense in Japan and its surroundings	'It is possible to attack enemy

defense	entirely without attacking the base of the enemy from the necessity of defense' (reply of Prime Minister Tanaka of 1972) was regarded as a government view, the Agency of Defense (then) We will exercise defense capability for the first time when we receive an armed attack from the other country and we will limit that aspect to the minimum necessary for self-defense.	base for self-defense' (the view of Hatoyama Cabinet in 1956) and explanation of enemy base attack is unclear.
Prohibition of overseas dispatch	In 1954 the HC announced in its Resolution on the SDF not to advance overseas. When establishing the SDF, it was confirmed again that, in light of present Constitution's Statute and the spirit of peace and anti-military in Japanese people. It is not permitted under Constitution that the government dispatched troops armed with the purpose of exercising force to other territories, territorial waters, airspace ... overseas. The dispatch is generally beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense (Prime Minister Suzuki explained in the HR in 1980).	In 1980 the Suzuki Cabinet Response in the explanation that 'dispatching units to other countries without having the purpose of exercising force is not permissible under Constitution', from the participation in the UN PKO from the Terrorism Special Measures Act, Iraq Expansion of SDF overseas expanded to Dispatch under the Special Measures Law.
Three principles of arms export	①Communist sphere, ②Country prohibited from exporting weapons by UN resolutions, ③Prohibit the export of weapons to the parties to international conflicts. Principles presented from the Sato cabinet in 1967, and virtually entire embargo from the Miki cabinet since 1976.	In 1983 the Nakasone Cabinet approved the provision of weapons technology to the US, and thereafter the elastic operation is advanced.

The previous 'Guideline' in 1976 focused on Japan-US cooperation when Japan was attacked, but the new 'Guideline' in 1997 took aims on Japan-US cooperation in the emergencies in the vicinity of Japan. As a result domestic emergency measures became the next focus. If the SDF carries out its original duties, it is necessary to prepare various domestic laws. Actually it is in the neglected state in Japan. Improvement of domestic

law to secure necessary people and goods emerging as the 'Guideline' in 1997 emerged as a specific political task.

### 3 Alteration of the Japan-US alliance after the Cold War

#### (1) 'East Asia Strategy Report (EASR)'

Since the autumn of 1994 administrative officials of the governments of Japan and the US have jointly examined the new role and significance of the Japan-US security system. A series of work proposed by Nye who took office as Assistant Secretary of Defense in September 1994 is called 'Nye's Initiative'. It became the US Department of Defense's 'EASR' in February 1995 and was positioned as 'involving in the economic, diplomatic and military fields in order to benefit from the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region'. 'It is considered to be a major factor that ensures Asian stability not only in the two countries but also in the whole region'. In consultation with Japan, Nye said that "We were able to clarify the necessity of the future Japan-US Alliance," and in the direction of strengthening cooperation in the future: ①Okinawa issue, Host Nation Support (HNS), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), ②strengthening the cooperative system for resolving issues in the Asia-Pacific region, and ③global cooperation such as the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and humanitarian aid.

February 1995 the US Department of Defense announced the 'EASR'. The report pointed out the need for the US and Asian countries to cooperate in security policy to maintain economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the scale of economic growth from the standpoint that securing petroleum supply is common interest in the world economy, the US emphasized again the importance of preparing for

emergency in the Middle East region. This means that it is not limited to East Asia.

The rationale for strengthening the security of East Asia is that the US and Asian countries deepen economic interdependence. Two major consumption areas of the world's oil are North America region and Asia region. In the event of an emergency in the Middle East region, the US military deploys in East Asia and the Pacific directly redeploys to the Persian Gulf and at the same time ensure the safety of the offshore supply vessel.

The Clinton administration has been ready to wage 'two front strategies of incidents' that can simultaneously cope with two large-scale regional conflicts when reducing the war potential after the Cold War. The report shows that the Middle East region and the Korean Peninsula are supposed to be models of 'two incidents'. As a security issue inside Asia other than the Korean Peninsula, the US asserts that the US is ready to cooperate in a peaceful solution, due to the territorial issue of the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands). While welcoming dialogue with the PRC in the Taiwan issue, it is recognized that the US policy to sell weapons to the ROC will help maintain 'peace' in the area. From the viewpoint of Japan-PRC relations, the 'EASR' which Japan and the US enacts means checking the PRC which has enlarged [Tanaka, 2000: 113].

The US government has announced a policy to maintain overseas troops of about 300,000. About 100,000 in Europe, about 100,000 in East Asia and the Pacific countries, and the remaining 100,000 are in charge of conflict areas and offshore duties. With the reduction of the 150,000 European stationed forces in 1992, the East Asia-Pacific stationed forces stayed in line, clarifying the Clinton administration's 'emphasis on Asia'.

The USSR threat had disappeared in 1990s but the US military has remained in Asia. The nuts and bolts of the 'East Asia Strategy' announced by the US Department of Defense on 28th February 1995 is 'responding to the destabilization of the region', and the central role in that is the relationship of the Japan-US security cooperation system. The Japan-US security system, which was a product of the Cold War, is subject to new clothing in the US strategy after the Cold War. The US Department of Defense advocated to 're-defining' the Japan-US security cooperation, mainly based on Nye's Report after the Cold War. Both countries intended to explore new ways of working while expanding the framework of bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the US throughout East Asia and global cooperation. The globalization of the Japan-US security arrangements has resulted in one direction of cooperation between Japan and the US.

This report evaluates Japan's contribution to the US, such as the burden of stationed expenses, and concludes that it is cheaper for US taxpayers to hold the US troops stationed in Japan than in the US. 'Globalization of the Japan-US security system' means that the US as the military superpower depends on Japan's improvement of logistics support in financial resources, leading the world after the Cold War.

Table 1-9: Summary of Pentagon's 'EASR'

<Preface: Toward the Future>

①Asia is still admit rising tensions, and the countries in it build up military power.

②Asia's friendly nations and allies' cooperation is aimed at deterring potential threats, preventing regional invasion, maintaining regional capability, monitoring of weapons of mass destruction within this region as well as from the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. It is essential for stability of the sea shipping route.

<Permanent national interests of the US in the Asia-Pacific region>

③The national interests of the US and Asian regions are secured by maintaining a sea shipping lane that supports international trade in crude oil and other products.

④The bilateral relationship with Japan is important. The US-Japan relationship is the basis of our Pacific Security Policy and global strategic objectives.

⑤The US believes that various long-term challenges concerning security in Northeast Asia strongly need to create a forum for security consultations unique to the region.

⑥As the PRC's plans, capabilities and intentions are not well understood, other Asian countries will feel the need to respond to the PRC's increasing military capability.

⑦The US and the countries neighboring the PRC, will welcome the PRC's defense plan, strategy and principles becoming more transparent.

⑧Peace in the Taiwan Strait was the long-term goal of our policy towards Taiwan. The sale of US weapons to Taiwan is done for that purpose.

⑨The US government is striving to the PRC to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

⑩The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system in the region is a key to the nuclear non-proliferation strategy.

< Expansion of US military into Asian during the 20th century>

⑪The Clinton administration is aware of the need to continue the forward base of powerful forces in order to protect the US national interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

⑫The troop reduction following the end of the Cold War has been completed. The US will maintain troop strength on a large scale in the Asian region.

The 'EASR' emphasizes that the Japan-US Security system is very important for East Asian peace and stability, and that the existence of the US stationed troops in Asia fulfills the regional balance. We must also pay attention to another motive. The Department of Defense believes that keeping Japan in the US will be the future theme. A senior official of the US government has been before perplexed by the fact that Japan began to search for multilateral regional security with neighboring countries such as the PRC, the ROK, and Russia, while advocating the Japan-US basic direction. This meant a certain 'distance' from the US. How to deal

with Japan is the content that leads to the *Bin no Futa Ron* (Policy of bottle with the lid on) that was in the 1980s. The US feels uneasy about becoming a situation in *Rebei* (detached from the US) in Japan.

If the 'bottle' is the US, Japan is locked in it with a lid. The role of the lid is the Japan-US Security Treaty. At that time the PRC also admitted the policy. Because the US and the PRC showed vigilance against Japan's going out of control.

We have to repeatedly emphasize the importance of the Japan-US security system in the 'EASR'.

## (2) Signification relevant to 're-definition' of the Japan-US security

Although the East Asia after the Cold War has developed the economy, it is promoting international instability. We have seen the changes in equilibrium of powers and expansion of military conducts. Due to regional instability in East Asia, the spreading various risks have increased since then.

When the situation of the Korean Peninsula became tense in 1994, the SDF did not cooperate with the USFJ in the surrounding ocean area for Constitutional reasons. The US understood that Japan did not pay consideration to the US in the security system. Inevitably in the US it is necessary to strengthen the relationship of the Japan-US alliance.

The US revealed the intention to convert elusive 'peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region' from the role of 'containment of the USSR' focusing on Japan's security. In the historical and qualitative conversion of the Japan-US security system, we will alter and expand its contents without amending the Treaty Regulations. That is the point of 're-definition'. Stated in a different fashion, the intention of US is to re-inforce

the Japan-US security regime with the 'pillar' of closer defense cooperation between the both countries, expansion of contribution to regional security, and support for global security issues. It was to 're-define' it into a role which the US has intended for a long time. The US seeks to secure 'Host Nation Support (HNS)' which allows US troops in Japan to flex with the US's intent under the Japan-US security system, and to constantly purchase the US weapons systems in the future. Furthermore it aims for convenience such as improvement of logistics support to the US around the Japanese territorial waters, as well as the mutual goods interchange agreement between the US military and the SDF, showing the willingness of Japan to collaborate with the US (i.e. ACSA). The response to this insistence is the announcement of the new reform of NDPO in November 1995.

In the post-Cold War era Japan could not build a new logic to replace the traditional security policy of trade surplus or 'nuclear umbrella' instead of bearing the stationing cost of the USFJ. In that regard the 'EASR' will be defined as the Japan-US security arrangements. However this triggers a legal fight concerning Japan's interpretation on the second clause of Article 9 in Constitution that prohibits the right to collective self-defense and stands firm on exclusively defense-oriented policy. The Japanese government needs an explanation to Japanese people about why the interpretation that did not change during the Cold War era, when the threat was clear, changed as threats diminished.

### (3) Seeking 'Stability in the post-Cold War'

The projection of Nye's Initiative was to maintain 100,000 US soldiers deployed in East Asia and the Pacific region, including 45,000 in Japan,

37,000 in Korea, and 15,000 in sea duty over the next 10 years. The US will build a closer Japan-US security cooperation and expand cooperation scope of support from this region on a global scale. Nye emphasizes the existence value of the US military in the region to deal with 'uncertain factors unpredictable in the post-Cold War era' such as worrying about the PRC's super powering, and unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Regarding the 'EASR', top bureaucrats of the Agency of Defense (lately Ministry of Defense) reinterpreted: the cooperation in the Japan-US security system in the future will set major emphasis in the Japan-US cooperation for peace and security in Japan and the Far East from the Japanese defense referred the Article 5 of Convention to the Article 6 in the Security Treaty. The revised plan of NDPO summarized by the Agency of Defense was also announced 'Contribution to the stability in the surrounding area'. It is the same view as the US in terms of seeing a new role in the Japan-US Security system in the post-Cold War period.

However the US cannot afford to dispatch troops to every corner of the world. To the end 'a considerable burden' as an alliance is indispensable. It is an improvement of interoperability in tactic between Japan and the US, exchange of defense technology, and so on. The US Department of Defense executives insist that the right of collective self-defense should be change to constitutional on government view.

In March 1995 there was a conference on the theme of Japan-US relations at the UK Foreign Ministry. At the conference a participant asked a question: The multilateral security system is becoming a mainstream, but will the framework of bilateral security as Japan-US security work in the future? The importance of multilateral security is

also stated in the 'EASR' announced by the Department of Defense in February 1995. However there is no possibility that the regional security system existing in Europe will soon be established in East Asia in the not-so-distant future. The dialogue of multilateral security that started in the East Asian region is positioned only as a secondary effect as 'the one that supplements bilateral security'. If Japan goes to multilateral security, Japan will improve close relation with the US. On the other hand 're-definition' also induces a sense of vigilance in Asian countries. The SDF officials were informally consulted by the high-level officials of US government: "We are dispatching the minesweepers to the surrounding waters in the emergency situation of the Korean Peninsula." The ROK Navy executives react against the foresight.

Why will the US maintain troops in East Asia and the Pacific? In 1993 the total trade with the US and the region was US \$ 374 billion, and in the US it gave jobs to 2.8 million people. In the middle of the 21st century there is an estimate that GNP in the region will reach 50% of the world. Based on this figure, Nye explained that the military involvement by the US contributes to the international stability and sustainable economic growth in the region and it fulfills the 'national interest' of the US itself. The job seeks security, and security promises regional stability. The involvement in Asia by the Clinton administration was linked to the Asian market that will develop the US economy.

The 're-definition' of Japan-US security fastened both of the US and Japan through the security system. Behind the background the US has another motivation. For the US government it is made a conjecture that the Japan-US Security Treaty plays a very important role in the US to prevent the way to turn Japan into self-defense (armed with nuclear

weapons eventually). The US leaves no other option but to Japan. So there is no room for the policy of multilateral security arrangements.

4 Response from Japan to the US

(1) The revised NDPO

In March 1995 the Agency of Defense compiled the 'Basic Policy' to promote security dialogue and defense interchange for the Asia-Pacific region. The Agency of Defense was also devising to reduce 'instability factor' by promoting dialogue with each other, similarly based on the Japan-US Security system as well.

In East Asian countries there is a strong concern for the creation of a 'vacuum of power'. The view that the region may become unstable if the security of the US rapidly declines should be considered. Then there is a high possibility that the USFJ in Japan and the SDF will play a role beyond Japan and the US.

On a long-term basis, however, if the military involvement of the US falls back, the multilateral framework will be an important existence as the axis of regional security.

What should Japan present for the US? One of them is that Japan plays an active role in strengthening the regional security system in Asia with the cooperation of the US. Various attempts have been initiated to build confidence, including countermeasures for defense policy in Japan to the PRC and Russia.

Table 1-10: Summary of Basic Policy of the Agency of Defense's Security Dialogue in March 1995

Background in the Asia-	In the Asia-Pacific region the historical background and view of security in each country are diverse and regional cohesion is lacking. On the other
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Pacific region Position of defense exchanges of views	hand there are moves to deepen mutual understanding in this region through exchanges of views on the security side including dialogue. In order to improve the security environment of the international community, including the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to positively promote defense exchanges of views with foreign countries, mainly in neighboring countries. In addition to promoting mutual understanding, it provides an opportunity to encourage elimination of instability factors within the region, and it is an important tool for improving the security environment within the region.	
Points to attention	It is necessary to make close coordination with the US which is the ally to Japan, to promote defense interchanges with each country while unifying recognition. While paying attention to the position in diplomatic relations with the partner country overall, pursue the transparency of the country's military, and to encourage friendly relations with countries that have become instability factors. It is necessary to seek building the relationship. We give the highest priority to relation with specific countries without any particular reason and make the countries tension to the overall balance so as not to make unnecessary misunderstandings to other countries in the region.	
Country-specific policy recommendations	Russia	In light of the changes in Russia's foreign policy in the future, we will boot exchange in the security field. However progressive development that does not exclude the resolution of the Northern Territories issue is necessary.
	The PRC	The PRC has great influence on security in our country and the Asia-Pacific region. It is also important from the perspective of stability within the region to deepen mutual understanding among defense authorities and to suppress military capability by the PRC.
	The ROK	The ROK is friendship nearest to our country, and an ally with the US. It is beneficial to further deepen interchanges of defense and to make friendship that makes agreement on security more further countries.
	Southeast Asian Countries	It is important to promote dialogue on various issues on security, occupying the strategic points of countries' sea shipping lanes. If the PRC and the countries in this region deepen their understanding of Japan's defense policy, it is effective for wiping out images like the army before the war. In the region, it is expected that multilateral dialogue will be promoted in the future, mainly in the ASEAN Regional Forum. It is necessary to contribute to relationship building.

(2) The NDOP revised for both domestic and international changes

In November 1995 the Murayama government (coalition cabinet by the JSP, the LDP, and the Sakigake) decided the revised NDPO, new 'Outline of Defense Plan' as a guide for the defense capability improvement after the Cold War and its appendix showing the specific level of defense capability in the future. Its content stipulated the maintenance and strengthening of the Japan-US security system while inheriting the concept of NPDO that kept minimal defense capability inherited characteristic from previous one. The revised one was reviewed for the first time since 1976. The government created a new plans of mid-term defense capability that would guide the defense capability of the next five years under the revised the NDPO.

The Agency of Defense's basic line was not 'threat response type' but to retain the minimum necessary fundamental defense capability as an independent state so that (Japan) does not become anxious in areas where power is in vacuum. That is the concept of 'fundamental defense capability' mentioned in the revised one. The contents of former and revised ones are different in the basic policy of defense.

Regarding the current international situation around Japan, the revised NDPO states that ①uncertainty and uncertain elements remain, such as tension on the Korean Peninsula continues, ②regional security dialogue moves began, ③Japan-US security system will continue to play an important role, but it does not show the recognition of a specific 'threat'. The revised one is the concept of logic of the infrastructure in defense that it is not necessary to stimulate neighboring countries with outstanding military power beyond defining clear threats. However the concept of fundamental defense capability includes aspects that expand

the content of the strength according to the environment, and the ‘upper limit’ of the content becomes ambiguous. This is different from the ‘fundamental defense capability’ set the upper limit in the former one.

Table 1-11: Outline of the Revised NDPO

- ①We adhere to the basic policies concerning maintaining the Japan-US security system, ensuring civilian control, and observing the Three Principles of Non-nuclear. That is the basic philosophy that will not be a military power under Constitution. The Three Principles of Non-nuclear means ‘we do not have nuclear weapons, do not manufacture, and do not bring in.’
- ②We recognize the concept of ‘fundamental defense capability’ that possesses the minimum necessary defense capability as an independent country from the former NDPO.
- ③We secure adequate elasticity while trying to rationalize, increase efficiency and compact defense capabilities.
- ④The Japan-US security system is indispensable to Japan’s safety. It also plays an important role in building a security environment in the surrounding area.
- ⑤In international efforts of nuclear disarmament, we depend on US nuclear deterrent while playing an active role.
- ⑥We implement the necessary actions in a timely and appropriate manner in various circumstances, such as large-scale natural disasters, and incidents caused by terrorist attack.
- ⑦We contribute to international peace through international peace cooperation work. We promote security dialogue and defense interchanges, and cooperate in military management and disarmament.

The decisive difference between the former NDPO and the revised one is that the role of the Japan-US security system was ‘prevention of aggression against our country’ and coping with Japan and the US to counter the act of aggression of the former. The former was ‘maintaining peace and stability in the surrounding area of Japan’. The revised one transfers to the foundation for securing the involvement of the US and development of the US military actions. It is also a feature of the revised one that further clarified the maintenance and strengthening of the Japan-

US security arrangements. Since the instability factor remains in the post-Cold War era, the military and political power of the US is necessary, and it is the basic policy of the revised NDPO to support it in both Japan and the US. In addition to continuing joint research about defense, military exercises and exchanging information, search and rescue in the regional conflict in the vicinity of Japan to cope with emergency situations through the operation of the Japan-US security system, and even to step on the Japan-US cooperation in PKO. The process of formulating the revised NDPO is carried out in parallel with the 're-definition', (i.e. re-interpretation) of the Security Treaty taken a focalizing role by Japan and the US, and was virtually agreed and accepted the 'EASR' announced by the US Department of Defense in February 1995. It was 'accepted the response'. There is less room for multilateral cooperation there.

### (3) The 're-definition' of the Japan-US security arrangements

On the one hand the feature of revised NDPO is the fact that the SDF is further incorporated into the 're-defined' Japan-US security arrangements. On the other hand little mention is made of 'multilateral security', which is drawing attention as a security system after the Cold War. The purpose of revised NDPO was to present guidelines for security policy in a new international environment. The Prime Minister's 'Commission' was recommended the standpoint of experts. Proposing to proactively tackle the creation of a new framework, such as promoting 'multilateral security cooperation', works to explore the defense plan after the Cold War has been considered for some time. Such admonishment did not reflect the revised NDPO in the ultimate.

The 'multilateral security system' was set up as the central ingredient

of future security policy at the 'Commission'. In addition to the UN peace keeping, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and on the Dialogue of Security of Northeast Asia countries it promotes prevention of conflicts and increases the transparency of military and defense. However in the government report of January 1994 'multilateral security' was described as 'talks on multilateral security system' in the one sentence of 'Japan-US security arrangements'. It has never mentioned at the ARF led by Japan, the revised NDPO does not mention the doctrine of how to secure the safety and stability in the environment of Japan and neighboring countries.

In November 1995 the Murayama government decided on the revised NDPO as a guideline and its additional clauses for the improvement of defense capability after the Cold War, showing the specific level of defense capability in the future. Its content stipulated the maintenance and strengthening of the Japan-US security system while continuing the concept of 'fundamental defense capability' that retains minimal defense capability from the former NDPO. The revised NDPO has been modified as needed for the first time since 1976. Accordingly the keynote of the revised NDPO became 'current status-approved type'.

The revised NDPO analyzes the current international situation around Japan as follows: ①uncertainty and insecurity factors remain, such as the continuation of tension in the Korean Peninsula. ②dialogue of regional security has launched. ③the Japan-US security arrangements will continue to play an important role.

However the concept of 'fundamental defense force' includes aspects that can expand the content of the strength according to the environment, and therefore the 'upper limit' has remained ambiguous.

The decisive difference between the former NDPO (1976) and the revised NDPO (1995) is that the shift of role in the Japan-US security system is from 'prevention of invasion against our country' of the former to the US cooperative coping to maintenance of peace and stability in the surrounding area of Japan, and for that purpose Japan worked harmoniously in the involvement of the US and the foundation securing the deployment of the US military. After the Cold War unstable factors influencing Japan's security, including the Korean Peninsula, remain around Japan. For the stability of the region, Japan and the neighboring countries need the US military and political power, which have been supported in both Japan and the US, which is the aim of the revised NDPO. The formulation of revised NDPO can be paraphrased as virtually accepting process of the 'EASR'.

#### (4) Adopting the revised NDPO

The revised NDPO stipulated that the Japan-US security arrangements, which were regarded as a means of 'prevention of invasion' against Japan, are important for ensuring peace and security in the surrounding areas of Japan in the revised NDPO. Japan's defense posture will contribute to the US East Asia strategy. On the one hand the feature of revised NDPO aimed to convert into the contents of the 're-definition' of the Japan-US Security Treaty.

On the other hand, as the basis of defense policy, they use the term of 'fundamental defense force' from the former 'Guideline' as it is. In addition they rarely mention the 'international security system' after the Cold War, and the revised NDPO impressed a limited character in multilateral security cooperation.

Strengthening the military cooperation between Japan and the US to cope with regional conflicts creates inconsistency and tension with Constitution prohibiting the exercise of collective self-defense rights. In the past the Ministry of Defense refused military cooperation with the US on the grounds of Constitution, particularly the Article 9. In the so-called 'New Outline', the interpretation of Constitution on the rights of collective self-defense is not clearly stated. When there are issues related to the right of collective self-defense, including the mutual goods and services mutual exchange agreement between Japan and the US, it is necessary to express Japan's clear statement of intention.

The revision of NDPO was aimed at showing guidelines for security policy in the new international environment. The 'Commission', the advisory body of the Prime Minister, advanced the review of the NDPO. It is suggested to proactively engage in a new framework of 'multilateral security cooperation' meaning 'multilateral security cooperation system', and work to plan the defense capability after the Cold War was attempted. But that could not be realized.

'Multilateral security cooperation' will be raised as a one of central factors of future security policy at 'Commission'. It is a doctrine to strengthen prevention of conflict through military and defense aspects through UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR), and security dialogue of Northeast Asian countries, and so on. In the end, however, the 'multilateral security system' has not been discussed only as a 'multilateral security dialogue and cooperation' in the revised NDPO [cf. Togo, 2008].

The basic idea of how to secure the safety and stability of Japan, and region by cooperation with neighboring countries is absent in the revised

NDPO. There were circumstances that the future of the situation of the PRC and the Korean Peninsula, the way the attitude of the US cannot be defined a clear position on the region, and the domestic political situation in Japan do not come up for a matter of debate on security. Certainly just as in the Cold War era, the problem remains as to whether future security can be secured simply by incorporating guidelines on military power in the formal written statement of defense. For example there should be a way Japan makes the Three Non-nuclear Principles and the Three Principles on Ban of Arm Export.

## 5 Extending Japan-US security arrangements

### (1) New Japan-US Security Declaration

In April 1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton announced the Joint Declaration of Japan-US security system. This announcement is virtually the content to revise and expand the Security Treaty in 1960, and will greatly change the hitherto known Japan-US relationship.

Firstly the area and scope of Japan-US defense cooperation expanded from the Far East to Asia as whole. The US will implement forward deployment strategies in Europe and Asia for its own security. On the one hand in Europe NATO will become the center of the collective security system, and 100,000 American soldiers will station in Western European countries. On the other hand in the Asia-Pacific region there are mostly bilateral security arrangements like the Japan-US Security Treaty, the US-ROK Security Treaty, and the Taiwan Relations Act (the US Internal Law). 100,000 American personnel stationed in Japan and the ROK. In the case of Asia the US is in charge of coordination among allied

countries. Japan promised to actively cooperate with the US in the joint declaration. Naturally Japan's behavior also affects countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Secondly the response of emergency will be expanded from in Japan to in the Far East. It was previously concretized in the 'Guideline' for the Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 1978 that Japan cooperates with the US military in Japan's emergency, but at this time is re-examined and develops cooperative strategies and policies to the revised NDPO ('New Guideline'<sup>(6)</sup>).

Thirdly there is a possibility to change the interpretation of collective self-defense rights. The UN Charter approves the right of collective self-defense, but the interpretation of Constitution prohibiting it is the policy of the successive Japanese governments, and the Japanese government does not exercise the right of collective self-defense. As a result Japan did not participate in the Gulf War in military, and only adopted actions limited to the PKO by UN. If the Japan-US cooperation system expands in the future, it will be impossible to avoid the re-interpretation of Constitution, and accordingly approve the rights of collective self-defense in it.

How have Asian countries seen the expansion of the Japan-US security arrangements? The ROK government is skeptical about Japan's strengthening of the military power by defense cooperation with the US and exercising direct and indirect influence in the incident of the Korean Peninsula. The Foreign Ministry of the PRC spokesperson expressed concern that if Japan deviates from the bilateral security system of Japan-US relations, unstable and complex elements will occur in the Asia-Pacific region. The PRC forewarns in containing with the PRC antagonistically.

The US adopts the 'engagement policy' that brings the PRC into the international community by deepening economic relations with the PRC. This was also specified in the Joint Declaration of Japan-US security system.

## (2) Agreement of 'New Guideline'

In September 1997 the final agreement between Japan and the US was reached a settlement on the 'New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation ('New Guideline')'. Japan-US security cooperation will be deepened newly through defense cooperation during giving reaction in states of emergency in Far East region. Then concrete mutual cooperation between Japan and the US, and its legislation became an issue.

Japan-US security arrangements mainly focused on defense of Japan and emergency of Far East, but in the overall framework of the 'New Guideline' Japan-US cooperation in the circumstance adds the situations in area surrounding Japan.

As the coalition ruling parties of the LDP, the JSP and the Sakigake at that time confirmed 'the situations in area surrounding Japan' giving an important influence on Japan's peace and security. That is the place where the emergency shall occur. An expression that did not clarify the area and scope is used. It is understood as a concept focusing on the nature of the situation (not a specific area), it is said that it is better not to clarify strategically which region is the target. However it is a fear that there will be no brakes.

There is a controversy that conflicts with the exercise of the right of collective self-defense which is not approved constitutionally in

cooperation with the US military. The first is conveyance with logistic support; the second is removal of mines. For conveyance weapons and ammunition are included. In the 'New Guideline' there are also high-seas and over the sky around Japan where conveyance by air, land, water is distinct from areas where battle actions are carried out.

Then because the high seas are included in the scope of mine removal, it is possible to eliminate mines that are abandoned, mines that damage Japan vessels and international community requests at the three party talks. It is not possible to remove mines that are laid in order to exercise force to other countries. It is hard to explain whether this representation is also clearly distinguishable.

Table 1-12: Points for situations in area surrounding Japan

Cooperation in aggressive operations of between Japan and the US	Ship inspection passed resolutions by UN Security Council, noncombatant transportation (10 listings)	
Support for the US military	use of facilities	civil aviation / harbor use etc. (6 listings)
	logistic support	resupply, transportation, maintenance, etc. (20 listings)
Operational cooperation	mine removal / sections on the sea and the air, etc. (4 listings)	

The 'New Guideline' means the unprecedented Japan-US cooperation relationship. It was also the history of coordination between Japan and the US in Japan-US security system. Japan does not allow the rights of collective self-defense from the beginning but the US seeks joint defense based on rights of collective self-defense in alliance. The 'Prior Consultation System' has been established on so-called 'Far East provision' that the US placed a military base in Japan for safety and peace in the Far East instead of the collective self-defense. However upon the

Japan-US agreement at the time of the return of Okinawa, the policy according to the strategy of the US was confirmed in advance negotiations in the case of the Korean Peninsula emergency in the 'Korean clause'. After the Gulf War in the end of the Cold War, Japan and the US address the various regional risks and conflicts. The US will try to cope with not only his own country but each alliance. Stated in a different fashion, the 'New Guideline' will be part of the global strategy for the US.

(3) 'Defense White Paper of 1997' and legislative process of 'New Guideline'  
The White Paper 'Defense of Japan' of 1997 was published in July 1997. In this White Paper there is also included a report on the 'New Guideline' and states that the law on emergency needs to be prepared in a comprehensive manner. In terms of so-called emergency legislation it is necessary for the government to comprehensively prepare a legal review of Japan's emergency and the preparation for emergency situations around Japan assuming Japan to be invaded. Emergency legislation has been classified into the following three parts.

'First classification' is a law directly related to the SDF. For example in Article 103 of the SDF Act, expropriation of goods and use of land and houses can be made in case of emergency, but no Cabinet Order has been stipulated on actual procedures.

'Second classification' is a law other than the jurisdiction of the Agency (Ministry) of Defense. For example there are no special measures to the SDF unit while repairing and destroying buildings, roads, facilities and so on in incident of emergency, and to continue the SDF's military operation in. Under the existing Building Standard Act, the SDF cannot act at acute emergency.

‘Third classification’ regulates evacuation of residents and establishment of detention facilities for prisoners of war, and so on, or the competent authority in charge of it has yet to establish the identity of. There are many overlapping parts with Japan-US cooperation based on the ‘New Guideline’. The LDP should insist on the legal system in the form of the ‘State of Emergency Legal System’. In accordance with the terms in Constitutional limitation, the controversy of this legislation is a marginal case on the borderline within Constitution. This review process was of interest to Asian countries. The ‘New Guideline’ highlighted again how Japan’s defense policy needs consideration for each country.

In April 1998 the Japanese government made a decision on the basic policy concerning the ‘Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation’. In the ‘New Guideline’ between Japan and the US agreed in 1997, there were 40 listings of Japan-US cooperation in the emergencies in the vicinity of Japan. It is legal improvement to fulfill the execution of listings. In the case of legal improvement is required to carry out them.

The Japan-US cooperation activities stipulates in the surrounding circumstances law (emergency-at-periphery law): ①‘logistic support’, ②‘facility use’, ③‘search and rescue’, and ④‘ship inspection’.

①‘logistic support’ is supply and transportation improvement to the US military and ②‘facility use’ is the use of the US military for private airports and harbors, but how to decide can ask for cooperation from local governments and private sector personnel, but there is no penalty provision. ③‘search and rescue’ is to search the US soldiers missing team members, and if there is consent of the country concerned, it can be searched and researched in the territorial waters. ④‘ship inspection’ is possible only when a resolution of the UN is issued. Regarding ③ and ④,

Japanese governments put on the review in considering the use provisions of weapons. In order to prepare for an unexpected situation, it will be examined in the direction to allow the use of the minimum amount of weapons. This also relates to the amendment of the SDF Act, and it is prone to argue in interpretation of Constitution.

Another issue is to give shapes of the procedure forced a hand in this cooperative activity. How does the government certify emergency situations around Japan? The Japanese government does not seek approval from the Diets, so it is decided on the responsibility of government. Based on the coordination and judgment at the government's National Security Conference, the Cabinet will decide the basic plan of the scope and contents of concrete cooperation activities with the US, and report it to the Diets. This is the same format as the SDF dispatch of PKO activities. In defense-sponsoring by Japan-US cooperation, the government recognized that it is necessary to be approved by the Diets, but in this procedure it is different from existing ways.

#### (4) Japan-US alliance in Asia

In May 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi and President Clinton reaffirmed the strengthening of the alliance between Japan and the US centered on the Japan-US Security Treaty towards the 21st century at the Japan-US summit meeting. Its main points are: ①strengthening alliances including 'Guideline'-related bills, ②joint efforts by the US, Japan, and the ROK toward the DPRK, ③the settlement of the Kosovo problem, ④the positive policy toward the RPC, ⑤the re-cooperation on economy between Japan and the US.

From 1993 to 1994 after the tension of the DPRK's suspects about nuclear development, stability and security on Far East were insisted, and both placed on emergency again. Resumed research with the Japan-US Joint Declaration in 1996, and the bill of 'emergency' was passed. This is the first time that a bill related directly to countermeasures against 'emergency' was established. There was another meaning for Japan's assistance based on the 'Guideline' for the US because Japan raised the level of defense cooperation with the US. The US welcomes Japan's course in the Asia-Pacific region to partner with the allies to settle the regional conflict.

Table 1-13: reaction to 'emergency' in 1976-1999

1976	Start of Consultation of 'emergency guideline'
1977	Start in Legal research of 'emergency'
1978	Decision on bills of 'Emergency Legislation, i.e. Guidelines'
1981	Adjustment of Relation between emergency legal research and SDF Act
1984	Settlement of Emergency Legal Research and Review of other Ministries and Agencies
1996	Joint Declaration of Japan-US Security system, and Consultation of Law on a situation in area Surrounding Japan; Guidelines
1997	Formulation of 'Guidelines'
1998	Bills related to 'Guideline' into the Diets
1999	Law related to 'Guidelines' passed by the HR and the HC

On the one hand while strengthening alliance is the main theme, on the other hand there is also an important aspect in Japan's diplomatic strategy. It is two points of diplomatic policy to the PRC and the UN. Regarding the policy to the PRC, both Japan and the US emphasize that the relationship with the PRC towards the 21st century has a big

significance. In particular President Clinton urged to understand that the partnership among Japan, the US and the PRC is important for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century and that the Japan-US guidelines are not hostile to PRC. When considering a stable framework in the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential to maintain a stable relationship with PRC in Japan-US cooperation as its alliance.


At that time the transparency of Japan's security policy becomes a problem as the ROK expressed on the guideline bill. In what circumstances should Japan respond to the request to explain what to do and how far to apply? For example there are uncertainties about amendment of the guideline bill toward foreign countries, as well as in Japan. It is difficult to understand its ambiguity in overseas. It is necessary that Japan's efforts to explain the concepts of Japan's collaborative research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and of Japan's original information gathering satellite.

May 1999 'Guideline' bill passed through the HC. This is the first case except for the SDF Act when the SDF was launched in 1954 as a direct basis for emergency response.<sup>(7)</sup>

First of all it is necessary to obtain preliminary approval of the Diets in principle for the two activities of the SDF (logistic support and search activity). However, in case of emergency, prompt approval is needed beforehand. Then based on the enforcement of the SDF, Director General of Defense (Defense Minister) of the Agency of Defense in the Cabinet will obtain actual approval with the prime minister. For other government ministries and agencies also act on the basis of their jurisdiction, and request cooperation from local governments and the private sectors. Regarding logistic support, there are cooperations with

the SDF's operations, local governments and the private sector that supplement it.<sup>(8)</sup>

Table 1-14: Treatment of surrounding Japan of emergency situation



How do we deal with emergency situation? When a situation occurs, information exchange and consultation with the US will be conducted. At that time governments also do what it can do with the current law. In addition when the government comprehensively judges information about emergency and understands that it is necessary to treat to the existential crisis surrounding Japan after consulting with the related ministries in the National Security Councils, the Cabinet is expected to examine from the activities of the SDF for cooperation to local governments and the private sector determine the basic plan that is the plan. The ultimate treatment will be reported to the both Diets.

Table 1-15: Request to municipalities and private sector for cooperation to SDF's operations

SDF	municipalities cooperation	private cooperation
① Supply of water, fuel, etc. ② Transport of personnel and goods ③ Repair and maintenance ④ Medical and equipment provision ⑤ Utilization of communication facilities, etc. ⑥ Departure and arrival of air base · Support for shipping port ⑦ Treatment of operations such as waste disposal	① Water supply ② Transport ③ Cooperation with local authority's medical institutions ④ Permission to use the port and airport ⑤ Temporary rent of warehouse and land etc.	① Transport ② Cooperation with private medical institutions ③ Waste disposal ④ Temporary rental of warehouse and land etc.

What is the future issue? We need to think the issues being involved in Japan and being involved in both Japan and the US. In terms of domestic involvement, it is divided into involvement of municipalities and private sector, and involvement within the government department. Firstly the problems concerning municipalities and private sector were confused about request for cooperation. There are no penalty provisions there, and if there is a legitimate reason, the municipality and private sector can refuse the request, for example in case of many ships at anchor in port. As long as there is no proof that nuclear weapons are not installed, non-nuclear regulations that do not allow entry of ports will have a negative effect on foreign policy, and will not be considered a justifiable reason as it is contrary to the port law that establishes equality.

Secondly the problems within the government department can be divided into those related to the government as a whole and those related only to the SDF. Regarding the inspection from information gathering centering on the Cabinet to decision of enforcement, especially the

request for approval by both Diets and the timing of the report to both Diets, the government needs an assumption that it divided into pre- and post-approvals. The government needs to take consistency in treatment and enforcement of relevant ministries and agencies. Because each local government does not request cooperation, agreement among ministries and agencies is required. With respect to the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, it is important to set concrete implementation standard of treatments concerning the Ministry of Defense. For example it is necessary to clarify specific criteria for the use of weapons.

