

《論 說》

Mass Politics and Political Party System in Western Europe

— Rethinking Western Politics from Rokkan's Model —

Masao Furuta

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Preface

Since the state-formation in the 17th century, West European governments have made every effort to adapt the 'dissents' in the territory as their own people to their political system. In the process of the nation-building, the election is one of the important political institutions in terms of the function of not only selecting representatives of individual residents, but also forming them as citizens and integrating them into the nation.

It should have been decided the way of nation-building and national integration during the era of the mass democracy from the late 19th century; the active participation of the ruled people in the political

system, the establishment, expansion and equalization of civil and political rights and obligations, and the recognition of opposition rights dealing with matters relating to elections, such as concentration of support and mobilization and formation of political parties organized for its expression. The process can be reworded as the establishment of liberalism and democracy. The electoral system stipulates the relationship between the state and the people not only then but also in later times. Elections have the aspect of expressing the diverse opinions of the people based on social cleavage, while the “unapproved members of society” can be incorporated as a member of the nation.

As the universal, equal and secret electoral system has taken root, the political system that controls the whole nation has some confusion, but overcoming it will increase the stability of the political system. By the early 1920s, Western European countries had expanded their political citizenship (e.g. voting rights) to all manhood. “There was an important difference in the character of electoral competition in 15 Western European countries. The confrontation over representatives was gradually” nationalized “through the development of mass membership parties, the interest in the elections were ... fundamentally different” [Rokkan, 1970: 70].

Certainly, although there is variation in each country from top to bottom, with the expansion of the right to election from privileged to non-privileged, it is possible to perform the comparative analysis of the forms of each country according to the criteria of the historical political development model presented by S. Rokkan. Therefore, in the essay, (1) the meaning of the rights represented in the nation formation, (2) I would like to explain using the Rokkan model of macro viewpoint the

circumstances leading to the general election with the “threshold” model, and (3) which party (system) expresses the political situation of the people concerned.

I would like to restructure the development of the mass democracy and political party system which have expanded political rights in western countries, and interpretation of present contemporary significance in this paper through Rokkan's theory.

I Expansion of Suffrage in Nation-Building

1. Macro Perspective: Conceptual Map of Europe

The east-west axis of the conceptual map of Europe (see Figure 1) identifies the conditions of national construction, and the south-north axis identifies the conditions of national formation. The premise of this map is interpreted as an important first step towards the demarcation of the territory after the religious reform [Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 64-74]. The east-west axis is an economic criterion that defines state-formation and the middle zone separating the east and west is the city-state Europe with a trade belt. The state-formation was relatively delayed in or near trade belts, and was initiated earlier in west coastal areas of the distance from trade belts and inland areas in the east. However, there is considerable difference in whether the national form is located in the west or the east. State-formation is based on economic resources from the highly developed money economy in the west and from the agriculture economy in the east, and shows the asymmetric character of the contents in the state-formation.

The south-north axis explains the conditions of nation-building from the cultural aspect. After the Reformation, Protestantism in the Northern

THE "STATE-ECONOMY" DIMENSIONS: WEST-EAST AXIS				THE "STATE-CULTURE" DIMENSION: SOUTH-NORTH AXIS			
WEAK	WEAK	STRONG	STRONG	WEAK	STRONG	WEAK	STRONG
Territorial Centres City Network	WEAK Seaward Peripheries	STRONG Seaward Empire-Nations	STRONG City	STRONG State	Europe	STRONG Landward Empire-Nations	WEAK Landward Buffers
	DISTANT	CLOSE	Integrated into Larger System	Constitutional Formation	Fragmented until 19th Century	CLOSE	DISTANT
Protestant State Church	ICELAND NORWAY SCOTLAND WALES	DENMARK			HANSE GER-MANY	PRUSSIA	FINLAND
Mixed Territories	ENGLAND			NETHER-LANDS SWITZER-LAND	RHINE-LAND		BALTIC TERRITORIES BOHEMIA
National Catholic	IRELAND BRITTANY	FRANCE	"Lotharingia" BURGUNDY ARELATUM	BELGIUM		BAVARIA	POLAND
Counter-Reformation		SPAIN PORTUGAL	CATALONIA	ITALY		AUSTRIA	HUNGARY

Source: Rokkan, 1973: 82

Figure 1: A "CONCEPTIONAL MAP" OF 16TH-18TH CENTRY WESTERN EUROPE
 (territories recognized as sovereign, 1648-1789, in italics)

European Region broke away from the hyperbolic control of the Roman-Catholic Church, and it was edified, and socialization into mass integration for national language standardization to national culture. It became an institution and was incorporated into secular power. As a result, Nordic countries completed construction of the nation and nation building relatively easily, and culturally integrated the nation before the age of mass democracy. On the other hand, the Catholic Church, which was a successor of the former Roman Empire in the southern region and was a spiritual unity, maintained its transdisciplinary character and repeated long conflict with the state.

Given the style of mass mobilization in the south-north dimension, in Protestant Europe (especially Britain, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries), religious, language and other cultural movements took the mass mobilizations from the bottom of the non-privileged group. It was mobilized and its leader was also selected from farmers, urban residents and industrial workers. In Catholic parts in southern Europe, mass mobilization was often from the top of existing churches and secularized privileged networks.

From the Conceptual Map, the initial situation of each nation can be organized as follows.

- (1) Switzerland and Union of Utrecht (Netherlands) are formed as a multilateral, federalized federal state in Germany because the urban network in the trade belt in a high density area is delayed in the construction of a unified system. And, like Italy, the region that has undergone long divisions until national unity was built as a nation-state quite late.

- (2) On the western side of the trade belt, a centralized state (e.g. Spain, France, England, Denmark, and Portugal) was established that succeeded in political integration with the strong urban economy.
- (3) On the eastern side of the trade belt, a central state (e.g. Austria, Prussia, and Sweden) was established where cities were weak and a strong primary economy succeeded in political integration.
- (4) Located around either east or west, there were surrounding areas (e.g. Finland) that separated from the greater political system in later years, and areas (e.g. Brittany, Bavaria, Lorraine, and Catalonia) integrated into the dominant center.

At the time of the 16th and 18th centuries, full-fledged state construction was underway, which would condition the modern nation-state. If this external boundary construction is completed without any problems, the people living there had an opportunity to smoothly develop their civil, political and social rights and obligations.

2. Process to Mass Democracy

In state formation and nation-building, the timing and form affect the transition to popular democracy in the area system in the process of external boundary construction. In other words, the control of external exchange was also related to the circuit of “voice” (e.g. justification of freedom of expression) that functions in the domain. It could cause the population to “exit” from the system. In order to bring the inhabitants that are in the regional boundaries and within the boundaries into the system, their “circuit protests”, the internal circuit of means was opened to the opposition and the marginalized residents, and so the boundaries

keeping the residents in the area, the execution of the “protest” would to the “nationalization” of the concerned residents. Differences in the distinctiveness of each nation emerge in connection with its installation. In other words, depending on how the nation-builders tackled the following four factors, it makes a difference in various results.

The four factors are whether (1) the “representative (class-of-identity-congressional assembly) circuit” was maintained in the critical period of regional consolidation from 1600 to 1800, (2) speed of the rights to vote expanded after 1789, (3) “levels of violence” that occur in taking politics into “protests”, and (4) organizing mobilization of “protests” from below during the transition to popular politics [Rokkan, 1974: 52].

The early ‘nationalization’ of Protestantism in Northern Europe allowed the mobilization of ‘from below protests’. First of all, early development of “literacy” actively mobilized the lower strata to popular politics, and the fact that the church has been incorporated into a part of the state apparatus reduces the number of disputes, which the controlled population resided in central and southern Europe, voluntary mass mobilization was delayed due to underdeveloped mass education, which in turn kept mobilization of “from above”.

The development of democracy in Europe in general must be considered both from the institutional side (political right = the right to vote) and from the source of social differentiation and mobilization (party system) [Rokkan, 1980].

In Western Europe, after the French Revolution, political rights was institutionalized the same rights to the people in the area and complete it in the 20th century. They legally embody the right to vote and the right to hold official positions, and guarantee the political status of “people who

cannot freely express their opinion.” Political rights include ordinary, equal and direct constituencies, as well as secret ballots, which is also the process of integrating the people and their representatives. It includes secret voting and is also a process of consolidating national representatives.

Secret voting is a system that allows individuals to exercise their own choices, either temporarily or away from the environment in which they are bound, in voting, if election is regarded as a pure individual's choice. It can be said that the election system is a product of the process of achieving “nationalization” in the form of uniform formal equality to all citizens through the “one person one vote” system [Bendix, 1971].

The equal constituency process of “one person and one vote” basically follows the following five consecutive stages [Rokkan, 1968: 148].

In the first stage of a series of pre-revolutions in the first half of the 19th century starting with the French Revolution, it was characterized as a condition of political citizenship, with the approval of membership in professional positions (noblemen, monks, merchants, artisanal professional groups, free farmers).

In the second phase, due to both the American and French revolutions, the time would come when election rights increase. However, there were strict restrictions on entering the political arena under the regime *censitaire*.

In the early mass mobilization in the third stage, the electoral rights was greatly expanded, but formal inequalities in terms of its influence, it took various measures and sustained such as multiple votes and inequality election system for representatives, etc.

In the fourth stage, the social and economic criteria for eligibility for manhood were abolished, and the manhood's common voting right has been generalized. Although the inequalities of one vote in the constituency were eliminated, there is a gap (of one vote) worth noting in terms of the value of one vote in the electoral districts.

In the fifth stage, the right to vote for womanhood, minors and short-term residents is approved, and the value of one voter's vote were homogenized.

The first and the second stages are the historical stages that aim at the establishment of liberalism, and the third, the fourth, and the fifth can be understood as the stage of the realization of democracy. Of course, the steps up to equal voting have not been uniform among countries. We confirm the expansion of political citizenship. Considering the components of the political development model in Table 1, the expansion and development of democratization in each country is the geopolitical position (I: Territory), then the range of peripheral control (II: Territory), or religion depending on the outcome of the reform (II: Culture), the representative system of the tribal conference (identity-based parliament) since the Middle Ages will survive or disappear (III: Territory), and the final universal suffrage has been universalized (IV: Rights). There are differences in social and cultural conditions to gradual or rapid progress of the five variables (Figure 2). Table 4 illustrates the variation of each country in the order of the general elections, given the combination of the variables in Figure 2. We can realize one message from here.

Table 1: The primary elements of the model
PRECONDITION VARIABLES

	Economy	Territory	Culture
0. The Early Middle Ages	Predominant Agrarian Structure: – <i>Atlantic/Celtic boscaige</i> – <i>open field (champion) farming</i> – <i>allodial</i> – <i>seignorial/manorial</i> – <i>Mediterranean-type field system</i>	Extent of Incorporation into German-Roman Empire: – <i>part of core</i> – <i>marchland</i> – <i>temporarily within Empire, later transferred to outside control</i> – <i>newer part of Empire</i>	Ethnic Origins of Successive Territorial Populations – Celtic – Roman – Germanic – Slavic – Finno-Ugric – Arabic/Muslim
I. The High Middle Ages	Strength/Structure of City Network	Geopolitical Position – within central city belt – close to city belt – distant from city belt	Strength of Vernacular Literature Standard(s)
II. 1500-1700	Change in Geoeconomic Position: – <i>breakthrough of Atlantic capitalism</i>	Extent of Periphery Control: – <i>degree of unification/centralization</i>	Extent of Nationalization of Territorial Culture: – <i>success/failure of Reformation</i>
III. 1648-1789		Survival of Representative Institutions v. Absolutist Rule	


INTERVENING PROCESS VARIABLES: INTERACTION OF NATIONAL WITH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1789-1920s

	Economy	Territorial	Culture
IV. Intensified Nation-Building	Character of Rural-Urban Resource Combinations: Commercial or military combinations with rural resources v. rural-urban conflict	Pressures for Centralization/Unification v. Movements of Liberation/Secession	Extent of Periphery-Center Strain: <i>Ethnic-linguistic mobilization</i>
V. Urbanization, Industrialization, Secularization	Rapidity, Localization of Industrial Growth	Pressures for Imperial Expansion v. Movements for Detente, Peace	Character of Church-State Relations: <i>strains, conflicts, alliances</i>

EXPLICANDA: VARIATIONS IN POLITICAL RESPONSE STRUCTURES 1848-1950s

	Rights: extension	System: alternatives	Party alternatives
VI. The Structuring of Alternatives	Sequencing of Steps Toward Universalization of Political Rights	Frequency/Intensity of Crises of Transition: extent of violent disruptions	Sequencing of Steps in Formation of System of Party Alternatives
VII. Consequent Mass Alternatives	Class/Culture Conditioning of Levels/Types of Participation	Class/Culture Conditioning of Attitudes to System: acceptance v. rejection	Class/Culture Conditioning of Party Choice

Source, Rokkan, 1981: 74-75



Source: Hagtvet and Rokkan, 1980b: 140

Figure 2: The process leading to the general election right

In general, countries that had sustained the center-building of the state for a long time tend to gradually and gradually expand the suffrage (see Figure 3) in the four stages [Hagtvet and Rokkan, 1980: 140141].

- (1) In countries where alliances of various powers to achieve nation-building were early successful, rapid democratization strategies are unnecessary (England, Sweden).
- (2) Although the two nations achieved independence, if there had been still a threat of separation, it brought about a sharp increase in voting power. In addition, rapid democratization is adopted even when it is necessary to achieve national integration, against decentralization (particularism) based on strong social cleavage (Switzerland after the Separation Alliance War in 1846, Norway in the 1890s, Finland in 1906).
- (3) Sudden transition from absolutism to representational rule trended

to maximize (at least manhood) the right to vote (France, Denmark, Prussia / Germany).

- (4) Countries characterized by strong anti-religious reforms must experience long continuous steps towards full manhood's suffrage. In countries where the Catholic Church were influential, the democratization process and mass mobilization slow down (Austria, Spain, Italy, and Belgium).

