

《論 說》

Contemporary Politics of Japan. Cooperation, Conflict, Support, and Change among Voters, Politicians, Parties and Bureaucrats

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Glossary of Abbreviations

CEFP	Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi)
CGP	Clean Government Party (Komeitou)
CPJ	Conservative Party of Japan (Nippon Hoshutou)
DRF	Democratic Reform Federation (Minshu Kaikaku Rengou)
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutou)
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party (Minshatou)
HC	House of Councillors (the Upper House)
HR	House of Representatives (the Lower House)
JCP	Japan Communist Party (Nippon Kyosantou)
JLP	Japan Liberal Party (Nippon Jiyutou)
JNP	Japan New Party (Nippon Shintou)
JNR	Japan Renewal Party (Nippon Shinseitou)
JSP	Japan Socialist Party (Nippon Shakaitou)
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyu Minshutou)
NFP	New Frontier Party (Shin Shintou)
NHK	Japanese Broadcasting Association (Nippon Hoso Kyokai)
NLC	New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyu Kurabu)
NNPP	National New Political Party (Kokumin Shintou)

- NSH National Strategic Headquarters of the LDP (Jiminto Koka Senryaku Honbu)
- NSWP New Salaried Workers' Party (Sarariman Shintou)
- SDF Social Democratic Federation (Shakai Minshu Rengou)
- SDP Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshutou,former JSP)

Preface

I have taught the "contemporary politics" in universities in Japan. For these several years the theme of my class is the "change of politics" about a topical political phenomenon in Japan. This paper was written to comment on recent political circumstances of Japan in order to achieve the purpose. I have prelected with a simple teaching material in the class. A friend of mine has once pointed out that he could use it for classes of the Japan politics to the foreign students who were in Japan, and would introduce political circumstances of Japan abroad if the material for my lectures had translated into English. I did not notice about what he told to me till then, but will come to teach the students from the foreign country afterwards. Of course I have lectured for Japanese students but keenly realized the necessity of the textbook to explain to foreign students. Therefore I made up my mind to write the teaching materials in English. This paper is put a part of the lecture into English.

This paper is not the text which analyzes current politics in Japan theoretically. It is to let readers understand a trend of the current politics in Japan, and, as for my intention, is to have readers more interest in politics of Japan triggered by this paper. I intend to reproduce the class in English.

The structure of this paper is as follows. At first how do Japanese people understand politics? How do Japanese people think about an

argument over Constitution? In addition do they feel the necessity of rights and system that are not prescribed by the existing Constitution? I consider how Japanese people regard Constitution over the their view of the political system. Then I explain changes of the voting behavior from a point of view that is what kind of political choice the voters have decided in current political system. The third handles the politicians and political parties as the political actor. The LDP has ruled for postwar in Japan in particular. As the opposition party which can be opposed to it, I take up the DPJ. The fourth is the political actor that the bureaucrats are indispensable when we think about politics in Japan. This paper elucidates the actual situation to be called "the bureaucratic government", and explains the movement that is going to change it. Fifth I choose six Japanese prime ministers to think about their political leadership.

It is intended to understand politics in Japan through four political actors called the nation, the politicians, the political parties, and the bureaucrats, speaking it from a general point of view.⁽¹⁾ Finally we think with readers what the political responsibility is.

1. Japanese People's Recent View concerning Constitution

keywords: Constitutional amendments, Article 9 of Constitution, new human rights

1. 1. Most of the Japanese People agree Constitutional Amendments

The constitution describes political declarations, organizations, structures and so on when being explained the constitution from a political point of view. Judging from a political system, the constitution arbitrates the interest struggles among various groups, and it is considered to be the document which summarized main organs and processes converted

various demands into rules and policies. The constitutional text is the social order that reality at the time of its establishment generated not the result that developed from a law-like idea. Therefore the constitution system reflects the political situation at the time of its establishment [Stein, 1958:33].

The dispute over Constitution was right or wrong of Article 9. The dispute is divided at three times. The first is from 1947 to about 1950. Prewar liberalists played an active part in this time. The second had struggles called the rights vs. the lefts. As for the third, various arguments have been developed with social changes after 1970s. International and environmental changes since 1990s can put it let in particular an ideal method of the Japanese security recur in post-cold war era [Kato, 2002, ch.4].

How do the Japanese people think about Constitution of Japan? NHK does the public opinion poll of the same question items every ten years. It was carried out recently in 2002. This chapter investigates Japanese people's way of thinking for the constitution by the public opinion poll.

The relation between "Constitution and own life" becomes close to 67%, and it is "being related" with two ratios to three including putting "relations together to some extent". About the outlook on Constitution, 58% of Japanese people think that it is ideal, but 38% think it undesirable. Those who think that it is ideal are a majority, but decreased when compared it in 1992.

On Constitutional amendments, "58% of the respondents want to revise it", and "we need not revise it" was 23% in 2002 (36% in 1974, 42% in 1992). It cannot cope for the revised agreeable reason in the times, and there is overwhelmingly much it. They object to revisions by the reason though

there are a few problems to some extent, and think that they need not to revise the Article 9 of Constitution. However the revisionists are majority for the first time. Why so?

1. 2. Increase of Revisionists and Article 9

Why does it increase that the Japanese people need the Constitutional amendments? "Present Constitution should be revised" was researched more than the last time even in any generation and turns around by the age distinction. Ten years old got old last time from an investigation point in time, but, except 70s, showed a tendency to increase ten years later. What kind of meaning does this have? There exists no difference in the younger generations and the older generations. According to the expert of the public opinion poll, it is said that this is the result that called "effect given by the times" acted on. It is thought that consciousness of the whole nation over the constitution changed greatly by domestic and foreign events of ten years. Japanese people have been influenced by the start of a new social frame; influenced in the end of Cold War, the Gulf war, a "surge" to the international collaboration and the collapse of "55 system" in Japan.

How about revising Article 9? It is called "war-renunciating clauses". The war renunciation and the existence of the Self-Defense Force continued being objects of the arguments for a long time after the Second World War. "The Revision of the Article 9 is not necessary " exceeds 52% and it is the majority. That shows a tendency reverse to the Constitutional amendments. 38% of men and 23% of women think that its revision of the Article 9 is needed", so men exceed appearing. 49% of men and 55% of women need not revise it, so women exceed appearing. By the

age distinction, as for the men, 30s and 60s support to revise, but the posture that the women maintain Article 9 regardless of age is seen, and the supporters of the LDP, the DPJ and the CGP need not the revision of the Article 9."

The supporters of the JCP and the SDP and the unaffiliated voters object to it and insist that it is useful, 73% is necessary to Article 9 and consists in the important factor among Japanese.

1. 3. New Talking Points of Constitutional Amendments

There exists the new point at issue. Many people think that they should introduce even if Constitution will be revised ; Public Election of Prime Minister System (Shusho Kosensei), new human rights (the right to privacy, the environmental right, the right of the child, the right to access, the human rights of the foreigners [Asahi Shinbun, 3. Nov. 2000].

In the public opinion poll, it is characteristic as above that the revisionists largely increased. However most of the people object to the revision of the Article 9. It is appeared that the opinion to include the Public Election of Prime Minister System and new human rights as a new point at issue. This is because there is the origin of the Japanese pacifism in the Constitution of Japan after the war [Terajima, 2005, 260]. We must consider what parts of the issue on Constitution make a problem.

The majority of the Japanese citizen want to revise the Constitution of Japan, speaking roughly, but the intention does not necessarily insist on revision of constitution Article 9 that revisionists of the Diet members demand. In other words the Japanese citizens wish to add contents suitable for current political environment. Therefore the citizens request new human rights to the existing Constitution, and do not revise the

Table 1 Japanese people's way of thinking to Constitution

<p>1. Do you need to revise the Constitutional Amendments? need to revise 58% not need to revise 23% not either 11% DK/NA 8%</p>	<p>2. Why do you revise the Constitution? not suitable in the times 81% make international contributions 9% forced the present Constitution by USA 9%</p>																								
<p>3. Why do not you revise the Constitution? not need to revise 50% support the Article 9 35% perfect Constitution 13%</p>	<p>4. Do you need to revise the Article 9 or not? not need to revise the Article 9 52% need to revise the Article 9 30% not either 9% DN/NA 8%</p>																								
<p>5.Revisinists on the Article 9 by age</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="176 715 546 928"> <thead> <tr> <th>age</th> <th>men</th> <th>women</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>16-19</td> <td>18%</td> <td>26%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20-29</td> <td>36%</td> <td>24%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30-39</td> <td>48%</td> <td>24%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>40-49</td> <td>42%</td> <td>24%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>50-59</td> <td>37%</td> <td>24%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>60-69</td> <td>47%</td> <td>22%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>over 70</td> <td>27%</td> <td>19%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	age	men	women	16-19	18%	26%	20-29	36%	24%	30-39	48%	24%	40-49	42%	24%	50-59	37%	24%	60-69	47%	22%	over 70	27%	19%	<p>6. Do you need to add the new human rights to the present Constitution? need to revise in order to add them 59% not need to revise 31% DN/NA 10%</p>
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over 70	27%	19%																							
<p>7. What kinds of the new human rights do you think to add the present Constitution? rights of privacy 67% rights to know 62% environmental rights 58% rights of children 53% rights of foreigners 39%</p>	<p>8. What do you introduce the Public Election of Prime Minister System? need to revise the Constitution to in order to add it 61% not need it 15% feasible in the present Constitution 16% DK/NA 9%</p>																								
<p>9. Do you need to introduce the plebiscite ? need to revise the Constitution in order to introduce it 46% introduce it without revising 35% not need to introduce it 11%</p>																									

Sources, NHK Public Opinion in 2002

Article 9. So the content of the Constitutional amendments that revisionists expect is different from the most of Japanese people. Therefore it should be careful that contents which the revisionists in Diet members advocate are different from contents which Japanese people require. In other words, the Japanese citizens demand that they add contents suitable for current political environment. Therefore they require new human rights in a present Constitution.

2. The Koizumi Administration and Constitution in Discussion

keywords: advocacy of Constitutional amendment of Prime Minister Koizumi, Research Committee on Constitution, Article 9

2. 1. Revisions of Constitution

The Koizumi Cabinet that started in 2001 expressed that they aimed at the revisions of Constitution. The Research Committees on Constitution were set to investigate about Constitution generally in the HR (Lower House) and the HC (Upper House). In 1997 the Diet members except the JCP and the SDP were going to establish the place that investigated Constitution in the both Diets. The past governments have faced battle lines on Constitutional revisions with any kind of posture. The Koizumi Administration makes a great difference in comparison with the past government [Tanaka, 2005, 212]. This dispute on Constitution did not begin in now. The argument of Constitutional amendments has continued throughout after the war [Miyazawa, 1969].

The first is the relation between Self-Defense Force and Article 9 of Constitutions. The Koizumi Administration insisted on while declining it with saying that it "was difficult to put the issue of Article 9 of Constitution on the present political issue when it was unnatural that

there existed not the Self-Defense Force in the armed forces". In the present Constitution, it was written clearly that Japan do not maintain the war potential of land, sea and air to Clause 2 in Article 9, but there was the Self-Defense Force, and it has been regarded it as constitutionality by the governmental interpretation. Making law maintenance and the situation about the Self-Defense Force suggested a duty and revision of the Constitutional intention.


The second is a problem of the use of the right of collective self-defense. With the right of collective self-defense, it points at preventing it with ability for the attack from the third country together with the country which is close to an own country concerned. When the armed attack occurs territories permitted Japan to run the administration, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be to be exercised. When it was "recognized, but the enforcement was not forgiven concerning Article 9" as for the right of collective self-defense by the government interpretation, and the governments showed it inside and outside throughout. Prime Minister Koizumi spoke it that "the Self-Defense Force and the joint United States Armed Forces which moved into action received attack in the Japanese sea near the shore, and in the case "Could Japan do nothing?", and he insisted on the re-interpretation of Constitution to defense Japan.

The third is the introduction of the Public Election of Prime Minister System. For the parliamentary cabinet system, Diet members elect the Prime Minister now. Prime Minister Koizumi demands the change for the direct election of Prime Minister by Japanese people. He might insist without changing the Constitutional other texts in order to perform the Public Election of Prime Minister directly.

2. 2. Article 9 in Future?

There are the obstacles for the realization of the revision of Constitution, too. First it is important to point where the public opinion is divided into two. The majority of the respondents express objection for revisions of Article 9 in the recent public opinion poll. Second even if the advocates of Constitutional revision in the LDP led coalition political power, the CGP which took the part of the ruling parties, stopped discussions about revisions of Constitution. Third the DPJ must cooperate with the LDP to find agreements of the revision of Constitution more than two-thirds that the advocate of Constitutional revision is necessary for revision of the

Figure 1 How do you think to revise the Article 9?



Source Asahi Shinbun, 3 May 2006

LDP. The DPJ cannot easily give in by an important problem called the revision in the LDP. Most of the DJP representatives decline in an advocacy of Constitutional amendment, but the protectionists of Constitution in the LDP do not need to revisions, so revisionists in the DJP break an opinion in the party how it revises Article 9.

On the revisions of Article 9 it was till now that breaks up two groups called the realists and the pacifists in the LDP and the DPJ. If the realists and the pacifists change in the Diet, the roles of the nation increase as never before. The revision of Constitution is because it is necessary to get majority agreement by a referendum. The majority of the nation objects to the revision of Article 9. The public opinion will stop discussions on revisions of Constitution.

2. 3. Problems on Revisionists' Intention

Third there exist some problems about an introduction to the Public Election System of Prime Minister System in the parliamentary cabinet system. As for the current system, the political parties controlling a majority of the Diet play a key role, but the introduction of the Public Election of Prime Minister System may almost come to a form of the presidential system, and it is necessary to change structure of a cabinet and the Diet overall.

There emerges another problem concerning the Emperor System in Japan. When Prime Minister is elected by a referendum, he or she becomes the virtual sovereign. It will bring out that it is contradictory that the Emperor appoints the Prime Minister, and there exists an opinion to object to the Public Election of Prime Minister System. But there is another argument in regarding the Emperor as the sovereign.