## 6 The Request of the US and Japan's corresponds exactly to it

### (1) Recommendation by the US bipartisan policy to Japan

In October 2000 the Asian policy expert in the US summarized a bipartisan report on Japan policy. It is a so-called 'Armitage Report'. While advocating reducing the burden on Okinawa, it is expected to expect the Japanese government to become aggressive in collective self-defense rights.<sup>(9)</sup>

Table 1-16: Recommendations of 'Armitage Report' to Japan (Abstract)

#### 1. Collective self-defense right

To prohibit Japan from exercising the right to collective self-defense by itself is a constraint on alliance cooperation. By releasing this prohibition, cooperation on a more close and effective security can be implemented. This interpretation can only be done by Japanese people. But the US government has to clarify that Japan is more willing to welcome if Japan has a greater contribution and is willing to become a more equal partner of alliance. We regard the special relationship between the US and the UK as a model of alliance. Now it is the time to share power from burden sharing. In order to achieve that the following measures are required.

①Reconfirmation of the US responsibility for defense of Japanese territory including Senkaku Islands.

- ②Steady implementation of 'New Guideline' for Japan-US Defense cooperation, including enactment of emergency legislation.
  - ③Joint use of facilities, integration of military training, and reviews of agreement on roles and missions.
  - ④Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid activities. As Japan has frozen the UN peacekeeping force (PKF) participation in main task, it is necessary to release self-regulation decided in 1992.
  - ⑤Expansion of the scope of Japan-US missile defense cooperation.
- 2.Expansion of the scope of Japan-US missile defense cooperation
- Both countries must complete the agreement of the Japan-US Special Action Committee (SACO) to delete 11 facilities including Futenma Air Stationing. In addition to organizing, consolidating, and shrinking by the SACO agreements, we should have the fourth goal. It is redeployment across the Asia-Pacific region. In order to make the US presence sustainable and reliable, it is essential to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. Consideration over the composition of force in Japan is not to end with the SACO agreement but to consider the possibility of wider and more flexible marine unit deployment and training implementation from the whole regional perspective.

While the environment in which 'New Guideline' work in both Japan and the US is being developed, unless the Japanese government implements collective self-defense rights, '20% of assumed activities such as evacuation of noncombatants from battle areas cannot be implemented,' which is in recognition of *mise en scene*. Furthermore deployment of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) will come into collision in future.

The report sets out a new policy to disperse the burden on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole by adding to the final report of the Japan-US Special Action Committee (SACO) because of reducing the Okinawa's centered mainly on the return of Futenma Air Station. According to Armitage, 'dispersion' is based on the facility and training of the US military, which ultimately leads to the reduction of the size of the station itself. There is a judgment that long-term stable securing of the stationing

is difficult.

In response to the 'strengthening of the Japan-US alliance' within the US, there is a question that 'does Japan have a preparation to respond?' Meanwhile, the report says that "it is unrealistic to expect that the current Japanese political leadership will take immediate steps to embark on reform and play a greater role in the international community." Armitage says "I do not think that reforms can be accomplished at one stroke and it is difficult in the near future," but explains "If we do not show high expectations, it will not tell you what you think the US wants you to act."

Japan has the second largest economic power and competent defense force in the world, and Japan, a democratic alliance for the US, will continue to play a role of keystone in the US's involvement in Asia. Japan is the focal point of the regional security strategy of the US in Asia.

## (2) The Bush government and Japan

The Bush government was accepted office in the US in January 2001. It had a lot of former staffs of well versed in Japan at the Republican eras in the Reagan and the Bush (his father) governments. In 10 years after the Cold War the US has undergone various interventions including military to maintain the international order. The US will end its role and would like the allies to share more roles [cf. Mead, 2004: Part 3].

Secretary of State Powell emphasized cooperation with allies and conceived to reduce the burden on the US by treating more relations with Japan than in the RPC, and by respecting the relationship with NATO member countries rather than Russia. Rice, aide of security, made a declarative statement of pursuing national interests of the US. It was

able to understand that Rumsfeld was nominated as Secretary of Defense to promote missile defense plan. The Bush government will actively promote the TMD, which Japan will participate in joint research. Rumsfeld was the first person to promote the missile defense plan and was a person who pointed out the threat of the DPRK's missiles.

The Bush government considered to take an opportunity to raise the level of cooperative relations concerning Japan-US relations, especially security. They thought that Japan depended too much on the alliance with the US, and understood that this relationship would survive since the Cold War. In lieu of the US's guaranteeing Japan's security, Japan has a relationship providing base and other resources. In the 1990s the US had focused on democratization of Russia, re-unification of Germany, division of the former Yugoslavia, expansion of NATO and so on. In Europe the danger to peace and security that lasted more than 100 years was almost solved.

However in Asia talks on security are stringent with the rise of the PRC, conflict over the Taiwan Strait, future problems in the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. It is repeatedly emphasized how to formulate these problems on the issue that the diplomatic officials of the Bush administration needed a strategic dialogue with Japan. The US does not want Japan to act differently from the US. The US does not think that Japan will take political leadership in Asia. However the US wanted Japan not only to provide goods and money, but also to perform completely the role of the allies as a 'partner'

[cf. Umebayashi, 1998].

The 1997 'New Guideline' showed the world that Japan and the US were in a 'special relationship'. However none of the two countries had

officially consulted the division of roles. If the US military acts on the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, the SDF cannot move even if requested from the US. Even if the SDF supplies to the US ships in high sea, it will return if the battlefield gets close to hand. The Bush administration's policymakers recognized that it was not easy to change the domestic situation. However the Bush administration expected Japan to accept the right of collective self-defense and also to improve the emergency legislation. They pointed out that the Japan-US alliance would not function.

### (3) Outline of Emergency-Related Law

Emergency related laws were enacted in June 2003. They are laws that stipulate countermeasures when Japan defends an armed attack. The points of these laws are to clarify the so-called 'unclear parts' of the SDF's Code of Conduct and also to civilian control by the both Diets. Specifically we consider emergency response for two cases: firstly situation of armed attack, and secondly prediction of armed attack.

When the actual attack against Japan occurs in the former assume the case immediately before the judgment from the behavior of foreign troops and of the imminent armed attack. In the latter corresponds to the preliminary stage of the former and the possibility of being attacked judging from the objective situation in which the international situation surrounding Japan is in the state of tension.

There is a different character between the former and the latter is that each response is different. In the case of the former the prime minister can order the SDF to defend Japan and its people. In the case of the latter the prime minister cannot take a defense action and can command to

stand condition to activate a defense for it. It is not permitted to use weapons. This standard allowed the SDF to train with various assumptions. The government estimates that it will lead to an improvement in deterrence. At the same time as a result of the consultation of operational code of conduct between the LDP and the Komeito in power and the DPJ in opposition, when the both Diets acknowledge *functus officio*, the government approves to follow its decision, and a mechanism that can check the SDF under the responsibility of the both Diets is established.

However we also have to point out a problem with this mechanism. From the public insight it is not clear what kind of personnel or what kind of information the government should decide on coping in case of emergency. If a serious situation occurs on the military side, there is a dilemma that cannot disclose information. Ultimately the decision is left to the government, so it is necessary to oversee the government by the both Diets' civilian control.

In recent years the defense and its development of Japan has been progressively developed due to the emergence of the threat of the DPRK. When the US military develops in Northeast Asia, the law concerning surrounding circumstances in emergency for Japan to logistic support triggered the DPRK launching a ballistic missile test. It is also due to the DPRK's action to escalate the recent nuclear development to make a start in the establishment of emergency-related law.

With the establishment of emergency-related law, Japan has entered a new stage of security. The government has two tasks. The first needs a supplementary resolution of the HR and the HR, within which a civil protection law will gain approval. Being armed attacks, the government

will take measures for its organization and functions of the citizens based on basic policies and on protection of citizens. It also supports national protection measures implemented by local governments and public institutions. Local governments themselves should take measures to protect citizens themselves based on the policy of the country, and promote civil protection measures taken by concerned organizations in the area of the local public entity.

The second is to deepen the public's understanding of security, and take a direction in the role of the SDF in that. The SDF's legislation has been dealt with every change in the international situation. In the Cold War period mutual deterrence between East and West superpowers was functioning, so the perception that war does not occur was dominant, and emergency legislations did not pressed forward. Regional conflicts have begun to occur frequently since the end of Cold War. To put in place necessary measure in legal development over the SDF resulted in the advent of overseas dispatch in response to pressing from the international community. As a result of the Gulf War, the international contribution of peacebuilding was requested, and the PKO Cooperation Law was passed. In addition to the PKO of the UN, it was forced the international community to cooperate with 'War on Terrorism', and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) in 2001 and the Act on Special Measures for Iraq Reconstruction Assistance (AIRA) in 2003 on the dispatch of SDF were enacted.

#### (4) SDF's multinational force participation

In June 2004 Prime Minister Koizumi decided to participate in multinational forces under the UN resolution by the Cabinet on the SDF

that is currently being dispatched to Iraq. Why did the SDF participate in multinational forces? In order to obtain the consent of Iraqi interim administrative authorities upon dispatching the SDF and to confirm the legal status that Japan possessed the exclusive jurisdiction when the SDF personnel mistakenly killed a person in action. Once Iraq's own sovereignty is made a transition from the US to Iraq, Japan needs an arrangement with the new provisional government in Iraq. There is also a method to individually decide without participating in the multinational force, but since other countries participate in the multinational forces and conclude a lump sum of arrangement, it was judged that Japan should also join it, and was also requested.

So if the SDF in a field participates in the multinational force, does its activity alter? The government explained that there is no change in the activities of the SDF, and it is not necessary to participate in security activities. On the other hand the opposition parties criticize the government's explanation that it will precede with participation in multinational forces without failure and that it may integrate with the forbidden use of force in Constitution. The successive cabinets have denied any participation in military purposes. However if humanitarian support is added to the activities of the multinational forces, it is included in the international contribution of Japan, but is contradicting Constitution in that it is forced to relate to the use of force, and another task of the multinational force the government must explain.

Firstly although the SDF operates as a multinational force, it does not enter under integrated command, and conducts activities on its own initiative. Secondly the SDF continues with activities in the 'non-combat region' specified in the AIRA. Thirdly Japan refuses requests to unite

with other countries in terms of the use of force. Fourthly the US government, which is the center of multinational forces, already acknowledged the policy of the Japanese government. If activities based on Japan's policy prove a challenge Japanese government makes the SDF to get cut off, there may be interruption and retreatment of activities. Otherwise phased, both governments of the US and the UK acknowledged that the SDF was committed to the amount of humanitarian support activities, so the Koizumi government interpreted that there would be no Constitutional problem.

Considering from the Diets in actions in past, the SDF's participation in multinational forces went beyond the jurisdiction of traditional views of governments. At the time of the 1990 Gulf War, the Foreign Minister Nakayama responded to Diet questions, "Participation acts as a member under command of the leadership: it is not permissible under Constitution". The successive cabinets followed this view. In 2004 the government's view states that "the SDF operates within the multinational forces, but it does not work under the commander of multinational forces, so there is no constitutional problem". Prime Minister Koizumi should explain what he defined as 'participation in a new form'. At the same time how far can the SDF guarantee not to be under the command of a multinational force? In addition since the government enacted AIRA, the Koizumi government should have also persuaded people to participate in multinational forces.

Government officials said that participation into multinational forces calls for a formal change in the mission of international contribution but the citizens were being criticized for Prime Minister Koizumi's support for the rapid expansion of overseas dispatch or the war in Iraq. People

showed signs of frustration on the judge of dispatching in multinational forces.

The government planned to revise the outline of the new defense plan, which will make the SDF's overseas dispatch to the main task after the national defense within 2004. There was a possibility that the Koizumi government intended to establish the permanent law of dispatching SDF overseas and in that sense the overseas dispatch of the SDF would continue to expand.

## 7 Re-examination of NDPO

### (1) How will the realignment of US military affect Japan?

In November 2003 the Bush administration announced that it would begin consultations with the allies on the realignment of the US military. Regarding the reorganization of the US military, the US government concerned about firstly range of 'arc of instability' ranging from Africa, the Balkans penetrate, the Middle East to Southeast Asia where terrorism and conflict are frequent areas, where areas with less the deployment of US forces. Secondly the US fundamentally reviews the formation of the army in the Cold War era, and responds flexibly to the 'asymmetric war' such as terrorism. Thirdly the US locates the Power Projection Hub (PPH) for overseas military bases as each level. Japan is considered it extremely important to one of the most important PPH. Specifically in coping strategy to the emergence situation, the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, the 7th Fleet (Yokosuka), the 5th Air Force (Yokota), and the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Corps (Okinawa) have the function of directing a small integrated unit to be formed.

The plan to transfer the command function of the 'integrated unit' to

the US Forces Headquarters in Japan will be based on the framework and scope of the Japan-US Security Treaty, which allowed the use of Japanese facilities and areas for Japan's defense and the security and peace in the Far East.

There are three choices of Japan for the reorganization of the US military. Firstly Japan will revise or re-interpret the content of the Japan-US Security Treaty. Secondly Japan will respond the request of the US while obscuring the relationship with the Security Treaty. Thirdly Japan continues to argue the countermeasure within the framework of the Security Treaty. The Japanese government emphasizes the Japan-US relations, and will ultimately employ the second choice in order to avoid confusion among domestic politicians by rights. However this may impair Japanese national interests. The US shall make free use of the bases in Japan as the result.<sup>(10)</sup>

NATO member states, the allies of the US, decided to exercise the right of collective self-defense with the US against terrorist attacks for the first time. In reality, however, it was cooperation only with the use of ports and domestic passage of their own country. Although Japan prohibits the exercise of collective self-defense rights under Constitution, exceptional measures are permitted in the form of 'movement' by the dispatch of the US military. Japanese governments have approved US 'vested rights doctrine' at the expense of sovereignty.

The reorganization of the US army shall change or modify the intention of the Japan-US Security Treaty fundamentally. To that end, the US will promote Japan a strategy suited to its PPH. Naturally, it can be assumed sufficiently also in case of using bases against Japanese national interests.

## (2) Need to overhaul the NDPO

How will we change the SDF for safety in Japan? On October 2004 a consulting conference for experts who requested by the Prime Minister Koizumi summarized the report for that. Experts' conference members consist of representatives from the business community, academic circles, and former officials of government and ex-executives of the SDF. The report sets forth the new defense strategy: Japan's defense and purpose, and improvement of the international environment.

The report urged Japan to review the equipment and organization of the SDF according to the threat with regard to defense and purpose. There is almost no threat of foreign troops invading Japan. On the other hand the threat of international terrorism and ballistic missiles by the DPRK is increasing. Therefore it is important to shift emphasis to dealing with new threats, and multifunctional flexible defense capability is required. For example in the JGSDF, it will reduce large-scale equipment for ground battles such as tanks, and choose it for mobility that is useful for anti-terrorist measure and overseas dispatch. The JMSDF will reduce ordinary escort ships and anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and emphasize the ballistic missile defense introduced in 2004. The JASDF reduces fighter planes, and emphasizes missile defense. In the technical research on missile defense jointly promoted by Japan and the US, when Japanese governments begin development and production in the future, the experts recommend that Japan move toward relaxation to the US on exports under the Three Principles of Ban on Arms Export.

In attaining the international stability, Japan has encouraged to develop the International Cooperation so that the SDF can respond quickly to the cooperation of PKO and multinational forces. Japan has consolidated

legislations according to the occasion to dispatch the SDF: the ATSMML on counter terrorism to support in the war in Afghanistan, and the AIRA cooperating in re-building Iraq. In the future when there is a resolution by the UN Security Council, Japanese governments point out that a law that can dispatch promptly is necessary. It will emphasize broad contributions such as capability of technical operation and organization of the SDF and utilization of ODA for measures against poverty, which prone to be a hotbed of terrorism. A new NDPO is considered based on the experts' report. It is natural that the SDF will reorganize as the threat changes.

We consider two further problems. The first is the problem how far can the SDF be carried out the review of the equipment and organization. The second is the realignment of USFJ bases in Japan.

On the first, since the foundation of the SDF in 1954, the defense budget continued to increase, and defense expenses continued to increase even after the Miki government of 1976 summarized the defense plan outline assuming a small scale invasion. In 1997 after the end of the Cold War the NDPO aiming at making the SDF compact in the Murayama cabinet era was enacted. Defense spending of 5 trillion yen at that time remained nearly flat and continued to the present.

European countries reduced defense spending since the end of Cold War. However the Japanese governments explain that East Asia has an unstable factor and cannot reduce defense spending. For this reason the new NDPO was supposed to replace the present equipment with cheap one and to spend more than 100 billion yen in missile defense expenses each year. Nevertheless defense spending was required to be restrained.

In the second, in September 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi announced

the relocation of the USFJ to reduce the burden of Okinawa which occupies 75% of the US military bases in Japan. While the Japanese government is requested to hurry from the US, it must show its policy to the people.

### (3) Renewal of NDPO in 2010

As a result of the end of September 2010, the Prime Minister's private advisory organization 'Roundtable on security and defense capabilities of the new era' announced the report to formulate the 'Outline of Defense Plan'. It was requested that Japan's defense capability be understood as 'deterrence' to prevent attacks and invasions from other countries and to be effective by more flexible operation.

The report is based on the line of 'static deterrence' focusing on the scale of equipment and the equipment with regard to the 'fundamental concept of defense force' that was the basis of defense capability since 1976. "With the diversifying role of military force, it lost the effectiveness". In future 'dynamic deterrence' that 'timely and adequate operation including warning surveillance and coping with airspace infringement and clearly indicating high defense capability' is a measure to increase the reliability of deterrence.

The report points out that "it is more necessary to emphasize" deterrence by operation 'in addition to deterrence by existence'. On the periphery of Japan there is recognition that 'the gray zone between emergencies and normal times becomes more routine'. In 2006 and 2009 the DPRK conducted a nuclear test and also tried launching a ballistic missile to jump over the Japanese archipelago. the PRC conducted the first satellite attack experiment in 2007 and attracted world attention.

The PRC's defense spending has continued to double-digit growth until 2009. Diplomatic efforts, including the 'Six-Party Talks' aimed at denuclearizing the DPRK, have not been successful. The defense budget of Japan does not increase, and the power of the US is declining. Judging from the situation a new concept of 'dynamic deterrence' seems to correspond to the security environment.

Japan is in charge of 'refusal deterrence' that leads to defense, and the US implements 'punitive deterrence' centered on retaliation attack. But this line has merely paraphrased the role of the conventional Japan-US security system.

However it is not easy to conclude simply by subjective judgment that the deterrence is not mere military level, but how potential enemies and hostile forces will evaluate.

## 8 NDPO in the era of regime change

### (1) New NDPO

In 2010 the DPJ government has compiled guideline of security policy. Keeping in mind the East Asian reality that the DPRK repeats nuclear and missile tests, and strengthening the military capabilities of the PRC, the new NDPO emphasizes warning and monitoring activities around Japan.

The new NDPO is the fourth edition, but it has been aimed largely in accordance with changes in East Asian situation compared to the past three times. There are three points of the outline on the new defense plan.

Firstly it is a major shift from the line of 'fundamental defense capability' that continued from the first NDPO, and to improve defense capability according to the concept of 'dynamic defense capability'. The

idea of 'fundamental defense capability' born in the Cold War era assumed the troops of enemy country to land on the coastline, but now it is judged that the possibility is low. It is thought that 'dynamic defense capability' will support Japan's peace and security in daily warning and surveillance and active participation in PKO activities.

The second point is the inclusion of strengthening activities in the Nansei Islands where warning and surveillance was inadequate. In the background, there is a change in the situation that the PRC strengthened naval power and air force strength and advanced into the ocean after the NDPO was formulated in 2004.

Thirdly it is postponing the relaxation of 'Three Principles on Ban of Arms Exports' enabling international joint development of aircraft and other equipment. As it is difficult to drastically increase the defense budget, we proceeded with consideration to open a way for international joint development to lower the development cost of equipment but postponed because the SDP strongly opposed.

Although there was such a big change, or a big theme being postponed, regarding the fundamental part, the DPJ adhered to the basic principle that it would not become a military power that thoroughly defended under Constitution and posed a threat to other countries. The NDPO formed by the Kan government was considered to have been made necessary for facing reality and making necessary changes.

## (2) Dynamic Defense Capability

What will exactly change with the shift from 'fundamental defense capability' to 'dynamic defense capability'? The number of JGSDF is reduced 155,000 to 154,000. The traditional major equipped tanks from

600 to 400 are decreased. In the JMSDF, escort ships are increased from 47 to 48, and within this range, the government will increase the number of Aegis destroyers equipped with high-performance radars to deal with the DPRK's ballistic missiles from the current 4 to 8. It is also notable to increase the number of submarines from 16 to 22 with the aim of exploring the behavior prediction of the PRC's navy in the waters of the Nansei Islands.

Although the number of aircraft such as fighter aircraft does not change so much in the JASDF, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) emphasizes the activities in over watching the PRC' navy around the Nansei Islands, such as strengthening the units in Okinawa. It states the importance of warning and monitoring on the Nansei Islands, which is the second point of the new NDPO. This is the territory, territorial waters, and exclusive economic waters outside of Japan. The SDF will protect own territories and territorial waters, but also conducts alarm and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard outside the territorial waters.

In September 2010 the Senkaku Islands where a collision with a patrol ship by a Chinese fishing boat occurred is also a part of the Nansei Islands and in the surrounding waters, the PRC's navy aiming to enter the western Pacific Ocean repeats active communications. It is said that showing intention and capability of Japan's defense will be a deterrent to avoid accidental conflicts and conflicts by continuing information gathering, warning, monitoring and reconnaissance activities around waters and airspace of the Nansei Islands. However such activities are an expression of caution against the PRC [cf. Toyoshita, 2012].

## (3) 'Three Principles on Ban of Arms Exports'

The third point is the postponement of revise of 'Three Principles on Ban of Arms Export'. It was announced that Prime Minister Sato in 1967 did not approve export except in the following three cases: to the Communist region, to countries where weapons export is forbidden under the UN resolution, and to countries involved in international conflicts or to countries that are afraid thereof. It is not permitted to export, otherwise it was possible. Thereafter in 1972 Prime Minister Miki stressed the principle of export prohibition to refrain from exporting weapons other than the 'Three Principles' indicated by Prime Minister Sato. For this reason Japan could not join the international joint development of equipment such as aircraft and missile defense system with the US was handled as an exception in Cabinet Secretary's discourse.

In the recommendation proposed by the DPJ's 'Diplomacy and Security Study Committee' prior to the decision of the new NDPO, the international defense industry in Japan is left behind as it is from international joint development and joint production of equipment that are becoming a global trend as it is seeking relaxation of the ban if the government could not explain the risks and raised costs to the taxpayer.

Under the DPJ administration, the new NDPO points to the content which analyzed the rapid change of East Asian situation. Japan also seems to enter an era where the change of regime becomes normal, and if the security policy changes greatly every time the administration changes, it will cause confusion both inside and outside. It is necessary to materialize the security policy by the change of administration while considering domestic and overseas. It is whether Japan can present a strategy with an international perspective. For example when conflicts in

the Taiwan Strait cause by tension, Japan should judge the situation on its own standpoint and respond in a manner based on Japan's strategy while continuing dialogue with the US. By clearly showing Japan's attitude Japan would turn to significant presence in the international political (not military) balance of East Asia. In the 21st century Asian countries do not depend on the US, but the balance of power among each country will turn to the key to peace. While the attitude of the US administration will respect Japan's opinion to the utmost, Japan's making a poor decision would detract from the relationship of trust between Japan and the US.

### Conclusion

Since the announcement of 'Guidelines' for Japan-US defense cooperation, defense discussion after the Cold War has increased in Japan and abroad. What are the 'Guidelines' necessary for? There is not much debate about that. In this respect we give careful consideration to two different purposes. It can be also assumed that they will carry out their purpose at the same time [cf. Saito, 2006: ch.7].

Firstly what purpose is it necessary that the Japan-US Security Treaty after the Cold War is to reconfirm about. When the Clinton administration was inaugurated in 1992, the relationship between Japan and the US has been often discussed mainly on economic frictions. After the Cold War there is no argument as to why the Japan-US security must be maintained: only economic friction is conspicuous. The joint declaration of Japan-US security system in 1996 also meant reexamining the Japan-US relations in the post-the Cold War, reconfirming the security, and surviving the friendly relations between the two countries. The

'Guideline' for Japan-US defense cooperation is also aimed at restructuring Japan-US relations since 1990s.

However as the second purpose in the Joint Declaration of Japan-US Security Treaty not only keeps the in good working condition between Japan and the US in 1990s but also firmly maintains peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, reaffirming Japan-US defense cooperation. It is related to another purpose to consider. It is important that the trade-off between the issue of bilateral safety and peace and the problem of achieving the security and peace of the Asia-Pacific region. In the discussions on Japan-US military cooperation after the Cold War, the issue of safety and peace in the Asia-Pacific region is not clear. The US would rather begin to re-define the character and scope of defense cooperation. What will the Japan-US relation have to review for? In the common concern between Japan and the US due to lack that re-examines this point, in what form does the SDF backwardly support the US military? And, as a more fundamental question, the argument about how to make an adjustment with Constitution that does not recognize the right of collective self-defense is neglected, and the view that only creates a *fait accompli* can end up making the situation ever worse.

Given the objective of ensuring safety and peace in the Asia-Pacific region, reviewing the 'Guidelines' is for ensuring the convenience that the US military will station in the Asia-Pacific region instead of manual making of how to deal with emergencies. It can be regarded as the explanation of this policy as to how the US can take the initiative diplomatically for safety and peace. How can Japan participate in the policy? Before re-examining the Japan-US defense cooperation, we should consider the issue of diplomatic safety and peace with the Asian

countries. The PRC and the ROK expressed distrust of Japan-US defense cooperation, but the ROK, the DPRK, the PRC, Russia, the US, and Japan have continued intermittent the Six-Party Talks off-and-on (now it takes a break). The Japanese government has responded to it. In that respect safety and peace in the Asia-Pacific region are uncertain, but they are taking the first step towards that goal. If this form of security dialogue accumulates and spreads to of the issue of Korean Peninsula, the Joint Declaration of Japan-US security arrangement will become a guideline for safety and peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Japan-US defense cooperation is one of the foundations that support US diplomacy. Japan should not consider military issues alone to determine how far defense cooperation will perform. The Japanese government has not shown a positive attitude to prior consultation system. However in 1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto said that Japan would decide defense cooperation with the US on an autonomous basis. In order for Asian countries to have no distrust of mind, it is important to explain exactly what defense cooperation will be to the US from any position, and to examine in a so-called multilateral direction that other countries can convince. Can Japan present the whole concept of a multilateral security system? Can Japan also contribute positively to translate solution and settlement into reality, and establish a regional security system?

Therefore the current Japan-US security arrangements may also need to be reconsidered. Japan should improve problems about the US military base in Japan, and must civilianize the security system according to the trend of Asian situation. Tasks in Japan should address the following points in consideration of new factors in the post-Cold War.

- ①Adjustment among nationalisms (especially the ROK, the DPRK, the RPC, and Russia etc.)
- ②Ingenuity for peace and security to continue as a member of the Asia-Pacific region
- ③Establishment of international security organization: Confidence-Building Measures (CBM), multilateral confidence building measures, not between two countries
- ④Self-control of power (pursuit of international security while self-regulating)
- ⑤Attainment of moral perspective and human security (achievement of value level of peace, human rights, democratization)
- ⑥Cooperation with 'War on Terrorism'

How will the Japan-US security system function in era of the post-Cold War? It is necessary to confirm how it should respond to the changing situation after the Cold War. From now on, in following Parts, we will discuss what the Japan-US cooperation will be, and also consider whether the bilateral alliance is a wise choice. It is doubtful that we emphasize only the 're-definition' of Japan-US relation. It may be better to consider security with added non-military, economic, cultural and political factors. Since cooperation systems like ASEAN Regional Forum are organized in Asia, the Japan-US relation may be also included in it. It is time to think for us about multilateral security or 'soft balancing' right now [Paul, Wirtz, Fortmann, 2004].

## Part 2 The transition of international contribution and security in Japan since the end of Cold War

### 1 Japan's peacekeeping operations immediately after the Cold War

#### (1) Introduction

After the end of the Cold War the term 'international contribution' has come to be widely used as a term emphasizing the role Japan plays abroad. Of course Japan has consistently played a role in overseas (especially the third world) mainly on economic support after the Second World War. However after the end of the Cold War, humanitarian activities to the contribution required to Japan, if more clearly stated, it is becoming more demanding peacekeeping activities abroad. How is the change in the circumstances related to Japan's peacekeeping operations and security? In particular we think that it is necessary to think again about the change of international contribution of Japan from the post-Cold War era to post-post-Cold War era after the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001. In Part 2, first of all, it is the subject of this study to examine how it is oriented[cf. Ito, 2000: part 2. Ch.1, part 3. Ch.2; Furuta, 2013; cf. Kohama, 2005; cf. Krauss and Pempel, 2004; cf. Ito, 2007; cf. Miyagi, 2016].

In January 1999 the 'Berlin Wall' which was a symbol of the Cold War broke down, and in January 1990 the East and West Germanys reunited. The Eastern European Revolution annihilated the Communist regimes centered in the USSR and Eastern Europe Satellite. Since the 1990s a new aspect of international politics has emerged due to the end of the Cold War. The first sign was the Gulf War in 1991.

People around the world thought that after the Cold War, military

expenses became unnecessary, and as people expected to enjoy the 'dividends of peace' in the post-Cold War, it was possible to improve the living by turning it to the civilian sector, enriching in peace. However various problems the Cold War structure suppressed has been spurted, and therefore the peacekeeping cost is rather enormous. It seemed that the end of the Cold War seemed to be absent at the 'hegemon country' at first glance. Needless to say, even if the Cold War is resolved, the South-North problem will not be solved, and ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts and the like will occur frequently since the 1990s.

The confusion after the Cold War and its setting into shape resulted in seeking a new world order. At the same time, conflicts and confusions such as region, ethnicity, religion, race, tribe, etc. become a major concern of the world. Conflicts and civil wars of various places in the world are frequent up to now.

From the end of the Second World War to the end of Cold War, Japan's security policy was based on abandonment of war based on the Article 9 of Constitution and public pacifism, based on the Japan-US Security Treaty, with regard to international contribution, mainly focused on not military affairs but economic assistance, Japan has been committed to 'purely defense posture' dependent on the US without involvement of war as much as possible. Since the end of Cold War, conflicts in various parts of the world are occurring one after another. In addition to economic international contributions, Japan has been required to make more international contributions than ever including the SDF's boots on the land. After the Gulf War the Japanese government started dispatching the SDF overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). However in the 1990s international political situation is getting more

severe. In response Japan's international contribution will change qualitatively. During the Cold War, Japan has made economic contributions, but after the Cold War the Japanese government thinks that the Japan-US alliance should be further strengthened due to the geopolitical circumstances in which Japan is located in East Asia. This can be seen in the change of international political situation with the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks in September 2001. Along with this, Japan's international contribution will be expanded qualitatively and quantitatively.

In this Part from the viewpoint of security concerning military and international politics, Japan's international contribution began with the Gulf War and the Cambodia PKO immediately after the end of Cold War, and in accordance with the international political situation after the terrorist attacks in particular, I would like to clarify the circumstances that change to international contribution centering on Japan [Furuta, 2013].

## (2) Gulf War and Japan's Response

The Iraqi army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 66, calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait to Iraq. Only when international politics is changing from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era, the international community led to an understanding Iraq's invasion as a challenge to the formation of international order in the post-Cold War era. On March 3 the Bush (father) administration of US asked countries to stop arms exports to Iraq. Initially Japan's measures against economic sanctions against Iraq include ①prohibition of oil import from Iraq and Kuwait, ②prohibition of export to both countries, ③measures to suspend

capital transactions to the both countries, and ④freezing financial service to Iraq. This decision went ahead of the UN's economic sanctions against Iraq.

On August 7th the US and the UK decided to dispatch troops to the Middle East region. It was a great task how to transport large quantities of materials such as soldiers, weapons, food, and medicines and so on. The Japanese government announced the contribution plan to Middle East region. It is international cooperation of each of transportation, goods, medical care and funds. Prime Minister Kaifu announced the 'International Peace Cooperation Act' which is the law that contributes to the international community.

On August 28 the Japanese government decided the first contribution plan to Middle East region. This contribution plan was included the contributions: transport, medical team dispatch, and fund to contribute. If the Japanese government cannot directly provide contributions in personnel, it was asked for cooperation in other fields. Instead of putting a uniform contribution policy by the government, ministries and agencies separately responded. A task working team was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contribute to the crisis of Kuwait. Its contents were included: Middle East diplomacy, Japan-US cooperation, relations with the UN, bill preparation of peace cooperation, support budget (\$ 13 billion), military analysis, and protection of Japanese people and so on.

### (3) The way left unresponsive to the situation

On September 14 the UK announced the dispatch of ground troops to Saudi Arabia. France followed this as well. The multinational force was

gradually being formed. Therefore the Japanese government explored the way of contributing in personnel by the SDF. Legal bases for the dispatch of the SDF had basis in fact that the UN Peace Cooperation Act (in draft) would be enacted. The bill intended to cooperate with the activities of the UN peacekeeping operations and others (i.e. multinational forces), and to combine SDF personnel with peace cooperation members. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would dispatch the SDF personnel overseas and intend to raise the 'quality' of international contribution. However the Agency of Defense did not prepare for overseas dispatch. There was also an objection within the Agency of Defense to dispatch SDF personnel under the bill.

However although it was planned for the initial dispatch of medical clinics to 100 people, in fact only 3 doctors could not dispatch to the front line. 'International Peace Cooperation Bill' was legal measure of cooperation for multinational forces, but it ended as a bill. Three of four contributions to the first plan of Middle East contributions would not be fulfilled, and the government would be able to select only the last financial cooperation.

On January 17, 1991 the multinational forces entered in combat with the Iraqi army. It was considerably expensive to use high-tech weapons in war. A Tomahawk of one hundred at eight hundred million yen was shot more than one hundred only on the first day in battle. Ultimately it costed warfare of more than 500 billion dollars. Japan would pay the expenses burden divided into three times. On August 29, 1990 the Japanese government decided the first contribution of 100 billion dollars. However the US was dissatisfied with the first.

In September 1990 the Japanese government announced a second

contribution for the aid of the Middle Eastern countries totaling \$ 200 billion for the additional support of the multinational forces of 100 billion dollars. In the following year the meeting between Finance Minister Hashimoto and Financial Secretary Brady was held in Tokyo. As a result Japan would pay 130 billion dollars. In the perspective of US, Japan imported 70% of oil from the Gulf Region in those days. The US imported only 30%. Then the US forced Japan the logic that Japan's financial contribution as non-combatant help was insufficient. On January 25 the Japanese government decided a third contribution of 9 billion dollars.

#### (4) Cost-effectiveness of only money contribution

How was the basis of cost and its expenditure about contribution? In March 1991 the US Congress passed the war expenditure bill, which allows for a budget expenditure totaling 42.6 billion dollars as warfare for the Gulf War. In order to cover the warfare of the Gulf War, each country supporting multinational forces promised the US to contribute 488.1 million dollars in 1990. Japan also promised of 17.4 million dollars in 1990 and 9 billion in 1991 to the Gulf Cooperation Fund. The 9 billion was converted to 11,700 billion yen at 1 dollar = 130 <sup>(1)</sup> yen.

According to the report of the Administrative Budget Bureau of the US on May 19, 1991, the total expenditure for the Gulf War in the US was 54.537 million dollars, of which combat service support costs (transportation, food and pharmaceuticals) was 166.5 million. The contribution from Japan to the US was 8.32 million (out of 9 billion). The LDP government needed cooperation from the Komeito and the DSP in measures controlling the both Diets. The Komeito and the DSP imposed strict conditions to refuse to use weapons and ammunition. The Japanese

government nominally saw settlements in the both Diets in a way that the Komeito and the DSP agreed, as Japan's financial assistance was used for non-military support. The international politics after the end of Gulf War shows as following features.

Firstly with the disappearance of the Cold War many occurrences of regional conflicts in various parts of the world and the diversification of threats have begun. Said differently the change in the concept of security is clear.

Secondly the role and expectation for the UN peacekeeping operations has increased. Japan has been often asked for international contribution. This requires considerable human, physical and economic costs.

Thirdly the US had to wage war while receiving economic support to other countries in the Gulf War. For this reason the US will needs a new defense strategy or even cooperation with allies. Of course the US will never let go of the leadership over the world order.

After all in the Gulf War Japan earned oneself a bad reputation by the international community, especially the US as the allies, despite providing a large war cost, and as a result could not participate in the formation of the so-called 'New World Order'. In that sense dealing with the Gulf War was made to think Japanese international contribution and crisis management without any consideration. It is said that the 'Gulf War Trauma' of the LDP and the bureaucrats in Foreign Affairs in particular greatly regulated Japanese diplomacy since the Gulf War. With that idea only the burden that further raised the level according to the situation after the Cold War could be increased to the conventional criteria of exclusive devotion to the US and economic support up to this point.

## 2 Reality of PKO and role of Japan

### (1) What is PKO?

The UN Peace-keeping Operation (PKO) has about the same history as the UN. The activity starts from the Middle East war. The first PKO is the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) set up in Palestine in June 1948. This still continues to work. At that time military organizations, mainly the UN member nations, were in charge of monitoring ceasefire and maintaining security for peacekeeping [Furuta, 2013].

The UNTSO was the first of the UN Peacekeeping Force (PKF), and was then sent to the Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula and others. This is a 'peacekeeping mechanism' that the founder of the UN Charter also did not expect.

PKO is defined as 'activities that involve military factors organized by the UN to support peacekeeping or recovery of conflict areas, but do not retain compulsion'. The second Secretary-General of the UN Hammarskjöld defined this concertation of activity to 'Measures for the 6th half of the Charter'. Although not stipulated in the UN Charter as express statements, it is positioned as a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council (the Article 29 of Charter) based on experience and practice. This idea is based on the Chapter 6, 'peaceful settlement of conflict', but it is called 'the sixth and a half' in the sense that measures that cannot reach the 'compulsory resolution of conflict' in the Chapter 7. Although there is a view to seek PKO as the provisional measures of Article 40, there is no basis on the Charter itself, so it is regarded as 'the sixth and a half' activity based on the concept of 'the authority of implied'.