3. Threshold of Legitimacy and Incorporation

Table 2: threshold and party system

Level of each threshold				Resulting party system
①Legiti- mation	②Incorpo- ration	③Represen- tation	④Majority power	
a. ①H	②H	③H	④H	Autocratic or oligarchic regimes, <i>Verfemung</i> of all parties: protests and grievances either channeled through the field administration or through estate representation.
b. ①M	②H	③H	④H	Embryonic internal party system: cliques of representatives, clubs of <i>notables</i> . Examples: Britain before 1832, Sweden during the quarrels between "Hats" and "Caps".
c. ①M	②M	③H	④H or M	Internal party systems generating rudimentary outside support through registration association but safeguards introduced organizations: predominant in Western Europe during period between the absolutism and the introduction of parliamentary rule under manhood suffrage.
d. ①L	②M	③H	④H	Initial phase in development of external party system: lower-class movements free to develop, but suffrage still limited and/or unequal. Example: Sweden before 1909.
e. ①L	②M	③H	④H	Same but with parliamentary rule: Belgium before 1899; Norway, 1884-1900.
f. ①M	②L	③H	④H	Isolation of lower-class or religious minority parties from the national system: restrictive measures against political organizations but full manhood suffrage. Examples: the Wilhelmine Reich during <i>Sozialistengesetze</i> , 1878-1890; France during the Second Empire and early decades of the Third Republic.

g. ①L ②L ③H ④H	Competitive party system under universal and equal manhood suffrage but with high payoffs for alliances and with a clear separation of legislative and executive powers. The best example would be the United States if it were not for the restrictions and the low <i>de facto</i> enfranchisement of Negroes in the South. France under the Fifth Republic may be a better example.
h. ①L ②L ③H ④M	Same but with parliamentary rule. Examples: France under later decades of the Third Republic and most of the Fourth; Great Britain since 1918.
i. ①L ②L ③M ④M	Same but with medium threshold PR (Proportional Representation); little need for alliances to achieve representation but safeguards introduced against fragmentation through explicit or implicit electoral minima. Examples: the Netherlands, and Switzerland since 1918-20.
j. ①L ②L ③L ④L	Same but with maximal PR and fewer restraints against majority power: the fragmented, centrifugal parliament and the plebiscitarian presidency of the Weimar Republic.

Note: H: High, M: Medium, L: Low

Source: Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 27-29

Mass democracy in Western European countries has developed through four stages in response to the “challenge from below”. They are: (1) establishment of the right to establish a mobilization agency, (2) institutionalization of the mobilization market through the expansion of the rights to vote, (3) acceptance for the “movement from below” to the parliamentary representative, (4) actual influence of “movement from below” to executive. These expansion of political citizenship expansions, depending on how they are dealt with, also have the “threat of violence”. The new political movement has to go to the core of the political system by going through these four “thresholds” at these stages (see Table 2)[Rokkan, 1970: 79ff].

- (1) “Threshold of legitimacy” is whether suppressed the protest as a conspiracy or, to a certain extent, approved as a right of criticism or

opposition (e.g. right of assembly, expression, publication). In the history of state-formation and nation-building, from what point in time did effective approval of the rights of petition, criticism and demonstration rights exist for the system? From which time was it judged that there was formal protection of the right of assembly, expression and presentation?

(2) “Threshold of incorporation” is whether the protester was equal to that of the dominant in terms of political rights. How long did it take for the supporters of the growing opposition movement to be recognized as legitimate participants in the selection of the same delegate as the vested interests?

(3) “Threshold of representation” is whether a new movement gains representation and it is institutionally guaranteed. How high is the initial “threshold” for the new movement against the representative? And when and in what ways was the ‘threshold’ lowered to make it easier for the legislature to get a seat?

(4) “Threshold of executive power” (is whether) Whether the opponent or not is incorporated into majority control, or the party or party coalition of the opponent can gain power by the victory of the election. How did the government exempted from pressure from the legislature? And how long did it take for the parliamentary forces to directly influence the government’s policy decisions? Whether the minor party takes the form of a proportional rule approaching the administration, or whether it is through the Cabinet system responsible for the majority of the legislature.

Although there are factors that cause one or more “thresholds” to

change, we can observe many variations in the order of the changes. The progress that develops from four “high threshold” to four “low threshold” is considered in the democratic scene. In other words, that is freedom of expression, assembly and association, and approval of expansion of the right to vote. During this development process, many variations influence each subsequent stage. So, even with some options, there exists no single, definitive model that can explain the whole. However, it is possible to arrange as follows.

The “thresholds” in (1) and (2) control the development of popular politics, and the elimination of the barrier to electoral power promotes the expansion of potential political markets and the political participation of citizens. At this time, the conditions of each country differ depending on the timing of determining the decline of the first two “thresholds”. Western countries can be grouped into a British model with a representative tradition and a French model with an absolutist tradition.

The British model has not regained inequality but slow and gradual general elections, but remains for a long time formal approval of inequality (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Finland). The French model has an early, sudden universalization and equalization of political citizenship, but the resurgence of unequal elections and the use of the referendum (e.g. Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Prussia / German Empire). Naturally, the variation of political games in each country is expanded (see Figure 2) [Rokkan, 1970: 86-87].

Countries that have successfully passed the five stages of equality are England, Belgium, and Sweden. These countries are in contrast to the rapidly changing case of France [Rokkan, 1961]. In England, the process from the 1832 electoral law reform to the abolition of multiple votes in

1948 took over 100 years. In Sweden, status representation was abolished in 1866, but extreme inequalities affecting elections remained until 1921.

Belgium moved from status representation to property qualification as soon as it became independent in 1831 and ended the multi-vote phase from 1893 to 1917, resulting in the election of all manhood over the age of 25. (However, one more votes had been approved by property, background, and householder until 1919).

In the Netherlands, he moved from a stutas representation system to a property qualification system in 1848, but did not experience multiple voting before choosing a men's suffrage during World War I. Finland had inherited the four-status Swedish system until 1906, and then went on from the first stage to the fifth stage of granting universal suffrage to men and women.

France, in contrast, ended the first to fourth stages in four years. The January 1789 Act was an indirect electoral system centered on nobles, monks, and tiers état, but in the 1791 Constitution, a taxing standard was established to allow a certain number of citizens to participate in the election. The Constitution of 1793 moved straight to the stage of the manhood suffrage, and sudden democratization appeared in a short period of time, but for the next few decades it swung between restricted and ordinary equal elections. That is, in the period from 1815 to 1848, the classical property qualification system restricted the suffrage, and democratization was rapidly reproduced by the 1848 revolution.

With a tradition of absolutists, Denmark, after a short period of status representation in 1831, reached the manhood suffrage which expanded in 1849, but, like France, it is during the dispute over Germany between oligarch elites and urban radicalism / peasant union that progressed to

manhood's right has taken the form of a division of electoral system, which is a mixture of the tradition of status system, property qualification system and general election system. Prussia gained the right to vote after the 1848 Revolution, but the three-class system (*Dreiklassenercht*, 1850-1918) protected the interests of landowners and bureaucrats. In contrast to the third-class election law, Reich's empire implemented equal suffrage for all manhood.

The Austrian Empire and Iceland did not fall into the two patterns of the British model and the French model. In Austria, four status electoral systems were adopted from 1861 to represent corporatist interests, but in 1897 the fifth status was added for non-status citizens, but in 1907 it was unified into a national representative system of "one man and one vote". Iceland was not completely democratized after the rebuilding of the Althing Council, but gradually progressed on democratization with the liberation from Denmark.

4. Thresholds of the Representative and Executive

When the first two of "legitimates" (of legitimacy and incorporation) are removed and the right to political participation is extended to manhood, a party appears to protest against the numerical inequity of the majority representation system next. This development can be understood as a political process that adds democracy to liberalism. The debate shifts from the unfair electoral system to the "threshold" of a representative who demands the proportional representation (PR).

Proportional representation is introduced as part of the strategy of nation-building and integration, as minorities such as languages, religions and ethnicities tend to destroy the system from distrust in the electoral

system in multipolar societies in each system. Therefore, proportional representation will create a new principle of coexistence with different elements by guaranteeing “protection of minority rights” in multipolar society, and will create new pressure from the bottom, and at the same time self from above. It appeared as a move to save statuses. It seems that it is easier for self-defense that it would be easier for a political party that has been in a property qualification system to lower the “threshold” of a representative than to merge with a ruling party.

Organizing the “threshold” of the representative in relation to the proportional representation system, the pressure for (1) the proportional representation system is likely to be established in a multipolar society, and (2) introducing the proportional representation system along with the expansion of the voting right, groups that become disadvantaged found a means of survival, and (3) the actually introduced states are small and easy to communicate among the elite, relying on international political stability, and can only be done in resourceless little and so, The resistance to the introduction of the proportional representation system was persistent in the four political regimes (e.g. Britain, France, and German empire).

From the above, the proportional representation system will stabilize the system from the viewpoint of nation-building, and when the proportional representation system is introduced in the mass mobilization phase, the structure selected by the political party will be stabilized, and It worked to “freeze” the relationship (IV: Political Parties in Table 2) of the electorate and the political party. That is, *“the party system of the 1960s will still reflect the social cleavage structure of the 1920s, with some important exceptions.”* This was a defining feature of the competitive politics found in Western European countries, even in the era of high

mass consumption after the Second World War [Mair, 1983]. Even then, party selection and party organization have been older than the majority of the electorate, and the political party currently active for citizens of the West European is part of the political landscape before the voters had the right to vote as citizens [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 50].

Variation in the gap between socio-economic change processes and political development processes must consider the role of political parties in administrative decision-making [Rokkan, 1970: 91-92]. It relates to the fourth threshold, “the threshold” of Majority power. How many votes does a party need in an election and what seats does a party need in a parliament to be given the opportunity for political parties to have an effective impact on the central decision-making bodies of the regime? The administrative threshold is related to the institutionalization of control from parliament to the government. Western European countries introduced rules of government control by parliament in the 19th century except Germany and Austria.

The process of lowering this threshold is divided into two models. One is the British model (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway), in which the parliamentary majority was responsible for the cabinet system before the expansion of the right to vote. In Britain, a responsible cabinet system was established during the Walpole era in the first half of the 18th century, Belgium was established in 1831, in the Netherlands in 1848, and in Norway in 1898. On the other hand, the other is that the manhood's suffrage right was introduced before the system of responsibility was institutionalized, and the gap between the system of responsible government and the suffrage system was large. It could not be established until 1901 in the Netherland. Austria, also Germany, did not

become possible until the defeat in 1918.

The decline of the executive threshold will allow access to the cabinet if one party or coalition forms a majority within the parliament, so the possibility of minority participation in the administration is assumed; (1) in terms of the majority seat in parliament, the issue for the coalition for the minority party and the largest party, (2) “bargaining ability” of similarity and closeness of policy, and (3) severe conditions of pressure from the international environment. And the conclusive meaning of “the threshold” of executive is “to explain the variation in voting behavior among all countries”.

In some countries, elections present conditions that allow the ruler to choose from multiple options. However, in other countries, the election represents a social cleavage that is “loyalty to a segmented society,” and by electing representatives of the rights of each segmented the culture of its own community. We can guarantee the interests of the community. It clarifies the structure of “issues to be clarified VI: Election Options” in Table 2. At the same time, this should be related to density in “VI: Progress in forming a party selection system”. In other words, in the way of the party system in Western European countries after the First World War, we can see the characteristics of the politics of each country.

Once the relationship between the lowering of each “threshold” and the process of democratization (election) is sorted out, the new political movement will communicate its views to the people in an election beyond the “threshold” of legitimacy and organize, To secure the right to participate, to gain the right to influence the choice of representation equal to established system supporters beyond the two transfer “threshold”, not only to collect votes over the “threshold” of

representative and if a minority gets seat in Parliament in the same way of election as existing political parties, and it is explained the pattern the high and low of fourth “the threshold” in Table 2 (patterns from a to f are historical cases, g to j) until the present case [Lipest and Rokkan, 1967: 26-29].

What are the conditions under which political opponents from these “threshold” organize political parties? (1) The arrangement of political parties within the political system appears before the decline of the “threshold” of representatives. (2) “The threshold” of the representative poses severe challenges to the new political organization at the stage of mass politics. In addition, (3) the movement to lower the “threshold” of the delegates has also become a policy to prolong the life of the split political parties who cannot jointly defend among the political parties anew with the emerging mass movement [cf. Carstairs, 1980].

5. Summing up

We lastly confirm the transition pattern to state-formation, nation-building, and mass democracy in the sense of organizing from the historical viewpoint of nationalization (nationalization) [Rokkan, 1975].

(1) In areas far from the trade belt (England, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland), democratization is gradual, so there remains almost no violence. These areas did not have problems with the control of ‘exit’ choices, maintaining a representative system, and standardizing their own law, religion and language. The expansion of the rights to vote has progressed steadily.

(2) In the area within the trade belt (Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium), progressed relatively smoothly. However, it developed multipolar co-existence for the strength of urban networks, blocked centralized

national devices, and completed the consociational democracy.

- (3) It was difficult to transit the mass democracy, and sometimes accompanied by violence, as the areas at the ends of the trade belts (France, Denmark, Prussia / Germany, Austria, and Spain) have strong centers. In Prussia, Austria, and Spain in particular, due to the lack of legitimacy within the boundaries to the territorial centers, therefore, it was not possible to maintain the regime without restricting the various “exit” choices.
- (4) If the territory had to go through the process of center formation, people formation and democratization in a short time (Italy and Finland), it was prone to various problems.

The development of mass politics centered on elections in Western Europe countries, as mentioned in the conceptual map, starts from the geopolitical and geocultural position of the country, and is defined by the way of state-formation and nation-building .

As Western European history shows from the 19th century to the 20th century, elections reflect the diverse interests of each community layer based on social cleavages, so there has existed an inherent possibility of a crisis that divides the nation-state. Or it has an important meaning in the process of “national integration” to make each resident recognize “unity as a nation”. We can understand the diversity of the development of the Western European nation-states through the examination of the history of electoral systems in each country, or the formation of popular democracy that is closely related to elections in the form of a party system. It should also be noted that the basic structure of the Western European party systems was defined before the start of mass

mobilization due to the expansion of electoral power and democratization.

II From Social Cleavage to Party System

1. Theory of Social Cleavage

Cleavage is a concept for identifying ongoing conflicts in a certain society. Even in the case of conflict, there are cases where the conflict that divides people is easily rooted in trade, negotiations, and an uncompromised social structure, but there should be also confrontations on the surface of each political party. The study of what type of division exactly deserves to be named a cleavage, especially a social cleavage, has been described in its own concept by each researcher, with very little discussion so far [Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 213-215].

The social cleavage is a concept that places the source of the political division of social structure about the difference between classes, status, beliefs, values, groups, and organizations within a capitalist society. And the emergence of social cleavages and the actual impact of it will evoke the role of organizational and institutional factors.

Rokkan explains the political conflict that has emerged from the transformation of social structure with the concept of social cleavage, along with the National and Industrial Revolutions in the 18th and 20th centuries. He also decides to distinguish people only when differences and conflicts between one social group and another confirm a clear perception, and are institutionalized in a political system. We must argue that it becomes a standard [Manza and Brooke, 1999: 31-32].

Two approaches are needed to elucidate the social cleavage [Bartolini and Mair, 1990: ch. 9]. On the one hand, there is an approach that brings impact on institutions and behavior, and on the other hand, there is an approach

that changes social structure. The social cleavage is defined as whether it remains at the surface of political confrontation or even close to social structures.