How should we think about Prime Minister Koizumi's remark of the revisions of Constitution? Surely the successive Prime Ministers had revision plans on Constitution. However the past Prime Ministers who insisted on revisions of the Constitution did not need to set to work debates on Constitution in a political schedule. In contrast Prime Minister Koizumi was active in revision of the Constitution after having limited it in the Public Election of Prime Minister System.

What is the aim in the discussion of revision on Constitution next? It promotes revisions of Constitution, speaking it with a word. Revisionists in the DPJ persuade in their visions. A spring is added to the revision of Constitution using the Public Election of Prime Minister System. It is necessary to get a referendum system ready by the introduction of it. This is the same as a revision procedure of Constitution. Even as to procedure is effective in letting a revision of the Constitution discussion accelerate. Therefore revisionists begin with the introduction of the Public Election of Prime Minister System that it is easy to be got the support of the Japanese people, and the true aim is the revision of Article 9 and affirmation in the review of the right of collective self-defense.

2. 4. Discussions of the Revision on Constitution

In 2001 the LDP advocated the aim that stepped into establishment of new Constitution or revisions of present Constitution. There are protectionists and revisionists in the LDP, too. The CGP of the ruling parties insists that it gives a constant conclusion after arguing for approximately 10 years. A part of the LDP insists on the establishment of the new Constitution. In the opposition parties the DPJ insists on arguing present Constitution but holds revisionists and protectionists. The JLP

showed the basic policy for new Constitution and is active in a revision. The JCP and the SDP have objected revisions strongly. As well as at a political party level, there is a difference among politicians within each party.

The themes of the Research Committee are the Public Election of Prime Minister System, Approval of the Self-Defense Force on Constitution, National Security, Social Security, Decentralization, new problems (for example environmental right) and so on. Each political party shows a national and social aim and plan, and it is necessary to be able to discuss to Japanese people's judging from Constitution [Kobayashi, 2000, 92-93].

3. Diet Report of the Research Committee of Constitution

keywords: Research Committee of Constitution, Argument on Article 9, Awareness of the Japanese people on revision of Constitution

3. 1. The Final Report of the Research Committee

In April, 2005, the Research Committee of Constitution submitted the last report to the Chairperson of the HR, Yohe Kono [Asahi Shinbun, Jun. 1. 2000] The Research Committee was set up in 2000 by the both Diets of the HR and the HC. Thereafter, after an argument for five years, it is included in more than 680 pages of this report. It is the first time that the Diet makes the issue of Constitution in an official document. This report highlights the both viewpoints that the one specified a major opinion, and the other showed the attitude that began to set to work in Constitutional amendments, so conflicts to revisions appeared. What is the meaning of the report which the Diet compiled about a Constitution for the first time?

The greatest characteristic of this report is the point that specified a

major opinion. It is regarded as agreement to with two-thirds which more than 20 Diet members spoke with a major opinion. Along this standard, the maintenance of three Constitutional major principles (the respect of pacifism / doctrine of democratic sovereignty / fundamental human rights), the approval of the women's succession to the Imperial Throne, new human rights (environmental right, a right to privacy and so on), the setting of the constitutional court, and the introduction of the Statehood Concept in Japanese Local Government are major opinion.

3. 2. Argument on Article 9

How does Article 9 of the focus turn out [Asahi Shinbun, Oct. 5, 2000] ? This report will maintain the item of the war renunciation to do Clause 1 of Article 9 that "abandon the use of war as the motion of the national power and the military power forever" firmly by a major opinion in future. About Clause 2 that "the war potential of the armed forces will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of state will not be recognized.", it has been recognized the minimum use of armed force for a right of self-defense, but it is in major opinion. But an opinion parts how it prescribes this in a constitution. It has been discussed that we should not change the important point about Article 9, prescribe in it the civilian control that is the step of the brake, and at a formal right of self-defense, so that opinion left the positioning of the Self-Defense Force. It was expressed after all as not denying that it took constitutional measures about a right of self-defense and the Self-Defense Force". It is vague, but Clause 2 of Article 9 is just good, but can understand about Clause 2 when there were many opinions to demand some kind of revision.

"Recognize attached limitation" about the enforcement of the right of

collective self-defense were able to understand the same number of each opinions. The opinion that the former demands Constitutional amendments is a majority. In that case major opinion should insist on a specification for Constitutional grounds. Each avoids direct expression carefully, but an opinion in search of Article 9 of the revision becomes a majority. Anyway reviews of Article 9 that were the center of disputes concerning Constitution in postwar period were specified in this report.

3. 3. Situations for the Revisions of Constitution among Each Party

The LDP, the DPJ and the CGP state that the making of agreement is possible across the situation of the party. The adjustment about the revision of Article 9 was not easy, but gave priority to the three parties agreed over the argument. For Constitutional amendments, two-thirds of each Diet members need the above-mentioned agreement. More than 162 Diet members are necessary at the HC, and more than 320 at the HR.

It is supportive about revisions of Constitution for the two major political parties, the LDP and the DPJ, in the background where an agreement was concluded. As for the protection of the Constitution, the revisions of Constitution or the opposition, it was not argued between the both of the parties. Two thirds of the all members of the HR become born after the war and have the change in the consciousness different from the older generations. Many younger Diet members do not feel the difference of the ruling parties and opposition parties concerning revisions on Constitution and the national security.

The JCP and the SDP sit on a sense of impending crisis in this situation. It was assumed that the emphasis of the major opinion deviated from the authority of the Research Committee and objected to report presentation.

As argument contents of it, the Research Committee speaks an international contribution and new human rights, but its true aim is revision of Article 9, and when it is to an open way for the enforcement of the armed force abroad, so the JCP and the SDP criticize it severely.

It is not so easy whether Constitutional amendments come up in a political schedule promptly. First even if the LDP and the CGP were able to form a wide agreement by the report, but, by a direction and the contents of each revision, the situation of three parties is different. Most Diet members in the DPJ opposite to the revision of Article 9. There are much careful of the right of collective self-defense in the CGP. It is natural that it regards to prescribe the Self-Defense Force and an international contribution on Constitution and is dissatisfied with vague expression. Because the ruling and opposition parties were opposed in the issue of Iraqi dispatch, the agreement may not continue.

3. 4. Japanese People's Consciousness on Reforms of Constitution

As for the consciousness of Japanese people, according to NHK public opinion poll on April 8th and 9th 2005, "agreement for revision" was 48%, "disagreement for revision" was 16%, and "do not know" was 31%. Opinions in search of Constitutional revisions increase, but the situation in favor of constitutional revisions does not have the majority of the nation. Revisionists were 26%, Protectionists 36%, and No Answers 31%. In comparison with the revision of the whole, revision of Article 9 has much negation. Put it together in the times, and the nation understands that it is performed a review, but not revise to Article 9; it is the consciousness of the nation of the great portion that is not necessary. But Constitutional amendment does not become the overwhelming majority

for the claim of the nation. There is an argument that Constitutional idea is not yet realized, and most of nations think that Constitution does not achieve the idea-like true value [Terajima, 2008, 26].

It is not thought that revisions of Constitution become the serious problem. There was still a big meaning in revisions of Constitution having been specified as a major opinion in a report submitted to the Diet. The Chairperson of the Research Committee, Nakayama, stated "Our tasks became clear. We should have established a referendum method for the nation to carry out sovereignty rests with the people fast all day long this time" in 2005.

The discussions on the revisions of Constitution may not argue soon, since there are gaps among political parties and gaps in the public opinions. The discussions on Constitution in future appear in the opinion that we should be able to advance to more carefully probably because the political parties were conscious of it while promoting the understanding of the public opinion. Diet members should argue to Japanese people concretely how the political parties think about Constitution.

The constitution is a contract of the people and the government. We must understand that the contract restricts the government. It is never means that the constitutionalism (rule of law) is not the tools to performs the ruler's orders and intentions.

4. Debates on Constitutional Amendment in Future

keywords: meaning of the Referendum method, Constitution Examination Committee, Article 9 concerning revisions of Constitution

4. 1 . Approval of the Referendum Method

A referendum bill for Constitutional amendments passed the HR with ruling parties in April, 2007. The DPJ submitted an original plan, but it was refused. Because each opinion in the DPJ was opposed to the LDP and the CGP of the ruling parties, the development of the future discussion of Constitution may be changeable [Saito, 2006, ch.5].

We have two important implications that the scene of the Constitutional amendments is regulated well in the referendum bill. In the NHK public opinion poll of April 2007, as for the right or wrong of the Constitutional amendments, "revisionists were 47%, anti-revisionists 20%, and "do not know" 27%. Revisionists need majority agreement of the nation by a referendum for the Constitutional amendments. There was not the law that determined a revised method till now. The procedure of the Constitutional amendments was not made have no matter how much agreement. This is the first implication. Another implication is to set up "the Examining Committee of Constitution" as a permanent construction organization. The Research Committee of Constitution was a constitutional research organ, but the Examining Committee discusses concrete revised contents, and has an authority to make a revision of the Constitution original bill. Revisionists advance to the argument which part change whether argument in the future revises the Constitution when a referendum method and the Examining Committee are got ready.

The Examining Committee was set up in an extraordinary session of the Diet in autumn 2007 because the LDP revised in future shortest schedule. But, by the bill, the LDP considers the CGP for Constitutional amendments and freezes the proposal of Constitutional amendments for three years.

4. 2. A Reason Why the Ruling and Opposition Parties Confront

Actually it seems that revisions take time more. They do not be active partly because the DPJ was opposed to the ruling parties; it is expected that revisions will be dragged on. Two-thirds of each both the HR and the HC needs the above-mentioned agreement for revisions. Unless the DPJ in the HC agrees, there should not be more than two-thirds. The ruling parties made much of a cooperation route with the DPJ. The DPJ approached it in the discussion and received the direction that extends a voting age to 18 years old, and it agreed on the position use prohibited point such as public employees even not to establish the penal regulations. As the DPJ insists to be able to utilize the referendum in the cases except Constitutional amendments, the bill became not different from the ruling parties within the DPJ.

However circumstances changed for two reasons in a year. The one was the reason why Ichiro Ozawa, the new leader of the DPJ, insisted on a policy connected directly with "daily life of the nation" than "Constitutional amendments" He spoke that he "cannot agree to joint suggestion" of the Referendum Bill with an advantage for election the leader of the DPJ assumed of office to in May 2006. The LDP and the CGP showed the contents which gave in the DPJ in April, but the DPJ objected to it.

The other is that the governments were changed. Prime Minister Abe advocated revisions of the Constitution in power and wanted to carry out "Constitutional amendments all over the term of office" and wanted to make it the issue of the HC election in 2007. Because both Ozawa and Abe twined the battle line of Constitution around election, It has become the issue of political situation irresistibly. When Ozawa gave priority to own

"party interests and party maneuverings over national problems", he criticized the ruling parties. The DPJ argued that The Abe Administration aimed at "revisions of the Constitution with power in order to seek the re-enforced statehood". Because it was the making of rule of the Constitutional amendments, it was the hot opinion that Abe has had better devise before it was disputed, but the Abe system in the LDP and the Ozawa system in the DPJ have brought to the changed aspect.

4. 3. Points at Issues

Within both the LDP and the DPJ, the inside circumstances are complicated each other. In the DPJ, there are groups of Constitution protectionists and a motley crew of the prudential on revisions. The executive of the DPJ is concerned whether a part of the Democrats to rebel inside from the party appears. The LDP do not judge to benefit with revisions of Constitution as election issues. When a part of Diet members of the LDP criticizes his right trend to Prime Minister Abe, it appeared openly that he should be resign as Prime Minister in his party.

Is the true argument accompanied even if the government devises the rule of the Constitutional amendment immediately? As for the revision of the Constitutional discussion, there is the viewpoint that the discussion of revisions stopped as far as the conflict composition of the Abe system and the Ozawa system does not change even if the Examining Committee is set up in the Diet.

There is an another problem. There was suggestion to extend the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) dispatch to Iraq for two years. In those days Prime Minister Koizumi who decided dispatch have answered that it was a

problem of the Constitutional "gray zone" by SDF. For further 4 years, as for most of the rights of collective self-defense to become connection with Constitution and the background, it has not been argued at the place of the politics. That cannot make an argument why is now Constitutional amendment for enough. It may make the agreement difficulty when revisions hurry only the making a stage of revision.

The problem that is not argued about a referendum method exhaustively is left. For example how do the minimum percentage of voting set? More than 40% of the voter is necessary for the approval of referendum in the U.K. The formal condition is not prescribed official regulations in an approved method. It is specified only with the majority of total votes, and will decide revisions of the one-fourth in the voter if effective voting percentage is 50%. If there exists a faulty ballot, there may be less. Thus it should be argued among Japanese people whether it is adequate. Nevertheless, according to the public opinion poll, Japanese people do not have interest to revise Constitution. If the revision will come under question, the proposer must show what issue is at point, it should be important to share a critical mind among Japanese people.

5. Voting Behaviors in the Postwar Periods in Japan

keywords: Conservatives and Lefts, "the 55 system", a "committed voters" and "floating voters"

5. 1. In the Days of Postwar Confusion (from 1945 to 1955)

In the latter half of 1940s, the basic frame of democracy in the postwar system was built under the present Constitution after war. In the right camp various Conservatives having the genealogy since the pre-war formed conservative political parties separately. In the Left camp prewar

left campaigners concentrated into the left wing and the right wing of the JSP (lately SDP) again separately. In addition the JCP was legalized. In just after war, the relations of the political parties and the voters were in the changeable circumstance [Ishikawa, 1995; Ryuen, 1994; Yamada, Kitaura, Takada, 1996]

5. 2. In the Days of two Parties Polarization (from 1955 to 1960)

This time was when formed a frame of basics of the postwar politics to be called one-and-one-half-party system which were near to two major party system; ("the 55 system"). The left wing and the right wing in the JSP were integrated in October 1955, and scattered conservative political parties carried out "conservative merger (hoshu godou)" in November of the same year and formed the LDP. The LDP took the support such as big businesses, medium and small-sized businesses, commerces and industries, the farmers and so on. The JSP found the support of the worker led by labor unions of public employee and the major company private enterprises As a characteristic of this time, the LDP and the JSP, and each supporters were opposed in own ideology strongly. The climax of conflict was an argument to renew or not the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in June 1960.