PKO has characteristics such as 'non-compulsive', 'neutral', and

'international' characters. The use of weapons is limited to the case of self-defense to the last; it is required not to interfere with local domestic affairs. In addition PKO is formed by the resolution of the UN Security Council or General Assembly, and the nature of the UN agency is granted.

PKO consists largely of ceasefire-fire monitoring and peacekeeping force (PKF). The ceasefire-fire monitoring group is responsible for military personnel of officer classes dispatched from each country to conduct ceasefire situations, withdrawal of troops, monitoring of disarmament and patrol of demilitarized areas. PKF consists of troops dispatched from each country (usually infantry battalion) and is responsible for separating troops and maintaining a ceasefire. Besides this, like the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), there are duties such as the office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), safety assistance role of private aid organizations, protection of local residents.

After the Cold War the demand for PKO has increased rapidly, and civilian (non-military) fields are also actively active. For example operations such as civilian police, election monitoring, human rights monitoring, and refugee return, etc. are also frequently gotten executed within the framework of PKO, and there are cases of governance like the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Table 2-1: Active UN PKO (1948~ 2006)

Installation date	Content	Dispatching place
1948.6	UN Armory War Monitoring Organization	Egypt, Israel etc.
1949.1	UN India-Pakistan Military Surveillance Team	India-Pakistan border
1964.3	UN Cyprus Peacekeeping Force	Cyprus
1974.6	UN Disengagement Observer Force	Golan Heights of Syria
1978.3	UN Lebanon Interim Force	Southern Lebanon

1991.4	UN Western Sahara Referendum Observer Force	Western Sahara
1993.8	UN Georgia Surveillance Team	Georgia
1999.6	UN Kosovo Interim Administrative Mission	Kosovo
1999.11	UN Kosovo Democratic Republic Mission	Democratic Republic of Kosovo
2000.7	UN Ethiopia, Eritrea · Mission	Ethiopia-Eritrea border
2003.10	UN Liberia Mission	Liberia
2004.4	UN Cote d'Ivoire Activity	Cote d'Ivoire
2004.6	UN Haitian Stabilization Mission	Haiti
2005.3	UN Sudan Mission	Sudan
2006.8	UN East Timor Integration Mission	East Timor

## (2) Basic Principle: 'Neutral and Non-Intervention'

PKF is one actor that constitutes PKO, and PKF cannot be considered without PKO. Therefore it is understood that PKF is included in PKO. Internationally only PKF has been introduced since 1948. In Japan the PKF's main service (for example, disarmament) is frozen in the UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Act in Japan [Furuta, 2013: 86-91].

A certain principle has been established between PKO and PKF through more than half a century of experience and practical practice. The principles of PKO are ①the existence of cease-fire agreement, ②neutral / non-intervention, ③non-compulsory, ④weapon use only for self-defense, and ⑤maintenance of international character. Of these 'neutral / non-intervention' is the basic principle of PKO, and in order to secure this object, the UN is conditioned on obtaining agreement prior to the dispatch of PKO personnel from the parties to the conflict or the parties concerned. 'Non-compulsion' means that actions corresponding to military actions are not performed as compulsory actions in the Chapter 7 of UN Charter.

'Maintaining international character' in principle can ensure fairness by actively participating in small and medium countries as activities

representing the international community without involving permanent members. PKO personnel act according to the direction of the UN. In recent years with the shortage of personnel due to the rapid increase in PKO, there are also participation in the PKO of the US, Russia and the PRC.

From the cease-fire watch, which is the 'first-generation of PKO' of the military force separation type, are focused on gradually the election monitoring, the human rights situation monitoring, the administrative supervision, the recovery assistance, the ethnic minority protection, and the humanitarian aid etc. It has developed into the 'second generation of PKO'. Somalia's second UN Somalia Activities II (UNSOM II), which took over the mission of the multinational forces, was authorized to use force in self-defense for the first time in PKO history. In 1992 UNSOM II was not a peace enforcement unit proposed as 'agenda for peace'<sup>(2)</sup> by Secretary-General of the UN Ghali, but it is located to be understood between the PKO and the peace enforcement unit. He defined it as 'expanded PKO' under the 7th Chapter of the UN Charter, but this caused some PKOs to become the 'third generation of PKO' different from the conventional one. However there is objection to this idea.

Since the end of Cold War there are an increasing number of countries we are thinking about their own security, mainly by the UN. The US does not want to give command to the UN. The US does not want to be involved in conflicts that do not meet national interests. This is possible because it is the US. However countries other than the US are forced to consider their country's security according to the activities of UN.

## (3) In case of Japan

In 1992 the 'UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act' was enacted. The Act prepares for the appropriate and prompt cooperation with three activities on ①the UN peacekeeping operations, ②humanitarian international relief activities, and ③election in the interested nation on international monitoring activities, of which is aimed for more actively contributing to international peace. In addition the basic policy on the implementation of international peacekeeping activities, the so-called five principles of participation was stipulated.

For the PKF main task by the SDF, it was 'frozen' without separately implementing it until enacted in law. However, on the other hand, the SDF has been dispatching for the rear support activities of the peacekeeping force (medical, transportation, communication, construction etc.). The amendment of the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act in February 2001 lifted restrictions on troop participation in the main activity of peacekeeping forces that was initially 'frozen'.

## Five principles taking part in PKO

- ① Establishment of a ceasefire agreement
- ② Consent of the parties to the conflict to Japan participation
- ③ Strict observance of neutral position
- ④ Withdraw if the above is not satisfied
- ⑤ Use of weapons is limited to the minimum necessary for life protection

In Japan in June 1992, by the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act the SDF personnel was dispatched to Cambodia and Mozambique, the campaign monitoring personnel to Angola and El Salvador, the

civilian police officer to Cambodia, and the SDF personnel to Rwanda as international activities for humanitarian aid. Although Japanese people grow understanding about the participation of logistic support and the dispatch of SDF personnel for humanitarian purposes, when the main activity of PKF is given approval, we have to face questions on conflict with Constitution and its constitutionality [cf. Tanaka, 2005: ch.6].

### 3 Lessons from PKO in Cambodia

#### (1) Dispatching to Cambodia

In January 1991 the Paris peace agreement were concluded that the parties put an end to the Cambodian civil war [cf. Parsons, 1995: ch.12]. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established. The largest peacekeeping operation in history of about 24,000 people in 34 countries was developed in Cambodia after the end of civil war. The UNTAC set up a headquarters in Phnom Penh, and started activities. Under the military department's highest commander, 16,000 people in 12 sectors and fields including engineers, telecommunications soldiers, medical soldiers from Asia, Europe, Africa and South America were in action.

In October 1992 the SDF personnel arrived in Cambodia for logistic support. The SDF handled the role to repair the national highway No. 2 and No. 3 line. The SDF received a request for fuel and water supply from the French troops that oversaw the disarmament of the area. The UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Act, which was passed in 1992, restricted the use of force and refused its request. The UNTAC Headquarters requested the Japanese government to respond immediately when it hindered work in the field. However it was two months after the Cabinet

decision decided to be able to supply fuel.

The 'Standard Operation Prescription (SOP)' is a local action manual common to 34 countries participating. It regulates joint training, correspondence in case of emergency, use of weapons, etc. so that they can act with one command. The actual situation on the Japanese side did not necessarily agree with the manual. In the case of Cambodia, the SDF's operation permitted by the UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Act was only for logistic support, and it was planned not to conduct main activity (PKF). In fact, however, as the situation drew on the general election after the end of the civil war, the SDF began to be forced to change the originally scheduled PKO operations.

## (2) Deviation from the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act

In January 1993 the Peace Conference of Cambodia was held in Beijing. The Cambodia's highest National Council President Sihanouk appealed the Pol Pot to participate in the general election. The Pol Pot faction rejected it, and obstructed the general election. In order to prevent the disturbance, the UNTAC returned a weapon once taken up as a special case to groups other than the Pol Pot faction, and allowed a counterattack. If the UNTAC personnel are within the range of self-defense, use of weapons was permitted.

The SDF personnel also differed from the original assignment. With the addition of a duty to carry the ballot, the Japanese government decided that the mission concerning the general election is within the scope of 'transportation task'. 41 volunteers from Japan participated as monitoring staff of the general election. If the SDF guards staff, that service aroused problems that deviate from the scope of the UN Peacekeeping Activity

Cooperation Act. The Japanese government dealt with this as 'medical support'. The SDF personnel assigned to patrol duty around the polling place. This was interpreted as information collection on 'maintenance and repair of road'. Stated in different fashion, the circumstances changed greatly with prediction before dispatch.

As the general election approaches, civilian personnel were dispatched to monitor elections. It came from Japan that the SDF should protect Japanese personnel. The SDF inevitably became involved in the contents of the main activity which 'froze' in fact gradually. It is also involved in operations that are not prescribed by the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act (i.e. security around the civilian personnel). The patrol was accepted an expanded way as a fait accompli, including reconnaissance about road, information gathering, and staff guards including drop-by to polling stations.

A rocket was driven into the civilian police lodgings in Siem Reap State on January 12, 1993. Two Cambodian women hired for general election staff died. In March Bangladesh soldiers and in April Bulgarian soldiers, and the Japanese volunteer of UN became victimized in Kontpom province. In May casualties also came out to Japanese civilian police officers and Chinese soldiers. Together with civilians and soldiers, the total number of victims was <sup>(4)</sup>55.

### (3) Remaining Agendas

From the experience of dispatching Cambodia there is a gap with the reality how to think PKO in Japan. There was also a gap between the planned duties of the SDF and the mission in the face of the general election, and some citizens recognized that there was a difference in the

operation of the law and the situation in Cambodian reality. However the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act was not subsequently reconsidered, after which it was decided to send SDF personnel to Golan Heights. The PKO in Cambodia left four agendas.

Firstly the top command of the UN PKO is in principle the UN Secretary-General, whose nominated commander is in the field command and executes it. Under the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act of Japan, the UN Secretary General has the command of PKO activities. However the command of SDF was added as the Prime Minister of Japan instructed. The SDF on site will be under the command of both the UN and the Japanese government.

Secondly those who interfere with UN peacekeeping operations/missions are permitted to use weapons. However, in Japan, the Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act stipulates the use of weapons when the individual members are harmed due to constitutional problems. In that respect we can recognize there are separate criteria.

Thirdly it is whether Japan's external attitude is just carried out similar manner of the Cold War era or not, and whether economic is support alone enough or not.

Fourthly the 'freezing operations' in PKO are concretely disarmament, weapons recovery, patrols.

In the Act the main activities (PKO) in the "frozen state", but in the case of Cambodia there were cases sometimes executed 'without debate'.

Table 2-2: PKO dispatching to Cambodia (November 1992 at the present moment)

Country	Number of dispatched personnel	Main task
1 Indonesia	1752	infantry

2 France	1391	infantry, army engineer, aviation duty
3 India	1367	infantry, medical treatment
4 Pakistan	1160	infantry, logistic support
5 Uruguay	982	infantry
6 Bangladesh	930	infantry
7 Malaysia	911	infantry
8 Ghana	903	infantry
9 Tunisia	885	infantry
10 Netherlands	857	infantry
11 Bulgaria	747	infantry
12 Thailand	720	army engineer
13 Poland	689	army engineer, logistic support
14 Japan	608	army engineer (facility unit)
15 Australia	499	communication task

Table 2-3: Activities in PKO and PKF in Cambodia

International cooperation activity	main task service
	1 . monitoring of compliance with suspension of armed conflict
	2 . stationing and patrolling in glacis
	3 . confirming and inspecting, and taking out or carrying in of weapons
	4 . retrieval task, safekeeping and searching of abandoned weapons
	5 . facilities management in setting up perimeter such as ceasefire lines
	6 . operation for replacement of prisoners of war
	logistic support service
	1 . medical service
	2 . transportation, communication, construction etc.
	civilian task service
	1 . monitoring and management of elections
	2 . advice, command and monitoring on police administrative affairs
	3 . advice and command on administrative affairs
	humanitarian international activities

(4) After PKO in Cambodia

In January 1996 the Japanese government sent 16 personals of the SDF to the PKO units to the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) which monitors the ceasefire of the Syrian Army and the Israeli army in

the Golan Heights. The UNDOF has the longest history in the PKO of UN. After the ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights, 'disengagement observer zone' was set up in 1974. There were 47 monitoring posts, in which soldiers from both Poland and Austria continued to monitor. Dispatched units are responsible for transporting food and fuel from Israel, Syria, Lebanon ports and airports across the detachment zone. In the PKO of Golan Heights the SDF delegation had to belong to organization and operations in senior member. Unlike the PKO in Cambodia, which the SDF independently organized for troops, it was incorporated as a part of Canadian troops.

The UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act froze the SDF's engaging in effort to in the missions of PKF. The ceasefire monitoring, which is the main task of UNDOF, is PKF itself. The SDF cannot operate with the PKF as a regular operation to construct roads in the area where troops disengage, while transportation of weapons and other troops is not accepted as 'normal task' to distinguish it from PKF. However it remained ambiguous distinction.

In October 1995 the Agency of Defense made a draft plan for revising the Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act, and pointed out that 'the standards are vague and virtually difficult' for the use of weapons, which was foreseen to be limited to justify individual defense of the SDF personnel. The Agency of Defense made joint exercises substantial reasons for 'self-defense'. Dispatch of SDF to PKO has many contradictions.

In 1992 the PKO Act was enacted for the purpose of the UN peacekeeping operations. Thereafter various PKO activities were carried out. The UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act imposed the premise in

the field that will be 'frozen' for the time being in the activities of the SDF as a dispatching unit. The fifth of 'Five Principles of PKO' was revised.

The revised part of the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act is an article concerning the use of weapons. Until then personal weapons use (the Article 24) was based on individual judgment. The SDF officers can use weapons unavoidably for the defense against life-threatening emergency. As a result of examining the relationship with the use of armed might prohibited by Constitution, it was thought that it would not use weapons as a unit although it was the minimum necessary for individual judgment. In the proposed amendment, the superior official's order was changed to be in principle. From experience in the case of Cambodia, leaving judgment to individuals may cause confusion. When acting as a group, there is a ground for self-defense, so that is not applicable to the use of armed might. When there is a superior officer at the scene, he (or she) must obey the orders of the superior official. In case of his (or her) absence, judgment by individuals is applicable. The order of restraint is also stipulated.<sup>(5)</sup>

#### 4 Changing response to Japan's international contribution and security after multiple acts of terroir

##### (1) Two points of views on multiple acts of terrorisms

The 'retaliation war' by the US against the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks rocked the international order based on the ban on war agreed by the international community after the Second World War. 'The nation denies the right to engage in war, resolving disputes by means of peace such as negotiation, intervention, and mediation', the trial has been demanded. However the UN has also adopted to adopt collective security

and non-military measures, in order to hold a tight rein on countries that are planning an illegal invasion war.

The collective security system has not work well during the Cold War era. Therefore, in case of receiving an armed strike from the other party, the authorized self-defense right has been executed tentatively. However since exercising force threatens the principle of banning war, strict conditions are imposed on the exercise of self-defense rights. There are two forms of the 'New World Order' in the 21st century.

In the case of one form is punishment with exercise of force under the 'interest' of 'right of self-defense' to international criminals ('rogue states', terrorists, and dictators) nominated by superpowers. This is the exercise of the 'right of self-defense' centered on the powers. It assumes internationalization and globalization of American values; 'Logic of Power'.

In the other form, armament reduction is the means to self-defend people's lives, wealth and lives beyond the nation-state. Rather than the exercise of 'right to self-defense', for example, the UN is required to build a collective security system, and promote international order by disarmament. The UN can be made to function as a permanent institution that brings together the respective actors. Since there is no panacea as countermeasure, it is essential to punish criminals while determining the exact cause of so-called 'terrorism'. A comprehensive international collaboration system for prevention, suppression and punishment of terrorism must be consolidated.

In fact in the military action against Afghanistan, President Bush exercised the right of self-defense, Secretary-General Annan and Chairman of the Security Council justified the exercise of its 'right of self-defense' in order to eradicate terrorism. This judgment may be either

abuse of self-defense rights or conversion of self-defense rights. 'New type of war' cannot be explained by the concept of the right of self-defense so far.

(2) Japanese government's actions to the 11 September terrorist attacks  
Since the end of Cold War, there are qualitative and quantitative transformations of Japan's contribution to the international community. It directed toward a purpose shifting from international coping with regional conflict to international contribution in a way that is better suited for the Japan-US alliance. From the end of Cold War it may be a response to the result that the international politics of the post-Cold War era through the multiple acts of terrorisms changed significantly. Although it was said that it does not conflict with the constitutional rule only by 'not using force', this policy became a turning point of Japan's security.

The US seeks to exercise the right of collective self-defense that the SDF will take part in combat action with the US military if the US is attacked. However the Japanese government's military cooperation with the US has been restricted to logistic support, and it has drawn a sharp line with the right of collective self-defense. Therefore the Japanese government explained that its interpretation does not make an inconsistent way with Constitution.

On October 2001, 29 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) was passed in the both Diets. It is a legal basis for dispatching SDF overseas during Afghanistan War. The Act aims to strengthen the activities of the SDF as follows: ①logistic support of the US military (transportation of goods including weapons and ammunition, refueling of

supplies, medical care at field hospitals, etc.), ②search and rescue activities of the US military soldiers who were distressed, ③activities to the relief of victims. It is the problem that how the relationship discriminate between activities of the SDF and the use of force. The Japanese government understands that its activities are not integrated if they move away from 'battle zone'.

The SDF's international cooperation under the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act enacted in 1992 is within the framework of the UN peacekeeping operations. It is based on the Surrounding Circumstance Law (Emergency-at-Periphery Law) established in 1999. Logistic support for the US military was regarded as the scope of Japan's self-defense rights. Both Act and Law has a framework to judge the activities of the SDF in addition to the principle of non-armed force. The ATSMML has described abstractly only as an activity collaborating actively on international efforts against the destruction by international terrorist organizations. Actually that is support activity for the US military. The US acts thinking about the global strategy. As a result Japan is dragged by the US military action. How can Japan respond if the US military action expands?

In June 2003 the Japanese government passed the bill for the ACT on Special Measures for Iraq Reconstruction Assistance (ASMIRA): ① support activities of humanitarian and reconstruction, and medicine and living goods to Iraqi citizens, ②activity such as medical treatment, transportation and supply such as securing domestic stability in Iraq. That is a logistic support for security maintenance activities conducted by the US military.

In terms of logistic and backward support during battle, the ATSMML is

restricted to non-war zone on the high seas. In the ATSMML the ships replenished fuel to warships of multinational forces in the Indian Ocean. In the ASTIRA the distinction between war zone and non-combat areas was vague in fact. Although the international community agrees the 'War on Terrorism' in Afghanistan, the UN Security Council granted retrospective approval to support reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of the war in which many countries opposed the War on Iraq.

Under the Koizumi government the dispatch of SDF overseas has set up a step by step timetable as a matter of practice. In the War on Afghanistan the ATSMML expanded to backward support for foreign troops in battle overseas. The ASMIRA gave approval to dispatch without the consent of Iraq, and there is a common recognition between the US and Japan governments. It is created a *fait accompli* that only the SDF overseas dispatch is putting more emphasis on.

### (3) Argument on the New Terrorism Countermeasures Law

October 2007 The Japanese government introduced into the Diets a bill (Special Measures Law about Supply Support Activity for the Counterterrorism Sea Check Activity: so-called New Antiterrorism Special Measures Law) to new anti-terror measures bill to resume fueling activities by the JMSDF in the Indian Ocean, which would expire on January 2008. The government limited its activities on the New Antiterrorism Special Measures Law rather than the ATSMML so far: ① the limit of activities to refueling and water supply only, excluding search and rescue activities against foreign troops, ②the deadline of the law repeats extension within one year if necessary, and ③the government will report to the both Diets when deciding a concrete implementation

plan, but it does not include approval of the Diets in advance or after the beginning of the dispatch. Because the government and ruling parties have set the deadline for the law to one year, the government explains that the Diets will be committed every extension.

What was the situation in the northern Indian Ocean? The three regions of Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa are all territories of international terrorist organizations, and terrorists move through the Arabian Sea between these three regions. A tanker carrying oil flows through this area. For Japan it is a key point of the sea shipping lane. The opposition parties in Japan accuse the 'War on Terrorism' in fact the US is leading to military operations in Iraq.

Each country organizes and acts multinational marine forces into three units at sea. One of them is deployed in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and is responsible for so-called maritime blocking activities, such as on-site inspections on suspicious ships. The mission of the JMSDF is refueling of vessels of each country taking part in this unit.

The military operations in Afghanistan have been exercised by the US exercising military actions that received multiple terrorist attacks, and putting into operation with the collective self-defense rights imposed by NATO. When a new administration was set up in Afghanistan, further developed by the NATO army and the UN Security Council supports it, in Afghanistan the 'counter-terrorism countermeasure' of the US has come to the character of the 'War on Terrorism' even more. And maritime blocking activities and indicting are considered as a part of that activity.

As in January 2007, the ATSMML against terrorism has expired, and the JMSDF cannot refuel in the Indian Ocean. 75 countries participate in a

variety of forms to support security and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council has also adopted a number of times the use of force to self-defend to NATO forces that operate locally, and now the activities that each country operates in Afghanistan are internationally approved as 'War on Terrorism'. This point is different from that in Iraq. Therefore, whatever coming into being the domestic change of circumstances, from the viewpoint of international contribution, if the SDF temporarily stops refueling activities, the impression that Japanese government has kept the SDF out of action in 'War on Terrorism'.

Japanese government explained that the Constitutional problem did not arise because the government does not become integrated force by foreign troops, that is, non-militant support on the sea. However it has been pointed out that there is no guidance as to whether or not to work with coalition to the joint arm counterattack by foreign troops and overseas dispatch of SDF. Supposed the current security policy of Japan, it is not likely to be easy to define because of the Japan-US security system.

It is said that when Western countries dispatch troops abroad, they usually make a judgmental decision in three conditions comprehensively: ①Whether there are national interests to move into action (i.e. security regime, economic interests, humanitarian intention and so on)? ②How risky is the strategy (for example personnel, money and so on)? ③What does the international community point to a trend (i.e. resolution of the UN Security Council)? Among them the most important condition for each country is national interest, and then the degree of risk is taken into account. They decide whether to deploy troops to foreign countries under

the two conditions of ①national interest and ②risk. If possible, they receive an endorsement from the UN. Put another way, the UN Security Council shall be a means to justify its own activities.

In the case of Japan firstly Japanese government and people would like to secure support from the UN Security Council Resolution. Rather than using it as a means of justification like Western countries, Japan tends to decide the policy based on whether or not a resolution already exists. However it is an important criterion of judgment whether it corresponds to the national interest of Japan or whether the dispatched SDF personnel are involved in major cause of the conflict.

Table 2-4: Current Law of the SDF overseas Dispatch

year	law/act	content/object	condition	purpose
1992	UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act	UN peacekeeping cooperation	state of ceasefire	UN peacekeeping
1999	Surrounding Circumstances Law (Emergency-at-Periphery Law)	logistic support to the US military	Non-battle zone on the high shipping seas	Strengthening Japan-US security system
2001	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML)	logistic assistance to the US Army	Non-battle Zones on the high shipping sea	US/International Cooperation
2003	Act on Special Measures for Iraq Reconstruction Assistance (ASMIRA)	logistic assistance to US Army etc.	Non-battle zone in Iraq	Cooperation with the US
2008	Special Measures Law about the enforcement of the Supply Support Activity for the Counterterrorism Sea Check Activity	logistic support including provision of heavy oil	non-combat regions on high seas	multinational war-ships such as the US military such as the US

	(New Antiterrorism Special Measure Law)			
2009	Law about coping to Punishment of Piracy and Piracy (Law about coping to Piracy)	Piracy Counter-measures with Multinational Forces off Somalia Maritime Security Action	Non-combat zone on the high shipping sea	International Cooperation

### (3) The New Antiterrorism Special Measure Law in draft

In January 2008 the draft of the Special Measures Law about the Enforcement of the Supply Support Activity for the Counterterrorism Sea Check Activity (so-called the New Antiterrorism Special Measure Law) was gotten through by the ruling parties', but the situation in Afghanistan and the international community changed during this period. In the 'War on Terrorism' the main battlefield has moved from Iraq to Afghanistan. The US military gradually drew off from Iraq and strengthened troops in Afghanistan. The international community was feeling a sense of crisis in Afghanistan. How can Japan contribute to the 'War on Terrorism' as a member of the international community?

The international community intensifies involvement in both security and reconstruction assistance as Afghanistan leaves the 'failed state'. For example at the July 2008 the Doyako Summit, the leaders of the member countries emphasized the importance of supporting Afghanistan. Many victims came out to troops in the field in public order, public opinion strongly disapprove of the idea of dispatching in the Western countries, but at the NATO summit meeting in April they agreed with the need for expanding multinational troops. Even with reconstruction assistance, the Paris Summit Meeting of the Assistance Country was held in June, and

the Summit participating countries announced about 2 trillion yen of support for the reconstruction and development in the next five years.

In Afghanistan various military operations such as the US-led 'Taliban sweeping operation' has been carried out. However the strategy is not very successful. The reason for this is that after the US collapsed the Taliban regime in 2001, it focused on attacking Iraq on the way without completely purging the Taliban. Meanwhile the Taliban revived in Afghanistan. Taliban forces have increased in Pakistan's border areas and are cross - border attacks in Afghanistan territory.

The US called for a burden on Japan for 'War on Terrorism'. From February to July in 2008 fuel and water equivalent to 8.3 hundreds of millions yen was provided to the ship of the seven countries free of charge. The US seeks to support on land other than continuing refueling activities. It is this logic of the US that makes a thorough effort to Japan of the collective self-defense of the Japan-US alliance.

It is difficult for the SDF and civilians to supply manpower on land. As it was dangerous in operating on land because of the many difficulties Japan had, Japan did refueling activities or stopping all the duties. On the other hand Japan's contribution to 'War on Terrorism' is strongly required. Japan made international pledges to continue refueling activities. It came closer to 'contribution and cooperation to the US' further to Japan, asserting to take measures to 'peace of the world'. However in the end, as public opinion was divided, such as the way of international contribution, the adequacy of the dispatch of SDF, the logistic support to the US military, it is not persuasive even if it explains to protect the sea shipping lane, national interests or humanitarian assistance on land.

At that time the Afghanistan problem became a major theme of the US presidential election, and the US emphasized refueling activities as a symbol of alliance. Japan should make its own judgment on how to do refueling activities and other contributions, but with the expiration in 2010 of the New Antiterrorism Special Measure Law, the refueling activity in the Indian Ocean ended. While showing Japan's policy of continuing support in both in security with the US and reconstruction for Afghanistan, Japan had to consider how to make international contributions in conjunction with future Japan's security policy.

#### (4) Issue on of Maritime Security Action

In March 1999 the Japanese government issued a maritime security action to dispatch escort ships to counter piracy off Somalia. The government submitted a countermeasure (in draft) against piracy to the both Diets to counter piracy. The main duty is to escort the pirates so that pirates do not approach the ships relating with the Japanese. It includes shipping vessels that carry ships and Japan-related cargos, even if it is not a Japanese flag. Each four coast guards got on board two escort ships and fulfill the duties of a judicial police officer when a scene such as arresting a pirate arrives.

This area passes through the Suez Canal and is a key hub of the sea connecting Asia and Europe, with more than 20,000 vessels sailing a year. Pirates appear and surround the Gulf of Aden on the coast of Somalia. Approximately 160,000 of these vessels are related to Japan. A total of 11 cases of piracy incidents occurred in 2008, 42 vessels were hijacked, and more than 800 became hostages.

Rampant pirates were caused by Somalia's 'anarchic state'. Since in

1991 intense civil war has spread all over Somalia, there is no central government. Armed groups and poor fishermen are becoming pirates to earn money quickly. They arms with automatic rifle and rocket cannon, and hit cargo ship and tanker with satellite phone and GPS. Piracy is, so to speak, 'businesses'.

The UN Security Council has adopted several resolutions. Responding to each country, a resolution calling for dispatching warships to the high seas off Somalia, a resolution to gain control of pirates within the territorial waters of Somalia, and a resolution to allow attacks on ground pirate bases. In response to this, the US, European countries, Russia, India, the PRC, etc. dispatch battleships, but they have individually escorted and patrolled, and have not been able to keep in close contact with each other. Also due to consideration for the hostage of humanity and fear of being involved in battle, every country is cautious about attack. In order to take measures against piracy across the entire sea area, cooperation with dispatching units in each country is just a supportive measure.

As a countermeasure against piracy required by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, bills of the Law about coping to Punishment of Piracy and Piracy was submitted to the both Diets in order to protect the safety of all vessels as well as Japan-related them. The main points of bill are: ① the mission of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) where the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism is in charge of coping with pirates unilaterally, ②if it is necessary in the special case, the SDF units can be dispatched anti-piracy actions. ③The use of weapons can be made in case of stopping the pirate ship in addition to legitimate defense and emergency evacuation. However the Japan Coast Guard had only one

large patrol vessel, so the current situation that we had to rely on the JMSDF is likely to make a sham of the bill.

The peacekeeping operations of the UN in Somalia have experienced frustration once in the 1990s. The piracy problem learns a lesson the hard way that neglected 'anarchic state'. The top priority is to restore law and order to Somalia and emphasize anti-poverty measures.

#### (5) Sign of Change in the security system in the Asia-Pacific Region

In the Asia-Pacific region the rise of the PRC is causing changes in the security environment of the region. The Japanese government is seeking (defense) cooperation not only with the Japan-US alliance but also with Australia, the alliance of the US. Australia faces both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and it is located in a geopolitical significance that it is close to the South China Sea. As part of the 'rebalancing policy' focusing on Asia, the US will increase the troops of the US forces deployed in Australia, and Australia will respond to it.

The reason for emphasizing the Asia-Pacific region is due to the existence of a sea shipping lane (maritime traffic passage) passing through the South China Sea from the Middle East via the Indian Ocean. About two-thirds of the world's sea transport is carried on this route. But now in addition to the military rise of the PRC and the entry into the ocean, there is growing concern that the situation of region will become unstable due to the decline of influence of the US. Increased defense spending in the PRC has reduced the difference in US military power in Asia. Also in the South China Sea, the PRC and other countries concerned have repeated conflicts over the territorial rights of the region (e.g. the Spratly Islands).

In addition the PRC has made a great entrance into the Indian Ocean. Based on common known as the strategy of 'pearl necklace', the PRC<sup>(6)</sup> secured a number of ports along sea shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, and expanded the scope of activities of the PRC navy under the premise of anti-piracy measures off Somalia.

Under this circumstance Australia shows a posture of defense cooperation with Japan. While the US drastically reduces defense spending, it tries to share its cost to allies. Up to now the two alliance relationships the Japan-US security and the US-Australia security have functioned separately, but the connection between the allies of the US makes possible the possibility of the framework of 'trilateral cooperation' among Japan, the US, and Australia.

Strengthening the relationship between Japan and the US, there is a possibility that the SDF may be required to play more role than ever in dispatching for warning and surveillant activity in the South China Sea. To what extent is appropriate for considering Japan's international contribution policy and security policy?<sup>(7)</sup>

## 5 Perspective from new theory in balance of power

I would like to analyze Japan around the current international politics using the balance of powers. Here we will apply hard balance of powers and soft balance of powers to the situation (hereinafter called 'hard balancing' and 'soft balancing'; see Appendix in details) [cf. Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, 2004].

'Hard balancing' is a strategy related to intense competition among countries. Therefore the countries must keep the military capability up to date. In counteract with the rival and hostile country, a country enters in

an official alliance with a third country. This is a classical concept of power balance common to the realists and the neo-realists. This approach is to equilibrate with a powerful military power and to openly manage and operate military alliances with countries that increase power and threats. A powerful arming plan is a way to achieve power balance. 'Hard balancing' is a costly, risky and uneasy strategy.

While on the other hand 'soft balancing' is a contemporary model in the power balance theory that maintains relationships with flexible correspondence without concluding formal alliance. For example it is assumed that a form of 'coalition of willingness' in which each country gathers for each international problem. This is approved when developing security policy on temporary, limited and flexible policies. A country needs a balance to counteract threatening actors and the growing country if they feel uneasy. 'Soft balancing' is based on the institutions and circumstances of the global and regional units, while strengthening a certain level of armedness, special national agreements and practices, and cooperative relations. Foreign policy will be temporarily switched to 'hard balancing' tactics if the security competition becomes intense and the nation becomes a threat. 'Soft balancing' forms a coalition that does not aim for military attacks in order to neutralize the threatening country and its allies, and attempts to cope with threatening existence with that way. For example Russia, France, and Germany temporarily collaborated in order to prevent the one-pole leadership of the US during the war in Iraq.

Japan has formed an alliance with the US, and will maintain its power in opposition to the PRC. However although this measure could maintain a certain, good relationship with the US, it is unknown whether the

relationship can last long. Put another way, we assume that the US is a superpower at all times in this way of thinking. Japan has been requested to upgrade its role as an alliance partner with the US since the 1990s. That's not just a matter of equal opportunity. In practice it is also attributable to the fact that the national power of US, and the evaluation from the international community are declining. Japan's stick to the security system with the US is also related to the sense of insecurity about the security of its own country (i.e. crisis in the Korean Peninsula), and the trust from the international community (i.e. request to enter the permanent member of the UN). Then Japan is increasingly trying to rely on an intimate alliance with the US. That means that in the Asia-Pacific, Japan, the US and Australia, bearing in mind the PRC, the trend towards an alliance of 'hard balancing' has been consolidated, and the attitude of confrontation with the PRC will become increasingly clear. In particular the US may choose the direction of 'soft balancing' rather than its own fiscal situation, but Japan is dependent only on the US, and due to the request for cooperation from the US and the conflict with neighboring countries, There is a fear that only the selection of that framework can be adopted.<sup>(8)</sup>

In May 2001 the PRC set up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Russia and the four Central Asian countries bordered by Afghanistan. The PRC and Russia have concluded a treaty of good-neighborliness friendship and cooperation between the both countries. This event is to counter the US and its allies. Although this trend is still partial, or in global terms in some way, it has the potential to head towards 'hard balancing' formation.

Bien entendu 'soft balancing' is temporary and can only be applied to

specific occasion. However it is possible to be a useful guideline when considering the behavior of the country in the international politics in the 21st century and the ‘asymmetric warfare’ in the classical power equilibrium theory, ‘hard balancing’. Given that, ‘soft balancing’ does not focus on military elements like ‘hard balancing’. For example we can consider the balance of power, including institutional and non-military means of global size and regional units, using social aspects of international systems such as international law, mediation, reconciliation, arbitration, diplomacy and so on. Japan may continue to improve its relationship with hegemon countries (i.e. the US, the PRC, and Russia), and use the various measures to realize ‘soft balancing’ policy more specifically.

## Conclusion

After the Cold War there are uneasy elements that shake international politics. There exit three factors that further reinforce instability in uncertainty.

The first is regional conflict involving within and without countries belonging to the former USSR. Russian leaders develop foreign policy mainly about their economic development and security. For example in Russia domestically, people are integrated through using repressive force on the people’s ‘common enemies’ (i.e. the Chechen ‘terrorists’, the Taliban, and the Islamic State). Regarding overseas, Russian leaders continue to tug-of-war with between countries due to security problem in Ukraine. Russia exerts an influence on the former USSR member countries, especially among the ‘failed country’<sup>(9)</sup> and ‘non-approved country’<sup>(10)</sup>.

The second is Central and Southwest Asia where active Islamic armed fundamentalist groups are active. Countries in the region and international terrorist organizations can serve as the base of terrorism. Its power not only expresses dissatisfaction with the present world order but also actively uses violent means to destroy it.

The third is recent trends of the PRC. The PRC still have troubles, concerning the issue of human rights, ethnic problems, economic gaps in domestic cases, and seeks change of the order so far in Taiwan issue, great power politics, and securing energy externally. That causes new conflict.

The 21st century leads to an era of multi-powers and multiple great countries. For the foreseeable future, the world will experience 'turbulent times'. It was aroused that complex relationship involving more than a few countries in one diplomacy or military incident. Conflict, incident, confrontation and so on occur in each time. That means we have to make a 'coalition of willingness' according to circumstances. The US, European countries, Russia, the PRC, Japan and Islamic countries are in different civilizations, which could lead to 'clash of civilization' Huntington insists.

In addition to not only reducing national defense expenses, each country must dispatch their own troops to various places and deal with conflict well. West developed countries should engage regional conflicts in future if they want to maintain established interests acquired in the second half of the 20th century. How we can deal with the various problems of 'New World Order' will determine whether the future world order can be stabilized or not [cf. Slaughter, 2004; cf. Hurrell, 2007].

Since the multiple acts of terror attacks, the framework of the international community once again changed, and it became an

opportunity to create a new international cooperation system. Even after the post-Cold War, the power games have not wended to a conclusion after the Cold War, and it appears to be more complicated. Among them, a stable international cooperation system is unlikely to be formed easily. However it is necessary to make a rule if each country abandons its power games to pursue their respective national interests. For example while utilizing international organizations such as the UN, while planning 'soft balancing' policies, it is also a policy to explore ways of international cooperation in accordance with their domestic circumstances.

The power games in international politics is not said to have been over the international relation with the end of the Cold War in a way, and it has become more complicated. Among them a stable international cooperation system is unlikely to be formed. However if countries develop power games that pursue their national interests, for example, exploit international cooperation and contributions that are based on Japan's security situation in both at home and abroad while utilizing international organizations (i.e. the UN) [cf. Calder, 1996: ch.2, 4, 6, 7].

The international community is striving to prevent and control international terrorism. It is the promotion of international cooperation by preparing and concluding various treaties, examining countermeasures at the summit of each country, and encouraging international public opinion. However the US has put into its own practice and measures against terrorism. They are economic sanctions against terrorism supporting countries, or military attacks on terrorist organizations. In any case it is impossible to completely prevent or eradicate terrorism. It is understandable that countermeasures against terrorism must be addressed internationally, but coping with it is not uniform. There is a

point that Japan must consider how to tackle in the era of the order-building of the post-Cold War and securing a foothold in expansion of the international role.