Then we have to think of three levels. The first level is the “experience” element rooted in social structure. The second level is the “normative” element in the conflicting sense of social groups. The third level is an “institutional” element expressed through individual interactions and organizations.

S. Bartolini and P. Mair explain that the type of political division present at only one of the three levels should not be considered a social cleavage. For example, divisions that are rooted in social structures based on class inequality are the criteria by which people judge their political position. A political division is defined as a social cleavage because the individual or group decides the standard of the cleavage as its own norm and then institutionalizes through the political party (or party system) appropriately characterized from the social cleavage, when it comes to being, and most political confrontations either with the mere “political quarrels” or short-lived conflicts.

It is expected to be inequalities rooted in a social structure pertaining to a social group, and their normative significance have little impact on the alignment of voting behavior without an opportunity to express that element within the political system. Political divisions do not persist unless there exists an element related to social structure, and are socioeconomic inequalities associated with conflict between groups, which political conflict tends to be short-lived.

We must consider social cleavages from the three conditions of social structure, collective unity, and political confrontation.

The first condition has to be based on a certain social structure. Social structures usually change slowly, but social cleavages tend to persist once established. The division based on social structure establishes a group of people with shared interests and statuses.

For example, if the proportion of working classes is reduced, the impact based on class cleavage may diminish. On the contrary, the decline can bring about changes within the class in terms of changing political formation. For the social cleavage with strong political impact, religion, class, race, ethnicity, language, etc. can be assumed.

The second condition is that there recognizes conflict between groups. It must be recognized that there are two or more different groups over collective identification and one group member is in opposition to the other. Collective identification is an essential condition for establishing a social cleavage. Therefore, the conflicts that arise from temporary dissatisfaction among people are unlikely to be considered in the organizational and institutional context.

The third condition is that confrontation will occur. The Social cleavage has to be made clearer between groups as a way to mobilize certain parts of the population for political activity. This is not temporary, but is a long-term political conflict [Manza and Brooks, 1999: 33-35].

Rokkan did not consider political parties as “outgrowth” of social powers, but regarded political parties as a representative agency in transitioning from a social cleavage to a concrete political confrontation.

First, the role of political parties is to consolidate and express conflicting interests with the establishment of manhood’s suffrage, to create organized networks, and to translate intergroup disputes by devising electoral strategies. So, every cleavage always does not translate

itself into a political party [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 26].

Second, as a clash of interests, it tends to explain social cleavages, but profits should be understood as more deeply rooted than economic advantages and societal privileges. When elements such as cultural confrontation and ideological division are strong, they are taken up, for example, in the form of class cleavage or expressed in “state-church conflict”. The important thing here is how to control the norms of the community. Said differently, it must be viewed as an issue of values. Otherwise, it will also undermine the explanation of political phenomena based on social cleavages. The social cleavage of “land-industry” of England in 19th century must be interpreted as “two value-oriented clashes” related to the legitimacy of status. Political parties represent “involvement in value in politics” [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 5, 15, 18, and 19].

The confrontation between groups in Western European mass politics and the ideological confrontation that accompany it are “the concept of moral rights and the interpretation of history and human destiny” [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 11], and it does not account for in certain situations group’s profit and loss. The following three phenomena are intertwined in the concept of social cleavage [Knutsen and Scarbough, 1995: 493-494].

First, a social cleavage is a relatively sustainable social division that gives rise to a group that “integrates” objectively according to the class, religion, economic and cultural interests etc. in which is rooted in the structure. Second, some social cleavages are related to some values common to group members. Group members understand the “common life”. Third, certain social cleavages are institutionalized in some forms. It adopts the form of churches, trade unions, and other associations, but is ultimately left to political parties. A political party can be regarded as a

product that has shifted mere social division into a social cleavage by giving consistent political expressions to certain social groups and their members.

The support of a political party is expressed in the form of votes from the relatively stable relationship with a social group, and from the voters the shared value orientation. Therefore, politics based on social cleavages cannot be achieved without adopting the form of political parties.

The notion of a social cleavage is more exclusive than the notion of political division, and has a more rigid meaning than social division. So social cleavages are more than just social conflicts, and at the same time constitute a particular form of political division. If the term social cleavage is used in all sorts of social and political divisions, the concept will lose its analytical ability.

In short, it is the social cleavage that forms the political and social view of human beings. It is the sub-culture that surrounds the individual. The lower culture is “a group of attitudes, values, beliefs, behaviors, and habits shared with a special group or social class in society, and has a decisive influence on the individual. And it has to be distinguished from the characteristics of the whole society.” Social cleavages are a culture of reference groups for individuals. Social structure is a collection of various “impermeable” groups, and cultural aggregates of different types and contents. In that respect, social cleavages make the inside of the social structure that forms the political activity clear.

That is why citizens try to live in a closed plural society in a multipolar society because they feel more attached to their community society than the people's position (national political culture). Social cleavages that divide societies like class, religion, language, ethnicity, race, generation, and

gender, in a way, characterize the character of social structure. We have multiple social groups that support a specific party, each forming a party, and each party has been embodied in the form of a party system.

However, the social structure that causes the political party system differs in appearance in the history of individual nation-state formation. The way in which social structures based on social cleavages affect the party system can be summarized as follows.

- (1) Social cleavages create party organizations that represent social groups. It takes a historical stack.
- (2) Certain political parties receive support from certain voters.
- (3) Each party competes for the acquisition of voters while appealing for a part of the society.
- (4) Policies arising from social cleavages themselves clarify the differences between the parties [cf. Rose, 1987].

Therefore, we can understand the current political situation of a country by observing the party system.

2. Importance of Intervening Agents

The division by class is usually transferred to the political scene, but not necessarily in every country. Sometimes religious divisions, even if turned into politics, cannot be concluded in reality that all cases will be of the same shape. And that is not always the same strength. For example, even though gender conflict is an important division in every society, it is not reflected in the politics of every country.

So, what will lead to the various forms of each country? G. Sartori

points out that the consequences of its form depend on the efforts of the people who are trying to express in politics (translators) and those who actually act with conviction (persuaders). Put another way, whether or not immobilizing the innumerable divisions in the society into cleavages means that the primary agent can function effectively and its interests can be communicated to political parties (or other forms of political organizations) [Sartori, 1990: 169]. For example, taking the class as the criterion of cleavage, we can say as follows.

A political party is not an “objective” socio-economic condition but a “subjective” socio-economic self-perception. However, if a political party derives only from socio-economic conditions, this is more important than the socio-economic conditions of the class, as the independent motivation and intention of achieving its political purpose. That is its own social recognition. At that time, there should remain the expectation of demand and supply to political parties in (part of) society. For example, it is the labor organization (usually a trade union) that mediates between the class cleavage and the socialist party, and as a result, the socialist party represents the workers’ interests in the election. The division-cleavage-organization/group-party scheme appears in the political phenomenon of elections.


Similar considerations apply to other divisions, such as the church and its umbrella organizations. This is sometimes expressed in the Catholic action. These institutions and organizations evolve in a process of mobilizing supporters in a religious sense, quickly gaining momentum even if they are the dominating party, and are religiously more organized than the original founder’s intentions. They can make clearer divisions more clearly. S. N. Kalvas does not automatically reflect the sense of values immediately after the identity and conflict with which religious

parties already exist, and conversely, “the religious ties are extinguished by modernization”. It is concluded that the transition from a cleavage to a party is a struggle between various groups and organizations in face of some pressure under the severe constraints of society at any given time. As a result, it can be reworded also as the manifestation of the willingness to penetrate self-perception in society.

In short, as shown in Table 3, the transition to politicization of the cleavages that arise from the critical social circumstances at that time is at least an intervening agent that actively asserts political powers in society and function of interest articulation and aggregation. It is essential that an agent can perform the functions of them. This function justifies acting on behalf of the people in the sub-society. However, when polarization is significant, the cost of consolidating and functioning them for citizens is rather “expensive” [Almond and Powell, 1996: 124].

Intervening agents play a very important role in mediating between cleavages and political parties [Kitschelt, 1992; Doorenspleet, 2005: 2-8]. Its role cannot be explained or judged only by the “objective” situation of social structure. In other words, the “objective” role played by the “subjective” executor who tries to put a certain social situation into a political issue and the intervening agent play an important role in the society and politics.

Table3: Flow of Functions of Interest Aggregation and Articulation



If there is nothing to divide society, judging from the standpoint of cleavage, the absence of it means no need for political parties or politics. However, such a situation is unlikely. Then we have to think about divisions in society. And if the division changes according to the age, the old cleavage line should disappear and a new one line appear. In this sense, political change should be explained in response to changes in social circumstances [Sartori, 1990]. However, since traditional cleavages are firmly embedded in each society as a means of networking and communication, it should be considered that they can withstand the changes of the times [Steiner, 1974: cf. ch. IV].

The “alignment” of political parties describes the support of voters based on social cleavages in society. For example, after the Second World War, it is said that Britain’s political party system was organized based on the class cleavages. The working class has supported the Labour Party, and the middle class has supported the Conservative Party. In France, the national differences between Catholics and anti-clericalists were a factor in the support and disapproval of parties from both the left and right. In other countries, political formation is usually based on social cleavages such as socio-economic class, urban and rural, language, religion, region, and ethnicity. Needless to say, all social cleavages are actually reflected, not adopting the form of political parties.

The action to become a political party support based on the social cleavage that divides the social structure is arranged from the conditions of the history of a nation. This will explain the diversity among the people (= multiple subcultures). In that respect, even if the social conditions leading to political action disappear, they will last for a long time. The new generation is socialized into values that combine with its social cleavages


(“imprinting”). That means that the relationship between the voters and party options is “freezing of party alternatives.” New values are considered to penetrate the younger generation by interrupting the current generation and the next generation in the political reorganization that cross-cutting maintains the conventional values. As soon as multiple social cleavages cross each other, they form political parties based on the interests of each field. In such a situation, inter-party competition becomes more common in the political style of multiparty systems different from the UK-US model. From the social cleavage to the subculture, the subculture and the culture of each social group occupy one part of the society, and it becomes a fixed (frozen) support to a specific party as a political expression after that [Rokkan and Campbell, 1960].

3. Social Structure of Party Choice

A Social change process causes change in the relationship between the political participation of citizens and the decline in the voting rate in relation to the constitution of the electorate and the social position and election behavior. From both points of view, voters decide the choice of party. It is stated that, once changes in factors have broken down the causal relationship between social structure and politics, that is, social position and party choice, citizens will not be loyal to a particular party. So, has the ideology that reflects the traditional cleavage become less important as a factor in determining voters’ political attitude and party choice [Thomasson, 2005: 7-9]?

It is an important element in the model to explain that citizens act instrumentally on the basis of their purpose by evaluating political issues and political parties and candidates related to government performance

[Carmines and Huckfeldt, 1996].



Source: revised according to Thomassen, 2005 : 8.

Figure 3: Conceptual Framework for Voting Choices

The effects of social change on citizens are depicted in Figure 3 explaining the variables in the causality scheme. It is held that the hypothesis of moving from left to right in Figure 3. This hypothesis can spare the variation in party selection. It is in common with other models consisting of long-term factors as the basis. At the same time, the model that emphasizes instrumental intentions to politics (e.g. value change theory) should be successful over time.

However, various approaches (e.g. political advertising, media coverage, etc.) miss the true position of an individual. So, as a basic way of thinking, I further consider the various variables on the right that is influenced by the factors on the left in Figure 3. So to speak, this scheme is a set of voting behavior variables that add value change to the Rokkan's theory of social cleavage.

It has been understood that the explanation by Lipset and Rokkan has lost its effectiveness in the Western European party system. This is not an argument that has just begun. A debate over the importance of class

cleavage for politics began in the early 1950s. O. Kirchheimer has explained, under the prevailing secularization and mass-consumption-oriented situation in the 1960s, the class cleavage (lines) has become fluid and diluted, and themselves were no longer critical [Kirchheimer, 1966]. It is stated that mass membership parties and Christian parties based on previous classes are destined to become catch-all parties.

The traditional cleavages, especially class and religion, are regarded as less important for voter's choice of parties in the late twentieth century. It is the argument that is based on secularization [Dalton, 1984; Franklin, 1992]. It is explained that there exists evidence that the impact of social cleavage declines in a double sense [Kaase and Klingemann, 1994].

- (1) The number integrated in the cleavage decreases due to social change due to the change in composition effect. For example, the number of Catholics who attend churches regularly decreases.
- (2) The relationship between affiliation of a specific part of society and a party preference declines. For example, Catholics who do not attend church have not voted for Catholic parties or Christian democratic parties.


However, can we simply make the "conclusion that the importance of the social cleavage structure diminishes" for election politics so easily? The claim states that it does not consider the importance of cleavage development towards political outcomes. However, we ignore the importance of politics and institutions that politicize social cleavages [De Gaat, 2001]. Long-term change in voters' behavior is because it is considered to be the product of long-term, gradual and secular social change in the

political environment [Curtice, 2002: 164].

III Party System and Voter Alignment

1. Party Formation

Mass democracy has developed a source of political mobilization (party and party system). An overview of Western European political history shows that there exist various types of arrangement of behavior at the individual level from the structure of social cleavages, through the party system consisting of parties. That is, it should be noted that in what form, in which order each social cleavage becomes a political issue, in any way, the social cleavage in any combination can adopt the form of confrontation between political parties and the public can be involved. Is it provided the basis for forming a party system? Rokkan described five models of social cleavages [Rokkan, 1980b: 121].



Source: Rokkan, 1980b: 12

Figure 4: Four Fundamental Conflict Patterns

Table 4: Critical Juncture and Cleavage

Critical Juncture	Cleavage	Issues
Reformation-Counter-Revolution: 16 th -17 th centuries National Revolution: 1789 and after Industrial Revolution: 19 th century	(1)Center-Periphery (2)State-Church	National vs. supranational religion National language vs. Latin Secular vs. religious control of mass education
The Russian Revolution: 1917 and after	(3)Land-Industry (4)Owner-Worker (5)Socialist-Communist	Tariff levels for agricultural products; control vs. freedom for industrial enterprise National integration vs. International revolutionary movement

Source: Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:47.

There have been four “critical periods” in Western Europe since the 16th century, and the measures adopted there create a social cleavage and the formation of a social group based on which the core of the political parties was formed. The first two social cleavages are direct products of the Reformation and the National Revolution; (1) it was a conflict between the centralized national language, culture and ethnicity, language, and culture (Center-Periphery), (2) it was an educational dispute between the state and the collective privilege of the church (State vs. Church).

The latter two are caused by the Industrial Revolution, (3) it was a conflict between land interest and industrial/enterprise class (the primary industry: rural vs. the secondary industry: cities), (4) it was a struggle between owner/employer and laborers/workers (capitalist class vs. working class). Furthermore, (5) it was a split between workers who have acquired political citizenship before and after the First World War either recognized that they were members of the nation or prioritize the international position as a working class. They split depending on whether it is involved in solidarity (Socialism vs. Communism).