5. 3. In the Days of the LDP's Majority (from 1960 to the first half of 1970s)

After the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, The Ikeda Government promoted a high economic growth policy / income redoubling plan (Shotoku Baizo Keikaku) and succeeded in letting "economy change the interest of the nation from political conflicts in the

former Kishi government. Thereafter the LDP Governments succeeded in letting Japan switch to structure from the primary industrial society to the second one with big businesses and economic bureaucrats in a policy corresponding to many problems of economy, society and welfare, form such as the domestic administration serious consideration from the industrial society, and it took the orbit for the single party government independent long term by the LDP, which was established the dominant party system.

The LDP in power did not show interest in Constitutional amendments that divided a public opinion into two, and devoted to planning economic growth still more. The doctrine of "the light armament and the economic growth" course (or principle) was succeeded to by "the main group of conservatives" in the LDP (hoshu honryu). In contrast the JSP lost the support of the voters as a result that the JSP persisted in an ideology (for example protection of Constitution, Anti-Self-Defense Force, Anti-U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) and decreased sharply with seats from 140 to 90 in general election of 1969. On the other hand the high economic growth let Japanese social structure diversify and delivered the moderate centrist parties which there were gradually in the needs of the city inhabitants; the DSP, the CGP, the NLC, the SDF, and the NSWP.

5. 4. In the Days of even Matching between Conservatives and Lefts (form first half of 1970s to 1979)

The change of the Japanese industrial structure that the LDP promoted decreased the farming population that was an original support base and came to gradually decrease the vote rate of the LDP at every election. However the increase of the city population did not always act in favor of

the JSP. The both parties will turn in a tendency to long-term fall from each circumstance. The CGP and the JCP grew seats for it steadily by speaking for the profit such as non-organizational classes base of the city that suffered the pollutions and the high prices of commodities in urban regions given up by the LDP and the JSP. The votes of non-LDP had increased in the second half of 1970s.

The fall in support of the LDP in power carried out the distribution of favors and the pork-barrel politics all the way; distributions to districts of subsidies or grants and public enterprises. This has produced the relation between the elector and the elected to some extent. The committed voter cannot be swayed to transmit profits [cf., Hirose, 1981]. It is a clientele politics in Japan. At the same time it is said that unaffiliated voters and non-voters have begun to be pointed out since these days. [Kawasaki, 2007, ch. 4,5].

As a result, many Diet members of the LDP have become pork-barrelers in specific business sectors such as postal services, construction, welfare, forestry, and education. In return, each business circle that profited assisted these "special interest" Diet members in collecting both funds and votes.

5. 5. In the Days of the Revival of the LDP (from 1980 to 1993)

In the first half of 1980s, the second switch of Japanese people to politics occurs. In other words the phenomenon that young voters supported the LDP in the urban regions became remarkable. The new generations born after the war have entered the electoral marketplace of politics and begun to support the LDP. They were engaging in the third and the fourth industries with the high educational background. He or she took a flexible


voting affirming the current LDP so that he or she maintained own life for the status quo. It is called the social conservatism for one's life (seikatu hoshushugi) in Japan [Miyake, Yamaguti, Muramatu, Shindo, ch. 2, 1988].

The LDP was able to acquire young flexible voters led by the city inhabitants with the thought for conserving own life while securing committed voters by the exchange of profit and the vote. The LDP has developed a type of the catch-all party. The flexible voter is "the buffer player"⁽³⁾ termed by Professor Kabashima.

However flexible voters may not always support the LDP. In other words the reason is that he or she does not change profit and vote, which are direct unlike committed voters. It is possible to leave the LDP temporarily when the LDP is involved in corruptions.

The JSP was limited to 85 seats by the great victory of the LDP by the simultaneous elections of the HR and the HC in 1986. However after that, because of the liberalization of agricultural products from abroad, the Recruit Scandal, rise of a consumption tax (a value-added tax), the LDP lost in the election of HC in 1989. It is strangely that the LDP recovered in the general election of the HR in 1990. However the opposite factions crashing in the LDP had occurred breaking up successively, so that the LDP defeated in the general election of the HR in 1993 when a political reform became the focus, and the LDP left the government. In addition the JSP became the number of the minimum seats since the formation since 1955, too. "The 55 system" centered the LDP and the JSP had disappeared perfectly.

Figure 2 Flow in Change of Political Parties since End of "the 55 System"



- CGP Clean Government Party (Komeitou)
- CPJ Conservative Party of Japan (Nippon Hoshutou)
- DRF Democratic Reform Federation (Minshu Kaikaku Rengou)
- DPJ Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutou)
- DPP Democratic Politics Party (Minseitou)
- DSP Democratic Socialist Party (Minshatou)
- JCP Japan Communist Party (Nippon Kyosantou)
- JLP Japan Liberal Party (Nippon Jiyutou)
- JNP Japan New Party (Nippon Shintou)
- JNR Japan Renewal Party (Nippon Shinseitou)
- JSP Japan Socialist Party (Nippon Shakaitou)
- LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyu Minshutou)
- NCJ New Conservative Party Japan
- NFP New Frontier Party (Shin Shintou)
- NLC New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyu Kurabu)
- NNPP National New Political Party (Kokumin Shintou)
- NPF New Party Friendship (Shintou Yuai)
- NPJ New Party Japan (Shintou Nippon)
- NPP New Party Pacific (Shintou Heiwa)
- NPS New Party Sakigake (Shintou Sakigake)
- RC Reform Club (Kaikaku Kurabu)
- SDF Social Democratic Federation (Shakai Minshu Rengou)
- SDP Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshutou, former JSP)
- SP Sun Party (Taiyotou)
- VN Voice of Nation (Kokumin no Koe)

5. 6. The Characteristic of the LDP Government under "the 55 System"
The long-term government by the LDP is defined with a dominant political party system. In Japan competitive elections have been held, but the LDP has continued maintaining the government for a long term, and there was not change of government. What is the characteristic?

Why is possible for the LDP to rule in "the 55 system"? We explain three points of views. First the LDP Administrations realized high economic growth, and succeeded to improve the standard of living of the Japanese people. Second it is strong that Japanese voters had a sense of the status quo. They became the powerful support base of the LDP with the increase of voters born after war in 1980s. Third opposition parties did not have the countermeasure that was effective against the LDP. It was effective in letting support to the opposition parties decrease that its policies of equality had been taken in advance to considerable degree in the LDP Administrations.

The long government by the LDP established in 1960s has continued until 1993. There was "the postwar agreement" of the LDP type in it. It is "peace and economical prosperity". This is the route by "the main group in the LDP" that Shigeru Yoshida and others got. The policies have been realized effectively after the war in Japan [Nonaka, 2008].

6. Political Realignments in the Time of the Coalition Governments

keyword: political realignment, unaffiliated voters, retrospective voters / perspective voters

6. 1. The Political Realignments and Coalition Governments

1990s was the times when a political change and complete reform were

demanded. Many new political parties form, extinct and combine, and the political reorganization happens in sequence. To the undercurrent, a political system has been reformed. Primarily it was introduced the single-seat district with proportional representation system to the HR election system. The second is the reform of the Ministry and Agency organization. There is the reinforcement of leadership of the prime minister there. The third is introduction of Diet reform and the Senior Vice Minister system for political leadership. "The postwar agreement" of the LDP type was gradually destined to be extinct. This change influences political actors greatly.

Table 2 Coalition Cabinets since 1993

Periods	Cabinets	Coalition parties
Aug. 1993-Apr. 1994	Hosokawa Cabinet	JSP, NPJ, CGP, JRP, DSJ, Sakigake, SDF, MRF
Apr. 1994-June. 1994	Hata Cabinet	NPJ, CGP, JNP, DSJ, JLP,
June 1994-Jan.1996	Murayama Cabinet	LDP, JSP, Sakigake
Jan. 1996-Nov. 1996	Hashimoto Cabinet	LDP, JSP, Sakigake
Nov. 1996-July 1998	Hashimoto Cabinet	LDP (SDP,Sakigake)
July 1998-Apr. 2000	Obuchi Cabinet	LDP, JLP, CGP,
Apr. 2000-Apr. 2001	Mori Cabinet	LDP, CGP, CPJ
Apr. 2001-Nov. 2003	Koizumi Cabinet	LDP, CGP, CPJ
Nov. 2003-Sep. 2006	Koizumi Cabinet	LDP, CGP
Sep. 2006-Sep. 2007	Abe Cabinet	LDP, CGP
Sep. 2007-	Fukuda Cabinet	LDP, CGP

The political realignments is used in two meanings. The one is how the coalition governments between political parties combine, and the other is what change of the political party support structures the voters' choice. If the political parties and the politicians cannot fit political party realignments in "the survival game", it means that they will be extinct.

The political realignments produce conflict axis (an issue) unlike the handed-down convention. The old conflict was industrialism vs. the ideology (or "the small government" vs. "the big government"). This increases the de-industrialism vs. the de-ideology. Furthermore international contributions vs. one-country pacifism (Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi), confrontation and decision by majority type vs. the agreement formation (the consensus) model are added. Each political party needs an effort to make an issue in these conflict axes an idea.

The Hosokawa Administration of the non-LDP coalition was born in the general election of the HR in 1993 and let a political reform related bill form. The LDP formed the Murayama coalition government with the SDP (former JSP) in 1994 and was able to return to the office. The NFP born in 1994 aimed at the bipartisan part, but was broken up in 1997. The DPJ gathered many political parties in 1998, and it aims at the part of two new major parties system and is opposed to the LDP. On the other hand the LDP loses the power that it maintains a single-party government and cannot but come to continue the situation to join the government by a coalition with the CGP [Nippon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1997].

6. 2. Independent Voters

Unaffiliated voters are few religious group members on the organization participation, and feel kindly toward the new political party on the feelings to the political party. The political attitude strongly has the dissatisfaction that is more political parties than the same political party supporter, and posits in the left wing for the ideology, but the vote obligation is low [Kabashima, 1998, 78].

The rapid increase of unaffiliated voters is seen in the one of the

characteristics of the recent political phenomenon. They exceed 50%, and it explains that the result that refused an existing political parties. The people called unaffiliated voters are existence considered to "be no supporter" at a certain point in time. Originally they supported a certain political party, and may support it in future. The unaffiliated and independent voters do not support a specific political party at present [Asahi Shinbun, 24. Oct. 2000].

The political reforms were demanded for years in the past, and the political realignments have been insisted on with them. However unaffiliated voters increased rapidly whenever the political realignments advanced from single-party government of the LDP to coalition governments. Only as for what occurs only "politics in Nagatacho (the center of Japanese politics)", and is sake of business only for politicians and the political parties, and ensure powers, and cannot explain to voters properly even if the political realignments advance [Kawasaki, 2007; Hashimoto, 2004].

However since 1980s the voting behavior has changed with the entry to a large quantity of political marketplace of the postwar generation in Japan. The postwar generation who judges it by oneself and casts one vote based on self-profit has appeared. Such voters are called independent voters, uncommitted voters, nonaligned voters, unaffiliated voters, or voters who do not support any political party.

He or she votes by judgment of oneself on occasion. This is not so-called committed, organized votes. We can consider it to be a volatile voting to be said to be "instrumentalism" to use one vote for oneself.

It has begun to be said that there are considerable numbers of "buffer players" in the youth generation that was apt to be thought to be volatile

votes in the cities. They desire that their orientation or stable intentions are strong, but they hate that the LDP emerge as the dominant winner in the election, and ruling and opposition parties' even matching is more desirable than the LDP's crushing victory, though what the LDP was defeated was troubled, so they take an aim to be able to approach two major party system even if they take too much into account in beating one party in the election, and the voters who adopted voting behavior to vote for the opposition parties at this time has begun to come into the limelight [Kabashima, 2004, ch. 4].

They have some common attributes. For example they were born in the postwar days and high economic growth era, and have a chance of a high academic career, work in the third / the fourth (service / information) industry, and live in the suburban satellite city. These voters are interested in low politics about everyday life than high politics with diplomacy. We may, so to speak, state that they seek to "conservative own present lives". Therefore this type of voters evaluates achievements (mainly on economy in particular) of the ruling party and the government in the retrospective voting, perspective voting, issue preferential voting, and the leadership evaluation voting, and it decides to vote for which political party / candidate. This reduces the combination of the party/candidate and voters, and increases a volatile voting.

6. 3. New Standard of Voting Behavior

Then it is the times when "floating voters" increase more and more, and on earth what will the standard that voters settle on be? It is explained that they evaluate the past performance, expect for own future, choose an issue, and judge a party leader at time of election. Each standard explains

current voting behavior, and it is with a technical term to be used well. Four standards are the following content.

The retrospective voting is a way of the votes to play with own vote because he or she evaluates past achievements of the party or parties in power if it is preferable for oneself". The voters make the quality of performance by the government connected directly with policies about daily life such as economic measures, the employment / unemployment, education, and social security on his or her grounds of judge. The voter cast one vote for past good achievements as a reward to the government party in charge and casts it to a different party or candidate when he or she finds policies unsatisfactory. This is the vote of reward or punishment.

The perspective voting will be "the way that the results of a political party and a candidate are unknown, but voters cast own ballot for the political party and candidate with all expectation" in the future. For example he or she changes a vote on a case by case because an opposition party and a different candidate seem to be able to still expect it without the results from disappointment to the ruling party or the incumbent politician. This is the vote for the prospects.

The issue preferential voting is a way of the votes to decide voters examines the pledge that a political party or a candidate advocate closely, and whom votes" for. For example the voters cast one vote to judgment materials in the issue with whether voters criticize the Recruit case by the HC in 1998, the attitude of the party or the candidate to the pension reform by the HC in 2004, and support or not support of the postal administration reform by the HR election in 2005,

A party leadership evaluation voting is effective in attracting the vote of unaffiliated voters when "popularity of the party leader is high". On the

other hand, when voters support the other party leader, they vote for the leader's political party. When the party leader is unpopular, the unaffiliated voters in particular do not vote for the political party, and even the political party's original supporters mean a tendency to grow away. For example the quality of good sensitivity, passion, behavior, ability, talent, and popularity of the party leader influence the votes of the political party. The cabinet support rate shows the evaluation of the prime minister (the leader of the government party) in Japan.