The Cold War ended in 1989, but in international politics, regional conflicts occur frequently. The Gulf War broke out in 1991. This was the first opportunity to explore international contributions to the international community for the first time after the Cold War. Japan has also joined the UN PKO. In 1992 the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act came into effect, enabling PKO participation in Cambodia. However while the dispatch of SDF overseas is possible, it was frozen that main activities in PKF such as 'ceasefire monitoring' and 'disarming weapons' which may be involved in military actions. The 'Five Principles of PKO' is imposed that restricts participation from constitutional interpretation and domestic political atmosphere. Based on the Japan-US Security Treaty from the Cold War era, Japan has given priority to own security and international contributions on the basis of Japan-US cooperation after the Cold War. In particular after the Cold War, in addition to the conventional policy, in the 1990s the level of Japan-US security cooperation has been further increased from Japan's own defense to overseas peacekeeping operations. From the viewpoint of strengthening the Japan-US security system further, we have to be able to see the political situation taken a new turn concerning anti-terrorism special law and so on.

The Declaration of Japan-US Joint Security in 1996 relates not only to Japan's security and peace but also to the content of those in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the purpose of re-examining defense cooperation between Japan and the US. Talk between Japan and the US on

strengthening Japan-US military alliance after the Cold War has not clearly pointed out the issue of safety and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather it begins to discuss the character and scope of defense cooperation. Due to the lack of talk on this point, when differences in perception between Japan and the US face real problems, there is a difference in correspondence between Japan and the US. The US seeks 'becoming a reality' of collective self-defense rights. As a result of 'remaining untouched' about that argument, only established facts precede, and both countries have left unattended how international politics in the 21st century should be taken aim.

### Part 3 International politics transforming after the Cold War and Japanese security policy

#### 1 Japan-US relationship on the introduction of TMD

##### (1) What is TMD?

The global strategy of PRC is trying to take the position of hegemon country as international relations with the idea of era in the Cold War like balance of power even after the end of it; ①following the collapse of the USSR, strengthening self-confidence with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), ②providing opposing force to the US by utilizing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ③adjusting the relationship of forces by geopolitical balance, ④recognizing that maintains the balance of power in the international community and located at the center of it [cf. The National Institute for Defense Studies, 1999, 2010, 2013; cf. Green & Gill, 2009]. The issues of Japanese diplomacy are the following factors.

- ①Adjustment of nationalism (especially the Korean Peninsula, the PRC, and Russia, etc.)
- ②Inventive idea of regional peace and stability
- ③Establishment of international security organization (multilateral confidence building measures, not between two countries)
- ④Self-control of power (pursuit of international security while self-regulating)
- ⑤Moral perspective (achievement of value levels of peace, human rights, and democratization)
- ⑥'War on Terrorism'

The efforts of these tasks define policies for Japanese diplomacy. Japan

may actively commit to a multilateral international organization (i.e. the UN) [cf. Togo, 2006]. Needless to add the reality is not always the way it is.

Since the 1980s the TMD is a major project that the US worked on. Three hundred companies in the US participate, and the Lockheed will reign at the top. It is responsible for the development of THAAD, the main weapon of TMD. THAAD is a weapon that has further improved its performance to intercept the former the USSR's long-range missiles.

What background did the TMD concept develop and developed? The US is aiming for all countries to become members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and to manage nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. During the Cold War the ballistic missiles exported by the US and the USSR spread to countries in the Third World, and since 1990 the nuclear missile holding countries have been in 29 countries, and ballistic missiles pose a threat to neighboring countries. For example the DPRK's Nodong, the PRC's CSS, and Iraq's Scud etc. are ballistic missiles developed based on the technology of the former the USSR. The ROK, Taiwan (the ROC), and Israel missiles diverted the US technology. The US rushed to develop a missile defense network on the assumption that mass murder weapons such as nuclear, biological, and chemical will be installed in these missiles.

The TMD is an air defense system that deals with various ballistic missile attacks ranging from 80 km to 3000 km fired by other countries. Interceptor missiles shoot down attack missiles from other countries in space, high-rise areas, and low-rise areas. The ERINT missiles responsible for the low-rise zone intercept at a height of 17 km. The LEAP missiles on Aegis equipped with high-performance radar are launched from the sea near the enemy. When it senses the firing of the other missile, it is

launched into outer space of 400 kilometers altitude, where it separates the interceptor body and intercepts the heat of the opponent's missile. The THAAD's defense range is a high-rise area of 150 kilometers altitude, and the THAAD automatically measures the opponent's missile, and hits the warhead. The TMD is a system that combines missiles independently developed by the army and the navy.

## (2) Japan's defense and the intention of the US after the Cold War

After the Cold War Japan governments were called for a major change in the defense system. In October 1993 Prime Minister Hosokawa announced the review of the NDPO so far. The NDPO was formulated in 1976, and based on the basic policy of Japan's own efforts to deal with limited and small invasion, the Miki government set the scale of weapons, purchase plan, and the number of SDF personnel. The new concept of defense plan had the following idea.

“Although the new defense concept is a qualitative expansion, there are parts that are qualitatively necessary, for example, high-tech as well as destructive weapons like the Gulf War, if we have no communication and information in the future security. It is impossible to maintain defense system, so it is necessary to switch to new content, since the Cold War has ended; it is dangerous to argue that defense capability should be reduced”.

In November 1994 the Republican Party of US stated to strengthen missile defense as one of the commitments of Congress election. Republicans repeated the election campaign of defending the US and its allies against missile attacks. This campaign was implemented by the US Defense Association. A number of high-ranking government officials and

lawmakers who actively promoted the missile defense network at the time of the Reagan and the Bush administrations were added to the same member in the past. "It is very important to be able to intercept the TMD levels with long-range nuclear missiles, if the TMD is realized in Japan, they will help neighboring countries and play a role appropriate for Japan," former Defense Secretary Weinberger said.

The TMD was created out of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the Reagan government, and the SDI defends the strategic nuclear missile attack of the former USSR in outer space. In contrast the USSR strongly opposed the SDI to the 1972 interceptor missile restriction negotiation, which was a major obstacle to reducing nuclear forces between the US and the USSR. However, as the Cold War ended, the SDI remained unfinished. Under the promotion of the TMD concept, the military-industrial complex intends to retrieve practically usable parts from the SDI and to recover investment so far.

During the Republican era in the US, because of the defense budgets and budget deficits, followed by the Democratic Party's government's defense spending cut policy, during which the military-industrial complex promoting the TMD newly requested the allies with the Department of Defense. The US government asked for the Japanese government to introduce the TMD in November 1993. In that case the US Defense Secretary Aspin proposed to buy or jointly develop the TMD to the heads of the Japanese government. In February 1994, for the review of the NDPO, a defense issue roundtable was launched. The challenge was how to review the NDPO so far; how to position the Japan-US security system in the future, and how to reorganize and review the re-definition of SDF and the weapons system in the past.

The US focused on the debate of Japan's defense issue commission. The Pentagon and TMD promoting members often contacted the commissioners. The Department of Defense made concrete proposals on the TMD purchase to the Defense Agency of Japan. In November 1994 the US Deputy Secretary of State visited Japan to appeal for the need for the TMD research. The US regarded Japan as the most likely country of the TMD deployment.

### (3) Introduction of missile defense system

The deployment of TMD would be a political issue of whether it would conflict with exclusive defense. The TMD may conflict with the collective self-defense rights and the peaceful use of outer space. The right of collective self-defense had been prohibited according to the government's opinion under the Article 9 of Constitution. If the third country attacks US forces in Japan, if the Japanese TMD intercepts it, Japan will be involved in the conflict and war in the US. This act is the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Moreover Japan has made an unprecedented resolution of the Diets in the world that prohibits military use of outer space.

The Agency of Defense explained that the TMD was necessary for defense of the country and that it did not conflict with the right of collective self-defense. Even if the TMD conflicts with it, Japanese government stated that it should not be introduced unless it introduces it. This conclusion is 'the TMD is necessary' rather than examining the right of collective self-defense.

In August 1994 the commissioners submitted a report to Prime Minister Murayama. The report emphasized the need for TMD without

conflicting the Article 9 of Constitution and relations with the Diets resolution. The report says, “Japan itself needs to have the capacity to cope with ballistic missiles, and in cooperation with the US where research in this field is progressing, we should actively tackle this system”.

#### (4) Impact of missile defense

In December 1994 the Coalition cabinet's Defense Reconciliation Council recorded 20 million yen as a TMD survey research fund in the defense budget of 1996. Here too, it was emphasized the proposal that was placed on the report of commission.

In January 1995, at the Security Council between Japan and the PRC, the PRC asked why to deploy the TMD. Japan explained the TMD for defense purposes only. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC said, “We pay heed to this report, the Asia-Pacific region is currently very stable, and Japan is responsible for contributing to peace in this region if it is a member of Asia”.

In February 1995 the Republican Party of the US passed the ‘Missile Defense Early Construction Law’ to strengthen the TMD on the scale of the Cold War era. Does the TMD bring stability in East Asia, or will it rekindle the conflict? What does Japan want to deploy for what? The TMD survey cost of 20 million yen had an important meaning. In December 1997 the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2 plus 2) explained that cooperation is progressing smoothly with respect to the implementation of joint research on the status of the TMD initiative. In January 1998 the TMD initiative was added ‘the possibility of technical cooperation between both countries’ to the joint research between Japan

and the US.

In 2004 the Japanese government started deploying missile defense systems developed by the US. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the greatest threat to international security after the Cold War. It uses ballistic missiles for transportation. It is sure that Japan had no way to prevent missile attacks.

In the Cold War era there were nine countries holding missiles. Thereafter, in the beginning of 21th century countries that increased to 40 countries and possess ballistic missiles rapidly increased. Especially the nation developing the weapons of mass destruction and the country suspected to possess it will definitely develop ballistic missiles. The idea of deterrence by nuclear equilibrium in the Cold War era ceased to pass. The US thinks that intercepting ballistic missiles is more effective and developed in cooperation with allies. The deployment of US military's missile defense system now is to alert the DPRK's ballistic missiles. Japan combines interceptor missiles deployed in the land base, the Japan Sea, and vessels to monitor the missiles.

How will the missile defense systems affect global security? From the standpoint of promoting missile defense it is claimed as follows; ①it can mitigate the threat of weapons of mass destruction, ②missile holder countries cannot use missiles for diplomatic cards in order to threaten foreigners or put pressure on them.<sup>(1)</sup>

The PRC opposes the US missile defense system development. Russia carried out an interceptor missile launch experiment in 2004. The missile defense is rather inviting an expansion of arms. It proves to be the result.

Japan deployed the missile defense system following the US. Missiles of the same type as missiles on Aegis ships in the US were mounted on the

Aegis ships of the JMSDF. Japan places a missile intercepting ground-to-air missile in the mainland of Japan, and lays a double defense net so that it can deal with even if it cannot intercept in the Sea of Japan. Prior to being deployed in Japan the US's Aegis ships have been already in operation. So if Japan and the US work together, the effect should double.

However this deployment may correspond to the exercise the rights of collective self-defense prohibited by Constitution. Even though Japan tried to intercept individually, it had no early warning system that could detect missiles from the launch stage that the US owns. The DPRK missile arrives in Japan in about ten minutes. Interception requires quick response. Therefore there is an opinion that Japan's defense system cannot be effectively operated unless it interlocks with that in the US.

The Bush government focused on missile defense systems against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since Japan assumes a missile attack from the DPRK, it will play a part of the US strategy. How will missile defense affect global security? That means that it affects Japan's security.

## 2 Japan's diplomacy and three issues

### (1) The DPRK and Asia's New Order

The presence of DPRK is important in Japan around 2008. In July 2007 the DPRK suspended the operation of nuclear facilities once, and accepted the inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The next was incompetence of the DPRK's nuclear program. Even if the DPRK declared it, there was no choice but to verify that it was correct by each inspection. Another focus was how to acquire economic

and political payoffs by the DPRK. The power generation facilities as plants of light-water reactor type, cancellation of the country supporting terrorism, and the switch of hostile policy by the US etc. While the DPRK has conducted diplomatic negotiations on the one hand, it has steadily made nuclear development progress on the other hand. Does the international community seek the DPRK to abolish nuclear weapons as usual, or will the DPRK change its policy to allow it to possess nuclear weapons and not to have any further nuclear weapons? We have to make a serious choice as to whether the international community coexists with the nuclear-armed the DPRK.

In 2007 the Bush government continued concessions to the DPRK. The nature of the Six-Party Talks has changed considerably from the beginning. Initially five countries should put pressure on the DPRK, but the US itself deviated from that framework. Before the Six-Party Talks, talk between the US and the DPRK were discussed, and it was at a pace to conduct the Six-Party Talks with that policy. The DPRK was in a situation where it was possible to negotiate while using the US and the PRC well.

The direct negotiations between the US and the DPRK gave the PRC's patience as chairman. However since the PRC hopes the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapon, it considered using the US and the ROK. The PRC welcomed the transaction to the DPRK in the US and the ROK in a sense.

The DPRK has desired to preserve its own country. The US performs to avoid nuclear proliferation. In July 2007 the DPRK executed missile launches and nuclear tests. This practice meant the DPRK owned nuclear technology. The US fears nuclear technology leaks.

There were two routes in the Bush government. One route of dialogue in two emerged because the route of that another route of confrontation did not go well. As other factor, the Bush government was preoccupied with demarche of Iraq war and Iran containment, etc. Therefore the dialogue group began to take the initiative. The US and the DPRK corresponded quickly to each other's agreement. The US negotiated directly with the DPRK. Some officials in the Bush government distrusted the DPRK. The Six-Party Talks were important for the Bush government to persuade them. The framework of the Six-Party Talks should have been able to prevent the outflow of nuclear technology.

Japan was aligned with the US's compromise with the DPRK, but still checked the Bush governmental policy. For example it is a denial of ambiguous settlement of nuclear weapons and resolution of the abduction issue. Since nuclear development and abduction are important issues in Japan, Japanese people would like to seek complete resolution. Japan has undertaken a joint pace with the US against the DPRK, but failed to act in accordance with the policy change of the Bush government.

The PRC, the ROK, and Russia would end the nuclear possession issue of the DPRK, and discuss economic issues as soon as possible. Should the US and the DPRK had signed a peace treaty, the US forces in Korea would become unnecessary, and the unification of Korean Peninsula may be easy to progress. The US wishes to finally end the Korean War, and resolve the structure of Cold War in the Korean Peninsula, but for the moment the US wanted to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies. After the 9/11 simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks, the American people have a mind of intimidation. However it is doubtful whether the US government can end the heritage of Cold War finally or

draw the subsequent Grand Design after it.

In February 2007 the Six-Party Talks set up a working group to discuss the mechanisms of peace and security in Northeast Asia. However, at the ROK-DPRK summit meeting at the end of August, peace issues became the main agenda. The ROK-DPRK just tried to have a head to head on the peace problem. The new regime concerning the regime of peace negotiation revealed the difference between the leadership conflicts and speculations of each country. The US planed an expansion to make the Six-Party Talks a place to negotiate safety in Northeast Asia. The PRC strived to maintain the initiative as the presidency. Although the Six-Party Talks were plotted to be a place of confidence building in Northeast Asia, the US aimed to secure Asian countries in cooperation with other frameworks (i.e. ASEAN Forum). The US had to emphasize economic prosperity and safety in Asia.

## (2) Signs of alteration in the Japan-US alliance

Japan has adopted a confrontational approach to the DPRK, but the Bush government softened rapidly. Japan and the US have developed different ways. At the time the de-nuclearization of DPRK is also a security issue for Japan. The US did not regard it as a direct threat in those days. The DPRK may have been a case in which Japan and the US differed in East Asian security. It brought about the alteration of the Japan-US alliance.

Japan respected whether the US would release the DPRK from the designation of a terrorism support country. When would the US release, what timing was it? If the Six-Party Talks were progressing steadily, the possibility that the Japan-US alliance could be forced to change. So far dealing with the emergencies on Korean Peninsula has become the

centerpiece of the Japan-US alliance. If the tension in the Korean Peninsula ceases, the US can try to use Japan for checking on the PRC. At that time Japan needs to strengthen political and economic relations with the PRC, because Japan would not become a mere political instrument of the US.

Some insisted that the Japan-US alliance becomes unstable.<sup>(2)</sup> The relationship between Japan and the US was shifting from a subordinate relationship of Japan to an equal relationship. For example the US and the UK are closely related, but even if the US does military action, the UK may not be in sync. However the US-UK alliance will not break. Bilateral relationships are maintained by cooperating in places where the two countries are involved in the foundation of the state as a fate community (i.e. information gathering, security and so on). This same thing exists in the Japan-US relationship. Japan is necessary for checking in the PRC on the US. Because the sense of discomfort in the PRC's sense of values, benefits, and regulations is felt by the US, it cannot overcome the caution against the PRC. For this reason the Japan-US alliance is the basic strategy of the US. If the relationship among Japan, the US, and the PRC is maintained national interest for the US, the Japan-US alliance may change, but it must remain indispensable in the future.

Sometimes Japan sours the relations with US due to the mismatch between the views of the two countries. What kind of attitude should the US face Japan and the PRC in the future? That will define the future relationship between Japan and the US.

Indeed, from the perspective of the PRC, the US and the PRC were in a conflict relationship, but recently it is in the direction of dialogue. If the PRC has a close relationship with the US, the PRC should maintain a

closer relationship with Japan. In other words Japan has to be a country that is between the PRC and the US. On the contrary, if Japan takes a harder attitude towards the PRC than the US, has the PRC thought about bringing Japan closer to the PRC even if using the US?

The alert against the PRC in the US was high, but it has also changed. Since 2006 there exists military exchange at the US-PRC. The economic relation will become closer in the US and the PRC. It has declined in the US that the tone of declaring Japan to allow the rights of collective self-defense as the US and the PRC become closer. However it will change depending on the situation. Ultimately the future of Japan-US relations will be influenced by the PRC.

After the end of Cold War we have experienced various transformations in international relations, but a new alliance could not organize in East Asia. In the 1980s Japan and the PRC cooperated to raise the expectation of the establishment of the Asian security system, but after that it did not proceed in that direction. From that point the Japan-US alliance is unlikely to change or modify.

The Koizumi government actively dispatched the SDF overseas. Although Japanese governments accept a tendency to build Japan's security with accumulation as a *fait accompli*, the Abe cabinet intends to convert the view of security in past. The Abe government has considered the US forces in Japan for the safety of the Asia-Pacific. The Abe government aims to give approval to the rights of collective self-defense, a new construction of the Japan-US alliance, and initiatives that had not been done for a long time, namely the fundamental changes.

Japanese diplomacy has been said to follow the US so far. Recently Japanese diplomacy received the impression of overwhelming the US in

support of the Iraq War, but Japan is doing its own diplomacy aiming to become a permanent member of the UN. On the economic side it remains interdependent with the US. This is because Japan and the US have common interests and values in the background.

In October 2007 the ATSMML was terminated, but this became an important turning point. If Japan withdrew from the 'War on Terrorism' in Afghanistan, the Japan-US alliance could have a negative effect. In view of showing Japanese own policy in the international community, Japan had to recognize that the government and people have to discuss carefully.

Japan-US security system is very important for safety in Northeast Asia. It's not just about solidarity with the US. Japan must also consider forming common recognition with the ROK and the PRC. The US intends to commit in Asia in cooperation with Japan, Australia and India. In doing so Japan must be more responsible for the safety of East Asia than ever. Therefore we will suppose a possibility that Japan's action will be withdrawn from overthrowing diplomacy in the US.

Japan has been actively acting internationally in form different from Japan-US relation since the Gulf War. European countries are of immediate interest to Japan seeking partners other than the US. For example it is a relationship with Australia. According to the Australian 'Defense White Paper', policies similar to Japan's defense policy are adopted, such as 'stable contribution in the Asia-Pacific', the 'War on Terrorism', and the 'military cooperation with the US' and so on. Policy similarity brings Japan and Australia closer. After all it will strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

Looking at the relationship between Japan, the US, India and Australia,

the PRC will think that this alliance' is the 'containment policy to the PRC'. The US, India, Japan, and Australia conducted joint military exercises at Bengal Bay in September 2007. The PRC, Russia, Central Asian countries conducted joint military exercises as if to respond to this. This leads to opposing composition of both camps, that is, the balance of power. That is not good for the security of the Asia-Pacific. In East Asia if a new block is formed, it is not preferable. In the future it is desirable that we will utilize many places and occasions for consultation for confidence-building measures.

### (3) Rise of the PRC and Japanese foreign policy

The existence of PRC is big. We know various opinions on how to see the PRC. The PRC will expand military power rapidly. What we are concerned about security in the PRC is that we do not understand what kind of security is being considered by the PRC, what kind of strategy it has, and why the military is going to modernize. For example it holds fighter aircraft of long cruising distance, operable ship and aircraft carrier in ocean. The PRC steadily enhances the expedition ability of the military, but is giving anxiety to neighboring countries just because it does not explain what that is aiming for. The PRC would not disclose security information [cf. Shambaugh, 2005].

The PRC's military buildup aims to preserve defense power appropriate for the great power. The expenditure of national defense makes the surrounding countries feel uneasy because of reaching double figures in recent years. However in fact it can be thought that the PRC has become able to enrich defense. In terms of defense expenditure of US \$ 1,204 billion in the whole world in 2005, in the order of the US \$ 528.7

billion, the UK 59.2 billion, France 53.1 billion, the PRC 49.5 billion, Japan 43.7 billion, and Germany 37 billion. Although the PRC aims to have a checking capacity in the US, the potential national strength is a threat in East Asia in the future. Therefore rather than competing armed forces between Japan and the PRC, both countries should choose to discuss common interests.

The US is wary of strengthening the military power of the PRC and makes its quality and intention matter. The US builds constructive relations in diplomacy with the PRC, but the American people who dislike the one-party dictatorship by the Communist Party increase a sense of insecurity on the 'Chinese threat'. The US cannot neglect violence to the PRC. Accordingly the US-PRC military relations will get tensed up, and the Japan-US security system will remain strengthened. From the PRC the US has overwhelming military power, so there exists a threat in the PRC as usual.

When considering diplomatic relations with the PRC, it is Taiwan (the ROC) that cannot be avoided. The Taiwan issue is said to be the 'powder keg' of East Asia. It is a global security issue more than the DPRK problem. If a military conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, Japan will get caught in it. Although the PRC feel a strong desire to maintain the current situation with real intention, the independents trends to increase in Taiwan. But the PRC government insists that the Taiwan issue is a domestic problem.

The US yarns to maintain the 'status quo' with regard to the Taiwan issue. The PRC is not allowed to unify by force, does not recognize 'two Chinese', and therefore suppresses the Taiwan 'not to be independent'. The US demands that it would be desirable if the Communist Party

regime in the PRC collapsed, democratized, and could be achieved peaceful unification with Taiwan. This story will be a favorable result for security in Asian countries.

Unlike President Nixon's visit in 1970, those who Taiwan thinks as a part of China are now a very minority. The PRC government aims for peaceful unification in the form of absorbing Taiwan. Although the US wishes to maintain its 'status quo', the PRC's current situation changes from moment to moment. Countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan are decreasing year by year. An economic environment where the PRC-Taiwan is integrated has already been completed. Maintaining the current status of the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan will form an environment for peaceful unification between both. Independents' orientation in Taiwan is a reversal of sense of crisis that Taiwan is absorbed in the PRC. It is possible that Taiwan will be unified under the present PRC's political system.

The PRC has still not abandoned unification by force. It is a top proposition in the PRC that it unifies with Taiwan, and that is also a plea. When the PRC enters into diplomatic relations with other countries, it will let the other country acknowledge 'one China'. If Taiwan declares independence, the PRC government may not make rational judgments and actions.

When the PRC unifies with Taiwan, security concerns are eliminated, so it is reluctantly welcoming the unification. However the people in US may not give a favorable response the unity that they do not like. It is against the PRC that watching-vigilance increases. When the PRC occupies Taiwan and its surrounding waters, the Japan-US alliance will conflict with the PRC, and it will be possible for the Japan-US relationship

to increase the alliance that places more importance on economic interests. When Taiwan is united in the PRC, the Japan-US alliance cannot help but be stronger. It increases the security cost.

During the Koizumi period the relationship between Japan and the PRC was getting worse due to the question of Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The PRC thought that Japan would agree with it if the US-PRC relationship was good, but that line converted. Beyond any doubt the PRC's hardline stance on Japan may not be noticeable. Japan must be an important country for the PRC. It is because it is a great force to support the PRC's economy. It is a significant role that the Japanese government and companies play in the PRC. For example in environmental problems and energy conservation issues, the PRC is indispensable for Japan's cooperation.

What are the important issues for Japanese diplomacy in East Asia? It is still a relationship with the PRC. Regardless of how the strategic reciprocal relationship with the PRC progresses, it remains to be a rivalry relationship over the leadership conflict. It is important that Japan actively commit in the Taiwan issue.

After the Second World War Japan has grown as an economic superpower, but has never shown a presence in international politics. At present the environment surrounding Japan has changed dramatically. Naturally Japan should look at national interests, and think about the safety and peace of Japan and the international community.

The DPJ government took the position of pro-PRC taking economic relations into account. That is appropriate in terms of ensuring necessary support for the stability of the Japanese economy. On the other hand we must not forget the fact that the PRC is strongly aware of its entry into

the Pacific Ocean, and repeats vigorous actions in Japan's near waters.

East Asia remains a structure of the Cold War era. That is why Japan cannot give away the option of the Japan-US alliance. We must consider what kind of cost and burden the nation seeks based on that reality.

In September 2010 a Chinese fishing boat and a patrol boat of the Japan Coast Guard collided in the Sea of Japan. The PRC government fiercely opposed this incident, and developed countermeasures one after the other, such as a temporary suspension of ministerial exchanges or more, and it has evolved into a situation that greatly shakes up the Japan-PRC relations. The prosecution authorities in Japan released the Chinese captain arrested for suspicion of interfering with public service execution with pending disposition. The captain has returned to the PRC, but the PRC government will not break down its stiff attitude, such as seeking apologies and compensation from the Japanese government.

It was a problem because the collision incident was around the Senkaku Islands. There is circumstance that occurred in the place where Japan and the PRC claim their ownership. Japan makes a protest that the Chinese fishing boats violate territorial waters, conduct illegal operations, and resist the patrol boats that crack down. The PRC made a rebuttal statement that the Senkaku Islands, and the territorial waters around it are the PRC's, which means that the crackdown on Japan is illegal. The Japanese government effectively controls the Senkaku Islands, and insists that there is no territorial problem in the East China Sea. The PRC rails such a strict attitude is to aim to appeal that 'territorial issues exist with the PRC even in the East China Sea'.

The Senkaku Islands were transferred to Japan in the Meiji era; Japanese inhabitants there before the Second World War were making

bonito and other items. After that it became an uninhabited island, but the PRC and Taiwan began claiming sovereignty in the 1970s. It is said that it was pointed out that the possibility that oil resources etc. exist in the nearby sea area. At that time the Japanese government played a role of normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, and continued negotiations to conclude the Japan-PRC Peace and Friendship Treaty.<sup>(3)</sup>

However, in the course of this negotiation, when the Japanese government confirmed that the Senkaku Islands were in the Japanese territory, a case involving 100 vessels carrying Chinese armed militias from the PRC rushed to the Senkaku Islands and a case of violation of the territorial waters of Japan occurred. At that time Deng Xiaoping in the PRC said, 'We do not have the wisdom to solve this problem, the next generation will be smarter, so leave it to the next generation', and the territorial issue of the Senkaku Islands has effectively been shelved.

The PRC itself has to admit claiming that Japan is the Japanese territory of the Senkaku Islands. However the PRC thinks that it does not want Japan to forget that the PRC government is a different position from 'Japan's Senkaku Islands are the PRC's territory'. However, since the Japanese government declared that 'it cognizes no territorial issue in the East China Sea', the PRC is completely ignored by its position.

The PRC government urged Japan to unconditionally release the captain arrested and detained, and suspended exchanges beyond the ministerial and ministries level, postpone negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the development in gas field in the East China Sea, defeated countermeasures such as postponement of Shanghai visit to 1000 youth. The suspension of exchanges on the ministerial level, the ministry level, and the top-level contact are extremely unusual in the relationship

between Japan and the PRC, which had been promised by both governments before. However it is a tremendous measure for the PRC government to postpone these schedules and meetings.

In recent years the PRC has greatly enhanced the naval strength, and that has posed a threat to neighboring countries. Its range of activity extends from the waters along the coast of PRC to the South China Sea from the western Pacific. At that time it resulted from an accident where the helicopter of the PRC army got abnormally close to the JMSDF's escort ship which was in charge of monitoring in April 2010. In this situation a sense of crisis that may deprive territorial rights around Japan is beginning to appear in Japan. The Japanese government set out to strengthen the defense of the Senkaku Islands at the end of 2010 as a new NDPO, concretely included the increase in the deployment of SDF personnel to the Nansei Islands and the remote island defense.

The PRC has a strong interest in the contents of NDPO. It is doubtful that Japan will establish some kind of defense related facilities on the Senkaku Islands.

It is not desirable for the international community to be at feud in the world's second and third largest economies, and also in the same East Asian region. It is no doubt that Japan and the PRC are one of the most important partners of each other. It is reported that the PRC will maintain its stance of emphasizing strategic reciprocity relations with Japan. The PRC government also calls into account with Japan; "If both countries compete against each other and will hurt one another. If we get along, we will benefit jointly".

### 3 New NDPO in the change of government

In 2010 the DPJ government summarized its own security policy. Keeping in mind the East Asian reality that the DPRK repeats nuclear tests and missile tests, and the PRC expands military capabilities, the new NDPO places emphasis on measure to warning and monitoring activities around Japan.

In 1976 the NDPO was enacted. It has been revised four times. The circumstances in East Asia have changed since 1976. New one has three points.

Firstly the new NDPO is a major shift in the concept of ‘fundamental defense capability’ that has continued from the first NDPO, and that it seeks to improve defense capability according to the concept of ‘dynamic defense capability’. The line of ‘fundamental defense capability’ set up in the era of Cold War assumed that the invading force lands on the coastline, but now it is judged that its possibility is low. The Japanese government becomes a consideration that ‘dynamic defense capability’ will support Japan’s peace and stability in daily warning and surveillance and active participation in PKO activities.

Secondly the new NDPO strengthened the activities in the Nansei Islands where warning and monitoring were insufficient. In the point of view we understand a change in the circumstances after NDPO in 2004, so the PRC has expanded into the ocean by strengthening naval and air forces.

Thirdly the new NDPO is postponing the relaxation of ‘Three Principles on Weapons Exports’. It was because the SDP of the coalition government strongly opposed it.

Even with this change the government adhered to the basic line that it

denies a military power that thoroughly maintains its external defense under Constitution and poses a threat to other countries.

What exactly will change with the shift from fundamental defense capability to dynamic defense capability?

Firstly the JGSDF cutbacked in the number of 155,000 to 154,000, and reduced the traditional major equipped tanks from 600 to 400 tanks. Tank troops were organized around Hokkaido assuming the situation when the former USSR troops attacked, but since the end of Cold War they were gradually reduced, and this time greatly reduced with the disposal of old tanks.

Next, in the JMSDF, escort ships are increased from 47 to 48, and within this range, Aegis destroyers equipped with high-performance radars and dealing with the DPRK's ballistic missiles will be increased from 4 to 8. The JMSDF also increased the number of submarines from 16 to 22 with the aim of exploring the action of PRC's navy in the waters of the Nansei Islands.

Although the number of aircraft such as fighter aircraft does not change so much in the JASDF, it is attached to activities in the Nansei Islands, such as strengthening units in Okinawa. It states an intention to the importance of warning and monitoring on the Nansei Islands, which is the second point of the new NDPO. This is the territory and territorial waters of Japan, and exclusive economic zones outside of it. Although the SDF will protect territories and territorial waters, they will also conduct watch and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard even outside the territorial waters.

The Senkaku Islands where a crash against a patrol ship by a Chinese fishing boat occurred is also a part of the Nansei Islands, and in the

surrounding waters, the PRC navy aiming to enter the western Pacific Ocean repeats active traffic. It is said that demonstrating the will and ability of Japan's defense by deterring information collection, warning, monitoring and reconnaissance activities from the perspective of the Nansei Islands is a deterrent to avoid accidental incidents and conflicts. However these activities will show a sense of vigilance against the PRC navy.

The third point is the postponement of the review of 'Three Principles on Weapons Export'. In 1967 the Prime Minister Sato did not allow export except the following three cases; ①for communist countries, ②for countries where weapons export is prohibited by the UN resolutions, ③ exports to countries in international dispute and possibly those countries are not permitted to export. Japan could be exported to countries other than its target countries. In 1972 Prime Minister Miki stressed the principle of export prohibition as 'to refrain from exporting weapons' other than the three principles indicated by Prime Minister Sato. For this reason Japan could not join in international cooperative development of equipment such as aircraft and joint development of the missile defense system, with which the US is treated as an exception.

Prior to the NDPO decision, the DPJ's Foreign Security Study Committee proposed to ease the ban of it. However the SDP opposed the 'review of the Three Principles', Prime Minister Kan finally stopped relaxing the three principles. Under the DPJ regime, the NDPO has been analyzed for the rapid change in the circumstances in East Asia.

## Part 4 Japan accepting the rights of collective self-defense

### 1 Contents of legislations related security

The governments of Japan, the US, and Australia pointed out concerns over the PRC in a joint statement of its ministerial strategic dialogue in 2006. India joined it for checking into the PRC in 2007. Prime Minister Abe proposed the 'Arc of Asian Democracy' except the PRC. He set up the 'arc of liberty and prosperity' as the basis of foreign policy. The geographical areas from the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, to the Korean Peninsula are 'arc of instability' for security, but at the same time it can be 'arc of prosperity' for economy.

In 2009 the LDP recommended a security policy, the 'Promise to protect Japan'. The LDP declares to strengthen the Japan-US security arrangements and steadily promote the US forces in Japan. The Japan-US alliance is the basis of diplomacy. The LDP governments will further enhance the reliability of the Japan-US security system, and strengthen the Japan-US alliance in order to secure Japan, the Asia-Pacific region and the peace and stability of the world. In addition Japan actively engages in strategic consultation with the US, planning consideration work, strengthening joint exercises and training, etc., and will continue to cooperate in countering terrorism, and promote ballistic missile defense etc. Furthermore the Japanese government will steadily cooperate to implement the reorganization of the US forces in Japan and maintain deterrence [[https://www.jimin.jp/election/results/sen\\_syu45/seisaku/2009\\_yakusoku/contents/ban...](https://www.jimin.jp/election/results/sen_syu45/seisaku/2009_yakusoku/contents/ban...); [https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy\\_topics/national\\_act/124705.html](https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/national_act/124705.html)].

In 2012 this security policy proposal was succeeded to the LDP's 'National Security Basic Law', and materialized in the security related

legislations after 2013. The NDPO of 2010 clarifies that the expanded deterrent power of the US is indispensable and that cooperation with the US will be made closer. Japan has been increasingly considering the security policy system along the side of US.

The US shows its intention to retaliate its expanded deterrence policy not only in own country but also when its allies are attacked. The US promises Japan and the ROK the 'nuclear umbrella' of an expanded deterrent policy. Japan not only depends on the US but also cooperating to increase the effect of the expanded deterrence policy of the US increases the reliability of extended deterrence. Specifically Japan needs to establish the security related legislations, and SDF will aggressively cooperate with defense cooperation with US forces in Japan. Furthermore, the US is calling for Japan to contribute to the fields of strengthening self-defense capability, Japan-US defense cooperation, and diplomatic efforts. The measures are the Japan-US agreement at 'Guideline' in 2015 [The Yomiuri Shinbun, 13, October 2017].

In January 2013 Prime Minister Abe delivered in a press conference speech expressed in the Diets. He spoke "It is urgent to rebuild diplomacy and security, and strengthen the Japan-US alliance, which is the cornerstone of it, we have to regain it".

Traditionally in the government view, the exercise of collective self-defense rights has been considered unconstitutional, but changed to a policy of constitutional interpretation. Major items of security related legislation are as shown in the Table4-1.

Table 4-1: Defense legislations to be revised

Item	Contents	Law to be amended
Revision of the SDF Law	①Protective measures of overseas Japanese ②Protection of armed weapons etc. of the US forces and other units ③Expanding the provision of goods and services to the US military during peacetime ④Regulations for punishment of foreign offenses	Self Defense Force Law
Important Impact Safety Assurance Law (Amendment of the Surrounding Situation Security Assurance Law)	①To clarify the purpose of amendment, including implementation of support to the US military, etc. in 'situations that have a serious effect on Japan's peace and security' Review objective regulations for ②Added support activities for foreign troops and the like other than the US military that conduct activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-US Security Treaty ③Expansion of support menu	Law concerning Measures for Securing Peace and Safety with regard to Peripheral Situation (Surrounding Situation Security Assurance Law → Important Impact Situation Act)
Revision of Ship Inspection Activity Act	①Revision accompanying review of surrounding circumstances safety ensuring law ②In response to the International Peace Support Law, conduct ship inspection activities when necessary for peace and security of the international community	Act on Ship Inspection Activities to be Performed on Surrounding Situation (Ship Inspection Activity Act)
Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act	①Expansion of operations that can be implemented at the UN PKO etc. (so-called safety assurance, flight guards), revision of restrictions on the use of weapons necessary for work ②Implementation of humanitarian reconstruction assistance that the UN does not supervise and so-called activities to ensure safety	Law on cooperation on the UN peacekeeping operations etc. (the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act)

Revision of legal system to cope with situations	Improvement of name, support, definition, procedures of surviving crisis situation Law	Law concerning measures taken by Japan accompanying the actions of the US military in armed attack situations (situation remedy)
	Positioning, action, authority etc. as SDF's mission to cope with the existential crisis situation	SDF law
	In addition to the US military to cope with the rupture situation, the US military and other foreign troops in a crisis situation	Act on Measures to performed by Japan in Response to US Military Actions in Armed Attack Situation (Act on Action Related Measures by US Military)
	Foreign troops other than the US forces in dealing with armed attack	Law concerning the use of foreign Military Supplies in armed Arrack Situations (Act on Use of Specified Public Facilities)
	Additional actions of foreign troops other than the US military in armed attack situations are added to use adjustment measures of specific public facilities etc.	Law on use of specified Public Facilities etc. in armed Attack Situations (Act on Use of Specified Public Facilities)
	Implementation of maritime transportation regulations in the event of crisis in existence.	Application of the prisoner of war handling law in the event of a crisis in existence Law on handling of prisoners of war etc. in armed attack state (Law on prisoners treatment)
Revision of the National Security Council Establishment	Law Revision of the Law etc. Arrangement of Deliberation	Matters Establishment of the National Security Council

The first is the limited exercise of collective self-defense rights. Until now the use of force was limited to cases where Japan was attacked directly, but even if Japan is not attacked it can attack. The second is to further expand support from the SDF concerning logistic support to foreign troops.