A social cleavage of “center-periphery” exists in every country with

one exception (Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark). However, when transitioning to a political party in a social cleavage, the “state-church” has been extremely important.

The social cleavages in “center-periphery” and “state-church” have affected the social cleavages that had risen from the Industrial Revolution. For example, in middle Europe the Catholic political movement crossed the cleavages of urban and rural economic interests, so that in countries where Catholic parties exist, agrarian parties are in principle absent. In Protestant countries, there exists agrarian party that consolidates peasants’ interests. Also, Industrial Development resulted in expanding the labor market and pushing mass membership parties to which the working class belongs to the political arena.

Needless to say, there remained differences among countries in terms of integration into the political system, and depending on the political character of each working class, proletarian internationalist communist parties and social democracy that has accepted the state. It splits into political parties, and two types of socialist political parties are formed, which compete through the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The case was the crash of the German socialist camp after the First World War. Differences at the historical stage of each country have added variation to the political party or party system.

However, the first three social cleavages formed the foundation of the modern party system and formed the differences between those in each country. So the decisive contrast in the system appeared before the working class party entered the political arena. The fourth social cleavage colored the framework, and the fifth social cleavage accented the modern party system. Needless to say, it goes without saying that the

entry of socialist parties had a major impact on the party system. Therefore, *“the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s”* [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 50].

If the competition between citizens on a national scale becomes a dispute over a system and is “frozen” with a specific group in the form of a social cleavage to individuals, that is a social cleavage — political party has a historical trajectory. It is considered to be a created “political package”; (1) ethnicity and the division of the vote reflected by language, (2) church members, the influence of church activities, (3) the spread of urbanization and the character of primary industry, (4) class voting, and (5) the division of workers after the first and the second World Wars. They caused differences and variations in the presence and strength of political parties arising out of social cleavages in every country. The difference has been expressed in the political party system of each country. We can understand the political trajectory of nation by observing the arrangement of political parties in that nation [Rokkan, 1970: 139].

We consider the conditions for the setting of a Christian democratic party from the components of the model in Table 1 [Rokkan and Svåsand, 1978: 56-57]. What are the preconditions for the presence or absence of a stable Christian democratic party within the political system? The various variables for its existence are I: Culture (success / failure of Reformation as a result of the Reformation), IV: Economy (resources combination of rural and urban, character of rural-urban resource combination), and IV: Territory (geopolitical position), V: Culture (church-state relations). In the Catholic Europe, the presence or absence of a Christian democratic party is related to the geopolitical position and to

the work of variables such as the alliance between the state and the church. So, while Christian democratic parties traditionally exist in Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, but are absent in France, Spain and Ireland.

On the other hand, in the Protestant Europe, nonconformists or dissenters and orthodox rallied into dissident parties because of the alliance between the church and the state. In these cases, their political arguments were expressed in liberalism (e.g. England, Denmark, and Sweden), nationalism (e.g. Finland), agriculture and peripheries (e.g. Ireland). Thus, one social cleavage may form one party, but there may be cases where it is absorbed by another social cleavage.

We must take into account two perspectives when it comes from the social cleavage to the way of political party formation. The first is the party organization and its members and size. Second, when and how a social group exerts participatory affiliation and what happens if a social group may become politically active without forming its affiliation [Stinchcombe, 1975: 583]. We have to consider the individual circumstances from the historical circumstances in all perspectives.

Mass membership parties developed in Europe during the 19th century in response to the expansion of the suffrage. The pioneers of the mass party were seen in the political movement of the national movement and the Roman Catholic Church, but the socialist party in Europe has developed on the basis of the popular. The socialist party succeeded in mobilizing the support of the working class, thereby becoming a prominent electoral power, and this party model was later adopted by the “bourgeois” party. This “contagion from the left” is not necessarily true. In Britain, both the Conservative Party and the Liberal

Party became mass membership parties before the birth of the Labour Party.

Mass membership parties are an efficient means of guaranteeing high and stable levels of electoral support, and more generally, the political mobilization of a particular social group. Historically, and particularly for socialist parties, a high degree of “social encapsulation” calls for the union of parties and members, and for members of the party a collective identity in terms of the obvious benefits was important in expressing.

Some mass parties have succeeded in “membership density,” which can hide realistic weaknesses in an broad appeal to the electorate. The membership has diminished gradually, weakening strong party identification.

In Western European electoral politics for several decades after the Second World War, it is said that two voting behavior patterns can be understood [Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995: 492]. The first is a pattern characterized by the stable main political parties in the 1950s and 1960s, and the relationship between voters strongly supporting them. “The strength of most parties has changed little from one election to another, from one era to another, or from one generation of life.” This shows the “frozen thesis” explained by Rokkan.

However, the second pattern has begun to appear in the 1970s. It is said that by the 1980s, “new politics” has changed many Western European politics. Instead of the sustainability and stability of the first pattern, the volatility, the dealignment, the unconventional political behavior, and the de-froze party system. It is the unfreezing theme for the latter pattern. Stated in a different fashion, that point to the pattern that old order changed.

2. Party Systems

Social cleavages are not all political issues in each country, and it does not necessarily mean that a particular political party is established in each country, and it does not always shift to a confrontation between political parties. Certain social cleavage indeed creates conflict between political parties in some countries, but in others not. However, it should be noted that the split of working class (Socialism vs. Communism) can be observed commonly in each country.

We will consider two cases in which the political parties and the political party system were established from a certain social cleavage, based on which the alliance formation of each power was arranged[Rokkan, 1980b: 121].

Considering the social cleavage of center-periphery in Spain and Italy as an example, this social cleavage exists in both cases, but in Italy there is no party that defends the periphery, but it exists in Spain. The reason is seen in the difference between the territorial structure and the city network. In Spain, there has been two economically powerful peripheries (Basque, and Catalonia) and a political center (Madrid). However, in Italy, since the center of state formation and the center of economy were in agreement, the political parties representing the peripheries have been lacking.

The social cleavage of the primary industry-secondary industry (rural-urban) was a political issue in northern Europe, but not in the Britain. In both cases, the Reformation integrated the Church into state-building elites. They acted in concert with urban and rural interests in the case of Britain, but in the case of northern Europe (especially Denmark and Norway), state-builders were based on alliances with urban bourgeoisie. The

reason is the difference between the two cases of liberal mobilization.

Whereas in Britain the liberal parties were the result of an alliance between Celtic fringes and nonconformists' industry and urban classes, in northern Europe the liberal parties support the core of the state. It was a product of the alliance with farmers who opposed the building of society. It cannot always be argued that social cleavages immediately cause political problems in this way, and cause political party formation and political conflict [cf. Urwin, 1980].

To understand the differences between Western European party systems, we must pay attention to the alliance, neutrality, and conflict that the pre-mass-mobilized state and nation-building elites have chosen in the first three "critical periods". Depending on their choice, Western European Party System's eight types in Table 5 have typified the complex and diverse alliance choice of seven actors. Actors are: (1) the core of nation-building that governs the state bureaucracy (N), (2) churches (C), (3) the Roman Catholic churches (R), (4) non-state churches (D), (5) landowner who ruled the primary industry(L), (6)urban commerce and industry (U), and (7)resistance movement from periphery(P).

Table 5: Eight Types of Western European Party System

Type	Case	Party System	Historical Background
I	Britain (1)N' choice: ①C ②L (2)P's response: P - D - U	Conservatives(N) vs. Liberals Celtic fringes Dissenters/Nonconformists Industry	Religious disputes are not resolved in Ireland before separation. Central culture was reinforced with a land noble network. The city was in agreement with the rural area. Correspondingly, the Liberal Party in the 19th century and the Labour Party in the 20th century were to play a role in the two-party system. With the rise of workers since the end of the 19th century, class cleavage made an important distinction in Britain.
II	Nordic countries (1)N' choice: ①C ②U (2)P's response: P - D - L	Conservatives(N) vs. Agrarians Christians Radicals	The urban elite's right wing (the bureaucracy / nobility) and the rural / peripheral left can not ally. Lack of feudalism and independence of self-employed farmers are high. Farmers and their organizations were able to cope with the domestic crisis from the late 19th century to the 20th century. The struggles of political relationship were class conflict, ideological split between workers, and urban and rural tensions.

III	Prussia-German Empire (1)N' choice: ①C ②L (2)P's response: P1 - S - U - P2 - R	Conservatives(N) vs. Liberals Catholics (Zentrum) Bavarians	Regional tensions by multi-centric states (e.g. Bavarian separatism) have made it difficult to unite national scales. Western liberalism and eastern conservatism were at odds. Protestantism and Catholicism were also related to the policy of national unity (Great Germanism vs. Small Germanism), and it has become apparent that social cleavages had a complicated effect since the late 19th century.
IV	Netherlands (1)N' choice: ①C ②U (2)P's response: P1 - D - L P2 - R - L	Liberals(N) vs. Calvins Agarians Catholics	This case is a mixed type of northwestern Europe (I-II) and southern and central Europe (IV-VIII). In the formation of political parties, liberalists, Protestants, and Catholics, who were responsible for the formation of the supporters, respectively formed a party. Similar Switzerland did not show any religious conflict at all.
V	Spain (1)N' choice: ①S ②L (2)P's response: P1 - U P2 - R	Liberals(N) vs. Catalan Liga Carlists	Multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic go back to the Reconquista movement. A single political culture is absent. The heterogeneity among the people and the strength of the independence of the region made it difficult to form the people. Conflicts between secular power and the church have been added to ethnic and cultural issues. Basque's strong religious loyalty is at odds with the anti-clerical central government, and Catalan separatism suppresses class cleavage.
VI	France (Italy in similar) (1)N' choice: ①S ②U (2)P's response: P - R - L	Liberals/Radicals(N) vs. Conservatives Catholics Christians	The city of anticlerical secular powers ruled Catholics. The central-peripheral conflict has been long lasting. With the support of the Christian Trade Union in 1944, it formed the People's Republican (Mouvement R'epublicain Populaire: MRP) but did not become a popular Christian party. After all, the alliance corresponding to the secular nation-building elite was not based (but established in Italy). There was a cross-cutting pressure of liberals, Catholics and socialists with regional characteristics.
VII	Austria (1)N' choice: ①R ②L (2)P's response: P - S - U	Christians(N) vs. Liberals Pan-Germans Industry	There existed a conflict between the capital and the growing area. We also considered a conflict between culturally and economically developed areas and underdeveloped areas. The party system has revolved around ethnic, religious and class gaps. Before fascists seized power, the Socialist party and the opposing Bourgeois formed the "Läger" on the issue of class and religion. The tradition is inherited after the Second World War. It has a multipolar social character, but converges to either the left or right wing.
VIII	Belgium (1)N' choice: ①R ②U (2)P's response: P - L	Christians/Liberals (N) vs. Flemish separatists	The opposition coalition was dismantled due to school problems until the early stage of the nation formation. The mobilization process of economy, culture and society was polarized to French and Dutch speaking areas. The cleavages overlap each other. This case is in contrast to Switzerland, which has succeeded in integrating ethnically and culturally.

Source : Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 36-41.

The Western European party system classified from these alliances and rivals falls under any of the eight type models from Table I, types I to VIII. Depending on the circumstances of each country, a social cleavage

had created a party, and the alliances and conflicts shown the characteristics of each country's party system in the above models.

We divide Western Europe into two. The characteristics of the southern and central parts (III, V, VI, and VII in Table 5) are as follows: (1) anti-Reform strengthened the position of the church, (2) radical secularization movement and Catholic tradition polarize, (3) cultural integration was started, if the bourgeoisie who opposed the ancient regime did not stand host to the church and (4) the churches have to reconfirm their place in the newly created political order.

Next, the northern and western parts (I, II, IV, and VIII in Table 5) are politically stable as of the 16th century, and it is so different in the southern and central parts that the structure of social cleavages which would be revealed after that. Its feature is; (1) State Church was not in conflict with the Nation-Building elites, and (2) the "left" movement against ready religious established forces had allied with dissenters and urban commerce and industry.

It is important that the basic structure of the political party system was determined before the democratization of electoral expansion and the start of mass mobilization. In addition, it has joined the party system until then, in the form of a class conflict between the bourgeoisie and working class due to the development of capitalism, and the socialist party representing the latter. So, once the five social cleavages adopted the formation of a political party, the political party system has become "frozen", and even if individual social cleavages disappeared, the established political parties survive thereafter [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 36-38]. This is the "freezing thesis".

The political party system in Western Europe was determined by the

pattern of alliances and confrontations of the lower classes of those countries before industrial workers entered the political arena. Therefore, the alliance and confrontational patterns with the upper class of society call for: (1) calling for measures to ensure lasting the “camp of right wing”, and from that, (2) forces that will not be with the partners of alliance chosen by the working class appearing thereafter, decided to condition the strategy in the relationship of itself and others. The centralized alliance of the upper class was, so to speak, bureaucrats, landlords, aristocrats, churches, and so on, so-called former “nation-building elites” under the ancien regime. Such ‘ins’ groups had to select out of the alliance partners, conditioned on social environment, interests and ideologies. That placed the “outs” that did not become alliance partners at the other side of the social cleavage line [Stinchcomb, 1975: 577-578].

The first choice of alliance and confrontation was the government’s religious orientation. The choice was determined by the outcome of the Reformation in Europe. The elites put the Protestant Church under control (in the form of a state church) in England and Scandinavian countries. Nonconformists, Priests, and secularists turned toward the oppositions of the conflicting camps.

Reformation had been divided in two countries, such as the Low Countries of the North Sea, Germany, and Switzerland, into the patriotic Protestant majority and the strong Catholic minority who oppose it. The Nation-Building elites, like Germany and the Netherlands, chose an alliance with the patriotic Protestant Church. The Roman-Catholic Church was not ruled by the Nation-Building elites, so the elite had allied with the Roman-Catholic Church or chose a secular, competitive attitude in southern Europe and in France.

The elite had come to adopt various forms in the first alliance. The liberals and the “left” allied with dissidents and fundamentalists in England and Scandinavian countries. The Catholics (the Center Party) and the secularists (the Liberal Parties) in Prussia Germany, in their respective positions, opposed the elites of the Second Empire. The secularists and Protestants persisted in opposition in Austria and Belgium. The Catholic Right had gradually developed into a secular, centralized attitude over time in France, Italy, and Spain.

The second alliance and confrontation was the relationship between the landlord and the urban bourgeoisie. This becomes active in the Industrial Revolution. This also took various forms. The Bourgeoisie in the city was dominant in the trade belt zone (see Figure 1). Rich landlords in areas like England and Prussia, east of the Elbe, and the peasants in Norway selected to ally the elites. In general, the elites had allied with the richest and strongest class. Allies were landowners in the Britain, Prussia/Germany, and Austria, and commerce and industry in the Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavia, and France (with small and medium-sized farmers who control the provinces).