In the European and American democracies the standards of four voting behaviors mentioned above were already seen from 1980s, but were able to observe only by national election after the latter half of 1990s in Japan. There was a kind of time lag. Why is it?

The reason is because there were three circumstances about politics in Japan in those days. First the confidence of the nation to ability for government charge of the political party except the LDP was not relied on. Second a way of thinking called "public work project investment to recession measures" had effect, and therefore felt an effect for the profit instruction from "the pipeline with the LDP by the local members of the Diets. The third is because the party and the candidate were able to secure a seat for a medium-sized district with the ruling and opposition parties. These reasons did not have the voting behavior by the four standards come up to the surface. However the sign of four standards have come to be gradually seen in elections after the LDP single-party government era was finished in 1993, which "the 55 system" was collapsed.

6. 4. A Good Fight of the DPJ in the 2000 General Election

The general elections of the HR in 2000 were the second time in single-

member district with the proportional representation system introduced from 1996. Two votes (single-seat election constituency and proportional representation constituency) have got closer to introduction to aim at two major parties system which will be possible for change of government by the progress of the DPJ. However the turnout was said to have exceeded than the last time (59.65%), and it was the second lowness (62.49%) after the war. The vote rate surpassed 40% in the single-member district system of the LDP, but there were 28% in the proportional-representation system. The LDP's winning margin with the DPJ were 13.3 points in single-member district system and 3.14 points in the proportional-representation system.

It was proved that use of "two votes" that the voters cast in the LDP in single-member district system, and cast in the DPJ in the proportional-representation system was remarkable. A vote was seen by the performance evaluation for the leader of ruling party in particular in the proportional-representation constituency ("retrospective voting"). The number of vote in the proportional-representation system of the LDP to the DPJ was less than 8 million votes of single-member district system.

In the big city the DPJ won in a part on the heels of the LDP. Many support bases of the LDP in the big city reduced. Therefore the LDP has to have come to cooperate with the CGP in an election campaign.

6. 5. The LDP's Great Victory in the HC Election in 2001

As for the election results of the HC in 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi proves influence of evaluating it in another meaning with the general election in 2000. The LDP votes increased rapidly by choosing Koizumi popular with Japanese people, and independent voters shifted the LDP

above all to get together. Prime Minister Koizumi insists that "even negative economic growth pushes forward restructure of Japanese society". He is a politician with the prominent communicative competence. He practiced politics to persuade and succeeded in it [Kabashima, 2001, 57-58].

The supporters for the LDP spread from 33% to 43% when compared the vote of the LDP support with the general election in 2000. In addition it was 15% in the general election to have cast in the LDP among independent voters, but increases with 27% by the election for the HC. The independent voters who voted for the DPJ decreased sharply from 37% to 20%. A characteristic of the elections for the HC is that "perspective voting" was performed for 2001 years. 41% out of the voters of the urban region felt the LDP with "the political party which fulfilled words called the most eager reformist" and surpassed far the image of reform seeker (10%) of the DPJ [cf.,Kabashima, 2001, 40-59].

6. 6. General Election in 2003

It was low that 59.86% of the turnout was in the general election of 2003. The number of the voters increased from more than eighty million in 1979 to more than one hundred million by 2003. However the turnout does not almost change with about sixty million. The turnouts deteriorate in the long term by just that much.

The number of votes of the LDP does not change with about 20 to 24 million votes with each election of 1993, 1996 and 2000, either. We can understand that the LDP depended on the organized votes. When the LDP which took cooperation of the CGP considers that the LDP approximately got the same number of the past elections, it was different

from an election for the HC in 2001, and it is thought that "the Koizumi effect" in 2001 did not appear [Kabashima, Taniguchi, Sugawara, 2004, 29].

The DPJ got more votes than the LDP in the proportional-representation constituency. In the single-seat election constituencies, it was the LDP's 144 seats vs. the DPJ's 99. In the DPJ, judging from having been the DPJ's two seats vs. the LDP's 25 seats in the 2001 election of the HC, the supports to the DPJ would increase in fixed number single-seat constituency of the election for the HC. The DPJ shrank the difference with the LDP because of the low percentage in the turnout. The DPJ improves an image of the ability for government charge by the manifesto and is giving result in the acquisition of unaffiliated voters [Kabashima, Taniguchi, Sugawara, 2004, 31]. The cause comes from the trend of independent voters controlling election. The voter, the political party and the politician mastered current election system in the three general elections [Kawahito, 1998, 20-25].

7. Japanese Voter's Ambivalent Behaviour between the Elections of the HC in 2004 and the HR in 2005

keywords: political effect of the single-member district system, volatile voting, expectation to leadership

7. 1. The Analysis on the Election of the HC in 2004

The election of the HC was carried out in July 2004. The turnout was 56.57%. Fifty seven million of the voters participated, and the abstainer was forty three million. The LDP 49, the DPJ 50, the CGP 11, JCP 4, SDP 2, independents 5, the Green Meeting 0 and other parties 0 got seats of the HC.

As for this issue, a pension reform before the election was the criterion

of the voting behavior most. "You made much of it for a question whether "attached great importance to the issue of pension" most, but "make much" of 45% most and "think about" of 39%, but "do not think" of 8%, and a pension reform problem became a standard of voting. The majority of Japanese people does not evaluate the action of the coalition political power to the issue of pension very much, or did not evaluate it at all, and the most of voters gave negative evaluation to "achievements" called the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of ruling coalition parties. The voters cast one vote in the DPJ with all "expectation" for objection replacing with the LDP.

The independent voters are 48% (48,000,000) and 23% (13,110,000) of the total voters. It was support of 15% (1,950,000) to the LDP and 49% (6,420,000) to the DPJ.

What happened to single-member district system to which we should have paid attention? The LDP won the 25 seats and lost two in the election of the HC in 2001, but wins 14 seats and loses 13 this time. Even a result only for single-member district system rivaled with the LDP in the number of the counts of the DPJ. Because the candidates of the LDP considers a point getting cooperation of the CGP in single-member district system, the total support of the LDP fall.

A support trend of the whole voters can understand it in the proportional-representation system. The rate of vote was 37.8% (21,140,000) of the DPJ, 30.3% (16,800,000) of the LDP, 15.46% (8,620,000 votes) of the CGP, 7.8% (4,360,000) of the JCP, and 5.3% (2,990,000) of the SDP. The tendencies of the progress of the DPJ and the reflux of the LDP have continued, compared about the point that was 37% (22,100,000) of the DPJ, 35% (20,660,000) of the LDP in the election of the HR in 2003. It was

heated in "Koizumi popularity" in the election of the HC in 2001, but rose the expectation to the DPJ in 2003.

7. 2. Characteristic of the Election of the HC in 2004

We can gather it up from an election for the HC result as follows. First it is remarkable that the decline of the LDP became in 2004. The LDP's vote deteriorated remarkably partly because Koizumi was influential to reforming system, and the original organized voters of the LDP in control of Koizumi cut apart in the provinces. Second the LDP persists in a collaborative relationship with the CGP and continues coalition political power with the CGP. Third it is obvious that the DPJ increased the share of votes cast. However the voters who supported the DPJ may not support the party in election on the next time. Fourth the DPJ got seats than ever, but needs coalition government partner to aim at the office. It is not the JCP and the SDP but the CGP. In the situation that a single-party government is difficult, the CGP holds a casting vote as ever. Fifth the decline of the small political party became more remarkable. Therefore sixth it got closer to two-and-one-half party system. Seventh the Koizumi Administration weakened centripetal force by the results of this election temporarily.

7. 3. The Analysis of the General Election of the HR in 2005

The turnout of general election in September 2005 was 67.51%, and the number of the seats was 296 of the LDP, 113 of the DPJ, 31 of the CGP, 9 of JCP, 7 of the SDP, 4 of the NNPP, 1 of the NPPJ, 18 of the Independents, 1 of the other parties. 327 seats of the LDP-the CGP in the coalition parties overwhelmed the seats of opposition parties ahead of two-thirds of all

seats (480) of the HR. The LDP largely increased from 237, and the DPJ largely reduced from 177 in 2003.

Voters judged from the issue on social security (39%), privatization of a postal service (38%), parties' policy and the leaders' personality (9%), change of government (8%). The privatization of postal service plan infiltrated voters before the election, but increased the issue of the election gradually.

The LDP confronted the DPJ in the 280 single-seat constituencies. It is 216 seats (81%) of the LDP and 52 (19%) of the DPJ. It was 114 (59%) of the LDP and 52 (41%) of the DPJ in 2003. The LDP showed strength in the urban districts.

To the LDP cooperation in election campaign with the CGP gave a big effect to the cause of victory of the LDP. The LDP recommended nine of the CGP's candidates. The result was eight wins and one defeat (89% in winning rate). The CGP recommended 239 of the LDP's candidates. The result was 203 wins and 36 defeats (85% and 67% in 2003). This cooperation in an election campaign showed power.

According to the poll of NHK, the support in a proportional-representation system in 69,530,000 voters was 44% (1% more than 2003) to the LDP, 21% (-1) to the DPJ, 6% to the CGP, 4% to the JCP, 3% to the SDP, 1% to the NNPP. 14,600,000 independents shared 39% (56% in 2003) to the DJP, 32% (22%) to the LDP, 8% (9%), 7% (8%) to the JCP, 7% (6%) to the SDP, 4% to the JNPP, and 2% to the NNPP. The DPJ decreased by 17% of vote cast, and the LDP increased 10%. The LDP adds to the support of independent voters. The volatile voters trends to decide the recent elections. 32% to the LDP in 2005 was the same phenomenon as "the Koizumi boom" occurred in 2001.

7. 4. The Characteristic of the Election of the HR in 2005

We compile the cause of victory of the LDP as follows. First Prime Minister Koizumi succeeded to make only issue the privatization of postal service in this general election. Second it was "dramatic technique" of Koizumi own style. He reshuffled the candidates against his party, and supported gave an effect contrary to public expectations. Third most of voters have a feeling of perspective expectation to guide good conditions in future. Voters demanded his strong leadership that promoted expectation to changes such as the privatization of postal service to Japanese people [Taniguchi, Sugawara, Kabashima, 2005, 100-103]. Fourth it was effective in the single-member district system. Because only one is elected in the single-member electorate system, as a result, related to a big share of seats by a slight winning margin. In a rate of vote of the single-member district system, the LDP got 48%, and the DPJ 36%, but in rates of seats the LDP got 73%, and the DPJ 17%.

The DPJ had to play moving second by the issue of the privatization of postal service to the Koizumi's LDP, and was not able to appeal to voters for own policy. We can say the difference of both elections as a result of

Table 3 Parties' Seats in Both Diets in 2005

	The HR		The HC	
Ruling parties	LDP	305	LDP	85
	CGP	31	CGP	20
Opposition parties	DPJ	113	DPJ	112
	JCP	9	JCP	7
	SDP	7	SDP	5
	NNPP	6	NNPP	4
	Independents	9	Independents	9
	Total	480	Total	242

trend which made the fluidity of voters.

8. "Huge Ruling Parties" in the HR

keywords: huge ruling parties, open argument in the ruling and opposition parties, the *raison d'être* of the HC

8. 1. Deliberations of the HR in the Single-Member District System

In September 2005 the extraordinary session of the Diets after the general election was summoned. The ruling parties assumed that it was in response to the popular will to let a bill on the privatization of postal service pass immediately. The ruling parties occupy two-thirds (327 of 480 seats) in HR.

The Diet members of the LDP who objected to the privatization in the former Diet turned around for agreement, and the bill was formed. Because the huge ruling parties were formed in theory, it may be formed any kind of bill at all. In the history of the Diet this may not always become so. When the LDP overwhelmed it from bill formation rate in a cabinet and the Diet formed after election just after that judging from past data, the ratio that a bill was formed in both the Ikeda cabinet (296 seats in the HR) and the Nakasone cabinet (300 seats in the HR) lowers remarkably. Because the ruling parties can do anything with absolute majority after having overwhelmed in the general election of 2005, the opposition parties strengthens confronting posture. A Diet deliberation does not advance smoothly, because of conflicts between the ruling parties and opposition parties.

8. 2. The Effect of the Single-Member District System

But these happened in "the 55 system" which the LDP had controlled in

the long-term of the single-party government. That may differ in how Japanese people think about a choice of governments, while the governments elected by the single-member district system is completed currently. Therefore the future development may change. The LDP won 1.3 times of the DPJ at a vote rate, but occupies 70% of the total seats. The single-member district system centralizes "power" in the political party which won in it. It facilitates the change of government depending on a result. The ruling parties are going to manage in the Diet affairs. Because the voter demanded the continuation of the Koizumi Administration in government, ruling parties insist with the responsibility of the LDP to plan speedup for policy realization. It should do the deliberation only without prolonging it if the opposition parties object to a bill, and take out a counterproposal so that the voters might judge in the next election.

In contrast the opposition parties object that they are high-handed methods of the ruling parties in steering Diet business. However the DPJ does not adopt the attitude that objects "anything". The DPJ insists that all the important bills take out a counterproposal. In the single-member district system the change of government will be possible in the next election depending on managing Diet affairs.

8. 3. Conditions that Voters Can Judge

Then what are the conditions to realize the possibility? The first condition is to manage in the Diet affairs that the ruling parties do not depend on numerical power immediately. It was necessary to let the policy that the LDP should show to the voters because the contents of the social security and the taxation system were not described for a manifesto to be concrete. In the public opinion poll of NHK 47% of the

respondents think the formation of huge ruling parties to be unfavorable. The ruling parties must explain the policies in the Diet deliberations carefully, and the deliberations will be stormy without the posture that the policies of the opposition parties can gain the favor of.

It is necessary for the second condition to do an open argument in the party before both the ruling parties and the opposition parties begin a verbal battle in the Diet. In the LDP there is an atmosphere that cannot criticize Prime Minister Koizumi for the sweeping victory in the general election of 2005. As a result of having avoided the counterproposal of the postal service privatization bill in the DPJ, the DPJ members were not able to deal with it. The Diet members work out a policy in a political party, argue in the Diet and summarize it in the next manifesto, and each party will be tested by the public opinion in elections. The voters pay attention to talking points in the Diet more than before.