The government over-interpreted the activities of SDF. The government and the executive of ruling party changed the interpretation because it is difficult to revise Constitution. There is a fundamental problem as to whether only the measures that enforced by the government's decision can be over-interpreted as it is with Constitution that does not specify the SDF. The government wants to enable the SDF's activities to a certain extent within the scope of Constitution. It is necessary to discuss the revision of Constitution for that purpose. Most citizens think the Abe government ignores the necessity of revising Constitution and enacts security related legislations as earlier.<sup>(1)</sup>

There are many obscure passages concerning the security related legislations. A new requirement for the exercise of collective self-defense rights is that "there exists a clear risk that the existence of Japan is threatened by closely related military attacks against other countries, the rights of the public's life, freedom and happiness". The regime of that time can interpret arbitrarily. Prime Minister Abe insists that "even if people do not support my opinion now, they will evaluate it in the future". More clear definition of restrictive criteria should be established, not only 'general judgment' that the government insists[cf. Toyoshita and Koseki, 2014: I . ch.1, II . ch.1].

Regarding the logistic support for foreign forces by the SDF, the scope of activities will be greatly expanded. The Japanese government defines

‘backward’ region other than battle area. This ‘backward’ activity is logistic support. Japan has so far set up a ‘rear area’ where the possibility of battle is lower, and has carried out logistic support in the backward area. From now on the SDF can operate even in dangerous areas if no battle occurs.

The specific duties of SDF are supplemented with supplies of ammunition and refueling to aircraft for supply, transportation and maintenance of supplies. In conflict areas there are plenty of attacks against replenishment units. We have to tackle inconceivable to the government that the SDF operates in the field.

The security related legislations are summarized in two parts. These security-related legislations are based on the Japan-US alliance. The Japanese government explains that Japan will set up an environment that can better support the US and enhance deterrence by strengthening cooperation.

Table 4-2: Two parts of law related security

Peace and security of Japan	Peace and security of the international community
Acceptance of collective self-defense rights → SDF Law Revised Countermeasures Act Backward support to foreign troops → Revised Important Impact Status Law Dialogue to the gray zone situation → Revised SDF Law	Backward support to foreign troops → Revision of UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation with UN PKO etc. → PKO Cooperation Act revised

2 Debates on legislations related security

(1) Security Legislations indispensable for safety in Japan<sup>(2)</sup>

The position to support the security related legislations consider that ‘deterrence’ is necessary from ‘changes in the security environment’.

The first is the change in the international situation behind the security related legislations. That is the change of power balance in the world. In particular the national strength of US will decline, and Russia and the PRC will attempt to change the current state of the international order. That will be an instability factor in the international politics.

The second is the global economy. While there are regions that enjoy development and growth, issues such as economic disparity, refugee and immigrant, environment, human rights, population structure change, etc. have become more serious, and international cooperation of developed countries alone is able to deal with each of them.

Thirdly there are terrorist activities and international conflicts and emergencies due to state and non-state actors. Also, territorial issues in the ocean, the cyber war and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction destabilize the international community.

In the Asia-Pacific the DPRK develops nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The PRC is accelerating the modernization of navy and air force. The PRC expands its dominance sphere in the South China Sea, and claims maritime interests in the East China Sea. In addition the PRC continues to invade the territorial islands to the Senkaku Islands, and the approach of the aerosphere is also prominent. Its military trend is a common concern among the US and Asia Pacific countries. Multilateral cooperation to counter this and deterrence function by alliance are more important under certain conditions.

In such a tense international politics Japanese government will agree ① the rebalancing advanced by the US, the deployment of military force focusing on the so-called Asia-Pacific, and the US military restructuring plan, and based on the review of the 'Guidelines for the Japan-US Defense

Cooperation'. In addition to promoting the sharing of the roles and functions of Japan and the US, ②it is necessary to strengthen deterrence functions and secure Japan's safety through cooperation and contribution to international peace and security. Put another way, Japan must protect Japan's sovereignty, territory and citizen's security by strengthening the Japan-US alliance. At the same time it is also important to cooperate and contribute to the peace and stability of the international community. Under today's international relation it is impossible to ensure peace and stability in own country or region only in one country. Therefore 'one-country pacifism' will not be established. Security legislations are composed of two parts.

The first is the legislations necessary to strengthen deterrence power to protect Japan's peace and security. One of them exercises the right of collective self-defense to defend Japan in the occurrence of crisis situation, when requirements such as the US that is closely related to Japan are attacked and the situation of Japan being threatened is occurred. This requirement is an armed attack to the US forces in Japan, and in principle, preliminary approval by the both Diets is required when ordering the SDF to take defense action.

It is also a legislation to provide logistic support to the US military that contributes to Japan's defense against such a situation. This is the Important Impact Safety Assurance Law. Although backward support embodies the supply, transportation, utilization, repair and maintenance and medical activity and communication and so on of the facility, exercise of force is not included.

The second is a law that cooperates and contributes to the peace and security of the international community. This has two legislations. One is

a legislation that implements backward support for foreign troops that deal with the threats for international peace based on the Resolution of UN Security Council. This is the international peace support law. This logistic support does not include actions that exercise force. Japan will not participate in multinational forces etc. In addition the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act has been revised. During the PKO activities the SDF will protect those concerned, if the UN requests operations concerned for relief.

Those who are in favor the lines have asserted on the view that it is necessary to maintain peace and security of their own country by measures for self-defense, and it is natural as exercise of state-specific functions to complete its existence. [cf. Hosoya, 2016: 219-258]

## (2) Legal stability and public distrust<sup>(3)</sup>

It is said that means to prevent military use is force of arms. We presume to make understand that if foreign aggressors invade by force of arm, it will counter more than purpose by stronger military force with weapon. This is 'deterrence' on military activities. This 'deterrence' is an idea not to use force by understanding that there is intention and power to use stronger force if the other party appeals to the force. That is the 'logic of a kind of threat's power'.

It is assumed that this logic is not dragged into war. In that sense it can be said that it is 'a measure for peace'. However since that method has the possibility of using force arms, it can be expressed as 'strategy for war'. We find that war and peace are two sides of the same coin.

Prime Minister Abe explains that if we cooperate militarily with the US, deterrence will increase and not get caught up in war. However we

can suppose another view. For example if the SDF defends the US ship, the power to attack it increases the possibility of attacking Japan. So we cannot see how effective 'deterrence' of military power is. Instead reliance on military strength alone may lead to a dangerous situation.

We can presume a different view. It is the use of force as citizen's point of view. In the war, humans kill each other, and they are killed and destroy their lives. Now we are watching wars in the Middle East and African countries. The security related legislation has made it possible to protect residents and other troops from these violent acts. However the act is a mere war seen from the viewpoint of citizens after all, even if it is the purpose of helping civilians, as the SDF fights, kills, and is killed overseas by armed groups. After the Second World War, the SDF will not kill one person abroad, but will change the character that has never been killed.

Wars have basis in fact reasonably. It is also necessary to protect the lives of citizens with military action. For example Japan already carries out economic support to protect the lives of refugees. Which of the following is a suitable contribution to Japan whether Japanese citizens are to suppress armed groups with the US, or to mediate peace between contenting parties through humanitarian assistance? Stated in a different fashion, Japan has to let a clear state disseminate a national imagery toward the world.

It is a matter of how far the issue is left to the judgment of the government. According to the provisions of the security related legislation, if the government recognizes 'an existence of crisis situation', even though Japan does not undergo an armed attack, the armed force can be exercised by the right of collective self-defense. What on earth is

this?

The government's explanation for this is not clear. Of course what kind of situation will happen in the future is unpredictable. Nevertheless the government must explain whether it is necessary to formulate a law that exercises the rights to collective self-defense. If the government cannot explain it, this law should become unnecessary. Also is it right to leave the criteria for accreditation to the judgment of the government? The government decisions elected by the voters should be trusted. However we cannot particularly give a *carte blanche* to the government on the judgment of war. So why is this distrust?

The answer lies in legal stability. People should trust the government if the government respects legal stability and has a sense of security that does not make easy decisions. However as governments and ruling parties tend to ignore legal stability, it is natural that they do not ward off the distrust of many citizens.

The point is that whether legal stability can be ignored to protect the country. Defense, tax, living and so forth are operated under legal stability under Constitution. Losing legal stability means disintegrating society. That leads to a conclusion to collapse the country and society to protect the citizens' life.

The people have felt a sense of distrust to the SDF for a long time. The Second World War causes people's sense to the postwar Japanese-style of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. However most of people support it now. It is because the SDF has served the missions of people's, recovery, and reconstruction on the occasion of disaster. Particularly the SDF has accumulated facts that no one kills overseas and no one is killed since 1954 as long as the SDF does not force.

That was the bond between the people and the SDF, and was the root of the legal stability over the SDF under Article 9 of Constitution. Expanding overseas missions and use of weapons not only increases the danger of the lives of the SDF personnel but also it will also end a committed relationship between the people and the SDF. Japanese people have believed that current Constitution will define specific peacekeeping duties for the SDF in the Article 9.

### (3) Correct judgment and verification of 'deterrent' effect<sup>(4)</sup>

In the security related legislations, two points are pointed out. One is 'correct judgment'. The other is 'deterrence'. There are many points insufficient for 'correct judgment' and 'deterrence' concerning the security related legislations.

The deterrence is thought to exceed the result expected by cost and danger rather than the adversary's own interests, and it is an effort not to let the adversary take actions contrary to self-interest. Suppression assumes a kind of 'reasonable' adversary who can calculate the utility of action choices based on information [Crag and George, 1995: ch.14]. In that respect the premise to be shared among the parties must exist. Without this premise, the deterrent effect will make no sense [cf. Kamo, 1990: ch.5].

What is the point of Japan's ability to exercise force in terms of the point of 'correct judgment'. Traditionally Japan was able to counterattack using military force with a purely defense posture only when it was attacked directly. In the future Japan can participate in the war with the judgment of government. What is necessary for that decision of correct judgement?

Firstly the dispatch of SDF is a kind of military action. It is not a means

of diplomacy. The Japanese government must judge whether dispatching can end the war and whether the cause of conflict can be resolved. Does that mean that Japan's safety will increase, and will the region and the world be stabilized? It is necessary for the government to choose whether to adopt military means or a non-military way.

Secondly it is forced to make a concrete decision when the war breaks out. Japan is not attacked directly, but it has to decide involvement in war. There are three choices. The first choice is not to participate in war. The second choice is to provide backward support for the US forces and the ROK troops by providing ammunition etc. The third choice is to assume an attack on Japan and fight back. The third choice is the exercise of collective self-defense rights. Japan has to judge whether participation in the war will protect Japan's safety or whether war should be avoided.

When deciding whether Japan will be involved in the wars of other countries, the current Japanese position is inadequate. We must know the military capabilities of potential attacking countries and also acknowledge about the regional situation that causes war. Since the SDF has never fought overseas, it does not have enough organizations or capabilities to evaluate and analyze military abilities. We have done little to collect information overseas so far. Needless to say, we also need for arguments on whether to make such a choice.

What will happen if Japan refuses when the US requests to collaborate with Japan on the counterattack against attacker? How do foreign countries appraise the Japan's decision? How will the international community make a valuation to Japan? The security related legislation intends to raise the evaluation in the international community. However

the other country does not solve the security affairs of their country only because of evaluating military capacity.

When Japan dispatches SDF abroad, it is important that the military purpose to be achieved is clear even in the case of the crisis situation exercising the right of collective self-defense, even in international peace cooperation activities. What kind of threats should we dispatch the SDF to dispose? What kind of situations can we recover and when withdraw the SDF from actual place? How important is the target for Japan to protect? To that end how much is the cost to pay? It is necessary to prepare 'answers' in before these 'questions'. Both are issues that Japan has not considered so far.

On second point regarding the 'deterrence', in fact it is important to prevent war beforehand. Because of that, it is necessary to suppress the potential attacking country as so to give up war as Japan is prepared to fight. This is 'deterrence'. The Japanese government insists that 'deterrence' will increase with this law. The Abe government appeals the necessity of 'deterrence' by taking the DPRK and the PRC as examples. However 'deterrence' is not effective only with security related legislations the effect of 'deterrence' requires three conditions[Ueki, 2015: 94].

The first condition is to have military ability and intention to counterattack.

The second condition is to correctly communicate the first condition to the other party.

The third condition is to share and to increase situational awareness and context recognition.

If actors except Japan and the US do not deviate from these conditions, Japan will not fight back assuredly. The security related legislations are

laws that strengthen the ability and intention of countering the first condition. However it also has problems. Under the security related legislation, the criteria for the use of force is unclear. It is unknown which Japan will stop any other actions of other countries without arming by force. With this Japan cannot convey the intention of Japan to the other party. Japan cannot express what Japan wants and what Japan can do.

Is Japan communicating with the other party regarding the second condition? Japan's intention will not be transmitted correctly. The current relationship of Japan-DPRK has no established means of communication. The relationship of Japan-PRC is still inadequate. In case of crisis it is necessary to construct mechanisms that can communicate properly even in the worst situation.

The third condition is the most difficult. If that condition is fulfilled, a certain trust relationship is indispensable for making the other side understand that Japan will not attack. Otherwise it is easier to think that it will be more advantageous for the other side to attack.

'Threat' by force creates 'deterrence'. On the contrary tension only occurs. If you attack, you must accept such a tragic result. If you do not attack, you will be safe in the future. Peace is maintained if this safeguard safe measure let other party understand. To that end it is necessary not only to strengthen 'deterrence' by force, but also to become familiar to how disastrous the country becomes when it loses the present peace. It is necessary to share through mutual interchange of personnel between governments, and maintain a strong relationship through institutionalization so that the other side feels disadvantageous. In that respect Japan urgently needs to improve relations with the PRC.

Although we have restricted the use of force by the law so far, we will

judge according to the situation from time to time. What should we protect at the expense of human lives? How will we realize the long-term stability of the region? What kind of world do we want to build and maintain? Originally it is necessary to argue over matter creating law.

#### (4) Necessity of arguing security<sup>(5)</sup>

We must consider the future problems and tasks from the viewpoint of the relation between the 'deterrence' claimed by the government and the change in the security environment.

The government officials and security experts insist that security concerning Japan is becoming increasingly severe, mainly in the PRC and the DPRK, and the security related legislations will increase 'deterrence'.

However 'deterrence' is not just an issue of military equilibrium. It is the important thing to work on the psychology of the potential attacker and to understand that the other side is 'deterred'. Currently the PRC will rather oppose it by reinforcing its military strength. Moreover it is predicted that many provocative actions of the DPRK will not change only by 'deterrent power' of Japan.

Furthermore it can justify all government claims including the revision of Article 9 of Constitution, explaining from changes in the security environment and the necessity of 'deterrence' insisted by the government. From that point of view, it does not necessarily explain the specific points of this legislation. How does Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense to 'deter' what kind of acts in which country? There is no argument for that. After all the coalition government of the LDP and the Komeito has no logic to understand.

For example if an emergency surrounding the Senkaku Islands occurs,

it is the subject of the defense of Japan's territory and territorial sea, that is to say individual self-defense. The current security related legislations are irrelevant to current situation. This is not subject to the right of collective self-defense.

In fact it is obvious that the PRC will not renounce the territorial rights of the Senkaku Islands. However, in reality, the possibility that the PRC will take the Senkaku Island with military force is considered to be extremely low. In the meantime the PRC navy will repeat acts such as invasion into Japanese territorial waters, and it is conceivable to continuously appeal 'dominant island and territorial waters effectively' in the PRC and abroad. It will be very long-term for the PRC's approach [cf. Iida, 2013: ch.2, 4, 5].

So, in response to Japan, what important in addition to defense is countermeasures at the stage where direct armed conflict does not occur. For example, in 2010, a Chinese fishing boat came into collision with the patrol vessel of the Japan Coast Guard. From now on the Japanese government should consider how to respond to such incidents. Either or both of the Japan Coast Guard and the SDF need to deal with such issues.

When the draft legislation concerning security is deliberated at the HR, the bill of 'Sea Security Guidance' jointly proposed by the DPJ and the Ishin no Kai is in mind with the response to the so-called 'gray zone' situation where such an issue of Senkaku islands is assumed. However the LDP-Komeito coalition regime did not show interest in it and prioritized the legislations of the exercise of collective self-defense rights, which is not directly related to the realistic defense of the Senkaku Islands. In addition the expansion of PRC in the South China Sea meets this requirement for a 'crisis situation of existence'. This is subject to the

exercise of collective self-defense rights in Japan. However the adherents of security related legislations have discussed only 'deterrence'. Though they argue a point of specific issue, they do not make a deliberate decision on various points of issues.

Beyond doubt it is not sure that the security related legislations are not effective for the military pressure of the PRC and the DPRK. In reality the fact that Japan's security role increases and that the Japan-US alliance is strengthened is welcomed by parts of the US and Asian countries. However in Japan the Abe government explains insufficient as a security policy. It jumbles up people rather than to persuade the public. This is related to what Prime Minister Abe's strong personal feeling to the rights of collective self-defense is driving into a key motivating factor in security policy.

The LDP will pursue the revision of Constitution in the future. Even if there is no direct relationship with Japan's security, it is said that the armed attack on ally and friendly nations is regarded as an attack on their own country, and that intends Japan embraces the joint action as the complete 'right of collective defense' policy. However listening to the opinions of many politicians who are supposed to be constitutional reformists of article 9 of Constitution, there is an interest in exclusively the threat of the PRC and the safety of country, but according to policy judgment of the government, the SDF is not related to defending Japan own behalf. It will be dispatched to the other side of the world.

In the end the viewpoint on the government's security policy is not based on internationalist ideas. The basic attitude of legislations related to security is derived from 'inward-looking thinking'.

Discussion of this new security legislation brings two perspectives. The

first is how to 'manage' the Japan-US alliance in the future. This pointed out the necessity of discussion about the future related to the foundation of Japan's security. The second is Japan's actual participation in the international security environment, and discussing how to do it with other countries. These two perspectives need comparative consideration with the policies adopted by conventional Japan [Hitoshi, 2014, 65]. From now on these two perspectives should not be disputed only in Japan.

On the one side in the US, whatever the domestic situation in Japan, Japan's security legislations seem to be useful for US strategy. On the other hand the ROK is Japan's friendly country that can have no illusion about Japan as clearly as the US. How can we build up the security cooperation among the three countries (Japan, the US, and the ROK), and the relation between Japan and the PRC in the near future, looking at the circumstances of the Korean Peninsula, which can be said to be the grave security issue for Japan in the short and medium term. The issues that were not deliberated at all in both Diets are standing in front of Japan that enacted new security legislations.

(5) Geopolitical situation in East Asia in the first half of the 21st century  
Even after the end of the Cold War, in East Asia power balance equally continues to play a dominant role in international politics. Bipolar balance of power system, which appeared in the latter half of the Cold War, has created a triangle state of great power. On the other hand there is a camp around the US, and on the other hand there is a camp mainly in the PRC and Russia. The PRC's rise will not bring about anxiety about the new balance of power system through cooperation between the PRC and Russia. This may be a sign of the emergence of a global balance of power

system. However, as in the Cold War era, unity among nations within each other's camp is not strong. It characterizes the expansionist tendency of hegemon countries in regions in bipolar situation in East Asia [Ross, 2004: 267].

Hegemonism allows maintaining the current situation by band wagoning hegemon countries and balancing new threats. The reason is that regional stability and coexistence of threats can be aimed [Miller, 2004: 242].

The balance of power system in both camps of East Asia is relatively stable. Firstly no stronger country is likely to emerge in the region in the future. Because Japan and Russia lack the attributes required to compete with the US and the PRC of the campaign's allies. Secondly due to the combination of polarization and geopolitics, the PRC, one of the leading actors, should not feel the cost and crisis like the Cold War era in completing with the US. Thirdly neither the US nor the PRC will try to aim for serious challenges to their respective domains.

The PRC still takes time to catch up with the economic and strategic power of the US. In contrast the combination of US's technology and military policy is more than those in the PRC. The US is still expanding its inclusive superiority. The PRC will try to cope with the modernization of military and economic development. Even if there is effort to increase the overall power of each camp, it is stable at the beginning of the 21st century in the balance of power of East Asia. The US's superiority and military deployment in East Asia are helping to strengthen the present strategic status quo, rather than challenging the US. The presence of US in East Asia will reinforce the US's own power within its influence. Nonetheless the regional deployment of the US military would not keep

the capacity of war-fighting in East Asia, and it is unlikely to provide the basis for a 'roll back' strategy. To carry out that, the US must enormously sacrifice the influence of PRC.

The PRC's capability to improve will strengthen the maintenance of strategic status quo. The PRC army is developing as ocean power in East Asia by the naval force deployed on the coast of PRC. Nonetheless its capacity seems to raise the security of the coastal areas of PRC, but it is still unlikely to completely eliminate the influence of US. There are US allies, maritime and air force bases are deployed. The US's long-term dominance in East Asia can still counteract the development of maritime capability of PRC yet [Ross, 2004: 296; cf. Shambaugh, 2005; cf. Gilboy and Heginbotham, 2012].

East Asia constitutes a bipolar structure, but the US is a hegemon country there, and the PRC and Russia do not always agree with the order that it brings. But for the moment, the PRC will not openly challenge to maintain East Asia's status quo. It is unlikely that it can develop to the hegemon country needed to establish a global bipolar system. But that does not mean that the global power of US can maintain balance. The balance of power consisting multipolar factors, if anything, may establish a global balance in reality. It is characterized by a global alliance against the US camps.

Since the PRC possesses the ability to prioritize the military modernization program and the strategic objectives based thereon, in that respect the PRC can compete with Russia in Central Asia, but its capability as collateral for cooperation with Russia the PRC want to preserve. However the PRC government is interested in strategic intervention by the US on the coastal defense border line (perimeter)

facing East Asia. Russia chooses 'roll back' to the presence of US to the ROC so that the 'roll back' is given priority to the presence of US in Eastern Europe. Naturally the common threat of PRC is the power of US, which is common interest. This will be the basis for strategic cooperation of the PRC and Russia in the middle of the 21st century.

Russia stands on the PRC side in East Asia and develops its own interests. Considering the current domestic and foreign circumstances, Russia will give priority to strategic targets rather than competing with the US and the PRC at the same time. So Russia chooses a security policy against the US rather than the PRC. It is an appealing attitude towards the DPRK, for example on nuclear and missile issues. Russia strategically concentrates its resources to respond to the US at the western border.

The current international politics is not a global system consisting of a single hegemon country but a multiple regional balance, which may be the basis of the global power balance. The US is hegemon country of a world in the two bipolar systems of Europe and East Asia in the early 21st century. The PRC and Russia may be involved and balance in countering relations with the US in these regions, and eventually rebuild the global balance of power politics.

Japan's role will contribute as the US collaborator to regional strategic order in the balance of power system of East Asia. Japan, along with the ROK and the ROC, has relied on the US for security. In that respect Japan is unlikely to compel security to neighboring countries with its own initiative. Rather Japan would as soon have to play a role in quarantining conflict with neighboring countries only within the US alliance system. For example it is an issue that conflicts with the ROK and the PRC concerning territorial rights and history recognition [Ross, 2004: 275].

Japan was going to carry out the leadership in disputes of the East Asia after the Second World War. Japan has contributed to local order maintaining in value promoted rather than independent activity of Japan by international environment. Two crisis situations exist in the East Asia at present. There are a crisis for the peace and stability, and the denuclearization on Korean Peninsula, and the crisis for the ROC on some future occasion. The PRC and the US are all leading actors. Japan, the DOK, and the DPRK take a part in the situation. Japan is nothing more than the actor that the US is dependent by those problems. Japanese governments after war have supported the US as much as possible, not only diplomatically but also defense. However it is unquestionable that Japan has made its great contribution to world in the realm of providing non-military assistance to other countries.

For the explanation mentioned above, we must point out two questions. The first is a premise that they get traditional armaments balance between the US, Russia and the PRC. The dominant national system based on the traditional balance of power theory may guarantee sovereign power and the independence of small countries in both camps. However it may not be guaranteed the security for middle and the small sized nations. Secondly hegemon country-centered strategies are not always effective for asymmetric entity called terrorism and separatism campaigns [Thomas, 2004: 315].

### 3 Change of postwar security system

Although there is a view that 'Japan is involved in the war of US', in fact the US has a think that 'the US might as well have no desire to become involved in conflict between Japan and the PRC'. The US has been

drastically reducing defense spending. The US regards the Asia-Pacific region as one of the most important region, but in reality the US performs the Islamic State sweeping strategy etc. in the Middle East, so it is not ready to fight in Asia for the US. Within the US we see a view that the situation of security and peace in Asia depends on Asian countries such as Japan, and that the US troops should withdraw from oversea as much as possible. However since security in the absence of US forces in Japan cannot be considered in Japan, Japanese government would like to force the US troops to stay in Japan at all costs. Therefore it is the current security related legislations that Japanese government provides concrete measures. Since Japanese government takes an active part in the Japan-US Security system, Japan tries to take a stance to support the US troop trying to defend together.

The US may not want Japan to be involved in a military conflict with the PRC from a different perspective. The Japanese government will emphasize that there is probably no such possibility, but the US will not admit that Japanese governments offer an account. At the press conference in April 2015, the remark of Defense Secretary Carter shows the true mindset of the US.

That remark is that the SDF has high military capability and will support the US military in the Asian region and the world. Because the geographical restrictions on the backward support to foreign troops have been removed, the SDF is expected to work with the US forces around the world. For example, in the South China Sea, the PRC will build a military base [cf. Iida, 2013: ch.4]. The duty of watching for it is one of the roles the US needs for Japan. The Obama administration was restrained by the war itself, but the Trump regime does not necessarily make the

same choice. Then Japan cannot deny that Japan is involved in the war that the US will go to in the future.

The JMSDF traditionally acted jointly with the US navy overseas. The JGSDF and the JASDF consider keeping Japan's territory and airspace mainly. There is also a difference in the position within the SDF. The US governments are also differing demands to Japan every time it gets a chance. The military support on the world scale of the US is not assumed at all by Constitution. For example if battle like the war in Iraq in 2003 occurred, it will be supposable more than supporting humanitarian reconstruction. The security related legislations will be able to expand Japan's possible missions. Who puts the brakes on the expansion? It is very important task to check up stretching the meaning of self-defense over its limits.

How do other countries except Japan take stock of the security related legislations? Because Southeast Asian countries feel threatened by the PRC's expansion in the South China Sea, they will sustain activities of SDF in that respect. The ROK government might appreciate Japan to achieve a measure of legitimacy in case of a certain role in the Korean Peninsula in emergency, but the people of ROK will show a strong national sentiment to be regarded Japan as a military superpower, and the ROK government suppresses the reaction to security related legislations.

The PRC exercises vigilance. The Abe government will utilize the PRC' criticism to justify the security related legislations. Naturally the PRC also reinforce its armaments against Japan. It is the 'Threat Theory on China' which is the basis of security related legislations, but how can we perceive the 'threat of PRC'?

The PRC's military expenditure has increased by 3.6 times over the past 10 years. The PRC is Asia's largest military power. In addition the PRC unilaterally makes advances into the ocean. It poses a big threat to neighboring countries. It is certainly inevitable that the PRC will expand its own influence with military power. The PRC will make use of all means such as military power, economic means, and propaganda maneuvers and so on [cf. Iida, 2013: ch.5].

Some politicians, experts, agencies and so on may presuppose a concept of power balance of security that the sum of economic power and military power of Japan and the US needs to exceed the national strength of the PRC for stability of East Asia. However the PRC does not suspect to engage in warfare with Japan or the US. If the PRC choses to go to war with Japan or the US, companies and business persons in Japan and the US that support the economy withdraw capital, and consequently may or not create whole unemployment. Then social unrest will become intense domestically, therefore the Communist government in the PRC will be caught up with crisis. We must pay attention to the fact that it is questionable whether a scenario convenient to the PRC is possible.

Although there are many technical debates over the dispatch of SDF this time, the fundamental doctrine will be worth serious consideration in a future subject for the direction of Japan's security policy. The Japanese government has no doubt that 'deterrence' can be strengthened by the security related legislations. Because the deterrent power is to check the opponent with the high military capability, it is expected that the potential opponents will avoid the use of exercise of military by necessity. However it is true that 'deterrence' policy encourages the competition of armaments expansion. Some experts are skeptical about the deterrent

effect of intent. Especially we do not understand how do suppress the PRC expansion. The specific policy for the deterrence policy has not been refined on.

The Japan-US alliance will certainly deter the PRC military action. However we must also recognize that deterrence will rather induce military expansion. It is important for Japan to appropriately control deterrence, minimize the risk of conflict, get a quick overview of the current state about the future situation, and ensure the steady implementation of strategy. This approach should solve the conflict through international rules or rule of law, while the PRC lightens the current situation based on military power and economic strength. This approach also requires multilateral measures of confidence-building.

It is necessary for us to express our opinions discussing security on whether to accept the SDF in Constitution. At that time what kind of the SDF activity is the central theme to argue? It is a mistake to think that security related legislations should be obviously acceptable. The security related legislations mean the big changes of postwar security policy in Japan. The change involves the foundation of the ideal way of peaceful nation that Japanese people have built up with attainments since the defeat of Second World War.

## Part 5 Japanese people's view of security after the Second World War

### 1 Political culture approach

I think that in Part 5 we must consider from the political orientation of the Japanese people who have influenced the postwar Japanese security policy described from Part 1 to Part 4. This is because the Japanese people's view on peace has controlled the security policy promoted by the LDP after the Second World War to a certain extent. For that political and cultural approaches need to be considered.

Psychological variables affect the results at the system level when forming foreign policy. Psychological variables influence factors, public opinion, nationalism, nation building identity, and others at the social level and national culture. This psychological variables impact psychological factors of the decision makers and people in judgment by policy decision actors and policy making. We can understand the effect of psychological variables on identity formation and inner group conflict [Levy, 2003: 253, 274-275; cf. Lasswell, 1930: IX; cf. Severin with Tankard, 1988; cf. Zaller, 2011].

Culture is defined as 'knowledge, beliefs, techniques, morals, laws, customs, other abilities and habits acquired by humans as members of society'. Therefore culture consists of 'learning patterns of behaviors, emotions, and thoughts shared by members of a society' [cf. Shweder & LeVine, 1984].

If we are aware of what we expect and are expected each other, we may be able to live safely and efficiently together. Every society has developed a combination of 'norms' of behavior, thought, and emotion in the society. Therefore the norms include behavior, thought, value, rule,

and relationship that many people share in a specific society.

People can spend peacefully and efficiently together, if they can fully know what they expect from others. Therefore every society has developed a set of norms. Norm is a habitual, conventional expected behavior in society. It is method of action, thought, and emotion (customary, conventional, expected way of acting, thinking, and feeling in that society). So the norm includes actions, thoughts, values, rules, and relationships that most people share in a particular society. And institution is organized systems of social norms and relationships which embody certain common values and procedures and which meet basic needs of the society [Horton and Horton, 1971 and 1977: 135-136].

The super ego is related to the internalization in the norm of the individual's growing society, and constitutes a personality. The main part of the ego structure is the object-precipitate of the relation. It means that internalization of the socio-cultural environment prepares the foundation that becomes the core of personality [Parsons, 1964].

The norm of avoidance measures has developed when the norm of evasion is tolerated and practiced among other ways of adapting people, where a pattern of biased behavior is in the expected behavior. For example that is tax evasion, speeding violation, drugs and so on [Horton and Horton, 1971 and 1977: 6].

Avoidance measures are means for handling identification between reality and ideal culture. Though they understand people relatively, they are respectability that supports an ideal culture without waiving compromise to real culture.

The concept of institution has two functions [Finer, 1970]. One is that the system will last. Accordingly it is automatically created from the system.

The other is effectiveness and constraint. The institution governs the central area of social life and lasts over time. The institution regulates actions, activities, and attitudes, and becomes a crystallized principle [Blondel, 1976].

The social system is a collection of norms related to interests concerning its members. For example the major social institutions are family, religion, government, economy, education and so on. Human interests will conform to a combination of actions, attitudes, values, beliefs, beliefs, etc. through appropriate norms. A collection of norms is defined. Then the behavior institutionalizes actions and is standardized [Parsons, 1961].

The political system is defined as a relatively stable set of abstract relations, behavior patterns, norms, and values. The political system responds to role, patterned behavior, and a clear criterion of abstract relations. The social structure of system is based on the distribution of power and authority.

These power relationships are usually represented by 'roles'. The political role will achieve or fulfill these decisions, and place rare values and costs. It becomes an institution, and determines the performance of behavior in society. The institution takes the form of roles and actions to form a political system [Mitchell, 1968: 474; cf. Easton, 1981].

Political socialization is political learning of children and adults. This is a normal definition. Political socialization begins in early childhood. The values are transmitted between generations. This inherited value system is institutionalized. It is a network with a structure and procedure and shared value in a social system, or a network with relatively permanent character, and it is related to some social function and some social

function. As Finnemore explains, 'States are socialized to accept certain preferences and expectations by the international society in which they and the people who compose them live' [Finnemore, 1996: 128].

Political analysis consists in about the relationship between institution and norm. The social scientist confirms the system corresponding to the function. Issues are influenced by the system. Political phenomena are institutionalized politics. Politics can also be said to be based on institutions and norms.

The institutions and norms constitute a causal part rather than a dependent part in social and political life; it is also an active determinant of political conflict and social change. As social form and regularity are recognized as effective to the actions and policy makers of power holders, it can be said that 'power' and 'policy decision' follow what can be deduced from data on social organization. On the contrary when considering it as a limited system, complicated and diverse functions come out of social organization.

## 2 Norms of 'pacifism' and 'non-armed neutrality'

### (1) 'Pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'

Pacifism refers to doctrine and movements which in principle oppose all wars, defending persons who do not participate in a non-war role. The means is to strengthen disarmament, arbitration, and international law and international organizations. The usage of modern pacifism is a conscious refusal to military service. However such military service may be rejected by 'anti-militarism' and by the political circumstances rather than religious and ethical reasons.

Modern pacifism is affected by Gandhi's 'non-violent resistance'. And

now pacifism emphasizes the trend of 'non-violent resistance' rather than 'non-resistance'. It is then trended to argue that non-violent actions perform the same function as engage in warfare and can be used as an alternative to military defense and armed liberation struggle. Pacifism is usually determined by means of its purpose. Therefore means and consequences of violence always seem to be accompanied by using armed force. From that point of view pacifism includes peaceful changes in social relations and personal life-style as a way to develop a universal non-violent society [Ostegaad, 1991: 403; Cartor, 1987: 363-364; cf. Creghton and Shaw, 1987].

Here we should note that there are two types of pacifism. 'Gandhi's' non-violent resistance' is absolute pacifism. It is a norm of violence as a personal belief. The norm is tried in the dimension of the person's way of life. This code does not necessarily lead to policies and institutions. The other pacifism is peace-orientalism. It is a thought of nonviolence as a political choice. This norm relates to institutions and policies. Therefore this is not an individual way of living [Matsumoto, 2013: 26, 27]. The credo of the Japanese people after the war is the latter position.

## (2) Advance by degrees of 'anti-war'

The Japanese people who experienced the despotic rule in the Second World War have strong feelings of frenzy. And the denial of war that 'war is not good' is the pacifism, and the 'refusal of war' that is 'anti-militarism' is political norms in Japanese style. Indeed Japanese people's live in the Second World War and after the defeat made a tremendous sacrifice to the people.

Many citizens did not recognize that 'they carried out war with the voluntary decision of the people', and the control over military

has 'responsibility for war of people'. The recognition has perpetuated until now. After the war this understanding becomes common sense of the people. This 'consciousness of defeat' claims to a sense of victimization in themselves as victim [Kyogoku, 1983: 45]. Most of people slip into victim mentality.

The Article 9 of Constitution is not only legitimate feelings of embarrassment, but also serves as a basis for strengthening the norms by political education for the people, as political norms the attitudes of denial and refusal to war. It was meaningful that this article prescribes to the US in advance Constitution in the form of 'intention to express to the Japanese' (the Article 12 of Potsdam Declaration) in order to deprive Japan's capability to rematch against the US.<sup>(1)</sup>

Japanese citizens have adopted the Article 9 of Constitution's war abandonment and unarmed neutral principle, but instead came to understand the image that guarantees unilateral and total security by the US. Said differently it obviously obliges Japan's unilateral dependence and unilateral protection of the US. Consequently denial and refusal of war have become common sense and norm of the Japanese people, and had a profound influence on subsequent Japan-US relations, Japan's security policy, and Japanese diplomacy [Kyogoku, 1983: 46-47].

Along with the beginning of the Cold War the US's global strategy has reconsidered the occupied role of Japan. Because the US wanted to exploit the geopolitical position firstly, the potential industrial capability secondly, the potential military capability thirdly.

Therefore the occupation policy by the US changed. The US intended the two transformations. The first is Japan's economic independence. The occupation policy turned Japan into a line to rebuild as a trading nation.

The second is stable use of US military bases. It was to switch from unilateral use by occupation forces to voluntary provision of military bases from the standpoint of Japan as the allies.

On the one hand Japan has confirmed that the San Francisco Peace Treaty has ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense rights’, while on the other hand the Japan-US Security Treaty has ‘effective means of exercising the right of self-defense in person’. As a provisional measure for defense, the US military wanted to maintain safety in and neighboring area around Japan because ‘Japan installed no defense capability’. So to speak the Article 9 of Constitution became one set with the Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty [Kyogoku, 1983: 47; cf. Dower and McCormack, 2014: ch.1].

After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the GHQ ordered the Japanese government to create the Agency of Police Reserve. De facto rearmament opened. In 1952 the Yoshida government reorganized it into the Security Force, set up the Maritime Security Guard, and established the Agency of Security. In 1954 the Agency of Security were reorganized into the SDF organized three forces of JDSDF, JNSDF, JSDF, and the Agency of Security developed into the Agency of Defense (lately the Ministry of Defense). ‘The SDF is the main duty to defend Japan against direct invasion and indirect aggression to preserve the peace and independence of our country and to keep the country safe’ (the Article 3 of SDF Law). This law concurs with the provisions of Article 9 of Constitution. As a result controversy on this coexistence in conflict continues. In this controversy there are three arguments.

①Conservative Revisionist group insists on the revise the Article 9 of Constitution and claims to reinforce the SDF.