The liberals recruited from much of the cities of Bourgeoisie in England and Germany. The radicals of farmers in Scandinavian countries were combined with the leftist fundamentalists. And they confronted the governments, the church, and the nobles in the city. This is classified into eight types in Table 5. Since it was organized in Western Europe, it would confront the working class. The elites split up into a liberal secularist opponent and a conservative landlord backed by a state church, as typified by England in the 19th century.

So how should we understand the split in the working class? We

consider the case of Britain, France, and Germany.

Although the Industrial Revolution was quickly achieved and there existed a large number of workers in Britain, workers formed alliances with Liberals, and started the formation of their own political party (Labour Party in 1918) in the early 20th century. The “right-wing” powers of the Catholic landlord and the secular powers of the “left-wing” where Paris and the local bourgeoisies allied were facing each other in France. This conflict led to the development of the labor movement from the 19th century to the twentieth century in a form different from that of Britain. The workers hostiled to conservative forces, resulting in a separate, alienated mass. The part of the workers in France participated in the Socialist Parties or the other workers who did not participate in them joined the Communist parties after the Russian Revolution.

The workers in the German Second Empire were revolutionary compared to those of the Britain. It was the situation that the Britain had developed own capitalism that could pay workers enough wages, while German workers were not in a working environment to match the development of capitalism. Therefore, the workers in German adopted radical actions. Some of the radical socialists formed the Communist Party after the First World War.

The each political system of the Western Europe began with social functional differentiation of the Roman Empire, the centers after Imperial collapse penetrated into each area, culturally standardizes on the national scale, and the right that more part of the residents could participate in the form of popular democracy that has approved the above, the form of the party system of each country, and it expresses the historical characteristics of each nation-state until now. And we must be aware that

the distinctiveness that could not be completely resolved even at the stage of national integration survive in the sub-cultures of each country at presence.

3. Political Space Established Fascism

We have considered the democratization process of the expansion of suffrage (VI: political rights), and the party system (VI: party alternatives) that is representative from social cleavages of the EXPLICANDA to be elucidated in Table 1. We need to consider the drastic transformation of the political system involved in the survival of liberal democracy, or the stability or collapse of the political system, as matters related to the political system (VI: system-alternatives).

Western European countries have each developed liberal democracy, so why in the 1920's and 1930's fascism (totalians or authoritarians) won in five countries, and in thirteen other western European countries problems related to the steady development and stability of the liberal democratic political system, whether it did not occur or could not be won, VI: System (the 'frequency / intensity of crisis of extent of extent of violent disruption') in Table 1.

The five countries were Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain, and Portugal, which converted from democracy to one-party dictatorship, and by confirming their similar "fate", the inter-war stability of the liberal democracy system The degree and strength must be considered [Hagvet and Rokkan, 1980a: 131, 136, 145-159; Rokkan, 1980b: 127; Rokkan, 1981: 86-93].

Considering the historical trajectory of Germany and Italy, the nationalism brought about by the French Revolution has promoted the movement of territorial unification. The Napoleonic War set huge surges of nationalism in various places, and the Industrial Revolution increased

the pressure from both countries on the core region of world capitalism. The decisive action of national unification was started from the area called Prussia with military power in the east in Germany, whereas the northern cities unified the southern peripheral region in Italy. Centering of the region succeeded in Austria and Spain but failed to maintain the empire at the early stages of state formation. Homogeneous residents existed culturally, but center building was delayed in Germany and Italy.

We certainly confirm three variables common to these five countries, although they differ in many ways in the development process. First, geopolitical position (the heritage of the empire) can be explained through the combination of two variables (I: Territory: Geopolitical Position and II: Territory: Extent of Peripheral Control). The early history of Europe shows that it can be rewarded as a series of failures on the imperial construction. Put another way, the collapse of the Roman Empire, fragmentation and subsequent decomposition of the empire by Karl the Great and his successors, and the failure of the Habsburgs Empire that attempted to dominate Europe from both ends of Europe (Austria and Iberia). It was decided to leave severe memories (see Figure 1).

Second, with the development of capitalism, there remained a process of retreating to regional economic marginalization that occurred in two major waves. One of them was the change in economic center due to the restructuring of trade flows in the 16th century (II: Economy, Change in Geoeconomic Position), and the other is the regional disparity in the development of industrial technology in the 19th century. The economic marginalization left behind by the location of center in the economic growth (V: Economy, Rapidity, Localization of Industrial Growth).

The third variable is the continual attempt to re-establish its position in

the international system through military-industrial alliances. This is expressed as a combination of resources listed in variable of IV: Economy (Character of Rural-Resource Combination).

Rokkan did not mention the formation of a party, the emergence of a party system, and the fascist movement-party in the discussion of the freezing model with S. Lipset. Although Rokkan did not argue the reason clearly, J.-J. Linz judges that the fascist party did not make a remarkable resurrection after the Second World War [Linz, 1976: 3-4]. It is possible to explain the maintaining and the collapses of the democratic political systems from the VI (progress in the party selection system) and VII (social / cultural conditioning class / culture conditioning of party of the party selection) shown in Table 1.

At the time of the general elections after the First World War, there should have existed already options for political parties in the voters, and the political landscape was naturally viewed as “packaging of political parties and voters”. After the “frozen” situation, the fascist movements entered the “political market”. At the same time, those who supported the fascist parties were up to now, but, after the Second World War, they would return their support again. This means that fascist parties could not build their own social bases. Put another way, most voters already organized into various social cleavage-based ideologies and integrated into political parties and mass organizations that had been “frozen” did not fully penetrate fascist appeals [Linz, 1980: 154]. Said differently, the fascist parties did not build an inherent social basis compared to the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the Agrarian Party.

The fascist parties, unlike the established parties, did not have the experience of slowly establishing concrete social cleavages that took time.

That is why fascist parties had no choice but to try a violent as a means, such as a revolution or a coup. They could take power in a short time, not in long-term competition with other political forces.

However, the fascist movements influenced the catch-all party (Volkspartei) to a great extent in terms of eclecticism between ideology and pragmatism after war, and in an effort to appeal to all social groups. The establishment was attributed to a more fluid social structure, the end of ideology, and a national restructuring in the post-fascist era [Linz, 1976: 5]. This situation may also contribute to explaining the rise of the current populist extreme right parties [Pelinka, 2013: 6]. However, to be careful, the rise of neo-fascism since the 1990s is different from the relaxation of political parties and their supporters and the current social background (e.g. anti-immigrants, anti-refugees and anti-foreign workers).

If the fascists had succeed, the collapse of liberal democratic system may have been spurred if the fragmentation of the party system had been heavy before democratic rules had collapsed, and on the contrary democracy might have been survived if fragmentation had been low. Otherwise phrased, the stability has brought about stability during the interwar period of Europe. The unstableness, as it were, has become the cause of instability. For example, unlike the political division seen at the end of Weimar Germany, states that were able to sustain democracy are linked to the “stability of the political party system” [Karvonen, 1993: 169]. In countries that were at the core area in the 16th century world system, the fascist movements became strong. However, along with the development of capitalism, it was decided to spend peripherally on the goeconomic basis. It is considered that the military-industrial alliance adopted the fascist systems as a strategy to regain international status in

such delayed industrialization and democratization [Hagtve and Rokkan, 1980: 146-147].


4. Cases of Eight Social Community Types after the Second World War

If political “loyalty” arises from a social cleavage, for example, class, like Britain, can explain the character of the political community. Various social cleavages have greatly influenced people’s political orientation. It has created a diverse current liberal democracy system. It is common to that is the institutionalization of liberalism and democracy (see Table 6).

The political system after the Second World War can be understood from the political party system formed by social cleavages in each country’s history. The solid line represents a social cleavage that represents a critical division, and the broken line represents a social cleavage that means weak but compartmental [Smith, 1989].

(1) Social Model of Class Society

One source of social cleavage (A: class) divides the people in half. Reducing the impact of the socio-economic class from broken lines B to E in political party formation, the stable class line A acts to limit the effects of other social cleavages. Britain can define the society with a class cleavage. Two major political parties are formed on the basis of the middle class and the working class. The 19th century has been a party system of the Conservative Party vs. the Liberal Party, and



Source: Smith, 1989: 42


Figure 5: Social Model of Homogeneous Society

the Conservative Party vs. the Labour Party from the 20th century. Due to the effect of the first part the post system in parliamentary elections, the two major parties have dominated the majority of the seats.

Britain can simply classify society by class because it had the time and conditions that could solve crisis one after another in the political and social development stages. The old elites were able to merge with the new elites in response to social changes, and were always at the center of society.

(2) Social Model of Multi-Polar Society with Consensus

The two major social cleavages (class, urban and rural) come together to create a multi-party system. If a cultural social cleavage crosses two or more quadrants, and stabilize the politics even in multiparty systems. It is dense that the network of voluntary associations has penetrated the whole society is dense.




Source: Smith, 1989: 42

Figure 6: Social Model of Sectional Society

The Nordic countries define politics by their social cleaves, and the political party system reflecting it is divided into left-wing bloc (Social Democratic Labor Party, Left-wing Party) and right-wing bloc (Moderate Party, Center Party, Liberal Party, Christian Democratic Party). However, the political culture of Nordic countries constitutes a society similar to “homogeneity.”

(3) Social Model of Nordic Variant Society



Source: Smith, 1989: 43


Figure 7: Social Model of Nordic Variant Society

After the Second World War, Norway has begun to be divided into the homogeneous social democratic Labor Party and non-socialist bloc. However, regardless of which government, the social democratic approach has been established. The Norwegian party system has been a variant of the Nordic countries type. Five parties have accounted for 75% of the votes. Four of them cross one social cleavage, and appeals to voters. The Labor Party, for example, appeals support to farmers and fishermen. The Agrarian Party has now renamed the Center Party.

(4) Social Model of Moderate Multipolar Society

The four quadrants produced by the two social cleavages A and B have equal meaning. The class cleavage A that separates society does not make sense in certain parts of the society, and the political parties have a

multi-class character. Religious cleavage B crosses classes. However, in another part of society (the lower half of the Figure 8), class still has meaning. In addition, social cleavages in the center and periphery may affect the survival of regional parties.



Source: Smith, 1989: 43

Figure 8: Social Model of moderate Sectional Society


The (West) Germany is politically and socially stable after the Second World War. It can be seen in two major parties, and a modest multiparty system including minor parties, and coalition cabinets consisted of major parties was continuing (either Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union with Liberal Democrats, or Social Democratic Party) with a minor party of Liberal Democrats. The Greens with new value and the Democratic Socialist Party (now forming the Left Party with a part of the Social Democratic Party) which inherits the Socialist Unity Party of the former East Germany have been added to the party system up to that point in recent years.

(5) Social Model of Consociational Society

This model is multi-divided by the fundamental social cleavages (language, religion, and urban and rural) that exist before the emergence of classes. Two social cleavages, A and B, formed three major parties. The other social cleavages (C to E) that fragment the political party system have been suppressed from emerging in cross-cutting alliances, thereby causing a stable political party system to emerge.

The three social cleavages are supported by the “zuiliung” phenomenon. A variety of social groups based on social cleavages operate

independently divided sub-systems. These sub-systems form organizations called “Zuil” which integrates political parties, trade unions, interest groups, mass media, education system, sports and leisure clubs, and so on. These countries maintain a stable political system despite the unstable factors. The elites who



Source: Smith, 1989: 42

Figure 9: Social Model of Mixed Homogeneous Society

belong to the top of each “pillar” work together so that the system is not destroyed, and the members who belong to each “pillar” give the elite members of their respective groups the support and trust close to what it sounds like a giving the elites of each pillar “blank check to of attorney”.

(6) Social Model of Southern European Post-Authoritarian Multi-Polar Society

There exist two dominant social cleavages (center and periphery, and left and right wings), and another historical social cleavage (secular and religious) is important for understanding the present politics. Among the former social cleavages, one is the traditional left-right ideological orientation, and the other is the division of the centralization orientation and the position toward regional autonomy. The secular-religious social cleavage is still seen today, but is weakened after the end of the Franco regime and is contained in the left-right cleavage.

The social gap between the center and the periphery is a nation composed of various ethnicities in Spain, which also affects politics and society. For example, the Basque Nationalist Party was a moderate right-




Figure 10: Social Model of Southern European Post-Aitjprotaroam Society


wing party in Basque Country, and the Rally and Unification (Ciu) was a moderate right-wing party in Catalonia. On the contrary, the Nationalist Party and the Social Labor Party located at the center are in nation-sized parties. As noted above, the party system in Spain incorporates centralized political parties and many regional parties.

(7) Social Model of Multi- Polar Society

Multiple social cleavages are distinct and mutually unrelated types. If the social cleavage becomes too strong, it will form a large number of opposition axes and establish a polarized multiparty system. If the social cleavage is weak, a moderate but unstable multiparty system emerges. Some social cleavages are complex, and create an uncompromised party system. France's individualistic liberal democracy has unique features. Liberalism has a self-centered tradition. It is expressed in the "polarized

phenomenon” of the party system in peacetime.

However, when state power tries to intervene in the rights and lives of individuals, the citizens have resisted together. Social cleavages have been reflected in parliamentary politics in the four-pole structure of the radical left, the moderate left, the moderate conservative, and the radical right.




Source: Smith, 1989: 44

Figure 11: Social Model of Multi-Polar Society

This multipolar structure and its symmetrical central bureaucracy are two aspects of French politics.

(8) Social Model of Two Major “Läger” of Consociational Society

Only one social cleavage is the main source of division of society. However, politically important variables are distributed in an orderly manner among the people. There exist two bourgeois parties (in ethnicity and religion) who opposed the Socialist Party based on class prior to the Second World War. Socialists and bourgeoisie formed the two “Läger”. It was consequentially an unstable two major party system



Source: Smith, 1989: 42

Figure 12: Social Model of Two “Läger” Society

(Christian Socialists and Socialists) with intense confrontation before the Second World War.

The political party system has revolved around social cleavages of class, ethnicity and religion, and has characterized modern political parties. The Socialist Party was a typical political party based on class, rooted in Vienna and the industrial center. As a bourgeois party to counter it, there has been a Christian Socialist Party (People's Party after war) based on the same religious base as the Socialist Party and a small Pan German-Party based on the middle class (the Freedom Party after war).

The political stability was realized supported by economic prosperity and Proporzdemokratie, and by carefully managing social cleavages that brought about social divisions before the war, stable two major parties (People's Party and Socialist Party) after the Second World War. Social cleavages have penetrated the Austrian public life as well as before the war. However, the modernizing society has promoted a coordinated public space with the progress of secularization as a whole. The two camps have become increasingly vague, and the societal cleavages in class and religion have not been as pronounced as they were before the war, and mutual exclusivity and hostility have weakened. In recent years, as the third party, the Freedom Party is positioned as the foremost leader of immigration exclusion, positioned as the extreme rights.