8. 4. The Meaning of the HC

The appearance of the huge ruling party in the HR caused another problem. How does the HC think about the role of itself? Because the postal service privatization bill was rejected by the HC, the political situation until the dissolution of the HR has begun. There is dissolution in the HR, but the HC is guaranteed the term of office for six years.

How should we think about the role of the HC? Even if the Upper House rejected a bill in U.K. and France adopting the bicameral system, the intention of the Lower House is finally respected. The Upper House corrects it than overturns the resolution of the Lower House, and it is expected a role to promote reconsideration in the Lower House. In Japan the HC is given to the independence of each House [Takenaka, 2005, 188].

There has appeared a reality that is not thought that the ruling parties is beyond two-thirds of all the seats in the HR, and the HR can reach decisions again and pass bills, even if the HC rejects. In such a situation, what is the meaning of the HC? The HC takes responsibility for explaining own thought to the nation. According the Constitution reform plan of the LDP, it does not mention the reform of the HC at all. Even a constitutional problem has to be argued for the existence of the HC. There is not the significance of existence of the HC, and there exists the argument to assume that the HC should be abolished. It is insisted uselessness about the HC to assume that it is only "the carbon copy" of the HC in Japan partly because countries adopting a bicameral system decrease in the world, and there is the opinion to demand the independence of the HC.

The voters let the LDP emerge as the dominant winner in the general election of 2005, which must influence an ideal method of the deliberation in the Diet. The voters must be aware that the discussion between the ruling and opposition parties influences nation's government choice in the next election to let an argument become active.

9. Result of the Election of the HC in 2007 and Change of Political Situation

keywords; cause of the LDP's defeat, aftereffects of the Koizumi Reform, extension of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

9. 1. Cause the LDP was defeated

The ruling parties encountered crushing defeat in the election of HC in September 2007. Prime Minister Abe expressed that "a blank period in politics is not accomplished", hanging on another time as Prime Minister

after the election of the HC. Why was the LDP soundly beaten? How about the future political prospect?

The result of election brought the LDP with 28.08% (the DPJ with 39.48%) in the proportional representation and with 6 wins and 23 defeats in single-member district system in the HC. All these crushing defeats were not transient, and an extremely serious situation for the LDP. The defeat of the LDP identified to be three causes.

As for the first cause of defeat, the anger of the voters to the issue of pension, and the problem of the money and politics became the strong "headwind" to the ruling parties. It was the second cause of defeat that his nature and leadership of Prime Minister Abe was brought a sense of distrust. His cabinet members often made slips of the tongue, and lost the public support through the ministers' fraudulent accounting procedure before the election. However Abe did not held these problems down. Though the Abe Administration advocated the "To the beautiful country"⁽⁴⁾ by making of Constitutional amendments, there was a gap between his affirmation and the consciousness of Japanese people who expected to remedy the income differentials and the social security.

The third cause of defeat is a structural problem. In other words it has collapsed the support base of the LDP. The typical case is a complete defeat in single-member district system. The local organized voters from post offices, Agricultural Cooperatives, construction / the engineering works industries which were damaged seriously by the Koizumi Reform did not function for vote-gathering machine of "the loyal supporter" for the LDP then. The Koizumi Reform destroyed local organizations in support of the LDP. Independent voters and the people without vested fights supported the Koizumi Reform.

In contrast the Abe Administration came back to the route that made much of the internal party harmony seen in the return to the LDP to rebellion groups against the postal privatization while succeeding reputation of the Koizumi Reform. However, as a result, the local dissatisfaction continued as ever, and the voters who expected it in the new LDP left. The reform became vague. Abe's undecided character must get paid back in the form of the defeat in the first national election after the Koizumi Administration.

9. 2. Political Situation in Instability in the Future

How does the future political situation unfold? There are problems that we cannot explain in the background of the ruling parties crushing defeat only by a headwind. As for the political situation, the extremely unstable situation will continue all the more. The first reason is that the fall of the centripetal force by the Abe Administration is not avoided. Prime Minister Abe performed his cabinet reshuffle in September 2007, and built the united party, and was going to obtain foothold in power again. However the election results let the Abe Administration come into question. Nevertheless the cabinet support rate was sluggish more if the Abe Administration followed when "the popular will be not respected". In the LDP it gradually has come to the front that "the next general election of the HR in one or two years cannot fight by the Abe Administration", and such anti-Abe feeling in the LDP demands openly his retreat of Prime Minister in the LDP. It was thought that the prospect whether or not he could maintain centripetal force by his cabinet reshuffle was very severe.

In addition is it good to make preparation for the united party by his cabinet reshuffle? Prime Minister Abe stated that "it is my mission to

continue reforming", which is the politics that the LDP waffles if the making of preparation for the party to compromise with critical powers. A crack in the party deepened if Abe has removed criticism in the LDP and the political situation should have become the serious dilemma. The CGP in coalition partner lost the election of the HC in 2007. The CGP began to keep safe distance from the Abe Administration temporally. Then it was expected that the maintenance of the centripetal force of the Abe Administration became more difficult.

The second reason is that the deliberation in the Diet becomes more difficult. Because the ruling parties lost the majority in the HC, the government bills will be rejected entirely by the opposition parties. It sends back a bill in the HR, and there exists a measure to agree to more than two-thirds of the ruling parties in the Constitutional provisions. However the government cannot use the method if opposition parties leave the government bills unattended in the H C.

The ruling parties which lost the chairperson post cannot excise the leadership skills in the HC, and the opposition parties can issue the censure motion (non-confidence resolution of the cabinet) for the cabinet minister of the Abe Administration. The government of the LDP-CGP comes to a deadlock soon. It carries out the dissolution of the HR and a general election in due course. It is the final aim that the DPJ recaptures the government in the election of the HR. The leader of the DPJ, Ozawa, backed by the majority in the HC boxes the government into the corner. As for the political situation, what an unstable state follows is expected. The various tactics become intense.

Will the DPJ be asked in the future motion?. In the whereabouts of the bills, the DPJ plays important roles. The DPJ that hits the Abe

Administration merely will be exposed to the intense criticism of Japanese people. The DPJ needs to think about the interest of the Japanese people.

9. 3. New Political Stage

It is a bill to extend the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to become the problem in the present deliberations of Diets. The government is going to submit it the extraordinary session of the Diet, but the Secretary General, Hatoyama, of the DPJ objects to this bill clearly. Then, how about the Japan-U.S. relationship? Ability to hold the reins of government of the DPJ will be texted at a place of the real policy decision making.

The LDP cannot afford to spend on its internal power struggles. It is thought that this defeat of election is the result that chose a leader only with the number of the public opinion poll without doing the policy dispute in the party since the Koizumi Administration. The LDP does not make a new departure through the cabinet reshuffle but must make politics to aim at clear. The ruling parties and an opposition parties won the majority of the HR and the HC each other. This means the collision between the ruling and opposition parties. Does it lead to confusion of the politics? Does the competition over the persuasive power of the policy by the ruling and opposition parties begin? A new political stage contained the Japanese politics, while being fraught with the possibility of the change of government.

10. Transformation of " the 55 System"

keywords: neo-liberalism, distrust of politics and authorized politician boom, populism

10. 1. The Transformation of "the 55 System"

It was the times of "the 55 system" when the LDP and the JSP were opposite each other on the issue of rearmament and defense as for the Japanese system after the war intensely [Morimoto, 2006]. There are various opinions when it was finished. It is said that "the 55 system" was transformed in about 1975, and it is said when it has changed and a new type of politics was appeared. The oil crisis from 1973 to 1974 in the Miki Cabinet has finished high economic growth, and began the times of low growth economy. The issue of Japanese defense performed that Defense Agency Chief Sakata demanded the understanding of the nation in the capacity design of the defense program, such a minimum defense capacity as was restricted within 1% of GNP for the defense budget in the days of the Miki Cabinet.

That time became a turning point in the post-war history, because Japanese people's understanding to the coexistence of the Article 9 and the Self-Defense Force has changed. It is thought that the defense problem was not the most important problem of the Japanese politics. At that time the point at issue reviewed the politics and the economy of the post-war in the times of low growth economy. As a global phenomenon, arguments such as the neo-liberalism and the monetarism have appeared in Japan. At the viewpoint of serious consideration of the market economy and of the competition in the international market, the substantiality of the government can play a role to restrain to "the smaller government". It is emphasized that the rich is comparatively more significant than the poor by coping with the globalization of economy strategically. It has carried out on a policy in the days of the Nakasone governments from 1981 to 1986. It was the times in the Second Ad Hoc

Commission on Administrative Reform (Dainiji Rinji Gyousei Chousakai). That argument rejected "the big government".

10. 2. Neo-Liberalism as Reform in Japan

From the latter half of 1970s, the distrust of politics among Japanese people have become very strong. There have happened many cases to wake up the distrust of politics such as the Lockheed Scandal in 1975, the Recruit Scandal in 1989, the Sagawa Kyubin Scandal in 1993, the issue of HIV-tainted blood products in 1996, the Ehime Maru affair in 2001 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs scandal in 2001 and so on. We can point out the cycle of distrust, expectation and disillusionment in the Japanese politics, and after each case, issue or scandal various expectations to the NLC boom in 1975, the Nakasone administrative reform boom in 1981 to 1986, the Doi (JSP) Madonna booms in 1989, the Hosokawa boom in 1993 to 1994, the Kan (DPJ) boom, the Hashimoto administrative reform in 1996 to 1997, the Koizumi or Makiko boom in 2001.

Public distrust has grown year by year. Only around 8% trusted on the faith of politicians in the last year of the Mori Administration (2000 to 2001). The disaffection to politicians is a global phenomenon, and from the latter half of 1960s to 1970s the distrust of politics occur all the countries. Therefore the political distrust is not only Japan.

But, in the case of Japan, it is a characteristic that trust to the authorized politicians appeared after every scandal. Japanese people have experienced the severe distrust of politics just before of the booms from the NLC. Japanese people place confidence in a particular politician when trust to politics collapses greatly. However it changes to disillusionment after two or three years. The Koizumi support is a peculiar example. The

Koizumi support was sluggish after having dismissed Makiko Tanaka who contributes to let the Koizumi Administration form, but restored support lately [Otake, 2003, i-v].

Professor Otake compares the populism with pork barrel type of populism and reform type of populism, and points out Koizumi's politics with the latter model. Kakuei Tanaka's politics is a model of the former in Japan [Otake, 2006, 9-5].

10. 3. Dramatization of Politics

Then why does such a thing occur? It is the point that politics came to be seen as a drama above all. It is usually explained by the phenomena called the populism. The populism means a political movement that a political leader and the government carry out a policy to contradict it to get support of the public [cf., Uchiyama, 2007].

The current politics do not argue mainly on the issue of Constitution until 1970s, but political corruptions in the great issue on occasions. Once the distrust to politics rises, the reform based the neo-liberalism is introduced in the cycle of the surge to expect a certain authorized politician. In the Hosokawa Cabinet times, a political reform was carried out with Ichiro Ozawa. What the reform of the Koizumi Administration was called the restructure of Japanese system (Kozo Kaikaku), was going to reform Japan basically by a principle of the neo-liberalism.

The reform of the Japanese style of neo-liberalism does not always practice on the basis of a clear program, and is characteristic that the reform trends to be realized somehow by mobilizing antipathy to politicians and the bureaucrats in a feeling of the nation. This is the salient feature of the political reform in recent Japan.

Then why will such a periodic cycle be appeared? Some assume that political system is not a presidential system in Japan. In the parliamentary cabinet system, a cabinet must be trusted by the Diet, otherwise reforms cannot push on Diet members chosen in election once. The prime minister is not guaranteed the uniformity term of office. The prime minister will spend much energy on negotiations with the ruling parties among other things. In addition because there may be dissolutions of the HR and a general election in the case of the HR, the political power is changed before the end in the term of office of both Diet members. It may be the reason why the Public Election of Prime Minister System should be introduced. Some insist that it can show the strong leadership.

And it is explained by a change of the political consciousness. Alternation of generations causes political changes. Professor Wada explains the political realignments of 1990s from the appearance of two new type of actors in Japan in the latter half of 1980s. One actor is a politician of young generations of the LDP and the SPJ which won for the first time in 1986 and 1990. They acted without thinking about a traditional faction and ideology. Another actor is many powers out of the politics. These actors are politicians in search of a political reform. When voters criticized politicians, these two actors went along with the movement about political scandal. These actors were weakened by "the 55 system" temporally. It led to a political change of 1990s [Wada, 2000, ch.7].

11. The Point at Issue on the Public Election of Prime Minister System

keywords: direct election for Prime Minister, a para-presidential system, modus operandi of the election system

11. 1. The Contents of the Public Electoral System of Prime Minister

The first meeting of the round-table conference to examine the Public Election of Prime Minister system was held in July 2001. What kind of meaning does it have in the situation of the current Japanese politics?

It has been insisted on the prime minister by the Diet members of the small factions in the LDP without the possibility to be elected Prime Ministers. The opinion that Japanese citizens should have made a direct election was chosen by Prime Minister to enhance the leadership of Prime Minister till now. Former Prime Minister Nakasone insisted on it early, but it is an argument of former Prime Minister Koizumi. He has ever raised it as a pledge of the President election of the LDP. Therefore Koizumi founded the Research Committee of Constitution as one of the breakthroughs of the Constitutional amendments with direct election for prime minister after the assumption of Prime Minister System and came into the limelight as a realistic problem.

The Public Election of Prime Minister is to choose the supreme political leader called "Prime Minister" by a referendum. There is a considerable difference for the claim by each advocate. In the Nakasone's idea which proposed the public electoral system first, a term called Prime Minister is used, but a presidential system such as U.S.A. is assumed. The characteristic does not limit a candidate for Prime Minister to a Diet member, and "Secretaries" assisting Prime Minister belong to members of

the Diet, and Prime Minister does not have a right to dissolve the Diet [Kato, 2002, ch.2; Kato, 2003, ch.4].