②Conservative Constitutional faction considers the SDF as constitutional and claims to enhance the SDF. This claim was a view of the Japanese government until recently.

③The Progressist Pro-Constitution element insists that the SDF is unconstitutional.

In considering this controversy we must take the following into effect.

Firstly in 1950 the GHQ pointed out that Article 9 of Constitution does not deny the right of self-defense, announced the transformation from occupation policy and postwar reform. Secondly Japan promised the US an incremental burden for Japan's defense in the preamble of 1952 Japan-US Security Treaty. The Article 3 of New Japan-US Security Treaty revised in 1960 declared to implement the ability to resist armed attack under conditions that follow the provisions of Constitution. Thirdly the majority of Japanese people have tolerated the system of gradual increase of the Japan-US Security Treaty and self-defense capability on the one hand, while maintaining the system of denial and refusal of war, the image of disarmed neutral on the other hand.

The Japanese security system switched to a system based on the 'specific rights of individual or collective self-defense' that Japan takes charge from the system of full assurance by the US military under occupation [Kyogoku, 1983: 49].

The norm of economic developmentalism has become a guiding beacon of postwar Japan. Japan emphasizes foreign policy that put the economy ahead of all else. It is the core in the 'Yoshida line' otherwise phrased. It combines post-war norm of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' with norm of economic developmentalism. Especially the LDP government will start full-scale economic developmentalism from the 1960s on the other hand.

In 1960 the Ikeda government focused on economic growth in regardless of military capacity. The economic developmentalism rejects the acceptance of pre-war militarism, and supports the postwar 'anti-militarism'. Japanese government and people placed economic interests ahead of military growth. Economic developmentalism prioritizes economic activity, promoting aggressive economic activities together with the public and private sectors [cf. Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson, 2012: Part1].

### (3) Japan-US security arrangements and '*Real Politics*' after war

In the conflict between the US and the USSR, the qualitatively different 'reality' from Japan's unarmed neutral image is that the security provided by the US against the USSR (i.e. nuclear umbrella, airspace overseas, the US military bases, etc.), meanwhile, meaning Japan not guaranteeing again the threat of peace and security of the US and the world. The Japanese government convinced the people to 'utility' of the Japan-US security system through economic prosperity 'real benefits'. The Japanese government did not attempt to explain its political meaning and ideology. The government adopted a separation line of government.

Japan has been able to achieve 'mercantilist' economic growth on the premise of military and international political security system provided by the US military and the international economic system centered on the US economy. Japan is involved in the international economy through trade, but diplomatic policy has not been taken as much as possible to international politics. Japan has followed up with the US on international politics decisions [Kyogoku, 1983: 49].

Japan's defense capability will gradually increase based on the Japan-US Security Treaty. Firstly the Japanese government passively

responded to the demand for the self-defense enhancement of the US, and carried out minimal reinforcement. Moreover it also became a measure to suppress the increase of fiscal burden. The policy is criticized as 'free ride' from the US. Secondly according to the norm of not wanting to get involved in the war of the Japanese people, depending on departure from isolation from international political problems and isolation orientation, the Japanese government has taken policy of avoiding conflicts about international politics. For example the Japanese government has not participated in the UN cease-fire monitoring group, and has continued to refuse political asylum seekers and refugees [Kyogoku, 1983: 49].

Beyond doubt the Japanese government was passive or not passive about the relationship with the US in accordance with circumstance. The conservative forces attempt to rectify 'excessive democratization' by postwar reforms. This is a 'reverse course'. Opposition parties and mass communications resisted it. The conflict over the revision of the security in 1960 was the cornerstone.

Later on the Ikeda cabinet agreed on the economic growth oriented by the people, and since then the LDP abandoned the return of the political system before the Second World War, and began to accept postwar reform.

Unlike before the Second World War most of Japanese people have shown 'attitude towards their pro-the US' after the war. Needless to say, still there is criticism of the US. When the occupation policy of the US changes from 'idealism' to 'real politics' and believes in peace toward Japan and the Japan-US security arrangements, it will come about criticism against the US in the left wing forces with intellectuals, cultural celebrities, and students. They criticize the intention of US to prioritize

military and powerful interests. US diplomacy is not peaceful, and imperialistic. Progressive intellectuals and cultural celebrities joined the camp of the 'anti-US and left'. This camp will work as a brake against strengthening of the Japan-US military alliance.

The opposition parties appealed 'all-around friendship' to the desire of the Japanese people. They appealed for the reduction and elimination of self-defense capabilities, and preached the withdrawal from the Japan-US security arrangements. The LDP government used this domestic situation as a means of negotiations to minimize the gradual increase of self-defense power [Kyogoku, 1983: 52; Nakamura, 2005: ch.1].

#### (4) Present 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'

So what does the current Japanese people think about security? I would like to think about that point from recent poll. I will judge from the research materials of the Asahi Newspaper, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Professor Fukuda.

Firstly let us look at the opinion poll of the Asahi Newspaper from March to April 2017 [[http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASK4L528LK4LUZPS004.html?ref=pc\\_extlink](http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASK4L528LK4LUZPS004.html?ref=pc_extlink)]. The 89% of Japanese citizens support the current Constitution. Regarding the revision of Constitution, the 50% of Japanese citizens think 'it is not necessary to change' (the 55% in 2016). The 41% of Japanese citizens are seeking a constitutional amendment (the 37% in 2016). Most Japanese evaluate the historical role Constitution has played and the guidelines for the present and the future.

The 63% of Japanese citizens do not support the change on the Article 9 of Constitution. The number of supporters who amend the Article 9 is the 38% (the 27% in 2016). The people are calling for actions, 'emergency

situation' claimed by the LDP, within the framework of the present Constitution.

The 93% of Japanese citizens feel uneasy about recent developments in the PRC's ocean and the DPRK's nuclear and missile development movement. However the 40% of people believe that Constitution is in violation of the 'security related legislations' established in 2015. On the other hand the 80% of people agree with the Japan-US Security Treaty and the 70% answer that the content is 'as it is'.

Similar survey results also appear in the public opinion survey on the security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [[www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ah\\_chosa.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ah_chosa.html)]. In Japanese awareness of peace and security, the 54.1% of Japanese people regard the country as 'peaceful and safe'. For Japan's peace and security they believe that the 77% should be strengthened in the US, the 47% in PRC and the 27.8% in strengthening relations with ROK. In the grounds that peace and security are protected, the 64% say 'Peaceful Constitution', the 51% 'Alliance with the US', and the 46% the 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles'.

In the security policy, the 42.6% call for 'dialogue and exchange', and the 34.2% expect 'strengthening Japan-US alliance relationship'. The 18.8% think about 'strengthening the defense capability of the SDF', and the 15.2% further aim for 'maintenance of emergency legislation'. The 8.7% only accept 'the exercise of collective self-defense of Japan'. Regarding the right of collective self-defense, the 40.8% believe that 'Japan should be maintained in the future' they believe that it is necessary to set up an emergency legislation.

However, among them, the 20.8% should limit 'the right to collective self-defense regarding high seas around Japan' to be granted. Therefore

the 57.1% make a certain evaluation for the UN peacekeeping operations, but the 49.4% are worried that 'PKO personnel are at risk'.

These findings show that they adhere to the norms of Japanese people's 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. Japanese people have continued two norms learned from the defeat of Second World War, domestic and foreign experience in the Cold War era, and international tension after the Cold War, which has an effect on the government's security policy.

Professor Fukuda is investigating Japanese view of war over security regulations in Japan and security consciousness [Fukuda, 2016: 129-149]. With reference to that consciousness survey, I will take up the current Japanese view of security, of war, and of peace.

According to attitudes towards the security-related law, approval is the 45.4% and opposition is the 54.6%. By gender the 54.3% for male approve and the 63.2% for women oppose. By age in the 20s and under, the opposites to the law agreed with the 50%, while in the 70s, the tendency was slightly more favorable, the 51.4%. There are many opposites in the 30s, 40s, 50s and 60s. Young people less than 20 years old and elderly people in their 70s are most generous.

In the question 'From the situation of the world today, Japan is involved in war and there is a danger of being invaded from other countries', the 17.4% answered 'It is a very dangerous', the 61.4% recognizes risk to some extent, and the 78.8% percept risk that there is a danger concerning war in total.

There are three factors in the consciousness of Japanese security-related legislations: critical attitude, positive pacifism and individual self-defense rights.

Critical attitudes represent a critical part of security-related

legislations such as 'the risk of Japan involved in war by the exercise of collective self-defense increases' and 'it is against Constitution'. Positive pacifism is; 'Japan is hard to maintain peace in the country', 'Japan's security policy should be changed according to the world situation' and 'Japan is active in global security and should support international contribution'. Individual self-defense right shows the attitude that 'even if it violates the territorial airspace and sea, it can respond with individual self-defense rights'. This is an attitude to question the inevitability of collective self-defense rights.

Japanese people criticize that the Abe government's dissatisfaction of less discussing the security bills are not being held firmly and that explanation to the public is inadequate. The 53% of Japanese people answer they feel a danger of returning to Japan's militarism before the Second World War'. The 49.4% are concerned about 'fear of becoming a conscription system'. The 75% think that 'the exercise of collective self-defense rights leads to participation of war in Japan'. The 59.2% believe that the security legislation is 'violating Constitution' and the 80.6% 'want to keep the 'peaceful Constitution'. The majority of Japanese citizens regard security-related legislation as constitutional violation. Said differently Japanese citizens persistently maintain the orientation of 'pacifism and anti-militarism'.

What is the relationship between Japanese people's views on war and security consciousness? The 87.2% say 'war should not be permitted for whatever reason'; the 86.4% have 'view of illegal war' that it is 'an illegal act'. Among them the 73% adhere to the view of indiscriminate attack that 'it is impossible for the war to judge ethically from either right or wrong'. Japanese people regard it as a phenomenon that cannot be

judged from an ethical point of view including right or wrong, and legal point of law and illegality. This consciousness may not necessarily coincide with the realism backed up by the balance of power and equilibrium of military power leads to the deterrence of war, and possession of armed force leads to deterrence of war. However it is also certain that there is a correlation between each view of war. Therefore 'pros and cons of war' and 'view of realism' influence the Japanese citizens in favor of 'pros and cons of security'.

For Japanese people the relationship between security consciousness and war has a certain structure. On the one hand the defeat in the Second World War, the illegal war by domestic and foreign experiences after the war, and incidents in the Post-Cold War have formed a critical attitude towards security legislation related laws, because it is oriented towards pacifism, anti-militarism, and pro-Constitution elements (especially the Article 9). On the other hand the citizens' view of realistic war is linked to active pacifism. Therefore although it appears contradictory, the attitude towards the security policy of Japanese people has an influence on the views of illegal war and realist war. This idea may not necessarily agree with the security policy of Japanese government

Japanese people have a unique view in political structure in Japan. There exists a controversy over daily realistic interests and ideological issues related to unconventional issues surrounding the constitutional amendment and security and defense in parallel. Left wing forces have exerted considerable influence at the issue of constitutional amendment and defense [Muramatsu, 1981: 290]. To this background Japanese people's values have been expressed for a long time [cf. Tsuchiyama, 2007].

### 3 Norm regulates security policy

#### (1) The Japan-US relationship on political culture

Realist theory explains in terms of unified, rational national conditions that maximize power. In this view Japan chooses a clear security policy. Japan invests in the economy, but in military security under the protection of US, and it is said to choose a kind of 'free-riding' in defense sector. There exist two problems with this explanation. Firstly the realist does not explain the fact that Japanese defense policy has adapted to the pressure of US in the 1980s. Even if Japan conceded merely to the US in the 1980s, Japan's defense reconstruction will not be underestimated. By the mid-1990s Japan was a considerable 'military power' in the world [Katzenstein, 1996: 149].

Secondly the realist explains that the political actor defines its interests during the period in government. Because the US has more power than Japan, it gets what it wants to Japan. Japan increased its defense expenditure in the 1980s. Although this explanation is better than military rebuilding of the power of the US, it does not explain the circumstances that failed in the transfer of technology [cf. Katzenstein, 2013]. We can infer from the results that the US government is not serious about transferring technology. The realist would analyze the measures of GNP in the country and take them into account into the overall influence. It is unlikely to be able to distinguish between the issues of military security and economic security [Katzenstein, 1996: 149].

Liberal analysis highlights not only power, but also the norm. However we can understand difficulties instantaneously. Since 1983 legal norms governing the transfer of technology between Japan and the US were re-defined to promote the increasing trend of appropriate military

technology. However Japan's economic policies have hardly changed. From this consideration, we would not like to insist that an analysis based on norms can determine in according to all the benefits of communicating policy choice with the normative standards [Katzenstein, 1996: 149-150].

How can we explain Japan's will to adapt to US pressure? The transnational nexus of Japan and the US does not mention the issues of collective identity. They are in the area of normative norms, that is, the appropriate code and norm of conduct within a foreign relationship defined by the terms of long-term standards [Katzenstein, 1996: 150].

In judging Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty, we can explain how to deal with the strict support of the first two (principles not making and not keeping nuclear weapon of non-nuclear three principles, and loosen the 'Three Principle' carrying on nuclear weapon). Under the conditions of collective identity, the Article 9 of Constitution is more prominent than the Japan-US Security Treaty. Japan's security policy is 'independence factor' of 'peaceful Constitution' that limits military, not relations with the US [Katzenstein, 1996: 149-151].

The institutionalized norms that formed Japan's security policy changed drastically with the norm that worked until 1945. The SDF is under the civilian control under the 'peaceful Constitution'. This change was due to unconditional surrender in 1945, occupation by the US until 1951, and a fierce political struggle in the 1950s. After the Second World War the Allied leaders instructed democratization and de-centralization of Japanese society. The Allied had abolished the army once. However its aim was to interrupt the US policy by the Korean War and to reorganize the Police Reserve Corp for Japan's security in 1950. The Police Reserve Corp expanded as the Safety Force in 1952, and was renamed to the SDF

in 1954. In the same year the Agency of Defense succeeded to Safety Agency. The National Defense Council was also established. However these security agencies became the cause of intense political conflict in the late 1950s. This controversy faded as soon as the LDP government brought about rapid economic growth from the 1960s [Katzenstein, 1996: 57].

## (2) Raison d'être of the Article 9 in Constitution

The developmental state of Japan, the brokered democracy in Japan, the relationship between the state and society, and especially the US-centered multilateral consolidation have constituted decisive factors on the security policy. So these factors will interact with social and legal norms. These norms influence Japanese people and Japan's security policy. In the early postwar experience the Japanese people will internalize consciousness in the complete opposite in the prewar. As typical example the Japanese people respect the Article 9 of Constitution [Katzenstein, 1996: 57ff; cf. Tanaka, 2005: ch.2, 3].

What is the reason that the institutionalized norm has been maintained despite domestic or foreign changes? The security policy is formed by the factors eliminated from the analysis by the realist theory in Japan. Realism focuses on a rational and unified nation. Through the measures of balance of power and bandwagon, the measures will try to secure their own safety and security in an 'anarchic' international system. The theory tends to ignore the effect of institutionalized norms in policy scope and variability [Katzenstain, 1996: 129].

When recognizing the role that regulatory norms play in politics, liberal theories contain explanatory elements from the theory of realist. We eliminate the difference between policy dimensions of Japan's economy

and defense in Japan if we neglect the regulatory norm and collective identity. The norm of economic security is a concept which the people agree. That is the policy of economic growth. On the one hand people approve the flexibility of the economic policy for that purpose. On the other hand citizens are critical for changes in national defense security policy. For example progressives in Japan strongly resist such policy (they are particularly worried)[Katzenstein, 1996: 129]. It is different directions shown in economic and defense security policies.

Since the defeat of Second World War Japan has avoided military power. In some of Japanese there are people insisting on arm with nuclear weapons, but most citizens have refused nuclear weapons and powerful troops. Professor Reischauer pointed out in 1970 that “Japanese people have distrust of militarism. However people feel they cannot circumvent the international responsibility that requires strong military capability”. Later, after the end of the Cold War, the controversy on that point has continued. However institutionalized norms are more dominant among the people than incentives, which are international contributions that are requested from international systems. The norms of ‘pacifism’ and ‘anti-militarism’ regulate Japan’s security policy in changing international politics. Japanese policy makers have been planning policies with the norms formed between the 1950s and 1960s, despite major changes in environments of foreign security. Japan has reduced tension in the Asia-Pacific region by avoiding military power [Berger, 1996: 356]. It is ‘Fukuda doctrine’<sup>(3)</sup> in 1977 for example.

### (3) ‘Pacifistic’ and ‘anti-militaristic’ norms

Japanese people have maintained the collective identity acquired in the

1950s for several decades. And a specific identity is 'peace-loving and anti-militarism-feeling' among people [Katzenstein, 1996: 23].

Many liberals argue that Japan's 'pacifism' (otherwise phrased 'nuclear allergy and anti-war idea') is a natural result of atomic bombings to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In association with this, the realist insists that the Japanese view of security is being influenced by changes in the international balance of power, which undergoes 'historical'. Both views explain that since 1945 Japan transformed itself from aggressive militarism to peaceful mercantile. But is it possible to fully explain by just pointing out?

Professor Katzenstein insists that he cannot convince even explaining the relationship between history and culture unless he can embody the transformational political mechanism. In the 1950s after the Japan's defeat the Japanese people have experienced intense political conflict at the time of what kind of country. For example debates on the revision of Japan-US Security Treaty have made Japanese people break up in 1960. Such a confrontation can be proved by politically sacrificing the Japanese political elites. In the 1960s the LDP governments reconsidered Japan's goals for high economic growth. This is the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' or 'Yoshida Route' that destined Japan to the present.

In the 1950s Prime Minister Yoshida set up the route that Japan should take after the Second World War. 'Yoshida Doctrine' was 'one placing high priority on Japan's economic growth and position in the world and low spending and priority on the military'. Yoshida's successors have adhered to the criterion of the Yoshida's line under the majority rule under the LDP's long-term administrations except a few ministers in the sustainability of the norm. Since then the norm has formed mind that it is

an essential collective identity when talking about Japan's security.

The norm cannot be static certainly. It is indeterminate. However 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' have not changed according to the norm of Japan's security. The 'answer' lies in history and institution after the Second World War. The political actors understand its meaning in the historical debate to clarify the collective identity rather than the daily conflict of politics. Collective identity does not change easily. Approval for institutionalized norms on it establishes in people's consciousness beyond the scope of choice at a given time. For example the majority of the people comply with the Article 9 of Constitution. Therefore history and institution internalize both priority and sustainability into norms.

In short it is important that Japan's security policy understands to political actors by various norms. It is beneficial to focus on norms. Collective identity in the people and institutionalized norms are closely related [Kazenstein, 1996: 22].

Since the early 1950s the central part of Japan's security policy has not changed. However since the mid-1970s, a new 'realism' has appeared in foreign policy. Realism brought various meanings to people. The pacifist leftists and liberals felt a threat to both the text and spirit of the Japanese styled of 'peaceful Constitution'. The rightists have searched for the possibility of reevaluating Japan's national role in the world. A new type of nationalism was in the form of increasing the influence the political scene between the right-wing camp and the left-wing camp. Political realists relate to the security policy of the diplomatic meaning and domestic 'pacifist' sentiment. In contrast a 'militaristic realist' is focused on the balance of military in Asia to promote the need for close political cooperation with the US. They are not interested in the public sensibility

of national defense.

In the Japan-US relationship Japan's policies have been expected to be more flexible over economic changes than military change. But the opposite is also true. It is unlikely to be able to explain the transformation of the postwar Japan-US security system by transnational linkage alone. In the 1980s Japan gradually accepted the role of security in East Asia. It effectively modified post-war defense policy [Katzenstein, 1996: 131].

#### (4) Norms of 'bilateralism'

We must not forget the norms and institutions that are another strong Japan-US bilateralism. This is strangely complemented by Japanese people's view of security in a form contradictory to 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' [cf. Hook, Gillson, Hughes, Dobson, 2012: Part II].

The norm of 'bilateralism' has also been embedded through the Japan-US Security Treaty, and has created people who agreed on its 'bilateralism'. This means that Japan's foreign policy acts on the basis of 'bilateralism' and that Japan should act outwardly within the Japan-US alliance. This idea of policy has been the dominant norm that has guided the role of Japanese governments and people in the world since 1945. Prime Minister Yoshida stipulated the norm of 'bilateralism' from the late 1940s until the early 1950s. 'Yoshida Doctrine' became the guiding principle for the subsequent prime ministers. However Prime Minister Nakasone expanded the activity of SDF in 1980s. In recent years it is being forced to modify with the end of the Cold War. Prime Minister Koizumi tried to change the conventional rule after the simultaneous terrorist attacks in 2001, and since 2012 the Abe government is promoting further to give shape to modify. Koizumi promoted the closer

cooperation with the US in the 'War on Terrorism', and Abe has called for further link within the US' dominance in the military tension in East Asia (i.e. the DPRK and the PRC). The successive governments have been maintaining the norm of 'bilateralism', seeking expansion to relations with the US.

The norm of internationalism is to cooperate with and support the international society. Particularly the 'realists' in Japan emphasize the 'normal state', in which the norm is the logic of developed countries. Put another way, it means a state that can fully utilize the military and economic capability.

Japan provides international public goods and support multilateral global institutions. The case is an international contribution of both participation in the UNPKO and make contributions to the world. It is said that this is 'normal internationalist action'. In dealing with the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991, Japan was criticized by 'free-riding' diplomacy or 'chequebook' diplomacy, especially from the US. This criticism tried to revise the conventional norm by 'realists' of Japanese political leaders. It is requested that the international contribution should be penetrated into Japanese society if it is indispensable from the views of human, physical and spiritual points. In sum it is the ultimate goal that the Japanese governments and people approve the international standard level that they have emphasized, and turn Japan into the 'normal state' [Ozawa, 1994]. The interpretation of this internationalism contradicts the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' domestically.

## Conclusion

'Pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' are the two great values of Japanese people

(4)  
 after war. Japanese citizens have been in the idea of peace and no-war commitment in an inconsistent way, centered on the war-renouncing, the Article 9 in Constitution, with the Japan-US security arrangements and the SDF, and they feel a gap between the norm and reality in particular in the international situation after the Cold War.

In September 1951 Japan restored independence after the occupation and signed the Security Treaty between Japan and the US. It provided for the maintenance of the US military for peacekeeping in the Far East region and defense of Japan (the former Security Treaty). In 1960 a new 'Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between Japan and the US (the so-called 'New Revised Security Treaty')' was signed by both parties. In the 'New Revised Security Treaty' the preliminary talks between Japan and the US are decided on the bilateral obligations of Japan and the US against armed attack to Japan, as well as the military action of US forces in Japan for peace in Far East.

The SDF is an 'army' with the main duty of Japan's defense, consisting of JDSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF that have police functions to maintain public order. The highest conduct is the Prime Minister, and the exercise of its commander's supervision right is based on the policy decided by the Japanese government. The Minister of Agency (Ministry) of Defense will oversee the SDF through the each chief of staff of the JDSDF, the JMSDF, and the JASDF, being obedient to the orders of Prime Minister. The National Defense Council is an advisory body to deliberate important matters concerning national defense to the Cabinet for civilian control [cf. Sadou, 2015].

Such value towards 'peace' is tightly coupled with the 'national consciousness' The Japanese people who experienced the first victims of

nuclear weapons and the resultant defeat waged eagerly for peace more than any foreign citizens. Still it is also a reflection and repentance on aggressive war that Japan carried out before the war. Real pacifism in the post-war Japan combines with the view in safety of its people's mind. In Japan the greatest tragic experience is Hiroshima and Nagasaki (, and the Fukuryu Maru Incident at the Bikini Atoll after the war). "We do not want to have such experiences again. Of course Japanese people wish that they do not want people in the world to experience the same atomic bombing as Japanese people. That is the origin of the Japanese people's postwar 'anti-war feeling', 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. Any international problem must be solved through peaceful means, not military force of nuclear weapons".

To date 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' should respect the experiences and lessons learned of Japanese citizens trying to preserve world peace and security. Each citizen can understand the experience of the atomic bombings to Japan only in abstract form. Japanese people place emphasis on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, because the victims of the atomic bomb are our compatriots. If Japanese people have not been attacked with atomic bomb, Japanese citizens' refusal to nuclear weapons would have been a shallow argument. This is formed on a deep psychological level of the consciousness of the Japanese people after the war [Shimizu, 1975: 58, 60].

Since the defeat of Second World War the consciousness to 'peace and war' of the Japanese people have changed greatly. Japanese People after the war have created the unique citizens called 'Sengo Nipponjin' [Nagao, 1997: 199].

On the other hand, however, if we consider that 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' were the consequences of the mighty 'peaceful coexistence'

between the US and the USSR, some people assert that Japan is a position of a 'subordinate country' under the US. In that respect Japanese people and their governments, as 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' are instantiated after the war, have preserved 'national consciousness' till now, but subjective positive attitude for value realization has lost [Shimizu, 1975: 50]. The Japanese people's 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' are usually different from what is defined.<sup>(5)</sup>

## Part 6 Re-examination of security in international politics

### 1 What is security?

#### (1) Concept of security

Security is maintaining national independence and interests against aggression and other external infringement.<sup>(1)</sup> Security is an important concept to understand international politics, but its meaning is ambiguous and flexible. In the most basic sense safety is not harmed as leaders or citizens by others, and it is in a state of not feeling threats, anxiety, or danger. With this level of content, it is believed that the state (or its leaders and citizens) is safe when another state or non-state actor is not hostile towards its own country. So security exists not an objective condition but a subjective aspect. Security therefore depends not on whether people justify how they perceive their method to be legitimate, but on whether they perceive their position within that environment. Furthermore sovereignty secures many contents without failure. Individuals cannot be tolerant of uncertainty, ability to live anxiously, or insecure to resist pressure. If anything individuals are subjective somewhere on a continuous line from safe to unsafe. Therefore we must also consider consciousness to feel safe or unsafe [cf. Buzn, Wæver, Wilde, 1998: ch.2, 3, 7, 9; cf. Sheehan, 2005: ch.2, 10, 11].

Then what is the threat which is not safe? The threat assumes the presence of enemies or potential enemies to security. Military threats are judged from 'capability' and 'will'. Even if a country has the intention of invading another country, if there is no military ability to do it, and if the military power of a country is overwhelming, it is not a threat for the country. Also, even if one country possesses military power, if the

friendly relation maintains in both countries, a country's military capacity should not be a threat.

The nation will not be maintained completely safe. Needless to say the nation is usually not in the midst of insecurity and fear. For both individual and nation safety is not a color such as 'black' and 'white', but it is in a state of 'gray' to the last. The security of the state is affected by the international environment. International politics is characterized by the absence of the world government with authority to form and enforce the law in order to resolve conflicts between states. In an anarchical situation in the international society the state must have a steady interest in security. The nation-state must maintain a stable situation that does not feel a threat to the behavior of other countries and non-state actors. The nation-state pursues the safety of its own country so that it should survive in the international community. Stated in different fashion, the nation-state 'has the right to restrain attacks from other countries to their own country and also to demand self-defense. Surely the primary concern for security tends to assume both military power and will of other countries. And in addition to them, we are forced to pay attention to the national capability in a broad sense.

## (2) Security dilemma

The concept of security is likely to be in a broad sense. Security has been interpreted conveniently for the sake of one's national interests. In the security policy a state has expanded its influence externally, military competition started from economic interests, and carried out an aggressive war under the 'self-defense'. The nation-state has acted under its own 'safety'.

For example, in former half of 20th century, Japan consolidated northeastern China (Manchuria) in the name of 'Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' in order to guarantee its own security against 'foreign threat', and went to war against China. It took up and occupied the Dutch East Indies, Southeast Asia. After the Second World War, the USSR dominated Eastern Europe and Central Europe for 45 years under the name of security against invasion from the West. The US also waged war in two Asian countries (the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam) for the safety and defense of the US and its allies against Communism. The USSR escalated nuclear arms for security purposes. In other words, from a historical point of view, 'security' has been used to justify the external behavior of the state. Therefore security includes both subjective character and various elements [cf. Duffield, 2006].

For example Liberalists argue that it is important to keep peace feeling that compensation for war is great. Damage due to military force is enormous. The damage is absent in peace. And maintaining peace brings peace of mind. Liberalism suppresses hostile behaviors through deepening interdependence and establishing institutions such as international organizations.

International institutionalization is necessary to ensure mutual benefits. To prevent that benefits from peace are not lost, the leaders of each country institutionalize security arrangements and economic arrangements, and otherwise increase the cost of breach. Participants must recognize that cooperative action has a beneficial motivation. That is a merit of observing the agreement, so a disadvantage against it. If political leaders realize that they have disadvantages, they can understand that interdependence is important [Ueki, 2015: ch.7]. However

will realists accept this view?

The dilemma of security is that conditions in an anarchical society of self-help that motivates groups and individuals who make efforts to achieve safety from attacks to avoid the impact of other powers to gain more and more power. There is no government or transcendental authority. In relation to other nation-states, the increase of insecurity motivates the expansion prepared 'the corrupt circle due to security and power accumulation'. International relations are also equated with anarchic social conditions in many ways. Even though hostile states do not attack other states, security dilemmas are often attributed to the source of military extension, escalation of diplomatic crisis to war.

The security dilemma works only on certain conditions of international relations. It arises from the perception of the leaders of the military environment. In particular whether attacks have substantial advantages over defense, and whether defense capabilities are distinguished from attack abilities. For example geographically natural topography such as mountains, rivers, and the ocean will facilitate defense and relieve security dilemma (e.g. Switzerland, the UK, and Japan). On the contrary the plains are defensive security dilemmas are diminished (e.g. Central European countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the western border of former USSR). Describing the technical capabilities, strong onshore defense is necessary. In addition nuclear weapons that seem to be highly precise and effective exacerbate security.

Military personnel and political leaders in 1914 thought that technical ability could instantly develop and mobilize the mobilization system, and be advantageous for attack. However attack and defense strategies cannot be easily separated. Ironically and immediately the war made

people understand that the trench warfare would make defense power advantageous due to misrecognition of the strategic environment. Said differently, the cognition of hostile intention and the changing strategic environment further exacerbates the dilemma of security. Before the French army expanded and the Russian one mobilized, the German leaders and elites cognized a kind of 'opportunity' in 1914. After that the security dilemma gradually deteriorates. Threats and concessions will increase hostile unsafe, but neither will likely eliminate the dilemma of security.

If the hostile country has a defensive objective, so as to improve and reduce the means of enhancing hostile intent and ability, it will bring a change in strategic attitude and weapons to procure advantage (or effectiveness) to the defense. It will be useful for security that non-armed management agreement that discards effective weapons of initial attacks and prepares non-militarized buffer zones and so on. Currently the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has relaxed the dilemma of security in Europe to a considerable extent. That is because established arms control and disarmament agreements reduce heavy-punch capability, and become possible to exchange information and tactics prior to crisis and emergency.

So the UN collective security framework becomes more effective. It is the regional 'cooperative security' agency that complements it. More concretely there is an incentive to strengthen existing alliances. Specifically the threat of ballistic missiles is dealt with by building a theater anti-missile defense system. The Western alliance formed in the Cold War era is transforming into a network for handling all aspect of various instability factors after the Cold War. The discussion on the

expansion of the North Pacific Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe and the Declaration of Security Communities in Japan, and the US is also making the alliance during the Cold War convert in such a direction.

The most important task at present is how to adopt a response to states that can pose threats to the west from a long-term perspective like the PRC, Russia and so on. From the 1990s onwards while taking a line of 'involvement policy' to the PRC, and strengthening existing relations of alliance, the US has strengthened the framework of 'cooperative security' including the PRC. However the present Trump government of US is taking an attitude in view of geopolitical balance of power.

After the Cold War the view of security has also changed. Cooperative regional security and active role of the UN were added to the individual security plus collective security (alliance) during and after the Cold War. Cooperative security does not assume a common virtual enemy country. They are examples that include the European Security Cooperation Organization (OSCE) in Europe and the ASEAN Forum (ARF) in Asia.

The framework of cooperative regional security does not directly assure and defend each country. As a collective security organization, it does not jointly negotiate counterattacks with respect to attacks from outside the Member States, and there is no punitive provision for armed conflicts among Members within the region. Its merit is to use countries that may potentially become hostile countries, and to use for mutual trust building through exchanging mutual intentions and information. Therefore cooperative security only 'complements' self-help efforts and alliances, and cannot 'substitute' for them [cf. Higgott, 2006].

### (3) Review of deterrence theory

#### Target of deterrence

Deterrence is a concept used by defense strategists, military planners, and alliances. The deterrence is the capability to protect the country that can be made reprisal against unacceptable attacks and threats from other countries and non-state organizations. The argument is that as long as the potential enemies are costly to attack, they are not attacked. Therefore military capability justifies possession of offensive capability under conditions to deter attacks from other actors. That means maintaining the status quo under the current security environment.

The deterrence aims at preventing behavior by the result fear. Therefore deterrence is also a state of mind assuming an unacceptable counteraction. It is easy to think deterrence is always a military role for all defense, except for people who intend to conquer war.

The deterrent countries should convince the opponent the willingness to exercise the military power. It is founded on the willingness and capability of counterattacks by the threat of retaliation. If it is judged that its attitude is bluff, the hostile country only prepares a pre-emptive strike or counter-strike.

However deterrence is not necessarily limited to military means, non-military means such as economic power should also be applied. A specific deterrence strategy is called 'to persuade' that not only exercises influence through capability to 'threat' or 'appeasement' by exercising ability or power, but also promotes a stance to cooperate with the other side by appealing to common interests with related countries. It is one of methods that is also conceivable [Sato, 1989: 10].

The deterrent concept needs to be reconsidered [Yagi, 2012: 101, 118-120]. It

has often been forced to modify due to environmental changes in international security. Put another way, the deterrent concept is complicated from by ordinary weapons to by nuclear forces, and even to non-military areas. Naturally it is obscure deterrence that composes intent and ability because of intricate circumstance on deterrence.

The concept of deterrence is shifting from physical to psychological conditions. Deterrence is a strategic interaction. In order to achieve deterrence, the enemy recognizes the higher cost and disadvantage for specific behavior. In reality it is difficult to verify deterrent effects. For example we cannot demonstrate whether the deterrent power of US was effective to the end of the Cold War. The deterrence is easily carried out by the absence of military power. Another related concept is coerce or rejecting. It is made use of compelling or rejecting in order to obey enemies.

In Japan deterrence stipulated that 'preventing invasion will depend on the nuclear deterrent power of the US against nuclear threats' in the first NDPO of 1976. From this point of view it was stated that the phrase was 'effective deterrence and countermeasures as a role played by our defense force' was stated. Even today in Japan, deterrence in the NDPO of 2010 is mostly pointed out on the military front. However, in recent years, the concept has begun to change. The suppression of crisis was to pursue all means including diplomacy.

It is not effective for deterrence, coerce, and refusal without the following points.

Firstly 'threat and communication' is indispensable for the deterrence strategy to be effective. Recognition of 'unacceptable cost' and 'result to be refused' is necessary. That is, the parties must share information.

Secondly 'common recognition of acting entities' is necessary. Parties differ in culture, purpose, form, and means. Nonetheless deterrence strategies make mutual recognition essential. A common framework is required.

Thirdly there is a need for deterrence and common recognition on compelling and refusing. If a message from one side is established as a common recognition with the other, the deterrence strategy functions.

Fourthly it is necessary for evasion to evolve from 'repulsive' or 'punitive' threats as collateral to 'compulsory' or 'refusal' correspondence. Therefore the concept of deterrence can distinguish not only retaliatory and punitive but also 'rejective' and 'compulsive' strategies and policies according to the situation of crisis.

There is the concept of deterrence by the alliance. It is important to be able to secure the certainty of fulfillment of the co-defense commitment provided by alliance partners. The alliance is basically 'dealing'. Consideration of 'dealing' is one of the options of cooperation of security on alliance. This also applies to the Japan-US alliance. For example, in Japan and the US, instead of providing Japan with US military bases in Japan, the US 'deals' not to request Japan to defend the mainland of the US.

#### Normal deterrence and nuclear deterrence

We must distinguish between concepts of normal deterrence and nuclear deterrence [Kamo, 1990: 265-269]. This is because when we apply deterrence of social life to the concept of nuclear deterrence, we tend to easily recognize the effect of deterrence and 'rationality of deterrence'. So we must distinguish between normal deterrence and nuclear deterrence.

Normal deterrence means manipulating others' actions by threatening to harm others in advance. The correspondence includes threats of violence.

If A tries to take the behavior of unfavorable Z of B, A intentionally threatens unacceptable cost which is unacceptable to B, so the deterrence is that B acts as Z which is to try not to take it. What is 'unacceptable cost'? It depends on how big and credible the 'fear of sanctions' is to the deterred countries or challenger countries. 'Fear of sanctions' will be expected trouble ahead to the country that plans attacks and exercise of military power after the attack 'fear of retaliation' by the other country. This fear gives the country planning attack in advance how much damage to military facilities and force, domestic economic system, cultural value system, and ideology, and it determines the effect of normal deterrence.

So how far can retaliation measures be prevented beforehand? It can be thought of as a subjective belief of policy makers. However its effect cannot be finally decided. The following questions arise.

- ①How do the state leaders, strategists, servicemen, service-women, and personnel judge their military differences between opposing countries?
- ②Is there a commitment to the alliance system by the state?
- ③If the party has an alliance with another party, how tightly is the unity of alliance system at the time of crisis?
- ④What is the difference in geopolitical conditions where the state is located?
- ⑤Whether other countries are actually willing to attack their own country, and can they retaliate against their counterpart country?
- ⑥How do both parties understand the strength of its mutual intention

and its credibility?

As another factors are added in the nuclear age, the shock of fear increases at once. When the concept of nuclear deterrence appears in international politics, it will head towards endless race of nuclear armed forces. It is the concept of nuclear deterrence that supposed to assume the following points.

- ①‘Credibility of threat’ changes nuclear weapons to the quality of their intimidation. Nuclear deterrence is expected to be retaliated with nuclear weapons, and attacking countries must prepare to suffer damage by nuclear weapons.
- ②By ‘impossibility of war’ nuclear power cannot rationally win by nuclear war.
- ③‘Unacceptability of war’ refers to the state of affairs that cannot be rationalized as a means of foreign policy.

In carrying out the nuclear deterrent policy, the following points are important [Kamo, 1990: 270, 272].