Table 6: Type of Liberal Democratic Regime

Government form	Case	Characteristics of Political Community	Electoral System and Party System	Liberal Principle	Democratic Principle	
				Separation of Powers / Centralized System / Federal System	Party State (National Representative)	Referendum (Direct Democracy)

Parliamentary System	Britain	Class Society	First-past-post system Two Party System	Separation of Powers with Parliamentary superiority Centralized Coalitional Stae	Changes of Power by two major parties since the 18th century. Superiority of Common House since the 20th century	The Prime minister's choice is the effect of the de facto "Peopl Referendum is every political issue.
	Sweden	Consensual Plural Society	Proportional Representation System One Dominant Party System	Separation of Powers with Ombudsman system Centralized System	One-Party long-term administration by the Social Democratic Labor Party or a coalition government of center-right parties	Political Issues
	(West)Germany	Moderate plural society	Proportional Representative System with Single District System Moderate Multiparty System	Separation of Powers Decentralized Structural +Federal System	Coalition Governments: Christian Democratic Union/Social Union and Liberal Democrats, or Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats or Greens	Referendum is in some states but is no National Referendum System.
	Spain	Post-authoritarian plural society	Proportional Representation System Political Party System in which two Major Parties and Regional Parties coexist	Separation of Powers Centralized coalitional System + Decentralization System	Governments of Social Labor Party or People's Party in the Post- Franco	Political Issue
Presidential System	France	Multipolar society that contains divisible elements	Single District System with twice voting system	Separation of Powers with parliamentary superiority in the third and fourth republics Separation of Powers with Presidential dominance in the fifth Republic system Centralization System	Unstable Party Cabinet in the third and fourth Republic Cabinet belonged directly to President in the fifth republic	People elect the President directly in the fifth Republic System Political Issues
Collegial Government System	Switzerland	Consociational Society	Proportional Representative System Moderate Multiparty System	Proporz rule by Collegial System + Canton-based organic Federalism	Constant Four Party Coalition Cabinet	Frequent Political Issues

Source: revised according to Yamaguchi, 1989: 46.

IV Socioeconomic Change and Three Stages Model

I. Outline of Three-Stage Model

G. Smith shows in Table 7 which changes the party system after the Second World War. The characteristic of each stage is clearly indicated on the basis of the voting behavior pattern based on the social cleavage of I [Smith, 1990: 251-269].

Table7: Electoral behavior and Party Competition

Unstable Electoral behavior	III (fourth stage)	I B (second stage)
	II (third stage)	I A (first stage)
Stable	Centripetal	Centrifugal
	Party Competition	

Source: Smith, 1990: 263

The “core model” corresponds to IA in Table 7. This indicates the stage at which polarized social groups continue to support a certain political party in a fixed manner (the formation of a mass membership party). Even if the contents of polarization were quite diverse, the alliance between social groups and political parties was identical. It is found in mobilization based on social cleavages, and stabilizes voting behavior, but represents the fragmented and centrifugal state of the party system; put another way, the fixed states of polarized state. The party system moves into voting behavior and the contents of inter-party competition to each stage of IB, II, III from IA through the socio-economic change shift in the course of time [cf. Heath, Jowell, Curtice, 1985: Part I].

The IB belongs to the first stage, and it is the same as the IA in the

state of fragmented subculture, and in certain countries there may be cases where political systems become unstable due to voting behavior based on uneven and unstable election mobilization (e.g. Weimar Germany, Italy, France right after the war).

Stage II represents the stability of politics, economy and society after the Second World War. There remains a situation where the voting behavior converges on two political forces over the postwar “consensus”. The appearance of catch-all parties symbolizes this era in stage II. The political party system (as well as the political system) will be stable because the political parties aim at a centripetal direction (moderate politics) unlike the previous stage.

Discrepancies occur in voting behavior and inter-party competition, or gaps appear in terms of support in stage III. Said differently, voting behavior is likely to change, and at the same time, the party system will become fragmented. However, the political system remains relatively stable.

There are signs of various fluctuations in more recent years. One of them is pointed out that the relationship between voters and political parties has changed. It is the symptom that support for political parties has been stable and fixed so far, but it has become very fluctuating as a volatile vote. There has been an electoral reorganization or a fundamental reorganization in the sense of weakening the affiliation of voters to political parties [Flanagan, Dalton, 1987; Dalton Flanagan and Beck, 1984].

I would like to consider the three stages of the Western developed countries since the Second World War. The first stage, which corresponds to IA and IB in the Figure 7, is said to be effective as “freezing these”, which formalizes the fixed supportive relationship

between political parties and supporters from social cleavages, and it is a representative ones in the 1920s. The formation of political parties and voters based on the social cleavage was fixed until the 1960s. The second stage II was the period when the political system tended to be centripetal trend, and the party tried to transform into a comprehensive party from the 1950s and the 1960s to the 1980s. The stage III is a period in which the relationship between political parties and voters became fluid despite the stability of the political system since the 1980s.

The contents of first stage do not completely disappear even after the next stages. The third stage is a part of the features of the first and second stages from the overall time series judgment, and it must be noted that there exists a development which adds and mixes the characteristics that occurred at that stage.

The development stages in three time series are divided for convenience from the voting behavior of each stage and features related to political parties (systems), but are dominated by the change of social structure from time to time. Voters and political parties are beyond doubt affected by the “legacy” from earlier stages even after these social structures have changed. Historical developments affect the character of the election response and continue to affect the structuring of the current party system. The general pattern of inter-party competition can be identified by combining the basic features of each of the three stages of electoral behavior and the directionality of each.

The chronological flow of each stage of the Western European party system in Table 7 is summarized in Table 8.

Table 8: Western European Party System and Stage

Stage	Period	Content
The First Stage (I A)	1880s – 1920s	Developmental stage : Crisis, innovation, liquidity become clear. Mobilization and organization in the transition to liberal democracy. Notable exceptions in the 1920s (Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Greece), other countries are relatively stable.
The Second Stage (I B)	1920s – 1960s	Stable Mobilization: Structurally strengthened political system (Italy and Germany from the late 1940s).
The Third Stage (II)	1960 s –	Increased Competition and Depolarization: Expand the scope of appealing parties that have become “catch-all parties”. Voters head for political party disorganization.
The Furth Stage (III)	1970s –	Structural Fluidization: Decentralization of political parties and diffusion of voter support. There exist learning, challenge and innovation among the elites and between the elites and the citizens. Greece, Spain and Portugal have added from the mid-1970s. The emergence of political party system in central and eastern European countries in the 1990s. The volatile votes, which has been increasing since 1970s, have started recovery, renewal and transformation of core parties in the late 1980s and 1990s.

(Note) See Table 8 for the numbers in parentheses at each stage.

Source : Donovan and Broughton,1999:262

2. Adaptations and Centripetal Competitions

The relationship between political parties and supporters was “freezing” the social cleavages in the first stage of Tables 7 and 8, and it is a persuasive time of Lipset and Rokkan’s proposition [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967]. The sub-society based on each cleavage could be isolated from the others. So, we were able to actually observe the situation of Sartori’s “polarized pluralism” immediately after the war [Sartori, 1976].

Voters have a sense of unity between a social group and the self and their own interests, and the meaning of their affiliation is to have political loyalty to a particular party. Social cleavages distinguish one group interest from another. Group members do not deviate from the support of a particular party. But, in reality, the potential of fluctuations has already

surfaced. Party support based on a social cleavage has begun to decline with the transformation of social structure.

So how should we pay attention to the circumstances? We have two perspectives.

- (1) More fluidity is evident in voting behavior. It is because political parties and groups cannot capture supporters. The voters conversely make decisions from other stimuli, motives, incentives, and so on.
- (2) The political parties themselves dilute the relationship of their supporters up to that point. They need to stylize new strategies. Whether the voters act “voluntarily” by leaving “constraints” from political parties, and whether political parties are crucial to supporting by voters. The voters are more likely to change their support in response. For example, if a voter sees a party as inappropriate for himself, he (or she) must correct his (her) position. Political parties are in the critical stage of survival in political markets.

As long as the political parties stick to traditional social cleavages, they will be late for progress. The political parties have a meaning in dealing with voters in this sense. However, the meaning of social structure change is ignored in the explanation. The change affects voters. The political parties must adapt to changing socio-economic circumstances. This is a precondition for the second stage.

The start of the second phase is from 1950 onwards. It is linked with stable economic growth from economic reconstruction and recovery. Conflicts and disputes in prewar society accelerated social change as well as the transformation, discontinuities, and severance that the war

brought about. Fascism, war, economic reconstruction, and postwar affluence had a profound effect on the changing social structure of the advanced western countries.

The social analysis by O. Kirchheimer from the 1950s to the 1960s is rich in suggestions. Not only did he pursue the underlying causes of the change in the political party system, he also presented a scenario for the subsequent development of Western European countries [Kirchheimer, 1966].

Kirchheimer insisted that the political parties would become centripetal competition (taking moderate course) as the society converges. It declines that slowing social conflict progresses in the same manner as political polarization. That strengthens the political system's stability and sentiment. The adaptation of political parties to the new social reality calls for dramatic revisions of ideology to political parties. Said differently, the political parties are either compelled to adapt to a "non-polarized, segmented society", or choose a way to co-exist, or seek a form of "non-ideological politics" ("end of ideology").

The centripetal trend of the political system has become a matter of agreement since the Second World War II. Each party is aware of the overlap in terms of support. The traditional parties cannot, in some cases, adapt to their reality and fall. That is why a new type of political party has adopted an appeal that crosses the boundaries of the sub-society (based by social cleavages). Put another way, the changes in social conditions due to postwar high economic growth give the opportunity to create new party types. Kirchheimer predicts a centripetal phenomenon of competition and the consequent consequences of a new type of party to the current situation, and the type of party called a catch-all party has the

ability to cross the old social cleavages and transcend. He may prove the conditions. Stated in a different fashion, catch-all parties get support from all voters. Other parties are threatened to erode their foundations, and thus become “an eternal opposition party”, and if they does not achieve catch-all parties, they will be left behind in the electoral market [Krippendorf, 1962].

Then, only two or three parties should survive in a certain party system. One of them gets a lot of support. The political parties thus have to aim for a realist response.

However, the real circumstances did not lead to such an outcome in reality so easily. The political party system of the Western developed countries has been in line with this forecast since the 1960s, and proved otherwise. Although the type of catch-all party was indeed established, it could never wipe out the other parties, and no signs of a decrease in the number of parties were seen dramatically [Wolinetz, 1979].

Large parties have the same “weak spots” as small and medium-sized parties which cling to a clear ideology. However, it cannot be easily denied that the Kirchheimer’s theme “is different from the fact”. It must be clear between the centripetal character of inter-party competition and the expected outcome of the party system. There should be no perfect match between Kirchheimer’s predictions and reality. The “binding to a centripetal tendency” imposed on inter-party competition caused by social changes should be regarded as one of the important effects on the one hand. The structuring of social cleavages leaves an imprint that is never erased when considering the politics of the Western developed countries on the other hand. However, in the third stage, based on the reality of the first and second stages, the new changes can also become

variables that affect the existing parties.

The inter-party competition has become a centripetal trend rather than polarized one in the second stage. The political parties are generally assumed to move toward a centripetal direction, but in reality they still leave one side polarized in term that they adhere to the limited and partial interests of society.

The catch-all partization of political party will gain new supporters, but there remains a sense that it fears that it will lose support from “clients” based on the social cleaves that have been the core part of the political party. Needless to say, we should not judge the competition among political parties within a political system by general tendency alone. The political party system in only a specific country has different indicators in historical differences. For instance, the party platform may only talk about specific policies. However, the action of political party is clarified that the general election alone cannot be considered in the election campaign of each political office, the tactics in the coalition government, and the opposition party.

The “polarized pluralism” which Sartori argued once seems to have become like “the relics of past”, and it is almost absent in the post-war advanced western countries. The neo-fascism phenomena from the 1900s must be considered for new consideration as a matter of course. However, the character of political system and the party system in it cannot basically deny the centripetal tendency.

3. Changing Social Structure

In Western Europe in 1960s, for employment in the three major sectors of economy, agriculture averaged 34%, manufacturing 40%, and services

26%. These three sectors changed to 21%, 31%, and 56%, respectively, in 1995. Agriculture accounted for less than 4%, industrial 28%, and service industry 68% in domestic production in 1971. It is representative system that these changes in the number of employees and production affect.

R. Inglehart provides the theory for democratic citizenship [Inglehart, 1977]. He ties the elite-challenging action to the value of post-materialism. It emphasizes direct participation, in politics, the “self-expression value”, which regards individuals as central. He explains the significance of existence of the individual who characterizes the postwar generation in the western democratic countries and the consequences of its cognition. He argues that social modernization gives rise to the post-materialism and “new politics”. They focuses on de-legitimacy from authoritarianism and liberation from it [Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart, 1997].

A new type of “self-expressive value” and post-materialists bring an old type of “survival value” or materialists into questions the view that representative democracy naturally takes control of a loyal citizen. The process of connecting anti-elitist to politics and post-material values leads, in fact, to tension with representative democracy and tension. It looks at seemingly individualistic “life styles” as opposed to the economic cleavages that the political partisan competition is based on material redistribution. This brings the position of a new extreme right party mobilizing anti-immigrants, refugees and traditional values on the one hand, and a “new left-wing party” which seeks to mobilize in environmental protection and the issue of “new politics” on the other hand [Inglehart, 1997; Kitchelt, 1989; Norris, 2005].

Furthermore, Election participation, a sense of identification with political parties, a credibility of system, and a sense of satisfaction with

democratic procedures have fallen in the post-industrial democratic countries. However, support for democracy as a political system and attachment to democratic norms is stable and increasing [Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011; Dalton and Welzel, 2014: 8].

W. Outhwaite proposes three steps of M. Water. The first step is a classical model called “economic class society. There remain subcultural conflicts within this framework. The second step is “organized-class society.” An institutional representation system compensates for domestic differentiation and the fall of occupational subcultures. The social class tries to extend its life regardless of market fragmentation and evolving social division of labor. Trade unions, political parties, and classes certainly still play a dominant role in social structure.

The third step is the emergence of “post-class society”. A society at this step is assigned a value-based status. The new middle class uses intellectual ability as a means of production. This stage abandons class-based, and identity, lifestyle, and politics based on issues become more important than the dimensions of the left and right. “Post-class societies” remain differentiated, inequalities, confrontations, but unforeseeable social movement progresses [Outhwaite, 2008: 108-110]. The third step is currently in progress. Roughly speaking, the emphasis on maintaining the cleavage seems to still assume the second step, but further emphasizes that the position to exaggerate social change has already entered the third step.