11. 2. The other Plan

On the other hand in the tentative plan of the younger Diet members of the LDP and the DPJ, Prime Minister is limited to a Diet member, he or she has the right to dissolve the Diet, but the Diet has the right the non-confidence motion against the cabinet by more than two-thirds of the Diet members. This plan is going to leave the frame of the parliamentary cabinet system.

Each plan needs either the recommendation of the constant numerical Diet member or the signature of the voters to run for the direct election for a prime minister.

It is unknown how Koizumi thought, but if anything, it is near in Nakasone's plan when he speaks the candidate for prime minister is a private citizen, and takes that the majority of the cabinet ministers do not need to be it with a Diet member into consideration. In other words it is thought that it is his attitude of mind to aim at the Presidential System [Koizumi, 1996, 87-92].

Each tentative plan is different in the contents, but each has a coincidence for the critical mind of the plan. The realization of the policy that the elected wants to carry out is impossible if his or her fellows do not occupy many of the assembly under the current parliamentary cabinet system. Therefore at first he or she must spend energy on compiling the ruling parties if Prime Minister will carry something out. If it is the elected from the nation directly, he or she can carry out own policy without hesitation, and he or she can show strong leadership in the

change of the times speedily, boldly and determinately. This is grounds in favor of the Public Election of Prime Minister system. Of course an argument is necessary whether the plan becomes really so. We will need the procedure of the Constitutional amendments if the Public Election of Prime Minister System is introduced because it is the issue that cut straight to the heart in the nation's political process [Kobayashi, 2001, ch.3].

11. 3. Why should we need to introduce the Public Election of Prime Minister System now?

The disputation of the Public Election of Prime Minister System has a cause in Japanese politics for a few decades having providing a sense of stagnation to Japanese people. The Hosokawa coalition government consisting of the non-LDP and non-JCP was come into existence in 1993. Afterwards the combination of the political parties was replaced with election and between elections, and Diet members moved to the other political parties which were different from election time, and the ruling parties and opposition parties repeated participation in governments contrary to the expectation of the voters. It becomes frequent that Japanese people are not going to understand who decide to make Prime Minister; and that is different from the choice of the voters in the election. Japanese people have dissatisfaction to the present politics in the expectation of background to the Public Election of Prime Minister System.

On the other hand the problems for the Public Election of Prime Minister System are pointed out, too. For example, it is indicated that there emerges a threat that this system becomes a plebiscite by the public. In addition minority governments are formed, and cause the

anxiety that politics becomes unstable in rivalry with Diets. Therefore it should devise it to give the Diets constant authority or keep a condition at a candidacy for Prime Minister. In addition, through the present electoral system, the single-member district system with proportional representation system, it is possible in the Public Election of Prime Minister System to devise by de facto government choice between major parties.

An essential question is the relation between Prime Minister and the Diets. If Prime Minister and Diet members are elected separately, powers opposed to Prime Minister in the Diets are occupied in majority, and, as for the whole, both are opposed in the deadlocked negotiations in the term of office. Israel has introduced the Public Election of Prime Minister system in the world at first, but it returns to the parliamentary cabinet system by the present. Because Japan and Israel are in different conditions, we cannot give an easy account with the simple comparison. However we need to inspect the reason why Israel has abolished is useful. In the assembly of Israel it was a perturbation that a few loyalists for Prime Minister continued being in power. And for that reason the Public Election of Prime Minister System was abolished in 2001 [Oda, 2001, ch.3]

11. 4. Why is it necessary for us to introduce the Public Election of Prime Minister System?

We need a perfect political system, but it is not possible in an actual political system we have created. By the final judgment each point in time including the merit of the present system, so which does the nation chooses? There is necessity to inspect why what we should consider changes an existing system on this occasion. We introduced single-

member district system with proportional representation system into the electoral system of the HR in 1994. If we had used the single-member district system-centered election system by the argument of those days, and it had been said to be it in electoral system to choose de facto election of Prime Minister because of two major parties-oriented politics. However the nation feels that it does not become real. It is essential to examine whether the reform of the past system was effective in assuming it.

Furthermore it is important how we apply a system. In U.K., Germany and Italy, the Public Election of Prime Minister System is not adopted, but the ruling party or parties and the opposition parties show the choice of Prime Minister before election clearly, too. It is possible to depend on the use of this way in the Japanese existing system. Will we have to spend energy to make a new system in sequence?

What we should ask is the roles of political parties and of politicians now. It is necessary for the parties and the politicians to understand a trend of the public opinion precisely and gather it up, and political parties task the function bringing up candidates for Prime Minister, on which Japanese people have demanded for a long time.

Even if any political party took the government, and if a political party and a politician are going to apply a current system as the present conditions, as for the support to the present Administration, the political instability will increase high. The instability does the anti-"Nagatacho politics" feelings of nation, the repulsion to a conventional (old) political style, and the lack of the achievements that the nation demands with a cause. Therefore the support to a Japanese democracy system will be not guaranteed [Tanaka, 1996, 66]. This phenomenon may be expressed in Japanese people's demanding the Public Election of Prime Minister

System.

12. Studies on the LDP

keywords: party platform and constitution, four important posts in the LDP, Jiban (base for supporters) / Kamban (well-known person) / Kaban (political funds)

12. 1 Basic Principles of the LDP

Putting easily, the basic platform of the LDP is as following.

1 The LDP is based on a democratic idea, and reforms and improves various systems, mechanisms, and establishes cultural and democratic nation-state.

2 The LDP is based on human universal justice to desire peace and freedom, and corrects and adjusts international relations, and expects freedom and independence of each nation-state.

3 The LDP assumes the permanent welfare model, personal originality and the freedom of the company in the economy a rule all-out devises in total and performs the stability and the complement of the public welfare.

Other than these three principles the LDP has documents same as general plans substantially. For example the LDP insists on the policy to have content to "revise Constitution as principles of the LDP since the party formation, which established in November 1955. The general rules of the LDP is a liberal democracy politically, and practices capitalism with basics economically but modifies it in part [Kitaoka, 1995; Sato, Matsuzaki, 1986; Uchida, 1989; Isikawa, Hirose, 1989].

12. 2. Organizations of the LDP

The LDP consists of the central headquarter, association of branch office

in each prefecture, and the local branch office and job area branch office in each metropolis and districts. The Sosai, President of the LDP, carries out party business as the highest officer in the party executive organ. Because President of the LDP is always Prime Minister at the same time, he has very political influential voice. When President is elected among the plural candidates by votes, the electoral method of President has a rule. However the rule has been changed depending on circumstances at that time [Stockwin, 1982, ch.7; Nakamura, 1984, ch.1].

The posts of the top-four party executive next to President are the Kanjicho (Chief Secretary), the Seimuchosakaichou (Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council), the Somukaicho (Chairman of the Executive Council) and Senkyotaisakuiincho (Chairperson of the Election Campaign Committee). Especially Chief Secretary as NO.2 in the LDP assists President, and carries out party business and holds real power to appoint candidates and to distribute political money in the administration of the LDP in place of President virtually. The Policy Affairs Research Council discusses and decides individual policies of the LDP. The Executive Council discusses and decides an important matter of the daily party affairs and activities in the Diet as a whole party [Nippon Keizai Shinbunha, 1983]. The LDP is strong in the character that factions are conjoint, and it is often that is determined in the talks of the influential politicians of each faction.

The Party Congress is held once every year, and assumes the supreme organ in the party. It consists of Diet members of the LDP and the delegates represented the association of each metropolis and districts branch office. The General Meeting of Diet members of the LDP is held in the emergency instead of the Party Congress about an important matter

of party administration and the Diet activities.

The local organization consists of association of the branch office and the local branch offices as the subordinate agencies in each metropolis and districts in each prefecture. Because each Diet member organizes an own supporter's association at the electoral district level, the local organizations carry out independent activities. A member of the LDP has got possible to participate in President Election by a primary election system introduced in 1977. This caused competition to add the members of a party to each faction, and became the local diffusion phenomenon of the factions. On this account the members of the LDP reached 1,400,000 in 1978, 2,500,000 in 1986, 2,960,000 in 1989 and 3,260,000 in 1998. The meaning of the number of the LDP members changed by the competition to get requisite in the LDP so that the primary election of the LDP and a candidate appointing in the proportional representation election of the HC brought list order forward.

12. 3. Jiban (bases for supporters), Kanban (well-known person) and Kaban (political funds)

What kind of people are the LDP's supporters [Aiba, Iyasu, Takasima, 1987, ch. 2]? Elderly persons residing at a certain place in many years have supported the LDP mostly when we observe the LDP's supporters in demography. They engage in the primary industries, the civil engineering and construction industries, independent businesspersons, medium and small-sized enterprises and managerial class and so on. To be group position is the people who are active in the regional society of the Agricultural Cooperative, and the commerce and industry groups. The LDP's supporters reside in the area which lives in many counties and

villages. In addition the LDP's supporters depend on the public administration or the public budget. This becomes the support base of the organized (and loyal) voters ("Jiban") for the LDP.

The support base is the ground of each Diet members (or candidates). There exists the ground of the Diet members in each district, and the ground of the member of the HR is based on them. The HC member is elected in the district which adjusts some electoral districts the HR to one. For example in Nara Prefecture, a scale of one HC electoral district merged four HR electoral districts. Therefore a member of the HR is in the position and viewpoint that is superior to the HC. So the HC members and local politicians follow the HR members, their cooperation in each election, plays a role as "Kanban" to make themselves to appeal to voters.

The main part of the source in political funds ("Kaban") of the LDP is the contribution that Kokumin Seiji Kyoukai (the National Political Association of the LDP) collects from the political financial supporters. It is a fee and a contribution that the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) collects from business circles and major companies. Keidanren assigns the fee and the contribution to each type of big businesses and industries. It is the unification of the formula contribution that the Keidanren offers to the LDP since the second half of 1960s. Factions and politicians of the LDP receive money for political activities, too [Mainichi Sinbun Seijibu · Keizaibu, 1991; Sasaki, 1999; Koga, 2004]. This has expectations to lead to individual profit directly. Each individual politician collects money for political activities oneself.

A politician's party to collect money for political activities since 1980s has become popular. It is said that Noboru Takeshita collected more than twenty hundred million yen at the Takeshita group formed in May 1987.

A subsidy system to the political party was introduced by a grant-in-aid of the political reform in 1994, and it becomes the source of political funds of the LDP (and other parties without JCP), too.

In addition money for political activities is subdivided into the Diet members and local politicians. This money is used as daily cost of activities of the supporter's association for the LDP politicians and a part of the campaign cash. Such a connection in money and politics is easy to grow "hotbeds of political corruption in structure" and cause the political scandal periodically.

The political corruption shows "the lack of transparency" in the exchange between actors. Exchange called the giving and receiving of the bribe is concluded there. Therefore the exchange lets "illegality" form and promotes a political corruption [Iwasaki, 2004, ch.12].

13. Factions in the LDP

keywords: function of the faction, the Tanaka group, the Takeshita group, the Obuchi group and the Hashimoto group, the change of faction circumstances

13. 1 The LDP as Factions Coalition

It is said that the LDP was the factional coalition party which maintained a dominant political party for a long term as a catch-all party. There are five causes of factions (habatu) formation in the LDP. The first reason is that the President candidate of the LDP is decided based on recommendation by the Diet member of the LDP. The President candidate of the LDP needs a faction to assure a recommendation for the support of the candidacy [Tanaka, 1986, ch.2]. Second the factions get the distribution of the post in a cabinet and the LDP. Third money for

political activities depended on what not only the party but also the faction leaders came to collect. Fourth a fight between candidates affiliated with the LDP occurred in a former multi-seats electoral district system (*chu senkyokusei*). The competition in the same electoral district strengthens combination with the influential person in the LDP different each in the party. It strengthened need to find the support of the voters by campaign cash acquisition for election, an instruction of the local profit, and the activity in central politics. Therefore politicians of the LDP need a faction. Fifth the members of the same faction perform cooperation in support between members and the petition processing as the mutual help organization which attracted led by an influential person.

The LDP until 1960s was an allied organization to antagonistic factions. The main faction in power got main cabinet posts, and anti-main factions aimed at an opportunity to rule over the LDP and the government. However, since 1970s, the characters of the faction changed greatly.

The current faction since 1970s has five characteristics [Iseri, 1988]. The first has organizational formations such as "corporation". The faction changed in quality to the organization institutionalized than from the personal bond body of the LDP President candidate. Second it is the change of the role of the faction in the money for political activities. The backbencher (*jingasa giin*) does not depend on the leader for the most of money for political activities. The faction functions as the "name or trust" grant to the faction member of the Diet than the direct collection of money and distribution on the fund. The faction takes the role of "the guarantor" at the parties that a member of the Diet holds for finance and recognizes an approach to the fund network of the faction officially by asking it for funding to it. The third has so-called "the general hospital" of

the faction in which gathered "the specialists" of each field works. The member of the same faction can help each other in one's field that the member does not make a specialty of. Fourth it is the intervention of the faction to executive personnel affairs of the LDP and the posts of cabinet. The faction is indispensable as an organization becoming basic of post affairs. Fifth there is a point that a faction scale extends.

Opposite relations produced it in an equivalence electoral district in a faction not to be able it was less than 20 members, and to win a cabinet minister and the LDP's post when it exceeded 50 members, and it is said that the condition in number of members exceeded a limit of the financial ability for the faction leader to feed position member of the Diet again once. However the LDP got possible to evade the competition in the electoral district by the change of the function of the faction in the money for political activities and just candidate support, and the maintenance of the faction was enabled very much, and it became rather advantageous. The introduction of the primary election lets the small factions reduce, and it followed a faction scale spread [Iyasu, 1983, 106-135].

13. 2. The "Hereditary" which the Tanaka Group, the Takeshita Group, the Obuchi Group and the Hashimoto Group left

The forerunner of the Hashimoto group which was the greatest faction of the LDP is the Obuchi group, and the previous of it is the Takeshita group, and it is a group among the Tanaka group [cf. Asahi Shinbun Seijibu, 1987]. The Takeshita group became independent from Tanaka group in 1987. The politics by the Hashimoto group following Tanaka's and Takeshita's politics, formed the center of the LDP and they had ruled politics in Japan. It has three traits as following.