Firstly the idea of nuclear deterrence is not ‘manipulation of persuasion’. Since it is ‘operation by compulsion’, we cannot pursue the rationality of policy to the end. Therefore nuclear deterrence cannot show the idea of ‘liberation from fear’.

Secondly modernization of nuclear technology will break the framework of nuclear deterrence. Thirdly once the nuclear war starts, it will be impossible to limit the impact to only the parties concerned. Fourthly nuclear proliferation occurs. Fifthly a leader who has only certain information may misunderstand the recognition of the opponent’s leader. Sixthly the change of new circumstances and leadership change need to reconsider the previous deterrence policy.

The deterrence policy will be implemented in two steps. The first is to determine the 'interests' of the state in the territory threatened by hostile behavior and to recognize how important benefit is. The second is to establish a 'commitment' to defend national interests and to convey to the adversaries.

The deterrent side tells intent by 'threatening' the action of the adversary. Threats must be strong enough. The deterrent side has to make it understand that the adversary has credibility. In that case, authenticity consists of two elements. Firstly the deterrent side must tell the adversary 'willingness and determination' to defend the interests at issue. Secondly the deterrent side should be considered to be effective for defense of profits, and must have 'capability' to make the adversary understand so. From the 19th to the 20th century, powerful balance of power systems in Europe tried to deter each other through power alliance. However it is dependence on existing alliances and the formation of new alliances that have been used to combat the forces that change the present situation [Crag and George, 1995: ch.14].

Non-military strategies distinguish between deterrence policy and coercive diplomacy [Craig and George, 1995: ch.15]. The deterrence policy aims not to let the opponent change the present situation. Coercive diplomacy attempts to overturn actions already caused by adversaries. It uses intimidation, and limited military power so as not to let the adversary to invade the adversary, for example to stop the intrusion or abandon the occupied land. Before that, coercive diplomacy usually uses three 'persuasions'. Said differently, it is persuasive to; ①persuade to stop the action before the enemy reaches the purpose, ②persuade the enemy to restore its original state before taking action, ③persuade the enemy to

change the political system.

Coercive diplomacy is distinguished from pure compulsion; rather than stopping the adversary, but rather ‘persuades’ to stop the invasion by the other. An enforcer exemplifies threats and limited military power to persuade adversaries to restore their original state on that occasion. But if an adversary challenges without giving up to intimidation, the enforcer must decide to withdraw coercive diplomacy or to exercise military power. At that time the enforcer will fall into a remarkable dilemma. It increases rather than the choice of action of opponent side on the contrary. In addition the compulsory side loses authority to countries other than the parties. It is not easy to make good use of coercive diplomacy.

#### Paradox of deterrence

The deterrence strategy implies the paradox of deterrence [Kamo, 1990: 270-271].

Firstly the second strike capability must have retaliatory capability. Secondly securing ‘sufficiency’ of the second attack is always difficult. Evaluation of it is not objectivized how ‘sufficiency’ is evaluated. ‘The credibility of threat’ is worth the nuclear possession if it cannot balance the strength of the nuclear powers. Aiming for ‘sufficiency’ of the second attack tends to turn into ‘superiority’ for the opponent. That will aggressively develop the first strike capability. Modernization of nuclear forces is tried seeking confirmation of the second attack capability in order not to have opponent’s first attack ability. Thirdly, as a result, political leaders will weaken the perception of ‘the impossibility of war’ and ‘non-acceptability of war’.

If policy makers in each country lack communication with each other, they will not perform mutual cooperation, but practice mutual abuse of confidence as a diplomatic strategy. The dailyization of a kind of 'prisoner's dilemma' begins especially among the leaders.

We need to consider the interest associated with deterrence policy. This is because the government that carries out national interests must take measures to deter hostile actions from the relevant countries afterwards in implementing external policies.

There are five points to consider for interest and deterrence.

Firstly negotiations (or talk) on domestic interests in international politics are inevitable. Negotiations are not necessarily coincidental, and interests are the cause of controversy over their own 'standards'. The parties hurry to prepare for deterrence if a subsequent conflict relationship arises.

Secondly the role of interest in political discussion relies on actor's thought and existing relationship. If this thought can be included in the interest, the political leaders of hostile countries will feel dissatisfied with their roles and meanings. The parties will inevitably assume conflict relations, in the worst case, war.

Thirdly even though X pursues 'common interest' of X and Y contrary to their own interests, and X will reduce other own preferences for 'common interest', in reality would the hostile Y approves this X's policy obediently?

It is not possible to understand that the long-term implication of policy in 'through erroneous information' or 'for a complicated way', and therefore X may choose a policy that is detrimental to X. Both X and Y should adopt deterrence policy in this case.

Fifthly an alternative is limited to the range involved by the parties. Parties cannot choose alternatives infinitely.

According to these circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain what external policy is better. Political leaders will consider the safeguards, presupposing the worst case than being the best for oneself. In addition the common system for determining politics is the political culture of people, which gives priority to different content. Then it is likely to prepare the concept of deterrence in advance.

That is why the countries concerned must form common goods in international politics, but considering the international community as the 'jungle world', there is only a desire to ensure self-interests.

The above circumstances make it necessary for the policy choice to fight over the interests of policy. In particular realists naturally prepare deterrence policies.

The deterrence policy, which assumes a fixed, that is, a balance of power system which is thought to last forever, will rather result in an unstable international environment. It is possible that the plan of country that takes the initiative within the alliance may also suppress other ally. It does not always continue according to time and occasion that concordance of interests of countries constitutes the alliance. There should be many factors in the deterrence policy, but it is vital that using deterrence strategies as a means of foreign policy presupposes its complexity. For example due to changes in the international environment since the conclusion of the Japan-US alliance, both judgments do not necessarily agree with each other, so there is a possibility that the recognition among allies will change each time the allies define the hostile country on case-by-case. Alliance and deterrence policy will fail in the

worst case.

When thinking about deterrence policy, it is insufficient for deterrent countries to think only of deterred countries. Strengthening cooperation among allies will be accompanied by the risk of 'getting caught' in war that is irrelevant to their own country. The weak 'junior partner' of national strength is a big issue how to secure the performance of commitment while avoiding risk. Stated in a different fashion, strengthening alliance relationships can be a 'dilemma of security' not only in deterred countries but also in relations between allies. As for coping with the issue, it is a prerequisite to establish confidence-building measures to prevent conflicts without relying solely on deterrent effect [cf. Kurita, 2015]. This effort is to form a kind of security regime on international public goods.

The US has strengthened the strategic nuclear superiority. Despite possessing overwhelming advantages both in number and quality in nuclear ballistic and conveyance systems, the US has disabled the deterrence capability of other countries, and enhanced the nuclear first-strike capability in order to improve the performance. Its strategic advantage is that the US intends to solve it by using traditional military force against regional adversaries and enlarges their deterrent threat [Ross, 2004: 282].

However this policy causes the adverse effect of escalating the number and quality of countries holding nuclear weapons. For example the current de-nuclearization policy toward the DPRK may cause such a situation. As a result of this policy non-hegemon countries in alliance will be forced to choose whether to follow the policy of hegemon countries or to abandon alliance. This situation will lead to collapse the present order

in the worst case.

#### (4) Japan's Security

In East Asia there is no phenomenon of 'de-nationalization' that progresses in Western European, so the sovereign state system is adhered. International politics, especially with the PRC, are influenced by the balance of power. Furthermore East Asia is in regional, ethnic and religious conflicts, and international organization taking control of them remains still inadequate. In facts many conflicts also occurred after the Cold War. Japan must navigate high shipping lanes for energy transportation to areas where regional conflicts are likely to occur. Thus there is the possibility of getting involved in various conflicts and emergencies affecting Japan's security [Pyle, 2007: ch.11, epilogue] .

The postwar Japanese security is based on the Japan-US security system. Japanese people have kept the SDF under the fundamental principles of exclusive defense. The LDP has always maintained and strengthened the self-defense capability, asserted the right of collective self-defense, and continued to insist on the emergency legislations and Constitutional amendment. However, even today, Japanese people have remembered the disaster of Second World War, and have supported the security policy based deterrence by US military power in a restrained security system. Today the people basically recognize the necessity of keeping to a minimum self-defense capability, and show a very prudent attitude toward strengthening the military power by the amending Constitution.

After the Second World War Japanese people have made an argument on Japan's security policies, such as exclusive defense, Japan-US alliance,

and the SDF's operations etc. Among the citizens they remain divided between the supporters of amending Constitution and the supporters of current Constitution [see Part 5].

More moderate realist point of view that sees a nation-state as security optimizers that balance against potential threats rather than as power maximizers, it would have appeared rational for Japan to have sought to acquire independent military capabilities, including at least joint control over allied nuclear stationed in Japanese territory [Burger, 1996: 321].

The national security of US fundamentally tends to mean traditional military in 'national defense'. Because the US possesses rich food, energy and other resources in the country, it need not concern about economic security except commercial intercourse. In a contrasting situation Japan's security avoids discussing military security, and trends to discuss mainly on economic security. Japan has several reasons.

Firstly, as a reaction to militarism before and during the war, the Japanese people after the war have a refusal response to military issues. Secondly military security will be transformed into a Japan-US security system. Therefore, due to constraints imposed by Constitution, Japan cannot introduce its own service of overseas military security. Thirdly since Japan relies on overseas for resources and economic markets, economic security is given priority. Japan must pursue comprehensive security in terms of defense, economic relation, natural disasters and so on. Japan should promote long-term stability in international relations because of interdependence as a major economic power, but there remains a question as to whether it was aggressive to prevent safety from being threatened [Sato, 1989: 165].

It is said that specifically Japan is confronted with threats to

unpredictable security such as emergencies in the Korean Peninsula, the civil war in the DPRK, the overthrow of the government, the territorial issue of the islands in South China Sea, and the security of the Malacca Straits. However after the defeat of Second World War Japanese people have tended to ignore the role of the military sector on security in Japan. Currently Japan has no direct military threat (although this also varies by specialists), we cannot think about security issues by ignoring the military aspect. Surely non-military diplomacy and foreign policy should be considered before enforcing military action.

There was no true debate of security in ‘true meaning’ in Japan after the Second World War. We have discussed about the strategy for with ideology centered on Constitution (the Article 9) after the war, but in a certain way neglected security, defense, strategy, crisis and emergence management, and others. While being not discussed in full-scale, nevertheless Japan adopted the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ at the time of Ohira government as a policy at least. Security is not limited to military and national defense. Security includes securing energy and food, as well as diplomatic efforts to develop the international environment of the world and the region favorably in their own country.

However it is unfortunate for Japanese people that the word ‘comprehensive security’ has been used as a term to ease ‘stimulating theological controversy’ of military and defense.

After the Cold War Japan may fall into a security paradox. Security paradox is dilemma on security policy planning. If a country conflicts with another country, and one country strengthens security on the hand, another country will reinforce its security on the other hand. This relationship will become trapped in a vicious circle; security for peace

paradoxically causes military expansion and military tension. For example some people at present Japan can imagine the DPRK and the PRC as a virtual adversarial country. The Japanese government has a possibility of falling into this paradox as more realistic countermeasures; especially military affairs are taken [cf. O'Hanlon, 2007].

## 2 Reflection on realism

### (1) Limits of realism

Realism is a political view that emphasizes power and self-interest, ignoring consideration by morality and norms. The growth of nationalism and the emergence of a modern nation state have transformed the state into a coherent political community. Among them people swear allegiance to ethnic groups and nations. Therefore realism is based on power politics and pursuit of national interest against overseas. Said differently, pursuit of power is a human nature's aim. The nation is a basic actor in international relations and the world stage, and the state can act as an autonomous existence because it has sovereignty. Sovereignty is an absolute, unlimited power principle. Sovereignty is related to the position of the state in the international community and the ability to act as the entity of an independent state [cf. Kamo, 1990: ch.1].

Realists usually tend to have a pessimistic view on humanity. They believe that power goals, power tools, and power use are the central premise of political activities. Therefore international politics is power politics based on competition between power and profit between rival and competitor.

Realism is skeptical of progress in international politics compared to domestic politics. They assume that world politics consists of sovereign

states under international anarchy. They regard international relations as a state of conflict between states, and thinks that international conflict will eventually be solved by war.

Realists emphasize on national interest, national security, state survival, and international order and stability. Political ethics (i.e. bonds of mutual duty) are not considered emphasis, because of the absence of international responsibility. World politics is formed from unequal capability among countries and the anarchic structure of the national system. Naturally great powers are at the center of international relations.

So they hold back the prescriptive analysis of world politics, subjective, therefore unscientific. Their international political theory assumes national behavior in a predictable way. So the bipolar system guarantees peace and security over multipolar systems. The Cold War was a period of international peace and stability.

Realism is indispensable in considering international politics. For example Spykman emphasized realism from a geopolitical standpoint [Spykman, 1942]. 'Power is to survive, the ability to impose domestic intentions on other nations, command the country without power, the possibility to force concessions to powerless countries,' he said. Indeed the jungle law of 'dog-eat-dog world' seems to be the reality of international politics [cf. Kamo, 1990: ch.4].

No authority above the sovereign state exists. Put another way, international relations are not harmonious, and are expressed in chaos. Because the state protects the life, property, rights, interests and happiness of the people and defends the national land, realists put importance on power in international affairs. That does not mean immediate international disorder, severe confrontation or infinite war and

conflict. Even in that reality we also acknowledge that we can maintain equilibrium between conflicts and cooperation among countries. It is the idea of the so-called balance of power.

The balance of power means a state in which the relationships of power between the nations or alliance are almost equal and is the guiding principle of diplomacy and strategy adopted to bring about this situation, its purpose seeks hegemony, it is to restrain the ambition of the state and ensure national independence. Peace and stability of the international community is guaranteed if a nation-state takes part in an alliance between states for national security. However relations between countries are inherently dynamic, so conflict and war will arise if the balance of power is broken.

Realist does not recognize international politics as a simple 'survival for the fittest'. Because power, wealth, resources and so on are not evenly distributed among countries. Major actors in international politics were always major powers. National force creates national ranking in international system. The great powers subordinate weak countries in various forms. During the Cold War the bipolar regime of the US and the USSR was 'peace' by the nuclear deterrent force system. In that sense the hierarchy of stable nations based on approved rules and forces based on perceived procedures has maintained peace and order in the 'Darwinian jungle'.

Neo-realism that appeared in the 1980's defines the new shape of realism. Neo-realism is also called structural realism. This theory modifies the model of power politics by emphasizing the structural forcing system of the international system. Neo-realism recognizes the importance of power, and explains phenomena in the structural conditions of

international system rather than from each country [cf. Kamo, 1990: ch.2; cf. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009].

## (2) Realism in doubts

Criticism of realism is the following point. Firstly realism and neo-realism are to separate morality from politics. It justifies the military extension and hegemonies of own country. Power politics can not only maintain peace but also to pursue the world ahead of catastrophe due to nuclear war.

Secondly the definition of power tends to be very vague. For example GNP and defense expenses can be quantified, but as a whole the index of power tends to be subjective. Power politics that realism places emphasis on it is becoming an anachronism.

Thirdly they are strengthening military power from power oriented behavior and obsession.

Fourthly realists do not try to anticipate the future only on the premise that they can recognize. They tend to capture international politics in a fixed framework. Therefore it does not necessarily agree on recognition with the framework of other countries.

Fifthly the empirical weak point of realism is that it limits actors of international politics only to the nation-state. Stated in different fashion, it disregards the pluralistic tendency to reconfigure the international relations since the second half of the 20th century. Realism is one-dimensional oriented which limits objects to an excessive extent. It does not exchange opinions with views or perspectives of other international relations theories.

Sixthly the problem of national interest, national security, and national

defense is not a top priority in international politics at the present. Put another way, disorganized state and failed state must be emphasized for security. Realism will deal with the local problem [Jackson · Sorensen, 1999: 96-98, 102-103].

Seventhly the alliance relation based on balance of power will not last forever, and in some alliance cases a country may betray another because of the perspective of national interest. At that time the balance of power will be destroyed. Is it possible for realists to imagine it and consider how to deal with it?

The theory on balance of power is equipped with physical violence and mental violence. The former overwhelm the hostile country with military power. The latter is considered psychological intimidation. The balance of power can be paraphrased as an effort to produce this effect [Galtung, 1969].

The real purpose of political activity is to move people. An atomic bomb cannot replace it. The suicidal character that the weapon possesses is unsuitable both as a diplomatic sanction and as a basis for an alliance. Such weapons are not useful for political demands. Building a defense system centered on weapons with a suicidal meaning will paralyze the national policy in the long run, hurt the foundation of the alliance, and drive all people to bottomless desperate weapons competition [Kennan, 1983].

## Conclusion

Intention towards peace that exists in reality has an ideology, and is boosted by some force. Every order should be supported by a specific value system (ideology) and specific power. What kind of peace and order we seek depends on the result of power struggle [Kosaka, 1966: 11-12; cf. Kamo,

1990: ch.5.1].

A nation-state is a system of forces, system of profits, a system of interests, and a system of values at the same time. We live by taking actions we want. However it does not cause confusion to society, and it can maintain connection with many people because we adopt a common behavior style and value system linking us. Various systems ranging from nation to individual are established with this connection. It is the difference between behavioral standards and value systems embodied in languages and customs to separate Japan from foreign countries. It is expressed as a political culture of people [Kosaka, 1966: 17; cf. Furuta, 2011].

Each nation-state tends to be extremely difficult to trust the behavior of other countries and to self-restrain their own behavior. The situation of the disorder of the international community arises in that circumstance [Kosaka, 1966: 196]. The situation of confused international politics is a situation in which the rules governing the behavior of each country weaken, we cannot understand what other modes of behavior take, or cannot trust [Kosaka, 1966: 192, 196].

When confronted with confused international politics, people tend to perform by one of two means. One means is to attempt to restore the state of confusion directly. This tends to promote confusion. Another means is to improve the state of disorder indirectly. In this means there are numerous methods. Among them it will be effective to freeze the situation of the exercise of justice and power that each country claims. That is the means begins with abandoning to eliminate the cause of conflicts. After that it is required to strive to solve only the phenomenon of confrontation of power. This would be a realistic countermeasure.

In international politics, even if we remove the real cause of conflict, the

operation will only continue to be endless. It will not resolve the conflict. We should firstly deal with the phenomenal confrontation. However frozen confrontation temporarily stops vicious circle. Therefore after that, the orientation toward international order should be sought [Kosaka, 1966: 197-200].

A nation-state may be able to gain outrageous profits by an unjust method in pursuing its national purpose. But that action obviously leads to a vicious circle. To improve the circulation of the international community, national leaders must make choices that will not create a vicious circle in pursuing national objectives. At that time leaders must take full account of the moral request. While doing what leaders can do now, they must remember to always wish for someday to do [Kosaka, 1966: 201-202].

While each nation-state protects the interests of its own, it forms international law and international order through its actions, and enhances the authority of the UN for example.

Political Culture to discipline our daily behavior is extremely important. And what is important is that there are several 'political cultures' in the international community. Put another way, the international community has several justices. Therefore a certain political culture has a certain 'justice'. So we should not think that the values of a country are correct and that of other countries is wrong. Otherwise and naturally there exists a possibility of tension and conflict [Kosaka, 1966: 19; cf. Levy, 2003].

Each nation-state is a system of power, a system of profits, and a system of values. Relations among nations are relationships in which these three levels are intertwined. However when discussing peace we tend to pay attention only to one of three [Kosaka, 1966: 19-20; cf. Furuta, 2011: ch.

6].

Interests determine the external policy; power is what it realizes [Kosaka, 1966: 24]. In this case the interest is not necessarily economic or military, and it may be asking for safety or peace. Power is not limited to military or political, but may be a basis for persuading others.

We must think about the defect of power balance. The balance of power cannot be defined clearly, because power is difficult to capture. It is difficult to properly evaluate the power of a nation and make a judgment of truth. It is impossible to properly evaluate the power of allies and to predict how certain the alliance is. It is because a country may reconcile and cooperate with a country that has had hostile relations until then. We must lay the uncertainty of not relying on the alliance on the basis of foreign policy [Kosaka, 1966: 26-27; cf. Walt, 1987: ch.8].

When countries adopt the policy of the balance of powers, it is 'equilibrium' favorable to their own country. However one advantageous 'equilibrium' is disadvantageous to the other, so the other will be dissatisfied. Therefore in order for the real equilibrium to stabilize, it is only when the country in a more advantageous position does not try to change the advantage to abroad by abusing its position and the country in disadvantage does not dare to challenge [Kosaka, 1966: 27-28].

Even though human beings may doubt the invasive intentions of a partner, they are very insensitive to the threats they give to their partners. It is 'moral imbalance'. Every strategy implies this risk. Leaders of a country think that it must prepare for it because the hostile country attacks using every opportunity. The realist sees the armaments of the hostile countries as a threat, but tends to understand that their armaments are defensive to the last [Kosaka, 1966: 28].

The country can measure mutual benefits, and find peace in compromise. Thinkers in the early modern period thought that the nation would not receive a fatal blow in the fight between states, thereby justifying the 'equilibrium' system. Now in the age of nuclear war, its premise has collapsed [Kosaka, 1966: 35].

Peace based on the traditional balance of power is suspected of its premise today. Especially the emergence of nuclear weapons has increased the sacrifice by war more and more. In international politics games, military power did not assume the extinction of the state, but now the military power is difficult to use. We must consider alternatives to the principle of old-fashioned balance of powers [Kosaka, 1966: 36].

Security and defense should be distinguished. Security is aimed at 'ensuring a safe state by preventing threats from reaching'. Defense means 'to eliminate by some form of force against the threat'. In the case of Japan there is a tendency that security and defense directly link. The reason for this is that we rely on military fixed means for the territory of nation-state, political independence, and external threats. This way of thinking is a view of traditional security. International politics since the 19th century through the end of the Cold War were thought to be orderly stabilized by the balance of power between the conflicting states (allies). Individual security will raise the risk of war by raising tension and distrust among the nations, as the military expansion competition between the nations occurs. It is built around military thinking. The first instance of the danger of individual security was the First World War. In modern times it showed that war does not match cost because of the national total warfare and nuclear weapons.

When the government relating all external situations to security and

defense, there are cases where political methods are used to encourage sense of crisis, and use it for expanding their own power. Consequently the sense of crisis and uneasiness propagate excessively to people. Foreign policies emphasizing security and defense can make rigorous diplomacy, and may be isolated as an uncompetitive and uncoordinated nation. At the same time alliances are forced to concede, and sometimes impair national interests. Instead such a security policy will 'bring the state into a dangerous situation, and place the people in anxious and uneasy situations'. And the thrusting of threat positively creates instability in the country, and it will occur conflict in international politics.

Great powers have been unable to exercise force to obtain advantageous results over certain non-military issues. In fact the major powers became less able to carry out military action. As the relevance and utility of force have declined as means to solve conflicts of interest, at a specific issue, non-military solutions between countries becomes important.

Countries directly involved in specific issues may implement various formal or informal arrangements. This is called the international regime. It consists of a series of procedures and rules to regulate the relationship of the parties in the region and field concerned with the issue. The regime differs in its character, its comprehensiveness, scope, coordination, cooperation and so on. It will build international public goods.

Regime regulates relations among nations. Regime is a device to solve specific issues. Each country within the regime shares an order based on the network and its mutual benefit. The regime could be solved through the network to potential conflicts between nations [Crag and George, 1995: epilogue]. Needless to say, that condition indispensably creates an

environment that enables trust fostering and recognizing it.

In short the political outcome is not a simple reflection of the intention or understanding of the actors, and it is not a context that causes each intention and understanding. Rather political results support a strategy over others, which actors have devised as a means to realize that intention in the context of doing so without regard to the intention of actor self. That is the product of the impact of strategy.

## Conclusion

### 1 Political relations between Japan and the US

The political relationship between Japan and the US is the consequence of the political ties between the two major powers across the Pacific Ocean [cf. Katzenstein, Shiratori, 2006; cf. Green & Gill, 2009; cf. Pyle, 2007].

Normalization of relations with two communist countries (the USSR and the PRC), dealing with the Gulf War and the 'War on Terrorism', internationalism after the Cold War will clarify the nature of political relations between Japan and the US. They explain the importance of bilateralism as a dominant pattern of international relations in Japan, and emphasize the dependence of its relationship. At the same time they have also proven that there are coercive elements and opportunities confronted by other actors, to gain an advantageous position of change in the structure of the international system to promote the interests and goals of the Japan and the people [Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson, 2012: 102].

With the end of the Cold War, this is now gradually implemented in a new focus. In February 1993 Foreign Minister Komura has said that Japan would judge that Japan had the effect of enhancing the reliability of the Japan-US Security Treaty and deterring the influence on Japan's peace and security. This remark, in a sense, discusses the realistic view of the Japanese government. Japanese people share this view with both consent and disagreement. However this view becomes logical only between Japan and the US. But is it understood for the third country?

The Japan-US Security Treaty has tied Japan firmly to the Western side in the early days of the Cold War. This security system results in Japan forming a character of bilateral relations and extremely weakening

US pressure in terms of security as well as politics and economy. At the same time since 1990s after the end of Cold War, Japanese political leaders have occasionally played a more adaptive role of Japan in the Japan-US Alliance, as Prime Ministers of the LDP in power. These leaders have accepted bilateral norms. The Prime Minister Hatoyama of DPJ administration attempted minimal challenge. However the Japanese governments could not decide a substitute place in the Futenma relocation of the US naval base. Prime Minister Hatoyama failed to challenge the US.

At the same time, however, despite the fact that the strength of its anti-militaristic and pacific norms have declined as the times passed, the 'pacific' and 'anti-militaristic' norms are that when deploying military to carry out the national purpose, the Japanese governments were detained by the norms. On one hand Japan's policy making agencies use domestic resistance as a means to oppose the pressure of the US seeking a more aggressive security role, embedding bilateral military ties further. On the other hand that is prepared as follows to challenge the norms in the process of strengthening military strength as part of Japan's responsibility to play a more adaptable region and to exact the role of the world at other times: ①the provision of bases against communism in the 1950s, ②the support of the war by the US from the latter half of the 1970s to the early 1980s, ③the introduction of legislation for closer military cooperation in the latter half of the 1990s, and ④US support in the 'War on Terrorism'.

Under these conditions bilateral security relations have adjusted pressures from both the US and domestic political forces. The Japan-US security system is a permanent partnership to certain policy of the goals

and benefits [Hook, Gilson, Hughes, 2012: 126-128].

## 2 Interpretation of the Japan-US security regime

For the past 60 years the Japan-US Security Treaty has occupied the center of bilateral relationship. Under the old treaty of 1951 the US did not have the duty to defend Japan despite placing US forces and facilities in the mainland Japan and the archipelago. Since the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960, the use of US military bases and other facilities in Japan has been approved for the purpose of contributing 'Japan's security and security in Japan and peace and security in the Far East' (the Article 4 of Japan-US Security Treaty). But in the 1970s, the latter aim (maintaining the peace and security of the Far East) became more important than Japan defense. "We do not have the power to have a direct relationship to oversee Japanese traditional defense either on the ground or over the sky in Japan."

The Security Treaty in 1960 can be resolved every ten years if either one notices the end of the Treaty one year ago. Since both Japan and the US have not selected termination so far, this Treaty has its effect since it was revised and updated in 1960. The Treaty has prescribed Japan's course after the war. It is said that it is at the center of Japan's security role in international relations, not Constitution according to realists. But liberals and lefts do not support the view, and emphasize the role of Constitution, not international relations [Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson, 2012: 126-127].

Regarding Constitution, the role of the Japan-US Security Treaty to maintain Japan's peace and security has been subordinated to the scope of interpretation. The Security Treaty has affected Japan. Many people

have interpreted the Japan-US security arrangements in various ways. And some experts of international relation have tried interpretation of Japan's security policy by putting various weights on structure, institutions and norms. The motives and approaches of policy-making agencies and political actors have been successful as a means for the treaty to 'suppress Japan'. That view was evaluated as a way to deter Japanese military power. In that sense Japan is interpreted as upholding the principles of anti-militarism and pacifism. It is praised for peace and security. Another commentary also criticizes Japan and the Japanese people to drag them into the war of the US. It may be concluded that Japan-US security system will throw away Japan's 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'.

The Japan-US Security Treaty as a means of curbing Japan prevents the change of normative consciousness from anti-militarism to militarism after the war. Put another way, the existence of the US military in Japan restrains the rearmament of Japan. There is a counterargument. Although the Security Treaty will consequently limit Japan's military expansion, despite the Article 9 of Constitution, and 'pacifistic' and 'anti-militaristic' norms, the Japanese government has made the government implement military expansion with pressure from the US. In fact the Japanese government is obliged under the Article 3 of Security Treaty.

Still one opinion is that the influence of the domestic right wing of 'neo-autonomists' or 'revisionists' seeking revision of the Article 9 of Constitution, as seen in the policies implemented by Prime Minister Abe and the LDP in recent years. They consider the pressure from the US promoting a more prominent military role of Japan all over the world [cf. Dower and McCormack, 2014: ch.3, 4; cf. McCormack, 2007]. They think that Japan

venture to turnaround from ‘one-country pacifism’ so far. Said defferently the conservatives, the old and new rights, and LDP government will seek to adapt the revised Article 9 of Constitution in order to their own ‘pacifism’ and ‘security’ to the ‘new reality’ that they assume to presuppose practical challenges [cf. Ishiba, 2014].

Some people argue that the Japan-US Security Treaty and its system have guaranteed peace and security during the past half-century or more, especially at the height of Cold War when Japan faced the threat of communism, with the expansion of nuclear deterrence to Japan and the presence of US forces both inside and outside the Japanese archipelago. However other people regard the threat of nuclear war as the greatest danger to Japan’s peace and security rather than the threat of communism. From this point of view the Security Treaty has become the cause of the Cold War and nuclear weapons competition, and indirectly involved Japan in the Vietnam War and the ‘War on Terrorism’, and in other respects Japan, therefore threatens the peace and security of the people. In any case the US itself is targeted on nuclear attack, so there is no possibility of using nuclear weapons to protect Japan.

Regardless of whatever interpretation is taken, the role of the Treaty’s interests and norms tightly linked to the US cannot be denied, and the profit at the center of bilateralism norms and Japan-US relations is important in Japan. It has been shared by political and bureaucratic policy making agencies.

As a result Japanese leaders are involved in the Security Treaty, let them bring out defense spending, buy US weapons, carry out a new military role, and contribute in a different way the region and the world for the US military and strategy. It means to keep under US pressure to

cooperate with strategy and objectives. The US uses these points. It becomes prominent at the time of political and economic conflict and rising crisis threat. This is a quintessence of Japanese weaknesses facing US pressure [cf. Dower and McCormack, 2014: ch.3. 1, 7].

The Japan-US Security Treaty is unlikely to be understood without considering the role of Japanese domestic society and political actors. For Japan 'pacifistic' and 'anti-militaristic' norms have played a role in the reaction to the Security Treaty adopted by the Japanese government. At one point the norms have been intensely conflicted with government policy. The policy is often carried out under pressure from the US. In other cases the government has responded to domestic demands by enforcing policies to support anti-militarism and pacifism. With that we carefully kept the balance of pressure inside and outside. The complex interaction between domestic organizations and international forces positions the Japan-US Security Treaty as the core of Japan's security policy. Therefore this Treaty interferes with its policy intentions against policy makers in terms of results.

The security relations between Japan and the US during the Cold War have developed under the successive LDP in powers, facing political pressures from both the US and the domestic. Under political leaders, active proposals for military security policy will be clarified, but the dominant pattern of security relations is not based on adaptive feelings to the US but based on US pressure. It is thought that it has been achieved. Even if many anti-militarist policies are rejected by the 'hawkish leaders' in the LDP such as Nakasone, Koizumi and Abe, Japan will still prohibit exporting weapons and dispatch the SDF overseas only under UN peace keeping operation to which Japanese people have adhered [Hook, Gilson,

Hughes, Dobson, 2012: 151-152].

However after the end of the Cold War, as a result, along with the domestic political transformation, the Japan-US alliance has tied the US military strategy more closely to Japan and people. This has already been adapted to the US at several stages of the Cold War, such as joint training of USFJ and SDF, security of maritime traffic channels and export of defense technology. From this experience it has been decided to re-define the role of the Security Treaty, revise the guidelines, and support the 'War on Terrorism'. In particular the 'War on Terrorism' has established new laws in Japan, so it has become possible to cooperate with the US globally, not locally. In addition it was decided to ease arms export prohibition.

Even though the security environment since the 9/11 terrorist attacks implies an active will to support the adaptive role towards the US by SDF, despite changes and restraints on military affairs, and domestic society, especially the people of Okinawa remain 'pacifistic' and 'anti-militaristic' norms [cf. Tanaka, 2009: ch.4]. Therefore, as anti-militarism norms continue to weaken and bilateralism is strengthened as a result of the 'War on Terrorism', the new government needs to consider both points in determining Japan's security policy [cf. Sadou, 2015: ch.5].

Likewise dealing with Japan's the 'War on Terrorism' is not a complete military role, but rather a means of institutionalization of international relations through economic power and the limited role of the SDF supporting US. It can be confirmed that the preference of the policy formation. This indicates weakening the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. However the role played by the SDF showed not involved in battle but resist arranging the full military capability of the SDF. After

the end of mission of refueling in the Indian Ocean, the humanitarian aids to Afghanistan suggest the importance of Japan's international relations institutionalized through non-military means [Kohama, 2005: ch.3, 7, 8].

As a matter of course, as seen in the case of Nakasone, Koizumi and Abe, the Japanese Prime Ministers have played a remarkable role in strengthening the ties between bilateral securities. Although the position of DPJ is subtle, the difficulty of transitioning to an equal relationship with the US in the security dimension was proved by Futenma from failing to select base transfer to these norms. Both economic, political, and security bilateralism, as well as elements of inequality embedded in this bilateralism, have maintained dominant at the policy formation level. Indeed Japanese policy-making agencies have carried out the inconsistent intents contrary to this orientation and the norms, and have made decisive efforts to achieve in reality weaknesses and vulnerability facing US pressure.

One of the reasons for this is that the policy makers of the old Japanese generation seemed to start the beginning of Japan's regeneration under the protection of the US. In this sense the occupation and the peace treaty after the war were occurred psychological dependence and spiritual weakness.

However continued dependence of Japan on the US, despite the growing importance of the PRC, policy making agencies would not challenge the power of the US politically in terms of security. Basically Japan is currently in a subordinate status in that relationship. Policy makers in younger generation are also obedient to pressure from the US as in the older generation. This weakness and subordination will survive as Japan's post-war power theme. In this sense Japan's increasing degree

of adaptability is in a state of restraint in relation to the US after the Cold War. Especially since 2015 the Abe government has actively accepted its dependence on the US.

In essence, after the Second World War, the relationship with the US in Japan's politics, economy and security have been concerned with the pressure from bilateralism at the heart of the Japan-US relationship and the pressure from domestic society maintaining a sophisticated standard of living. Policy with priority of economics and policy with 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' in domestic society have intention to support the US, and Japanese government and people support the Japan-US Security Treaty as a whole. However this fact does not mean that the Japanese government is expanding the "free use" of the SDF in the policy of the US global strategy. Even if the 'War on Terrorism' makes the security environment more complicated, some forms of suppressing the SDF in carrying out the national goal are reserved as an option for domestic society. Support for the Japan-US Security Treaty is established with an unbalanced distribution of costs to maintain it. For example it continues to be unduly brought by people living in Okinawa that maintain it [Hook, Gilson, Hughes, 2012: ch.6].

### 3 The dominant pattern of Japan-US relations

In the international society the relationships with the US in Japan's politics, economics and security has been centered on bilateralism when Japan can decide its favorable course in international systems. It suggests many other relevant features in the relationship pattern of Japan-US. These are as follows; ①the necessity of considering domestic actors, not simply the structure of international systems, ②the necessity to pay

attention to norms in regardless of the trend of immobilization, when the important interests are in danger, the policy making agencies that respond to changes in the structure of the international system with the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' and economic principles, which are useful to clarify the role of domestic society in particular, and ③to institutionalize through more adaptive economic power, continued selection of country and people pursuing non-military solutions to the problem, and ④intention to institutionalize the SDF into national power rather than former regime, in the first for 10 years in the 21st century, Japan adaptively plays a relationship with the US, especially in the security dimension following the US declaring of the 'War on Terrorism'.

The norm of internationalism is to cooperate with and support the international society. This emphasizes the 'normal state'. Otherwise phrased, it means a state that can fully utilize the capability of military and economy.

However Japan's financial and human contribution is positioned as important component of the world order the US has contemplated. It will expand the Burdon Sharing for the maintenance of the international order according to Japan's supplementing it along with the upset of Pax Americana.

Japan provides international public goods and support multilateral global institutions. Japan will take part in the UN PKOs, and make contributions to them. It is said that these contribution are 'normal' internationalist action. In dealing with the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991, Japan was criticized by "free-riding" diplomacy and 'chequebook' diplomacy, especially from the US. This criticism tried to reverse the conventional norm by realists of Japanese political leaders. It is requested

that the international contribution should be penetrated into Japanese society if it is indispensable from the views of humanitarian, physical and spiritual points. The ultimate goal is to approve Japanese governments and people 'international standard level' and turn Japan into 'normal state' [Ozawa, 1993]. The interpretation of this 'internationalism' contradicts the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' domestically.

Domestically embedded norms, 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' norms of Japanese people arise from the experience of Second World War and the traumatic effect of atomic bombings to Hiroshima and Nagasaki has always been embedded in political debate. This norm may not be compelled to individual policy makers. For example Prime Minister Nakasone united his efforts on close cooperation with the US, deciding to increase the military strength of the SDF in the 1980s, and Prime Minister Koizumi's 'War on Terrorism' since 2001. Prime Minister Abe recognized the rights of collective self-defense with the US. However Japanese people remain to accept a norm that does not require the use of military power as a legitimate means of national policy. This is seen in the refusal to amend the Article 9 of Constitution. It is evident in polls and social movements.

In recent years, essentially since 1990s, Japan has been in charge of military responsibility in East Asia with pressure from the US. Indeed, as the norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' have weakened through so-called *Zeitgeist*, the Japanese government gradually accepted military power, but on the contrary we pay attention that the government and people have still shown resistance to it. 'Pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' led this paradigm maintained by a leftist camp like SDP. There are considerable people who support this norm.