There have been significant changes in people’s lives in the past half century. Technological changes in various sectors, and economic modernization have eroded many traditional social boundaries. As a result of people becoming more prosperous, they were able to receive

higher education, and tend to converge their life-styles, and obscure the dividing lines that separate them up until then. For example, female employment in Western Europe averaged 31% in 1960, but it reached 40% by 1990 [Lane, 1997: 37]. Another variable indicator shows the decline in numbers belonging to the traditional working class. The ratio of working class dropped from an average of 50% in 1960 to 40% in 1995 in Western Europe. It has dropped from 54% to 36% in the Netherlands, from 54% to 35% in Sweden and from 61% to 33% in Britain.

Change is not only economic. The decline of religious identity and practice has gradually turned to secular society. This change has made the value symmetry more pronounced [Inglehart, 1990: 191]. 83 percent surveyed in older cohorts (over sixty-five) define themselves as “religious persons”, but 53% in younger cohorts (15 to 24 years old). Religious practitioners had dropped significantly by that time. In Italy, for example, regular attendance to the Catholic Church from 1965 to 1967 decreased from 69% to 37%. In West Germany, only 25% of voters in the 1980s regularly attend churches. During the 1950s, the percentage of Catholics alone decreased from 50% to 40% during the same period. Also in Ireland, the church attendance dropped sharply from 81% to 67%.

In the Netherlands, the secularization process was more pronounced. Religious identity and practice are important components of Dutch culture. The “pillared” division of the three major denominations, Catholic, Protestant, and Calvin was maintained in equilibrium by religious tolerance. Some 75% of voters belonged to the three sects in 1959. These religious affiliations were in addition more than nominal. 51% of voters had regular church activities in the same year. 87% of these were Catholics, and 88% were Calvin. The Netherlands was a typical

“religious nation” in 1959. However, by 1986, this figure had changed dramatically. The nominal religious voters were 52%, but the practitioners were substantially reduced. Only 17% of the voters attended the church, of which 26% were Catholics. The Netherlands has virtually become a “secular state”.

4. Changing Voting Behavior

The identification between specific groups and political parties is declining in addition to the dramatic changes in social structures of many European countries. Said differently, collective partisan preference has fallen due to the decline of workers and religious practitioners. One of the signs of change is that the preference for either the traditional social class left or right wing has been reported. Even if the workers decline, it should be predictable to maintain the preference for the left and right parties, if the traditional cleavage is still dominant. And even if there are a lot of middle class in the voters, it should choose the moderate or right-wing party, if we think simply. The way to look at the preferences of various classes is the “Alford index”. It is measured that the degree to which the support on the left was more among workers than in the middle class [Alford, 1963].

For example, in the UK in 1951 the Alford Index is as high as 41%, which is the result of muscle workers (63%) minus non-muscle workers (22%). If the index number is high, the class voting is remarkable. Workers tended to vote for the left party, while other classes voted for the center party or the right party. The Alford index gradually declined from an average of 37% to 29% in the 1960s, 24% in the 1970s and 19% in the 1980s. The class voting have been halved.

For example, 1964 elections in Britain, the Conservative Party was supported 47 % more than the Labour Party from the class of service sector. The Labour Party was 32% in 1992. The Labour Party reduced the support for skilled workers from 45% to 13%. The Conservative Party reduced the vote from 41% to 29% from the low class in the service sector. This group supported the Labour Party until 1997 [Evans, 1990: 90; Evans, 1999].

The cores of the middle class and of the working class thus continue their traditional voting preferences. Even if the cohesion of each core declines, it is difficult to predict that voting behavior is consistent with general socio-structural changes.

Religious divisions, as part of the political arena only in certain countries, have similar patterns of religious and partisan preferences. The importance of religion to traditional voting behavior should not be underestimated. Religious differences make more impact than the preferences of religious parties show. Religious differences also determine party choice in secular situations where parties are involved.

For example, in France, the fall of the Catholic party in the early 1950s (Mouvement R'epublicain Populaire: MRP) does not necessarily mean a decline in religious influence in voting behavior. According to 1978 survey, against 20% of those who do not attend church, more than 50% of regular church attendees support the right of center party. Contrasting conclusions have been made that about 20% of the party choice variation among "secular" parties is accounted for by Church attendees. Survey results from the 1960s indicate that religious clearages actually have a greater impact on party selection than social classes [Lijphart, 1979].

Secularization expresses the tendency of social structure by all means.

For example, in the Netherlands, Catholic Church in 1950s was actively involved in the daily lives of believers. Many practical Catholics supported the Catholic People's Party (KVP). The KVP, which was the second party in 1956, received support from 95% of practical Catholics. However, the KVP had dropped to 67 percent of practical Catholics by 1977. Dutch Catholics have not voted for their party since then. The KVP merged with the Protestant political party in 1980, and became part of the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA).

Have modern Western European workers and church attendees abandoned the role of traditional social cleavages? This creates an environment where individual preferences replace collective identification as a basis for party choice. It is the result of erosion of two important subcultures (classes and religions) in modern Europe.

Other factors promote European voters in this direction. For example, one view points out that politically sophisticated voters appeared in the 1980s [Dalton, 1988: 18-24]. This new voters have received higher education. They get political information from television. This directly links the individual and politics rather than the foundation of sub-culture. This trend is compounded in the transition to the privatization of consumption such as housing, health, health care, welfare, leisure and so on. Individualistic political judgment drives party preference.

M. Franklin concludes from a comparative perspective that it is due to a fundamental weakening of the relationship between social structure and voting behavior, including class and religion. He explains an average of 23% of the change in voting that social structural variables (class, religion, gender, trade union membership, church attendance, etc.) acted from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. This figure had dropped to 15.1 % by the mid-1980s. Only

Italy increased exceptionally from 24.4% in 1968 to 28.5% in 1988.

However, the general downward trend continues. In particular, in Denmark, it drops sharply from 23.0% in 1971 to 9.0% in 1987 and in Ireland from 11.2% in 1969 to 1.6% in 1987. These variations make it possible to predict the appearance of new cleavages by changing the traditional cleavage structure itself. This phenomenon is the result of increasing “particularization” and “initialization”, and it is pointed out that the influence of traditional cleavages on partisans has diminished [Franklin, Mackie, 1992: 406-431].

However, may we emphasize only the de-freezing phenomenon? The Social cleavages are maintained by three elements: (1) individual social infrastructure, (2) collective identity, and (3) organizational expression. The cleavages are maintained through the subculture, which is an expression of social identity, rather than voting being a reflection of instrumental choices.

It is true that the traditional demarcation is obscured. The division of the class is not clear, and the progress of secularization has alleviated the shock from the religious division. The personal behavior has ceased to be collective despite the survival of traditional social groups. And the traditional variation in political choice among groups is ever decreasing. As a response to these changes, political parties, particularly emerging political parties, have begun to appeal to certain voted groups and voters. In short, it suggests that was un-structured voters, fragmentation of party choice, and a tendency towards “selfishness”.

However, two points need to be kept in mind. First, class and religion have not completely eliminated their influence. It is a view that the new fluctuation has not shocked the voting behavior more than the cases from

the 1950s to the 1990s. For example, in Britain, the new middle class engaged in the tertiary industry still chooses the Conservative Party. And the skilled and unskilled workers still tend to choose the Labour Party. Declining religious practitioners vote for the CDA in the increasingly secular Netherlands.

Second, although the class and religion provide cues for voting, other cleavages exert strong influence. Most voters in the Basque country in Spain vote on Basque regional parties. Most Northern Irish Catholics cast a vote on the Irish nationalist party. Most Swedish Finns support the Swedish People's Party. In Belgium, in fact, Flemish voters vote for Flemish political parties and Wallonia voters for Wallonia-like parties. The cleavage in the center-periphery of Norway has revived on the issue of joining the European Union (EU). In Italy, the South-North conflict has been reactivated by the mobilization of the Northern Alliance. It is said that class politics are disappearing in Britain, but in Scotland and Wales, which advocate Ethno Nationalism, British nationalism has been emphasized through the appeal of the Conservative Party.

R. J. Dalton has described the nature of the changes that occur in Western European politics and has presented two models for predicting political consequences in the debate on electoral change in the advanced democratic countries [Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984; cf. Dalton, 2004]. As a new cleavage emerges from a traditional one, the voters move on the process in the "re-alignment". This represents not only the "new left wing" but also the supporters of "new extreme right" [Norris, 2005: ch. 6; Kitschelt, 1995: 275-279; 2013: 95-103; Norris and Inglehart, 2019].

It concentrates on the decline of the role of political parties as a result. Political parties have become increasingly inappropriate given the new

issues and concerns that arise in the post-industrial world. Citizens have become dependent on interest groups and social movements to meet their needs. A “de-alignment” process is eventually established. Emphasis is placed on the fall of cleavages like class and religion. The theme of reorganization is due to an increase in post-materialist interest (“quality of life”). De-alignment means that voters become more unsocially structured. For example, it is a view that divides new and old types of extreme right parties. The old type reflects historical materialist confrontation, but the current new type sets the post-materialist confrontation of the post-industrial age to “newness” [Bornshier, 2010: 33ff. cf. Ignazi, 1992; cf. Ignazi, 2003].

The arguments that the ‘freezing’ party system has collapsed emphasizes only change. We need to re-confirm the Rokkan’s point of view that even if social structure changes, existing social cleavages will persist. Both change and survival must be considered more.

V Summary

1. Has the Party System Changed?

J-E. Lane and S. Erssen describe changes in the party system using five indicators [Lane and Erssen, 1994: 177 ff]. These indicators include; (1) degree of participation in the election, (2) number of parties in the system, (3) degree of ideological polarization, (4) sociological character of support for the party, and (5) changeable voters (volatility). P. Mair criticizes that obsessive attention to the electoral dimension is contextually elected in the organizational and ideological dimensions of party structure[Mair, 1989].

G. Smith states that the integration of the ruling and opposition parties is very important as a characteristic of the party system [Smith, 1989]. It is;

(1) party membership and its relative size, (2) ideological distance between parties, (3) change in electoral support of parties, (4) change and persistence in characteristics of cleavages, (5) way of government party and opposition party, and (6) place working party system (e.g. election, governance style, parliamentary management and so on). And the political parties (party systems) must be analyzed within the historical context [Donoven and Broughton, 1999: 257-262]. Mair and Smith focus on the social structure, and the politics and party system with the emphasis on voting change and the so-called “de-freezing” of the party system at present. They are aware of some of the changes in the relationship between the cleavages and the political parties.

Since Lipset and Rokkan have announced the theme of “frozen party system”, it has been pointed out many perspectives of dramatic changes. Sartori sometimes regarded the 1990s as a “new de-freezing” steps in contrast to the “de-freezing” step from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s [Sartori, 1994: 50]. Researchers who support “new politics” argue that “the ‘freeze’ of party system no longer exists in Western Europe”, and “the models of Lipset and Rokkan are past” [Erssen and Lane, 1996: 13]. Needless to say, the perception of change, in these views, has centered on the lack of stability of the party and support structure until the early 1970s [Dalton, Flagan, and Beck, 1984; Dalton, 1996; Mair, 1990; Mair, 1996]. Rokkanians do not mean to deny the change on the one hand. They furthermore would try to scrutinize changes more in the long-term political perspectives on the other hand [Bartolini and Mair, 1990]. This research reveals, from another angle, the significance of social cleavages.

There has existed a premise that socioeconomic and cultural fluctuations inevitably cause instability in the political party system, as a

number of volatile voter dominate political party support in the de-freezing theory. Mair refutes from two points. One point is not the frozen interwar period, but the time when there were a lot of past volatile voters. He emphasizes that the era is more than the changeable votes that increased from the 1970s. It should not be overstated that the stability of elections in 1950s and 1960s were exceptional. The other argues that Mair asks for what “freeze” is. “Freezing” is not meaningless by the volatility of each election.

The notion of volatile voting recognized by Maor is not the votes of individual parties, but the movement of the left and right wings within the bloc where cleavages are drawn, which the voting of each of the left and right wing indicates stability. For example, voting behavior across workers and capitalists will be an exception. Therefore, even if voters move back and forth between a social democratic party and a communist party, there cannot be a volatility that crosses the cleavage between workers and capitalists, as stated in the class cleavage. The same applies to the center-right bloc [cf. Mair, 2002: 122-142; cf. Armingeon, 2002: 143-165].

Arguments based on social cleavages, from the perspective of the electoral volatility alone, make the theoretical point of view lacking about the structuring of political parties (and party systems). Rokkan's analytical approach should pay more attention to having a sociological reductionism. Put another way, the political parties are formed when political mobilization due to cleavage has been fulfilled. And such political parties are positioned in the political party system. Said differently, the social cleavages are socially structured [Zuckerman, 1982]. In fact, the structuring of political parties (and political systems) through intervening agents maintains the institutional requirements derived from the

interaction of political parties' tactics.

In short, political analysis derives not only a cleavage but also a bloc. It means that the bloc leading the sustainable pattern of government formation provides the material to be formed in political history [Luebbert, 1991]. The Sartori's analysis on the political party system is not a fluid arrangement, but it implies the formation of a stable interaction pattern. There remain tensions between social structures and intervening agents (e.g. interest groups). New parties may be successful under the leadership of the elite (e.g. the Greens, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Dutch Democratic Party 66). As noted by J. Blondel and J.-L. Thiebault, a party organization and ideology may have transformed events. Social structural determinants, so-called social cleavages, are weakening, and there exists an increasing number of situations where intervening agents in positions go mainstream "front stage" (e.g. neo-corporatism, new social movement, top-down type of leadership) [Blondel and Thiebault, 2013].

2. Social Structure and Intermediaries

Analysis of social structure points out the importance of organization and ideology in the relationship of cleavage-intervening agent-party. The conventional cleavage-oriented party system assumes the mass membership party as party type [Sartori, 1968]. However, such party type may no longer exist. By weakening the connection between voters and political parties, today's political parties seem the catch-all party [Kirchheimer, 1966], election professional party [Panebianco, 1988], modern executive party [Koole, 1994], cartel party [Katz and Mair, 1994] and so on, and the relationship between the elite and the voters has changed too.

In mass membership parties, party members controlled party leaders,

but this is reversed in the present case. Voters are not connected with a particular party's ideological identification, and tend to change their votes every election. Membership in a party, as a matter of course, loses its influence in some ways, but it can still be influential depending on the scene [Katz and Mair, 1992; Katz and Mair, 1994].