First there is serious consideration demanding to the politics of "the local development promotion (Chiho Sinko)"; "Remodeling Japan (Nippon Retto Kaizo Ron)" of Tanaka, and "Rebuilding Hometown (Furusato Sosei)" of Takeshita. The LDP put an important point for the politics to distribute public works project among local areas, and it was politics to drain off votes thereby. Second the factions put wide talented persons to practical use in politics". The LDP has strengthened the relation with bureaucrats and the industries through the faction, and absorbed a talented person by supplement. The third had "the numerical logic", and the Tanaka group formed a faction to hold the Diet more than 100 Diet members once and held leadership (in its turn Japanese politics) in the LDP. It was a model of the Japanese politics of the higher economic growth times.

However the current politics needs reorganization to social structure letting it be similar in the days of low economic growth. Prime Minister Koizumi was going to show the politics-style that was different from influence the Takeshita group, the Obuchi group and the Hashimoto group in a party. The Hashimoto group adopted collective guidance system by the influential person in own faction. All the previously-mentioned sect clique members recognized an advantage by the scale of the greatest faction, and the previously-mentioned sect executive officer insisted on unity when they could find leadership in an internal party. However in the former Tanaka group and Takeshita group there is a recognition why their way of politics as in the past became impossible in the Hashimoto group. A disagreement comes out for the style of the future faction, the election of President (virtual Prime Minister in Japan) or a struggle for successor of the faction.

It is not easy to predict the faction in future. The reason why faction-based politics still survived is that the power of the opposition parties still paid more attention to only an internal party weakly. If there emerged always change of government, can faction-based politics until the present continue in the future? The expanse of the Koizumi support in the election for the President of LDP in April 2001 is an outcome of the sense of impending crisis to the faction system which many members of a party are tamed. The faction structure of the LDP begins to shake. By Koizumi appearance, it cannot deny that factions was decreased the capacity of control to Prime Minister election and to the leadership of President of the LDP greatly [Otake, 2003, 74].

13. 3. The Change of Faction Circumstances

The technique of Prime Minister Koizumi who put up an opposition candidate to a member of the Diet against the Privatization of Postal Service will destroy the function of "a mutual aid" which is the one of the faction functions of the LDP. The candidacy with the independent and the cases of the secession appeared one after another in form sent out of the party in the Hashimoto group and the Kamei group including many dissenters in the Privatization of Postal Service.

An accident occurred in the factions by the landslide victory of the LDP in the general election of the HR in September 2005 [Asahi Shinbun, Sep. 6, 2005, Sep. 14, 2005]. Prime Minister Koizumi directed the party executives to arrange "the training" to new Diet members of the HR whom a faction took newly till now. It was the part of the trial aiming at de-faction-based politics, but ironically, most of 83 new face of Diet members elected by "Koizumi whirlwind" hoped for the enrollment to the

Mori group (the Matimura group at present) to which Prime Minister Koizumi belonged. On the other hand many members of the Hashimoto group and the Kamei group who objected to the Privatization of Postal Service bill lost the seats of the HR. As a result the factions of the LDP decreased power.

After the general election in 2005 the members of factions have changed; 87 Diet members of the Machimura group (the Seiwa Policy Meeting for Study), 78 of the Tsushima group (the Heisei Meeting for Study), 50 of the Koga group (Kouchikai), 36 of the Yamasaki group (the Near Future Politics Meeting for Study), 34 of the Ibuki group (Shishikai), 16 of the Komura group (Bancho Policy Institute), 16 of the Tanigaki group (Kouchikai), 15 of the Nikai group (the New Wave), 15 of the Aso groups (Ikoukai) at a point in time in December 2006.

Because heads of the LDP's intra-party factions took office as Prime Minister and was changed one after another, a kind of "pseudo-change of government" has been considered. It is said that the LDP's rule has continued for the long term. However the majority of nations cannot participate in this. The next Prime Minister is selected by circumstances in the intra-LDP to the last

14. Koenkai

keywords: function of *koenkai*, nature of para-community, "hereditary system" of *koenkai*

14. 1. Election Machine

The *koenkai* is an association for the supports of a candidate / incumbent. It has a characteristic which the supporters' association organizes a lot of voters in place of an authorized candidate / incumbent",

and adopt the form that the members organized voluntarily to support a candidate and / or an incumbent because the *koenkai* is an organization for election, but actually a candidate oneself is the sponsor of it and bears the activity costs and personnel expenses. The politicians of the ruling and opposition parties organize each personal supporter's association except the JCP [Abe, Shindo, Kawahito, 1971, 152-160]

Japanese people understand two points of formation factors in the *koenkai*. First the poverty of the local finance of 1950s let a petition to the central government become active. On this account a conservative Diet member has made a system with a local politicians elected by the voters of the district. Second the conflict among candidates / incumbents in the same electoral district occurs, and it was necessary for the a candidate of the Diet of the LDP to get more votes than the medium-seats electoral districts system. Now they try to find more support votes in the existing single-districts election system. Because an incumbent / a candidate cannot depend on the party organization for own count of votes, they have to possess an independent count organization.

We see contrastive character in the *koenkai* with the electoral campaign by the system of the Diet member - district politicians. The *koenkai* joins a voter and an incumbent / a candidate together directly, and the local influential person and various pressure groups link to its executive officer. However the members of *koenkai* consist of more than ten thousands. Its activity is contrastive with the campaign strategy to depend on local politicians and / or influential persons [Aiba, Iyasu, Takashima, ch.2].

14. 2. Histology

The *koenkai* consists of two parts. The core part is the so-called "circle of the supporters (hito no wa)", the inner circle of it. It has more ten thousand members. It wraps all up from those believers who are extremely faithful to a candidate / incumbent as eager members. The core of *kohenkai* is linked a Diet Member with inhabitants, conveys the inhabitants' demands to a Diet Member, and acts to get the votes of inhabitants on the occasion of election.

There is "a broadening department (gaienbu)" of supporters as the second part outside of "the circle of the supporters" in the *koenkai*. The broadening department is the executive officers of various professional organizations such as the local politicians, the Agricultural Cooperative, the construction industry, the business and industry, the chamber of commerce, the medical association, the dentistry medical association and so on, which have become conventional group systems, and it is the people whom they follow interests and purposes of the organization of the self in many cases, and participated in the *koenkai*. It increases and decreases whether the broadening department is going to push forward the ups and downs of the political ability of the Diet member and his or her policies. Though each supporters' organization is different from local characteristics, the *koenkai* is formed in every area. The organization of the *koenkai* can be said to have met the Japanese society. It is a group of the character of the para-community just like "a family". A sense of belonging to the candidate / incumbent who is a sponsor is made much of.

14. 3. Activity

The *koenkai* is aimed for gathering the votes at the time of the election.

It must move into action routinely to tie voters with as supporters. A Diet member returns to the hometown at an end of a week and talks with members, so it expresses consequence of the *koenkai* activities, and return to Nagata-cho, Tokyo in Tuesday of a new week (kinki karai). The secretaries, the office workers and the office administrators in the *koenkai* office in the case of the LDP are usually more the numbers than the number of the secretaries helping the Diet members' political activities in Tokyo. When a member of the Diet is absent from local district, they administer his or her *koenkai* and adjust a schedule on the weekend so that a member of the Diet who returned home can contact with as possible many members.

The *koenkai* has three kinds of activities. First it provide facility about in part to increase own budget such as construction or the repair of an institution and the road that local cities, towns and villages demand, and it is to assist it. Second the *koenkai* office is handling of various problems that a local voter brings in. There are many matters of the personal property; care of mediation / the offices of finding employment, financing and the business, intermediation of the dispute, "settling" of the traffic accidents and so on, It is said to widen his or her vote-getting base by settling the voter's personal trouble. Third the *koenkai* offers various entertainments and a place of the society to the member. It functions as a space for social interaction. It goes down to the Diet member side to a lot of members, and function to keep votes. The meeting of the branch offices uniting the *koenkai* is held on every opportunity, and dining together is arranged there. "Such an atmosphere strengthens the unity of the member in just like the para-community. Its events are various; a baseball match of the *koenkai*'s sponsorship, the gathering of the

karaoke, a game of go / shogi / gate ball meet, a golf competition, a hot spring trip and so on.

14. 4. Influence

The influence that the *koenkai* has given to Japanese politics is great. First vast expense works that a candidate/incumbent establishes the *koenkai* and administers it. In the supporters' association it becomes the factor that a candidate / incumbent causes a political corruption, and the politics to cost the money stirs up a feeling of disgust and a distrust of politics to Japanese people. All Diet members establish the private office with some secretaries in the hometown, and must maintain contact with the member of it.

Second it comes to extremely have difficulty with an entry to the politics that a supporters' association needing a big sum fund settled as the election tactics, and the opportunity when a new candidate appears is limited remarkably.

Third because the expense of the *koenkai* increases, it obtains the nomination of the politician who retires in order to appear for the politics as a new face by transfer. Thus the hereditary politicians, the second (or the third) generation Diet member, and the secretary turned a Diet member increase. As a result it comes not to have the personality of the candidate and necessary relations to politics, and the member of the *koenkai* will get interests from the continuation of it.

Fourth the Diet member is to be forced to many profit instructions for a member of the *koenkai*. This brings profit of the politics and may become the result to have dealings with local profit by the issue of government.

The main role of the *koenkai* is a electoral machine, and it is not a collection of money. The money for political activities of the Diet member is almost used for the maintenance cost of the *koenkai*. It takes on the personal character of the Diet member and can win the vote of the local voters by reducing profit to the hometown to its elements. The *koenkai* is "privatized" by a candidate / incumbent and the successor or the heir / heiress, and the *koenkai's* function with an enormous sum, "the assets" of the Diet member individual, and as a result it is in the motive of "the hereditary system" of the Diet member.

The hereditary system tends to be discussed as the family with a Diet member. There is an argument to consider a hereditary as a system. Because the election is a system to supplement a Diet member, he or she is affected by the system. Therefore the second (or third)-generation politician is a product of the medium-sized district electoral system, so it is insisted that the hereditary of Diet member decrease in the single district electoral system [Ichikawa, 284-285]. However the second (or third)-generation politician does not decrease practically [Ito, 2005, 102-105].

15. How has the LDP changed?

keywords: paternalistic conservatism, New Rights, the priority of the policies

15. 1. Transformation of Conservative Ideology

Originally the LDP came as a basic idea in the sympathy of paternalistic conservatism. Its sympathy is authority to realize support by guidance from the bottom to the top like the model of "father (or politician) and child (or nation)". The conservatives receive "reform or progress for

preservation". The reform by the conservatism made basic values of sympathy basic. In the case of Japan this viewpoint was represented by "the main group of conservatives (hoshu honryu)" in the LDP.

"One Nation Conservatism" is the "way of thinking that conservatives perform by reform because social leaders break off social complaints from a paternalistic viewpoint". The conservatives sensed danger to divide into two nations of the wealth and the poor, and thought that inequity let the dissatisfaction of the nation accumulate. Therefore the reforms are necessary to prevent a revolution. As a result the reform becomes the profit of the wealth. Seeing from a different point of view, the person having wealth and a special privilege must assume an obligation for the poor and the weak. Wealth and power involve the costs of the special privilege, and the owner must have social responsibilities and missions. This thought was based on "*noblesse oblige*".

The LDP has carried out the middle way between economy of non-interference and the state control economy. The LDP thought that free-market economy might not function effectively. Specifically the LDP government has performed "Keynesianism-like mixed economy to relate state possession, regulation, and management to the vitality of the private enterprise in company mind in a part of the economic activities". When the LDP government made an economic aim and planned an economic policy in capitalism in cooperation with big companies, the LDP achieved "state controlled economy in total". On the other hand the LDP promoted welfare policies to take care of the life of the people from a view of paternalistic conservatism. The exponents are Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda formed the "main group of conservatives".

However there are politicians called the New Rights adopting a

situation of the "anti-main group of conservatives" in the LDP. The New Rights is an ideology to fuse in conservatism into liberalism in market serious consideration from the viewpoint that attached great importance to an individual positively", and it is an ideology to advocate "a strong nation" at the same time. The New Rights pushed the paternalistic conservatism aside and came to represent the present conservatism. The New Rights has become a mainstream in the U.K. and the USA. In Japan the Nakasone Administration in 1986 and the Koizumi Administration after 2001 are the representatives of the New Rights.

The New Rights has two principles. The first principle is the way of classic liberalism in economy. This is called neo-liberalism. The second principle emphasizes social order, authority, and rules. This is called the neo-conservatism.

The neo-liberalism is the classic political economy to require "a modern application of free-market economy and small government" stricter. The neo-liberalist puts absolute trust in each individual and the market. The market respects it as the mechanism that personal choice arrives at progress and profit. In economic life the free market plays a key role of economy while harmonizing supply and demand for product and service.

The welfare services let people lose personal independence, self-determination, self-responsibility and enterprising attitudes, and fixes "culture of dependency" to the nation. They increase people to depend on the government for not to be able to rather remove poverty.

The neo-conservatism is one form of modern conservatism in support to restore order, recur in the value of tradition and family, and activate nationalism again". The people criticized traditional morality and social authority while the affluent society in postwar was realized. The neo-

conservatives insist that this way of thinking collapses a traditional morality. The New Rights demands that "the anti-traditional thought" reduces a national role in economic life, but maintains "law and order" in social life, and tries to strengthen the strong national identity, defense, peace and order outside.

Since the Koizumi Administration the LDP shifted from the paternalism-like viewpoint under "the 55 system" to a viewpoint of the New Rights. It proved the renewal of conservatism. What kind of role will the conservatism take in future? It gave an impact to the civil society to reduce government roles in economic life and to keep more roles in the market, and activated competition and promoted entrepreneurship.

However the trust to values of the New Rights really considerably shook for reasons of the principle of settlement by a short term, expansion of the inequity, and minority exclusion. It may be asserted that the present conservatism falls into a certain blind alley now.

15. 2. The Renewal of the LDP

The LDP which overwhelmed in the election of the HR in September 2005 let the Privatization of Postal Service Bill has passed. Critical power against the Koizumi reform in the LDP was swept away, and there would not be the situation that was opposed to Prime Minister Koizumi. He stated that the LDP became the political party promoting reforms by a great victory in the general election of the HR in 2005. The reason is because it succeeded in making the image of the LDP promoting reforms in urban voters. It is a problem whether it really becomes so. Once at the time of the election of the HR in 2003 "the LDP has changed!" explained the LDP. It appealed to Japanese voters that the LDP has got to the

political party promoting reforms. However the LDP has to have come to repeat the same appeal in the result in the reality of 2005 without transforming its nature.