The norm of economic developmentalism has become a guiding beacon of postwar Japan. Japan emphasizes foreign policy that put the economy ahead of all else.<sup>(1)</sup> It combines postwar norms of 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism' with norm of economic developmentism. Japanese government and people placed economic interests ahead of military growth. Economic developmentalism has showed the rejection of militarism in prewar, and accepted anti-militarism in postwar. It prioritizes economic activity, promoting aggressive economic activities together with the public and private sectors.

On the other hand 'economic-first' policy has supported the postwar economic developmentism, for example political leaders like Prime Minister Ikeda who led to high economic growth have given this paramount priority in policy making the 'Yoshida Doctrine' expresses the lightly armed and economic growth in supremacy. Japanese priority turned to economic growth in international politics especially after 1960. That is the critical issue in the Japanese political history in the post-Second World War [Anderson, 1996: 206].

The norms embedded in the post-war Japan have been attempting to carry out economic foreign policy as non-military, primarily as a trading nation. What this means is that when Japan is asked for a role as a 'normal state', this norm creates tension with the contribution that the international community demands. The norm of economic developmentalism has been regarded as a special characteristic of Japan as an 'abnormal' state. At the same time, however, it is insisted that the norms should be the extent and type of activities in the international community for Japan, and has conveyed the world how to arrange the power that Japan can provide in the political, economic, and security

dimension of international relations.<sup>(2)</sup>

## Appendix: Theoretical re-consideration on balance of power

### Introduction

Japan has continued to strengthen the Japan-US alliance after the end of the Cold War. This alliance may be necessary for security in the meantime. However this direction may cause disadvantages arising from realism and power balance. It follows that Japan may interfere with the security policy from the deviation between reality and theory. I would like to discuss the current interpretation of power balance in Appendix.

Some people argue that the concept on balance of power is important for understanding modern practices and theories of international politics. Because it is the post-Cold War era, it is the argument that a new viewpoint requires a theory of equilibrium of power and its effectiveness

[cf. Paul, Wirtz, Fortman, 2004; cf. Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth, 2007; cf. Sempa, 2007; cf. Brooks and Worthforth, 2008].

According to the theory on balance of power, the nation-state will try to keep itself independent. The nation pursues power in anarchic international politics. If nation-state has no power, it will either lose its own security or economic prosperity, or be dependent on the will of another country. National interests cannot be separated from the maximization of power, and if the international society is chaotic, the sovereign state will endeavor to enhance national strength. As a result inter-state competition makes international politics a 'natural state' just as a Darwinian jungle. If we realize that a nation-state consisting of one country or plural countries is superior to another nation (or another coalition), it tries to penetrate our own intention.

As weak nation-states cannot secure their own safety, their existence

may also face the threat of disappearing. Therefore a small country participates in alliances, coalitions, and unions in other countries for self-protection [Waltz, 1979: 129], because it is a powerful country that poses a threat to them. Great powers are easy to exercise hegemony over weak countries and actors. A nation-state under threat may also adopt military expansion in order to acquire competing ability.

*Realpolitik* is a struggle for self-preservation with essence of balancing, meaning alliance on the one hand, and the formation of a hostile camp on the other hand. The balancing process leads to counteraction by coercion for the exercise of power under conditions of violence anticipated internally and externally. The balance of power system arises from the absence of international consensus and agreement, and consequently the conflict inevitably brings about balancing. This should lead to deterrence theory.

The sovereign states pursuit the ultimate goal of power [Spykman, 2007: 103-104]. Power needs for self-preservation. The theory on balance of power is consistent with power politics. As a result the pursuit of power must be in equilibrium. According to the theory, equilibrium means peace and stability. However foreign policy makers want to make their own safety superior and reliable to other countries [Sempa, 2007: 75]. Needless to say, pursuit of power is a struggle for acquiring hegemony [Haas, 1952: 442-477].

The system of power of balance has the following six 'rules' [Lake, 2001: 62-64]. The nation-state ①selects negotiation rather than war, ②chooses to makes a war rather than miss the opportunity to increase its possibilities, ③ceases war to reduce (number of) major actors, ④takes behaviors against a coalition or an alliance consisting of a single nation-state or a

plurality of nation-states desiring a superior position, ⑤acts to suppress the nation-state agreeing to the super national organization principle, and ⑥makes the nation-state accepting the role as a partner and treat it as a partner with all the countries that comply with the role.

### 1 Logic on equilibrium

According to the balance of power theorist, the situation where one of the competing camps dominates is not favorable. It is because dominant forces are easy to adopt aggressive behavior. The hegemon country will set self-will in other countries. In contrast peace is established when the balance of power exists among the great powers. In equilibrium a single nation-state or a coalition of them is unlikely to have the incentive to attack other countries. In doing so, none of the nations should think that the equilibrium will prevent warfare because they cannot be convinced of victory [Hall, Paul, 1999: 5]. A nation recognizing the crisis of its country devises tactics on defense, so potential adversary country is obliged to abandon its attack. By all means, it will be significant that opportunities for military victory are reduced. Needless to say, the establishment of the balance of power may provide 'hope' to control and reduce war. At present, however, due to economic growth and progress of military technology international system becomes dynamic, and the equilibrium will only be established at certain limited times and conditions.

We must point to two things as a means for the state to maintain equilibrium. One is to reinforce armaments and secure resources by their own efforts. This is an internal balancing. The other is to establish a military alliance with a third country. This is external balancing. Small and medium-sized countries are to form an alliance with the great

country against the threatening power [Walt, 1987]. However strong powers do not always respect the weak countries, so weak nations may want to form an alliance with other countries. If the alliance reaches adequate defense and deterrence that will keep down enemies from attacks, they should not suffer disadvantages.

The stability of international politics is in a state with the balance of power. As the power balance spreads out, every unit will survive, and a single state will not stand out, meaning that war between big powers will not occur. The theory of power equilibrium pursues that all nation-states are surviving and that a certain stable order is maintained. Because all nations do not want to lose human and material resources, they dare to keep the status quo [Doyle, 1997: 166-167].

The classical realist argues that the theory on balance of power is grounded as a necessary condition to maintain the international order. The historical typical example is the Vienna regime after the Napoleonic War in the beginning of the 19th century. The Cold War structure after the Second World War is also based on that idea. The keynote is the theory on orthodoxy balance of power. The balance of power justifies the principle of deterring a single hegemon country and the coalition consisted by nation-state trying to maintain a superior position. Naturally the balance of power only makes international institutions and organizations take on a secondary role within the sovereign state system. The sovereign nation-state regime, with the objective not to emerge the 'lawless state' of international politics, approves the rights of each state as legitimate, regardless of size or competence [Liska, 1957: 1957: 34-41].

## 2 The problems of classical theory on balance of power

It is sometimes said that the logic of a bandwagon that will attach to a powerful state is established if a state prepares conditions for security and economic benefits. This behavior means that selecting a balance is not necessarily a natural behavior of the state. There are two possible motives to support a state or coalition against which a nation-state is a threat. One is to avoid attacks on own country, and the other is to be given to 'shares of victory'. It is called 'getting on the bandwagon of a winner'. However there is a counterargument that balancing is a wise choice than a bandwagon. Weak states will only choose the subordinate situation. There exists a danger of 'alliance's dilemma' here. Rather than expecting a strong nation to be friendly, it is safer to choose a balance of powers as preparation for realistic threats.

Furthermore when considering the balance among nation-states, the role of the allies depends on the perception of the threat. While there is a tendency for a state to balance the nation-states and actors threatening it, it does not necessarily tend to balance the power on the other. Thus weak nations and actors are not always able to organize opposing powers. In fact it is more difficult to balance against powerful powers, so it is more common to maintain equilibrium in threatening situation [Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987: 8, 15].

The theory on balance of powers assumes that states and actors share the same perception of the current situation. But is there such a premise of various nations, governments, actors, or leaders? For example a global power cannot always maintain its position for all eternity. Also the effectiveness of deterrence has differences in depending on their position. For that reason political decision makers will assume an attack of self-

centeredness.

### 3 Nation-State of behavior in Post-Cold War era

Is it necessary to maintain equilibrium in the superpower of the US under the post-Cold War era? Professor Ikenberry has argued that under the 'one-pole rule system' of the US, it is not possible for three factors to establish that other countries balance it [Ikenberry, 2002: 23 - 26].

The first is a factor related to the positioning of the US on international relations. The US is different from past hegemonic countries due to factors such as geopolitical conditions, democratic institutions, liberal political orientation, and involvement in multilateral institutions. It does not pose a threat to other countries; rather it is a useful country for each country. The liberal democratic structure in international relations is rooted, and the US will not take actions that deny it. Otherwise phrased, the meaning of balancing the US is declining markedly.

The second factor is the fact that each country gains practical benefits in the 'unipolar control system' by the US. Each nation should consider cooperating with the US better than the cost against the US in terms of the economic benefits of security.

The third factor is the question of the usefulness of adopting the balance of powers policy in the 'unipolar control system' by the US. For example if the possession of weapons of mass destruction understands similar views of each nations, that is, equilibrating forces as meaningless, it significantly lowers the incentives involved in the balance, so taking a new balance What is the meaning of that?

Currently under the 'unipolar control system' by the US, esppecially in military is it possible for a situation of equilibrium of power in relations

with each nation-state? Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the PRC have maintained friendly relations with the US. At the same time the US and its allies have tried to integrate potential competitors within the order of the liberal camp through institutional mechanisms with consent. However the US will cooperate with India, Russia and Japan for the opportunity to check on the PRC. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have tried to suppress Russia's actions and incorporate Russia into the Western camp in the form of economic cooperation and security with Eastern European countries, namely through the eastward expansion of NATO. However, like the Cold War era, Western countries do not necessarily become 'monolithic unity'. From 2002 to 2003 France, Germany and Russia tried cooperation to prevent the US from opening up the Iraq War from Iraq crisis to war. Unlike the Cold War era, each country (mainly the major powers) began to form an alliance that took the form of division and dissolution to each international issue for a while. How can we relate this phenomenon to the balance of powers policy and regime?

If the US adopts an expansive policy to exercise its influence to other countries, including the allies, then a regression phenomenon to the balance of powers may arise in a way that opposes the US as a balancer. In Europe in the nineteenth century, equilibrium and cooperation coexisted through cooperative systems, mainly in the UK. On every opportunity the great powers participated in a cooperative system to suppress common enemies. After the Cold War, the US became the only state to exert influence on events in all regions of the world [Sempa, 1989: 114]. However cooperation among the great powers will not last forever. The same thing happens even after the Cold War.

Confusing of cooperation and checking will occur between countries depending on circumstance within a specific area. In areas where conflict is likely to occur, balancing behavior is always taking place. However in other areas, such as Europe, Southeast Asia, South America etc., great conflict is unlikely to occur. Cooperation based on international institutions and organizations is the main focus. Even if another country adopts traditional balance of powers tactics, the state of that region has been trying to solve the problem by institutionalized cooperation system. As a matter of course with that, it is not a reason to deny the balance of equilibrium policies. When explaining a phenomenon, it must also take into account the change in each region, nation, and issue.

In the situation of post-Cold War the US is not entirely commanding the world. Moreover it cannot be clearly divided into 'enemies and ally' like prewar days and during the Cold War. In other words it will be assembled in relationships between countries according to circumstances and situations. It may not be possible that the traditional balance of power occurs.

#### 4 New interpretation of the theory on balance of power

The traditional concept of balance of power cannot explain relations between nation-states during the post-Cold War era. The argument as to whether or not to balance the influence is only an idea of dichotomy between two options. Put another way, it is not an inflexible theory, and cannot explain modern complex international politics in the post-Cold War. However the nation-state may choose a different means from military expansion and alliance in order to balance with a powerful country and a threatening nation-state, and non-countries.

The classical realist focusing on the military balance between states markedly restricts the scope of the theory on power equilibrium, and interprets it severely. There will be no intermediate categories of security behaviors derived from various approaches. In order to consider the current international politics, it is vital that the nation fully understands the concepts and actions to suppress hegemon countries and threatening actors in both global and regional dimensions. To them it is unlikely that the public's view will influence foreign policy on the own government.

We must think of the balance of power as a model to analyze current international politics [Paul, 2004]; 'hard balancing', 'soft balancing', and 'asymmetric balancing'.

'Hard balancing' is a strategy developed by nations involved in intense international competition. Therefore the state must keep military capability always up to date. In order to combat hostile countries, the nation-state signs an official alliance with a third country. This is a common view of power in classical realist and neo-realist. It can be said that this view is the theory on balance of power which has been explained so far.

This approach is to openly organize, and operate a military alliance against a powerful country, a country that intensifies power or a threatened country. A powerful arming plan is a common way to achieve power balance. Today, however, traditional 'hard balancing' is only applicable to areas suffering from conflicts around the world (e.g. Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia).

'Soft balancing' is a balance of power which adopts informal alliance, put another way, flexible mutual theory and cooperation. For example it

is possible to assume a form of coalition of willingness in which each country gathers for each international issue. This is approved when developing security policy on temporary, restrictive, and flexible policies. A nation-state needs a balance against them, if it feels uneasy about a threatening actor (e.g. the Islamic State) or a growing state (i.e. the DPRK). 'Soft balancing' is based on a certain level of armedness strengthening, cooperation, and practice among special countries, while using the global and regional institutions. Policies based on 'soft balancing' are likely to turn into 'hard balancing' tactics in an open manner when intense and powerful nations or actors become a threat.

'Soft balancing' attempts to deal with threatening countries and actors by forming a coalition that does not aim for attack in order to neutralize the threatening countries, actors, and their allies. Use of international institutions to create special coalitions, or use of systems that limit the power of threatened states, or both. The state adopts various means to participate in 'soft balancing'. For example cooperative relations between Eastern European countries and NATO member countries to balance with and Russia, cooperative relations between the US and India to confront against the PRC and cooperative relations among Russia, France and Germany block US leadership in the war in Iraq and so on. Because of their nature these cases are temporary and limited security cooperation that is less stringent than the official defense alliance and the alliance to block a specific country [Paul, 2004: 14].

'Asymmetric balancing' is an effort to deter threats by sub-national actors such as terrorist groups that challenge the state (i.e. terrorist groups vs. anti-terrorism coalition). The sub-national actors and the nation-state groups that support them (terrorism-supporting countries) are

vested in the international community using asymmetric attack means (i.e. terrorism) such as a state-to-non-state group different from the conventional state-to-state, terrorist groups try to challenge and to weaken the country with authority and order. A recent case is a strategy of sweeping the Islamic State, which each nation-state, mainly the US and Russia, was formed.

Terrorist groups attack hegemon countries through asymmetric means (i.e. 9/11 terrorist attacks). Stated in different fashion, it is balancing against the threat from non-national forces to the state. International cooperation is ongoing in the form of anti-terrorism coalition that is currently trying to solve the threat to international security by the terrorist organization. The US's attempt to actually formulate the 'coalition of willingness' for countering terrorism is a way of balancing against threats from non-state actors and countries supporting them using asymmetric attacks.

In sum in today's international politics the 'hard balancing' as normalized in the past has been lost in empirical cases. Attempts such as 'soft balancing' and 'asymmetric balancing' are more frequent than hard one.

## 5 On the theory of 'soft balancing'

Governments should give priority to benefits for their citizens rather than securing military superiority in the international relation of world. Domestic factors (i.e. citizen's choice and norms) regulate government diplomacy and defense policy. Therefore the external policy of the country makes 'hard balancing' impossible, and the conditions surrounding the state are directed to low-cost 'soft balancing' rather than

hard one. The conditions are: ①that it is almost the 'situation of multi-polarization' from almost unilateral control by the US since the end of the Cold War, ②many of the multinational companies which are headquartered in the US, but are responsible for economic globalization, ③the existence of a common enemy called super national terrorism, ④difficulties in converting economic assets into military power in a short period, and ⑤the allied countries in the security and economic support provided by the US can become free riders, and be exempt from the burden by buck-passing [Paul, 2004: 16].

When adopting tactics of 'soft balancing', a sovereign state uses reinforcement of self-defense measures (internal balancing), as well as utilizing international institutions in accordance with assumed enemy forces, as well as at the same time defending its own interests and extensive actions to increase cooperating countries (external balancing) will be frequently used. Usually there is a considerable difference in the balancer against the hegemon country, and the blatant hostile attitude towards hegemon countries is too risky, so the balance may be only a function of checking that action. Besides there can be political and economic pressure from hegemon countries in some cases military retaliation. Furthermore the breakdown with hegemon countries will be too expensive in the era of economic globalization.

Needless to say, it does not become a big advantage to the hegemon country. For example although the PRC, Russia, France and Germany show a posture to balance with the US, it is not easy that they can drive full cooperation from the neighboring countries before the Iraq War in 2003. For example although India has been provided a lot of support from the economic, political, and military aid in ideological affinity with the US,

it will be a discordant relationship in the nuclear weapon issue, so it depends on circumstances to the US. It is also thought that it adopts the band wagon.

The equilibrium policy cannot improve the security dilemma, but the international system may turn it around. International institutions, organizations, agencies and so on alleviate conflicts arising between states, and reduce the cost of their own country [Martin, 1999: 79-98]. International organizations can prevent and reduce conflict, military competition, and war by fulfilling functions such as collective security, mediation, peacekeeping and peace building.

Changes in international politics are predicted if major countries do not use 'hard balancing' and instead heavily use soft 'soft balancing'. 'Hard balancing' must focus on the global balance of power and rally forces that are strong enough to keep checking hegemon countries aiming for control. By contrast because 'soft balancing' distinguishes abilities that can be held according to the circumstances of the occasion, the tactics also seek a temporary balance, trying to gain better results among them. Therefore, in order to effectively implement 'soft balancing', the participating countries must prepare actions that temporarily cooperate with certain common goals[Walt, 2005: 120-141]. We need build the confidence levelling measurements as a precondition for 'soft balancing'.

The realist theory on balance of power works when the nation-state is in an international, particularly military environment with intense competition and rivalry. When international competition is not so severe, the state should minimize efforts to balance. In the face of economic globalization and hegemonic behavior of the US or the PRC, the state will adopt various tactics such as pass-through blame, band wagon, and

containment. The state adopts limited and timed tactics under given conditions. For example tactics are negotiations based on international institutions. They converge with a method of 'soft balancing'.

In the international relation in the absence of universal authority in order to maintain peace and stability, it will be necessary to achieve a balance between various independent entities. Having the necessary to reduce high costs such as conflict, antagonism, clash, confrontation, split, and war, and to make the balance more stable, it occurs in two institutional realities. The first is the international system of 'law of nations' regulating war and keeping peace, the second is the meeting by president (or representative) of the nation aiming for justifying the 'new balance of power'. It is a meeting [Anderson, 1997: 25]. Both express the contents of 'soft balancing'.

After the Cold War the contemporary world tends to assume unstable situations that have shifted from 'unipolar control' by the US to 'multi-polarized structure' in the global politics. This is a chaotic world image after the Cold War. In some cases each nation forms an informal diplomatic federation and a loose alliance, so as not to let the great powers exercise their capabilities. In another case several countries (and non-state actors) mobilize their resources and formulate specific tactics to resist pressure from hegemon countries.

These behaviors can be said to be an attitude to flexibly balance. Its characteristics are determined by what action the hegemon country chooses. Certainly the US will remain a powerful nation for the time being. The next nation-state will be the PRC. But what we should look at is whether other actors favorably look at the situation. In particular the situation judgment is changed depending on whether the each intention

of US and the PRC are agreed to be reasonable, or whether the other countries are rebounded against expansionism of powers. In the latter case efforts to balance with the US or the PRC will increase, and as the formations of force opposing shall increase, the US or the PRC will gradually become isolated among nation-states [Katzenstein, Keohanane, 2007]. This may be future of the PRC.

Currently countries and coalitions that are balanced against the US are emerging. Each country will utilize a wide variety of countermeasures to control hegemon countries when the national strength of US shall decline, and the rise of PRC is significant. This strategy proves to be a low cost option compared to hard balancing tactics. If hegemon countries such as the US or the PRC stick to the policy of old-fashioned equilibrium, 'hard balancing', Japan would choose it. The Japanese governments have embraced and will perhaps continue to depend on the US only security system in bilateral relations with the US. However, in the future, Japan has to consider security policy based on 'soft balancing'.

## Conclusion

'Soft balancing' assumes several effects. Firstly a nation-state, including the use of military force to resist hegemon countries, will have an effect by actively balancing. Secondly a state can exert the effect of collective pressure based on cooperation with other countries. That will be a means to make the country advantageous position in international negotiations. Thirdly a country becomes a diplomatic warning or manifestation of intention to make 'soft balancing' tactics and make domestic circumstances recognize the circumstances and norms of their country. Fourthly when a country faces a situation where its relationship with the

hegemon country is uncertain, it can respond flexibly in deciding the policy of country in the future.

'Soft balancing' can be thought of as a basic framework consisting of various elements that challenge hegemon countries. It should be noted that this 'soft balancing' is a limited, temporary, flexible, and loose cooperative relationship. Participating countries should establish minimum trust relationship within anti-hegemony coalitions. What is it for nation-state will have to re-force and extend international confidence-building measure system?

If the hegemon country damages the interests of other countries then, at that time, 'coalition of anti-hegemon countries' which usually does not become visible will be formed. Each country repeats separation and dissolution for each individual problem. A hegemon country cannot cope with various opponents at the same time. If it is judged that the balancer at that time needs to suppress the hegemon country through cooperative action with other countries, the balancer establishes a partnership against the hegemon country although it is only the part that empathized on the basis of their own benefit.

It is an important extent which each country can recognize the intention of the hegemon country. Conversely leaders of hegemon countries must convince many countries that hegemon country 'does not give threats or disadvantages' unless they take a threatening action on their own interests. Then again would Japan have the qualification and capability of balancer in 'soft balancing'? The Japanese governments must be actively and responsibly committed to participating in the establishment of confidence-building measure based on multilateral cooperation.

The dialogue on multilateral security implemented mainly in Japan recently contributed to the confidence building of the East Asia region, and the tension between Land Power (e.g. ,the PRC, Russia) and Sea Power (e.g. the USA, Australia, Japan). It may be able to play a role of alleviating. In addition to providing a forum for dialogue of other countries, Japan can contribute to stability in the East Asian region by strengthening bilateral relations. Japan is geographically in the midst of tension, conflict, and confusion, but changing the points of view, Japan may be in the strategic and geopolitical 'good position'. Needless to say, it also raises caution against geopolitical conditions favorable to Japan

[Takesada, 2015: 232].

## Note

### Introduction

- (1) See Ch.4 in Part 1 for details.

### Part 1: Postwar history of security in Japan

- (1) The US military can use bases in Japan not only for Japan's defense but also for international peace and security in the 'Far East' (the Article 6 of Security Treaty). Regarding the scope of the 'Far East', the government in a unified view in February 1960 interpreted the areas that are in Japan and its surrounding areas and that are under the control of the ROK and the ROC are included in this area. It is not confined to this area when the safety of this area is threatened due to the emergencies occurred in the surrounding area.
- (2) On the documents exchanged between Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary of State Herter in January 1960; ①important changes in the arrangement and deployment of US forces, ②important changes in equipment, ③regarding the use of the base in Japan to perform operations, the US has to consult with the Japanese government beforehand. However, since the conclusion of the Security Treaty, no prior consultation has been hold. Change of important equipment includes the carrying in of nuclear warheads and intermediate / long range ballistic missiles and the constructing the bases according to the Japanese government's view in April 1968.
- (3) 'Mitsuya Research' in 1963 is similar to the new 'Guideline' of 1997, and the legislation prepared for emergencies.
- (4) Defense Secretary Wineberger related his thoughts that "at that time the USSR had placed military power in the 'Far East' within range of Japan and other countries. At the some time what you should keep it in your mind is that Japan and the US are closely related allies to cooperate with each other".
- (5) The Japan-US Security Treaty obliges Article 5 to jointly deal with armed attacks on one side in the territory under the administration of Japan between Japan and the US. Furthermore Article 6 stipulates that the US is permitted its Army, Air Force and Navy to use facilities and areas in Japan to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the 'Far East'. In addition to Japan's defense, it allows the US military to stay for the peace and stability of the 'Far East'. Article 6 is called the 'Far East provision'. It has explained that the government concerning the scope of the 'Far East' includes areas north of the Philippines and Japan and its surrounding areas that are under the control

of Korea and Taiwan.

- (6) There were various ideas within the US in the deployment strategy that the Clinton administration placed on the security of the world. In Europe, after the Cold War, there were plans to reduce 300,000 personnel to one third, and to reduce 135,000 in Asia to 90,000 in Asia. Japan's stationed force was also reduced by about 5000. However the US stopped reducing military force on the ground of allegations of the DPRK's nuclear crisis in 1994. The 'EASR' to maintain Asian stationed troops of 100,000. In the US doubts were raised about maintaining 100,000 personnel within the military executive. In addition there was a need to seek flexibility militarily. The US had economic circumstances that could not bear the cost of having troops stationed abroad forever. According to the trial calculation at that time, it was said that the cost of the US military stationed is \$ 40 billion per year. Japan paid 5 billion dollars (500 billion yen) of the expenses of the station.
- (7) In 1967 Prime Minister Sato responded to the Diet on exports; firstly in the case of communist countries, secondly in the case of export of weapons prohibited by UN resolution, thirdly in the case of country of international conflict and country with fear of war breaking out. This is the 'Three Principles of Bans on Arms Exports'. Thereafter in 1976 Prime Minister Miki refrained from bans on exporting weapons to areas other than the target area, and weapon manufacturing related equipment was also handled according to weapons. By establishing strict regulations, virtually all weapons exports were forbidden. In 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone relaxed the 'Three Principles' only to the US, and opened the way to provide only weapons technology. In February 2004 the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) requested review of the 'Three Principles' in consulting between leaders of the Keidanren and the LDP.
- (8) There are indications that emergency-related laws are outdated assuming large-scale military invasion of the former USSR during the Cold War era. Because the problem is not in the law, it is problem that has not reconsidered the security policy and the SDF in the times. Japan's future challenge is how to carry out the contribution to the stability of the international community while observing the principle of exclusive defense that does not give concern to neighboring countries.
- (9) The main participating members are following; Armitage (former Assistant

Secretary of Defense), Kelly (Former Director of the Asian Directorate of the National Security Council), Sakoda (former Deputy Director of the Japanese Department of Defense), Wolfowitz (former Assistant Secretary of State), Campbell (former Defense Assistant Secretary), Lincoln (Research Fellow of Brookings Institute), Nye (former Assistant Secretary of Defense), and Green (Fellows of the Council for Foreign Affairs).

- (10) The Japan-US Security Treaty obliges the Japanese Government to the 'Prior Consultation System' when fighting operations overseas by the US forces in Japan. The 'Prior Consultation' has never been carried out. According to the secret document 'Comment on the negotiation of preliminary consultation under the Japan-US Security Treaty' published in 1960. One of the unnecessary cases of prior consultation is 'the US Army from Japan to other parts of the US or the Far East and Movement of Equipment'. All dispatch of marines, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft etc. from the US military bases in Japan to overseas has been treated as 'movement'.

Part 2: The transition of international contribution and security in Japan since the end of Cold War

- (1) In terms of how to compensate for this lack of expenditure for contribution for it, the Ministry of Finance firstly reduced expenses by a supplementary budget for 1990, and managed to raise 200 billion yen. Regarding the remaining 970 billion yen, it was decided to issue temporary deficit bonds. Redemption of redundant government bonds of 970 billion yen that was implemented with tax increase of 670 billion yen and reduction of 300 billion yen such as defense expenses.

There was no financial system for crisis management in those days, so the government could only allocate it with reserve funds. Reserve expenses are usually used for natural disasters. How will the budget come up with \$ 900 billion for emergency to be established in a single year? Also the cabinet did not know how war would develop; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a difficulty doing to make money for the expense. As a result its financial resources were covered by a tax increase of 10,000 yen per person, such as corporate tax and oil tax.

The Japanese government explained 9 billion dollars as follows. Just before the Gulf War, the US government held a meeting to negotiate in order to come

up with the money for the multinational forces. The criterions for evaluating to contribution are following: ①GNP, ②contribution by the manpower to multinational forces, and ③degree of dependence on oil import from the Gulf region. The US government estimated trial warrants of 45 billion dollars in three months, and decided to have Japan pay 20% of it. There was no ground for 20% itself. It was only a rough index.

Since both Japan and the US did not examine and confirm the amount in advance, both countries had differing opinions thereafter. That is; ①What kind of payment is made? Whether it was yen-denominated or dollar-denominated was not left in the document. ②which countries would be paid? Would it be allocated to the US or multinational force participating countries? It was a dollar=133 yen when Hashimoto-Brady meeting which made the first financial arrangement. When the multinational force won the beginning of March, it exceeded dollar=140 yen range. And ③Paying with yen-denominated contributions would result in a reduction of 500 million dollars. Even if Japan did not compensate the loss the US had insisted, viewpoints of the US and Japan crashed.

Foreign Minister Nakayama declared that he did not intend to pay reduction in value of amount on March 25. But the next day, the US demanded the amount of '900 billion dollars' including the loss to Japan. Until then the money paid by Japan was 400 billion dollars, which was allocated to the Middle Eastern countries by 200 billion dollars, and the remaining 200 billion dollars were allocated to the US, the UK, etc. through the Gulf Peace Foundation. July 9 after making a decision based on the expenditure of 9 billion dollars, the Japanese government decided to pay 700 billion yen from the reserve expenses equivalent to about 500 million dollars' worth of funds contribution. This 500 million dollars was agreed to pay for the reason that it played a major role in the Middle East of the US after the Gulf War (and eventually it was paid with special item). The Ministry of Finance directly negotiated with the Department of State. This also became dual diplomacy. It was not doubtful that the Japanese government shared the war expenses during the Gulf War. However Japanese people could not confirm how the money they provided was used.

- (2) The UN conducts 'preventive diplomacy' before the conflict. 'Preventive diplomacy' is diplomacy not only to prevent conflicts between parties, but also to limit its scale. Confidence building measures between the parties, survey of

causes of conflict, early warning, deployment of UN staff, and configuration of demilitarized zone will be put in execution. If “preventive diplomacy” fails, negotiate through the UN peacefully resolving the conflict, call it to the International Court of Justice, and assist in the cause of the conflict. If ‘peaceful creation’ also fails, it moves to peace with compulsion. ‘Peace enforcement’ is the use of force to stop invasion act prescribed in the UN Charter, ‘Peace Enforcement Unit’ is responsible for receiving military force from the UN member countries. However since then, the Ghal’s concept underestimated difficulty in arguments and practices. For example in the Somali civil war and in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, the peace activities of the UN did not function effectively.

- (3) ①existence of ceasefire agreement between the parties to the conflict, ② consent of PKO of the parties to the conflict and the SDF in participation, ③ strict observance of neutrality, ④withdrawal of the SDF troop if the above principle is not satisfied ⑤personnel for protection carries weapons at minimum.
- (4) ①strict observance of suspension of armed conflict, monitoring of military repositioning, withdrawal, and disarmament, ②stationing and patrolling in a buffer zone, ③inspection and confirmation of purchase and installation of weapons, ④confirmation of collection, storage, disposal to abandoned weapons, ⑤ support to conflict parties in setting boundaries such as ceasefire, ⑥aid to exchange of prisoners among parties to the conflict.
- (5) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered commentary, “A certain degree of risk is inevitable, at that time there were many opinions that the ceasefire agreement collapsed in the case of a cease-fighting violation in the country. The ceasefire violation was a part and the whole was not collapsed, so PKO will not be performed if withdrawing with a little ceasefire violation”.
- (6) The ‘Pearl Necklace’ strategy is expressed by analogy to a strategy the PRC deploy in the Indian Ocean. Liking the Indian Continent to a ‘face’ and setting up the PRC’s base in the area surrounding India, it is so called to look like a pearl necklace when connecting it. The PRC explains that the government has set up such a base for the defense of its own sea shipping lane. However the PRC will strengthen geopolitical influence and military presence in the Indian Ocean.
- (7) Out of the ruling party of three parties in those days, the SDP opposed the UN Peacekeeping Activity Cooperation Act when it did not brake on the freewheeling activities against use of force abroad. The amendment may be an

organizational use of weapons. Among them, we need various investigations as to whether it is sufficient for the superior officers to respond flexibly. Regarding the use of weapons, it is also an important issue to consider in context of which is supposed to be in emergencies.

- (8) The strong links among Japan, the US, and Australia face opposition from the PRC. The PRC has a relationship with Japan, the US and Australia from an economical perspective, but it does not serve as realistic guideline of complete 'containment' policy on the PRC. To strengthen the relationship among Japan, the US and Australia, it is intended to go ahead with the PRC's actions within the international order centered on the US, and to drive forward the PRC to play a role as a 'responsible power' in Asia. That is unlikely to make its plan to enhance the inhibitory effect of power like the PRC, which will not tolerate the postwar order so far. The camp claiming the logic of Japan, the US and Australia tends to be legitimate, but the nations or countries that have been subordinated so far will not tolerate such logic which foreign policy makers recognize in Japan, the US, and Australian. On the contrary they will express antipathy soon.
- (9) A 'failed country' is a state where political authority and order cannot be maintained and domestic security and legal systems are collapsing (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia, Congo, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Colombia). Not only are the domestic conditions unstable, but refugees, diseases, starvation, etc. having adverse effects on the security of the world. In addition the terrorist group based on these countries creates a threat to the international community.
- (10) What is noteworthy in recent years is 'non-approved country'. It self-designs itself as a 'nation-state' and nominates 'nation', but it is a region not approved internationally. In the end of the Cold War, separation and independence tendencies become manifest and often develop into armed conflict. 'Non-approved state' is not only power conflicts within the area to which it belongs but also to the power of speculation of a major power. (i. e. South Ossetia, Abkhazia in Georgia, Ngoro Calabaku in Azerbaijan, and Donistre along Moldova). Kosovo falls under this category before independence approval.

### Part 3 International politics transtorming after the Cold War and Japanese security policy

- (1) But we also stipulate criticisms. Missile defense is; ①not technically unfinished and practical at the practical stage is impossible, and ②arms race is

re-beginning.

- (2) For the change of the Japan-US alliance since 2001 see Calder, 2008: ch.6.
- (3) When the independence momentum in Taiwan increased in March 1996, the PRC conducted massive military exercises off Taiwan. The PRC warned against Taiwan. In contrast the SDF and the US army carried out joint monitoring actions in some cases.

#### Part 4 Japan accepting the rights of collective self-defense

- (1) According to the NHK opinion poll of September 14, 2015, many citizens do not support the passage of the security related legislations. The result is in favor of 19%, in opposite of 45%, and in not either 30%. There were many opponents in the same question in the past 4 months. Not only do supporters of the opposition parties and independents gain support from majority, but the supporters of ruling party agree less than 40%, and not either stays unchanged. The government and ruling party's policy has not become widespread own supporters.
- (2) Satoshi Morimoto, "Naze kono Hosei ga hitsuyoka (Why is this legal system necessary?)", "Shiten Ronten (Perspective and Point)", September 28, 2015 ETV Broadcasting
- (3) Kyoji Yanagisawa, "Hoteki Anteisei to Kokumin no Fushinkan (Legal Stability and Public Distrust of People)", "Shiten Ronten (Perspective and Point)", September 29, 2015 ETV Broadcasting. cf. Yanagisawa, 2014; cf. Yanagisawa, 2015.
- (4) Chikako Ueki, "Tadashii Handan wo surutame ni (To Make a Correct Judgment)", "Shiten Ronten (Perspective and Point)", September 30, 2015 ETV Broadcasting. cf. Ueki, 2015.
- (5) Yoshihide Someya, "Yokushiron to Anpo Rong; no Yugami (Misalignment between Deterrence and Security Discussion)", "Shiten Ronten (Perspective and Point)", October 2, 2015 ETV Broadcasting. cf. Someya, 2005.

#### Part 5 Japanese people's view of security after the Second World War

- (1) The Preamble and Article 9 of Constitution of Japan

Preamble: We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations

and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

- (2) Especially the SPJ (lately the SDP) of the largest opposition party had insisted on the demilitarized principle of neutrality
- (3) Prime Minister Fukuda announced in 1977 that Japan would not become a military Power, build mutual confidence and trust based on, heart-to-heart' understanding, and forge an equal relationship with ASEAN, as well as mutual understanding with Indo-China.
- (4) We cognize criticism against this 'pacifism' and 'anti-militarism'. 'One-country pacifism' means a kind of thought pursuing peace only in own country. This term tends to be used when Japan is criticized not only for economic support to the developing countries and countries in conflict, but also from a position to

actively contribute to human, material, economic and military aids of international cooperation. Criticism is often claimed by some people insisting on constitutional amendment in some Japanese people and the US government. From another point of view, Professor Murata pointed out that under the hegemonic system, Article 9 of pacifism will be transformed [Murata, 2005: 231 - 232].

- (5) In addition to that, it is pointed out by Professor Huntington as the follower. The Japanese people who were born after the Second World War lack the collective memories of war. It is also a fact that many young people do not want to be interested in the past related to war. However the neighboring countries in Asia remember the role Japan played in the Second World War. As long as Japan avoids frankly opposing the role of Japan at that time, it is unlikely that signs of the revival of Japan's militarism can be neglected in and out Japan [Huntington, 2002: 181-183].

#### Part 6 Reexamination of security in international politics

- (1) For security, see Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Crag and George, 1995: ch.8.

#### Conclusion

- (1) Otherwise phrased, it is the core in the 'Yoshida Doctrine'. Especially the LDP government started full-scale economic developmentalism from the 1960s on the other hand. In 1960 Ikeda government focused on economic growth in regardless of military capacity.
- (2) It is pointed out that in Japan, especially the realists consider the Japan-US Security Arrangement as an established fact. Many Japanese people have no idea that the reliance on US nuclear deterrence will be revised. They should be able to contribute internationally from the experience of war, atomic bomb, and defeat to the international community from a unique perspective as a peaceful state, but that idea is not likely to be generalized. We should also pay attention to the fact that Japan can contribute to peace and security of the world by the standpoint of disastrous experiences as a nuclear-bombed country, and from its own position as a peaceful state to implement the 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles' [Asai, 1989: 129ff].

Appendix Theoretical re-consideration on balance of power

- (1) Put another way, on the one hand, the hegemon country should be able to stop being hegemon countries by maintaining cooperative relations with other countries. On the other hand countries cooperating with hegemon countries must have a sense of trust in the hegemon countries, so that only countries that pose a threat to hegemon countries will suffer from backlash of opposition from the hegemon countries.

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