The intervening agents that are social structural factors (structural constraints) will have a prominent role as leaders in Figure 3 who are performers. In traditional parties, the image of the party leader is projected to the leader. However, many of the new parties tend to be influenced by charismatic leaders. For example, such as U. Bossi of the Italian Northern Alliance (*Lega Nord*), J. Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party (*FPÖ*), J.-M. LePen of the French National Front, recently, M. LePen of the French National Federation (*Rassemblement National*), G. Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom, and N. Farage of the British Independent Party (*UKIP*), and B. Grillo of the Italian Five Stars (*M5s*), are aimed at top-down such as presidential role.

The important thing is the role of media and market research experts at the national headquarters of parties and the role of television in communicating with voters. For example, such cases appear suddenly in Italy with S. Berlusconi's campaign and its populist style, and in a sense they tend to become common in each country.

The political behavior of masses stands for direct political behavior, and the elite stands for entrepreneurial behavior. Put another way, the citizen initiative, the new social movement (*NSM*), and the political party inspired by the new grassroots movement create a democratic "democratic transformation" of representative democracy from below [Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995]. Such types of intervening agents increase personal

factors. It lacks a solid foundation based on cleavages (= subcultures). It's got a vote that is easy to be influenced by just the point of a moment.

We must remember that it is occupied by those who pursue direct participation of more citizens in politics are recognizable, but in the real world, those who supply a party democracy who is still competing rather than being replaced by what the citizens claim (i.e. established power) [Keane, 1988: Ch. 4]. If citizens have an effect on the government, then traditional parties (and party systems) in Western Europe must try to preserve the existing characteristics of Western democracy [Ware, 1987].

However, anxiety and apprehension mean that the increase of personalized agents means the structural decline of party system. It is possible to take an unstable factor with regard to the current vote's flux with reference to another definition of the origin of the political party system. According to A. Pizzorno, the present party system is in the age of "de-generative" [Pizzorno, 1981]. We need an understanding of historical context of the party system. It is the historical dimension of the change in the political party system. This view can be understood with Smith's three-stage mode [Smith, 1990].

Once again briefly confirmed, it is the model is in the early stages of exceptionally long-lasting stable stages of cleavage-based mobilization and organization, followed by the second stage, which began in the 1960s, and the third stage since the 1970s. The stages overlap in time. The features of the first and second stages represent the transformation and de-polarization of party organization. That is a prediction of Kirchheimer [Kirchheimer, 1957; Kirchheimer, 1966]. The political party at present is not a type of traditional mass membership party, but a political vehicle for ambitious leaders and their professional advisers, and the competition is

gradually implemented under a centripetal situation while avoiding extreme intentions. It will appear, at the fork, that changes in social structure, such as a decrease in the influence of social cleavages, and party types according to it. In that regard, it is important to reconfirm the circumstances in which the catch-all party has emerged. The third stage is a fluid one with “de-concentration” and “diffusion”.

“De-concentration” and “diffusion” indicate the emergence of new political parties and the decline in the size of existing political parties. Large people’s party is absent. “Diffusion” indicates the propensity of political parties to voters in order to get votes among the large number of political parties [Rae, 1967].

The spread of the rights to vote certainly has seemed to mean the liberation of citizens from restraint, but Smith recognizes that there remains a “safe adventure” on the basis of society [Smith, 1979: 140]. He points out that the range of sustained confrontation has become limited. Ideological uncertainty and fragmentation of the political party system may prove that citizens will be able to assert themselves. There has been a decline in the effectiveness of political parties based on traditional social cleavages. However does that point to exaggerate the “noise”?

Smith insists that it is in a dominant “people’s party” at a time when liquidation is almost re-stabilizing (the second stage) before the large-scale “de-freeze” era of the 1990s, as Sartori suggests. It is pointed out that systematic and ideological adaptation has already been prepared [Smith, 1989a; Smith, 1989b]. The “liquidity” in the formation of the left-wing camp has also influenced the center and right-wing parties since 1989. The mass membership party types of social democratic parties and Christian democratic parties which based on class and religion have

experienced serious (or “critical”) corruption. That can be explained as follows.

For example, in the Netherlands, it is said that two communal and solidarity parties are sacrificed for the rise of individualism [Napel, 1999]. The phenomenon is the impetus of the materialist “Silent Revolution” presented by Inglehart [Inglehart, 1977], and it gives the right wing an opportunity to penetrate the silent “counter-revolution” [Ignazi, 1992]. They are able to absorb voters, for instance, in the former case, de-materialists who seek environmental protection, in the latter case unemployed people who shout anti-immigrants, anti-refugees, and anti- foreign workers.

The liquidity of the voters, therefore, do not weaken and may continue in the future. That is, in Smith’s words, “the challenge to the core (the holders of vested interests)”. Indeed, although electoral fluctuations are now tending to seemingly lead to cataclysmic changes, there have remained also some “mild cases” of signs of inter-related changes like Sweden. Also, as in the case of the Netherlands, resilience is indicated regardless of the significance of historical change. This liquidity cannot be denied the traditional social structure completely. Some issues (e.g. environmental protection, immigration, refugee and so on) are likely to be protracted in their solution, but to what extent do they occupy a part of the social structure and become the cleavage concepts, systems and structures defined by Rokkanians? Said differently, this does not mean the disappearance of social cleavages.

3. Survivals of Traditional Social Cleavages and “New Politics”

Even if the Western European parties have been not based on social cleavages, there remains a mass base in each society [Vgl. Eith, 2001b: 323-333].

We must understand the changes of two party organizations, the “cadre party” and the “mass membership party” before the catch-all party, in Western Europe.

First of all, with the political party system experiencing evolution, the “cadre party” had to transform into a “mass membership party”. The latter type must be considered by political parties in the social structure. For example, the political party system in the United States does not belong to the family line of political parties (and party systems) that make up in Western European countries. Then, it tends to think that there is no “drop in values” of social cleavage. Is it possible to conclude so? It cannot be said that the part that social cleavage occupies as its own (sub-society) norms is completely gone in social structure. Explaining social order in terms of social norms, it is only considered at the “surface rules” of social life, but we need to maintain a cultural structure that allows them to support those rules. It should be emphasized that “the meaning of social structure is acquired through social learning” [Lopez and Scott, 2000: 90].

The social sciences study the phenomena that are the products of human beings who dominate the human relationship (in social structures, institutions, cultural traditions, manners, fashion, etc.). The relationship between the subjective power of human agents such as social groups, organizations and political parties and the objective power of reality focus on trying to understand what kind of social structure is created. That is structuration. “Structuration” explains social structures and systems by conceptualizing human agents and subjective and objective control [Parker, 2000: ix].

The fall of old social cleavages has certainly not disappeared completely (even though it has been structured) since the 1990s, but isn't

it that there should remain a room for doubt about the agreement between the views and facts claiming that disappearing? The old cleavage is related to the significance of being the mass membership party. At present, whether the political party in Western Europe can say that the social base of it has disappeared even if the mass membership party type has declined. If the social cleavage related to the transition from “modern” to “post-modern” has finished one of the central features, we must also consider that the character of support for political parties has changed. To that end, the transformation of relationship between political parties and supporters according to the change of social structure must be taken into consideration (e.g. transition from mass membership parties to catch-all parties, and further such as cartel parties).

We can confirm the following three points in relation to social groups and political parties.

- (1) There exists a correlation between group members and party choice.
- (2) The voters need to have a social affiliation (related with social structure and social composition).
- (3) It has been still effective for the political parties to appeal to voters based on the social cleavage.

It has been affected by the social and political developments of the past decades (especially since the 1970s) from above (1) to (3). A decline in the correlation between class and party choice has been shown in many cases since the 1980s. Religious votes also decline. The core of selecting parties weakens, in which based on the social cleavages of workers and adherents, and as a consequence, the relationship of cleavage-party support diminishes. They are captured, instead, by new middle class and

non-religious groups. The social cleavage-based parties are now, for example, social democratic parties and Christian democratic parties, which exist as major parties in the party system.

Voting behavior due to social cleavages is, on the one hand, the result of interactions and differences between groups in society and, on the other hand, the result of interactions between political parties and important actors [Goertl, 2007: 14]. We should not simply identify changes in party appeal or party strategy in understanding the future development of social cleavages. Is it possible to analyze the variation of relationship between the social character of voters and the choice of a party without considering what causes the party system [cf. Broughton and Napel, 2005b: 198-209; Mielke, 2001: 77-91]?

The theory of contemporary political change reflects the notion of a “post-industrial society” [Smith, 1989: 38-40]. The subject is useful for the politics of the developed society of Western Europe. It is underlying this theory that is a changing economic structure with high affluence, and the accompanying change in the value structure of people in the background. That projects so-called post-materialist values, which conflict with traditional forms of political behavior and established political parties. We, therefore, will have to appreciate the emergence of the catch-all party and its analysis.

The “new politics” concept is partially represented by a set of values for participation, but its strength provides an ideology that opposes the values of industrial society. Since industrial society thinks that the way of stabilizing social processes is sustainable economic growth, it raises distrust in the post-materialism. It is likely that a new cleavage can be characterized from that situation. It reflects in the left-right dimension.

However, that does not mean that “new politics” will replace “old politics” and that it will become automatic that the post-materialist gets a dominant value in Western European society.

First, the post-materialism is more concerned with the specific stages of Western Europe’s development rather than it is a general tendency. Second, in dealing with the new cleavage line of “new politics”, there remain questions about social structural relations. “New politics” lacks a historical (sociological) basis. It may be a “community” that shares certain values belonging to a particular social group or stratum (or a temporary circle that shares new values).

If there is no doubt that the appearance of a new cleavage, or if it is referred to as a cleavage, then the social foundation of politics must be an issue. It does not mean that weakness in identification with conventional political parties, declining rate in voting, difficulty in mobilizing voters to specific political parties, voting on issues, increase in volatility, etc. are unimportant when judging current politics. If there exists a change in the social base of politics, and if the base of the party-voter formation has become fluid, then the political party will capture more voters in addition to the supporters based on traditional social cleavage in the style of “catch-all”. The party needs effective tactics for ad hoc appeal of elections only. Otherwise, has the “post-modern society” got so fluid that it cannot create the new social cleavage of Rokkan’s way?

Conclusion

Even if an individual was released from the fetters of feudal system, the individual could not live in isolation from society. How to integrate an individual into society is a big issue at any time. As a framework for

integrating individuals, there exist concepts such as civil society, nation, class, religion, language, ethnicity and group. Nevertheless, the gap and confrontation between individuals and society as a whole has been contained. Their role in bridging and mediation is regional, social group, community, political organization, political party, and social or political system and so on. They have been influenced by the “distinctiveness” conditioned by the historical development of the respective territories.

Rokkan’s model is based on the “distinctiveness” of such historical conditions and territories, and various approaches to the study of political development that explain the origin, growth, and completion of the nation-state of Western Europe. It is an attempt to repeat consolidation, and reorganization to seek strengthening measures to counteract, and solidify internal cohesion, or to seek its change. This model, if simplified, consists of two parts.

The first part is the theoretical concept of the stages of political development. The second one is to explain individual institutional variations (e.g. regional consolidation, introduction and extension of suffrage, establishment of citizenship, political parties and party systems, federal systems, and welfare systems, based on social cleavages) They represent empirical topologies [Flora and Alber, 1986: 45-48].

With regard to the first stages of political development, Rokkan forms four individual stages and explains the causes of the accompanying “crisis” (state-formation: penetration stage, nation-building: standardization stage, mass democracy: participation stage, welfare state: distribution stage). The first two stages were “assault” from the center to the periphery. It was the rule of military-economy (state-formation) and culture (nation-building), which were attempt into subvert the territory, and were also an attempts to make the

residents in periphery to the subjects of the state. The other two stages are aimed at restructuring and nationalization within the territory through the expansion and re-definition of citizenship (participation and distribution), which re-originate from the periphery toward the center.

It was aimed at the introductory stage of state-formation that political, economic and cultural unity was pursued at the central and peripheral elite levels. The goal is to establish direct contact between the centers and the peripheries in the standardization stage of nation-building. The participation stage has become an issue through the development of mass politics and the equalization of political rights. Considering the region and social citizenship have been gradually established through the re-distribution of resources, goods and benefits at the stage. It has been decided in the first three stages of development how to promote or delay the development to the stage of the welfare state.

The second institutional variation focuses on development process and its consequences for mass democracy; introduction and expansion of right to vote, the formation of a political party (and party system) based on the social cleavage resulting from the nation-building, and the legal and institutional setting of responsible cabinet systems, or the practical implementation of them. It is the background to promote the development of consolidating and expressing their own interests and requirements, and inevitably acquiring executive power that has been to enable for vulnerable groups to gain the opportunity.

Rokkan's model explains the way of previous stage influences the next stage, and as a result, the similarities and differences of each political system, and at the same time, the variation that the history weaves from the viewpoint of historical process through diachrony and synchrony. I

have tried to figure out in this paper; we have outlined the generation, development, and transformation of the nation-state to date from the Rokkan's model, but in what is now called the post-Rokkan era, the nation-state has undergone major changes since the 1970s. It is necessary to develop and re-examine his model after recognizing the circumstances surrounding nation-state.

The nation-state was now challenged in various ways after the completion of the nation-state after the Second World War [Lipset, 2001: 7]. For example, being in failure of governance function [cf. Rose, 1980], an ethnic problem called regeneration of ethnicity [cf. Allardt, 1981], the emergence of a transnational organization beyond the state by European integration [cf. Banchoff and Smith, 1999], the relative decline in functioning of the nation as globalization prevails [cf. Held, McGren, Goldblatt, 1999], with migrants and foreign workers who bring about a transformation of the value of nation-state The rise of the extreme right forces that resist them [cf. Kitschelt, 1995; Merkl, 2003], it is argued that the formation of voters and political parties has changed from the value change, and the social cleavage up to now has ceased to function [cf. Mair, 1993], the re-examination of way of opposition in the modern nation-state [cf. Helms, 2002], and the neo-liberalism breakthrough to challenge the welfare state [cf. Himmelstrand, 1987].

It is said that two voting behavior patterns can be understood in Western European election politics for several decades after the Second World War [Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995: 492]. The first is a pattern characterized by the stable political parties in the 1950s and 1960s and the relationship between voters strongly supporting them. "The strength of most political parties' in elections has changed little from one election to

another, from one era to another, or from one generation of life.” This has still shown the “frozen thesis” Rokkan has explained by his model.

However, the second pattern begins to appear in the 1970s. It is said that by the 1980’s “new politics” had characterized many Western European politics. Instead of the sustainability and stability of the former, the latter theme is volatile voters, “de-alignment”, “unconventional political behavior”, and “unfreezing” the party system”. Put another way, it claims that the old order has collapsed.

How these phenomena can be explained in the Rokkan’s model or its correction must be shown by correcting or supplementing the model. And, now called the post-Rokkan era, Rokkanians need to conceptualize the current phenomena, incorporate them into the Rokkan’s model, and further develop it.

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