It goes without saying that there is the point to be able to say the LDP has changed. First Koizumi did not make the official candidates of the LDP to the politician such as Shizuka Kamei, who objected to the Privatization of Postal Service Bill and were a force of the old-style pork barrel politics in the LDP. As opponents in the LDP to Koizumi insisted on no-conditions united the government and the LDP contrary to him the Koizumi Government was able to realize a promise to the nation. It is sure that it has changed. Second the role and function of the faction deteriorated greatly. The Hashimoto group and the Kamei group opposed to the Privatization of Postal Service Bill, and it caused an unprecedented situation that the leaders of factions has been absent for a time in the LDP. In choosing the LDP's candidates of the HR, party executives excluded out revolting elements with Koizumi's strong leadership.

However it is understood that the LDP is the renewal by this incident. The LDP bulletin stated that "readiness to risk for reform" as a sales point of the LDP which became new was taken up. With this readiness, the LDP showed that it carried out the Privatization of Postal Service on understanding that the important supportive group which supported the LDP in elections conventionally such as the Privately-Owned Post Office Association (Tokutei Yubinkyokukai), which makes an objection against the Privatization of Postal Service Plan, grows away from the LDP. It is to build "a small government" that the new LDP aims through public administrative reforms and deregulations.

15. 3. Information for Making a Decision

However it was determined whether or not to approve the Privatization of Postal Service Bill to have pressured each candidate in the LDP for a manner on the occasion of the general election of the HR in 2005. We cannot judge it hereby if we do not observe future development that the LDP became the political party promoting reforms in all fields. We must verify two materials of judgment about that.

The one is the reform of medical insurance. It is the review of increase on the medical examination and treatment reward in restraint of the total sum of medical costs. A review was performed three years ago. Being similar circulated through the increase of the individual payment of workers, Prime Minister Koizumi was directly opposed to Japan Medical Association and the Diet members concerned a medical insurance system. The drastic reform was postponed then. Just after that unpleasant feelings in Japan Medical Association did not support the LDP in the nationwide local elections in 2003, which has been an influential support group with Privately-Owned Post Office Association. Of the manifesto of the LDP the concrete medical reform was mentioned in nothing. How does the LDP cut in swelling medical cost? Can the Koizumi reform push on for readiness to break off relations with Japan Medical Association? On condition the LDP was pressed by disputes on the Privatization of Postal Service, why was not the medical reform argued for most of these problems?

The other is already the issue of review of the specific source of revenue on roads (Gasoline Tax). The Gasoline Tax to assign to highway constructions amount to five trillion yen a year, but the government estimated that this fund remained as a result that a public enterprise

projects had been restrained strictly. To advance for the financial reconstruction Prime Minister Koizumi desired to put this fund into the share in general revenue when some Diet members (doro zoku in particular) of the LDP interested in road constructions would need the maintenance of road in future, and objected to a policy of Prime Minister Koizumi. When the younger Diet members who supported the Koizumi reform put this specific fund into the general revenue, they worry about bringing to serious antagonism more than the Privatization of Post Service

Over how to lead reforms, there was not the guarantee that the LDP was not opposed to Prime Minister Koizumi. In the LDP antagonism between provincial interests and urban interests may be rather strengthened in the LDP as a result that the LDP emerged as the dominant winner in the general election of 2005. It is necessary for us to observe how each reform is realized.

15. 4. The Proof of the Pudding is the Eating: It is necessary to verify that the LDP having changed

When we think about the future LDP, it has another problem. The LDP did image enhancement by the election of the HR in 2005, but it was too dependent on a personal character of Prime Minister Koizumi. He made an enemy in his party, and the method of Koizumi style to raise a cabinet approval rating had a limit. The LDP must show perspective of the reform of its own to Japanese people in future. Therefore we should examine what the LDP would do to the cooperation of the government and the ruling parties. The Diet members of the LDP has taken the demand of the local support group till now, and tried to get an individual

budget and perform for their supporters of the districts.

However it was not used that the LDP should have been able to leave fiscal balance alignment to the government and the bureaucrat when the priority in the policies comes to be asked how distributed the limited resources already broken up the past days of economic growth. The National Strategic Headquarters (NSH) of the LDP took the recognition and proposed the new cooperation with the government and the LDP. NSH proposes that the government drafts, decides and enforces policies, abolishing the prejudging system (*jizen sinsasei*) including some Diet members (*zoku-guin*) who are influential to privileged policies individually. That implements integrated schemes of public policies to the government. In the coalition government, vested interest tied to the *zoku-guin* in the LDP was surely controlled to some extent [Ito, 2005, 283].

The government and the LDP draw one blueprint of the public policy, but it is necessary to change it into the system which can concentrate political energy on there. All of the main elements of the program, from fiscal restructuring and dealing with the bad debt of financial institutions to privatizing the Japan Highway Public Corporation and Postal Service, were campaign promises made in the LDP's manifesto.

In addition the LDP could not express concreteness-like plans besides a pledge of the Privatization of Postal Service. We can see the point that the LDP is not changed to the reformist party. The LDP should examine public policies by establishing the permanent agency for an open argument in a party to revise the contents of the manifesto.

When the LDP fails in reform and came to a deadlock, the government and the LDP (and the CGP) must take responsibility together. A lot of voters should cast votes in hope of a change to the LDP as the reformist

party. It is responsible for the LDP to reward for them.

After 1990s many political parties compete for the leadership, the policy performance, and the performance evaluation in the American and European democracies. The correspondence to "the negative inheritance" which reform of 1980s in particular brought became the problem. Japan cannot finish escaping from the confusion state that "a negative inheritance" left economically causes. The LDP cannot show the prospects for ability for policy making and the performance evaluation. The DPJ can realize change of government if it can get a conservative base of the LDP [Sakano, 2000, 117].

16. Conditions for Opposition Parties in Joint Forces

keywords: meaning of the opposition party, coalition government with the LDP, condition of the cooperation among the opposition parties

16. 1 The LDP-centered Coalition Government

Since 1993 politics in Japan finds oneself in the mighty swell of changing time. On this account some people express disapproval that political parties, and politicians abandon principles and repeat compromises and defections. The JSP cooperated with the LDP which should have been in cat-and-dog relationship until 1994, and the CGP which assumed that it put in the opposition formed the coalition government with the LDP since 1998. It is time of the coalition government led by the LDP. Such a passing phase lets distrust of politics and a political detached room accelerate. The voters think that own power do not manage by vote. Japanese people as the nation have no voice to be a sovereign or a supreme ruler on Constitution. Why is such a situation beginning to spread among Japanese people?

The first factor is that the single-party government became impossible. The LDP, the SDP and the CGP could demand own policy by a coalition agreement because the LDP has declined.

The second factor is that a state of confrontation by the conservatives vs. the lefts, so-called "the 55 system", collapsed. The LDP persuaded the political leader Murayama of the SDP to be Prime Minister for return of governmental office in 1994, and the coalition government of the LDP, the SDP and the Sakigake was formed. Prime Minister Murayama let the SDP switch policies based own left principles; maintenance of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Self-Defense Force on Constitutionality, Approval of the National Flag (Hinomaru) and Anthem (Kimigayo). "The 55 system" of the conservatives vs. the lefts already became the events in the past. Because the lefts went to ruin it, the whole nation is put in the vague conservative atmosphere.

The third factor is introduction of the single-seat district election with proportional representation system of the HR. The DPJ confronts the LDP in the single-seat election constituencies, and the CGP, the JLP, the JCP, the SDP and the other small parties cannot but rely on getting seats in the proportional-representation constituency. The CGP is going to adhere to a viewpoint to hold a casting vote as the third party to the LDP and the DPJ. The CGP has taken part in ruling parties with the LDP in the Local Assemblies. It is natural that the CGP choose the LDP as a partner in the coalition government.

16. 2. The Situation of the Opposition Parties

The NFP formed in 1994 had been the greatest opposition party, but was divided into six new political parties in December 1997. The NFP had a

power of 156 seats in the general election in 1996. After the division of the NFP (173 seats in the HR and the HC); the JLP (54 seats), New Political Party the Peace (37), the Reimei Club (18), the Voice of the Nation (18), the Reform Club (12), Independents (11). There were twelve opposition parties in those days.

Fifteen hundred million voters who casted their ballots for the NFP in a general election of the HR in 1996 could not but presume a demonstration of only the realignments of political change among political party system afterwards, and only distrust of voters was left without "the pledge of the political party" being observed. The NFP presumed no general report on disorganization of party in 1998. The division of the NFP to supporters and voters should have been made "explanation and responsibility" clear.

About the uproar of the division within a political party, a political party and a politician must be aware of political responsibility to the nation. At this point what politicians should consider in the behavior of the politician is the "Gesinnungsethik" and "Verantwortungsethik". To put them simply, the former may express the politician's ethics of feeling in other words, and politicians do not think about responsibility for a result. However the latter may regard "the ethic of the politician's responsibility" as absolute liability. As a matter of course a politician need both ethics, but must make much of "the ethic of the politician's responsibility" among other things.

16. 3. Three Opposition Parties

The opposition parties were divided into three political camps from 1990s. The first political camp was in the JLP which is middle-conservative political power. If the LDP-centered coalition government came to a

deadlock, the JLP would change a flow of the politics in connection with anti-executives of the LDP, but as a result we could not observe the state of affairs, so the JLP was in condition that it was not in the opposition party and not in the government party from the LDP. That means that the JLP could not but maintain a collaborative relationship with the DPJ, and really merged in 2003.

The second camp is in the DPJ which led by politicians left the Sakigake and the SDP in September 1996. The DPJ takes support from "the Rengo", the National Center of the Labor Unions. The Voice of the Nation, the Sun Party and the From Five, which descended from the NFP, were going to form a new political party afterwards, but was absorbed into the DPJ soon.

The third camp is in the CGP. The CGP had been active in the HR, the HC, and the Local Assembly separately after the division of the NFP in 1997, but New Political Party the Peace collaborated with the Reform Club in the HR. The Peace joined the CGP, and the Reform Club came to stop acting.

16. 4. The Meaning in Existence of the Opposition Party

The LDP is relatively a dominant party since 1993 without majority in HR (except from 2005 and the HC). This cause is because opposition parties fall into a state of division after the decline of the SDP which was the first of opposition parties in a change of the political situation since 1993. The DPJ made rapid progress in the general elections of the HR in 2003 and both elections of the HC in 2004 and in 2007, so the possibility that the role of opposition parties carried out still increases [Yamada, 2003].

It is the opposition party that is indispensable for a democratic politics. The opposition party has a role to three points. First the opposition party keeps watch on the government and the ruling party, and protects freedom and rights of the nation by restraining the political power of the time. Second it observes a public policy of the government, and serves to let the government explain its act, scans it, improves it and proposes an alternative plan. Third it shows an alternative in change of the government to voters, and comes to power.

Of the present situation of opposition parties in Japan how should we estimate it? First it is important to bring about confidence. Each political leader does not have cooperation among opposition parties without confidence. Second it is the problem in the line and policy of parties. In contrast to the LDP the problem is where the opposition parties should take a stance. Third the opposition party shows what kind of policy the party adopts. It is necessary for the powerful opposition party to break off a deadlock of confinement of the politics. It is important above all whether the opposition parties can get the trust of the nation.

17. Does the DPJ take the Role of Opponent to the LDP?

keywords. democratic moderation, the DPJ's aim, opposition parties in joint struggle or in original strategy

17. 1. The Political Stance of the DPJ

The DPJ was formed to aim at the third power against the LDP and the NFP in 1996. Many Diet members joined the DPJ the after the solution of NFP in 1997 and combined with the JLP in 2003, and developed into the opponent of the LDP. The political ideology of the DPJ insists on as follows;

- 1 We create the society based on openness, fairness and justice.
- 2 We aim at the friendly society guaranteeing reassurance and security while we carry on through market mechanism by the economy.
- 3 We replace the centralization of government with the decentralization of power in society, and aim at the joint participation in cooperative society.
- 4 We realize Constitutional basic mind called the sovereignty of people, the respect of fundamental human rights, and the pacifism.
- 5 We establish international relationship and trusted nations with the mind of friendship based on independence as a member of global community.

The DPJ represents the situation of the "citizen", "tax payer" and "consumer"; and adopts neither the principle of market with almighty" (neo-liberalism) nor the doctoring of welfare state (old style of social democracy), creates the civil society where the individual who is independent lives together, and insists on the "new democratic way" in order to limit a role of the government to the making of the system. The DJP takes in a neo-liberalism-like element but expands civil society. This is a way of thinking of the new social democracy ("the third way") that is in Europe and America.

17. 2. New Style of Social Democracy

The social democracy is "a way of thinking that is revisionism of moderate reformism to maintain a market and social balance". The social democracy is originally used in a meaning to be realized in society and the economy to guarantee substantial equality for a current democracy

system. This way of thinking is an ideology to intend economic equality as well as political equality through universal suffrage and assembly. It was characteristic of the social democracy after World War II that a nation made social development a plan. It cannot be controlled inequity and the uneasiness-like economic order that a market produces only in an assembly. Therefore the social democrats are going to achieve substantial equality and fairness by letting a nation and the society intervene positively. It attaches greater importance to tolerant of a social aim than cooperation, a confrontation than competition, and the participation of a group for risk aversion is made much of.

The social democracy is going to realize fairness by re-deal of the income through the assembly, and therefore a nation carries out the intervention to the market, the regulation and the control plan. After World War II there was a difference of the degree in the advanced democracy, but a social democracy-like way of thinking was adopted.

After World War II a Keynesianism-like economic policy became the tide in the democracies. The viewpoint did not change in a situation of "the main group of conservatives" of the LDP at the point that seemed to be a guarantee of "the equality of the opportunity" with the public engine and an approach to "the equality of result" In addition the LDP was ahead of the principle of equality-like claim and policy of the opposition party. The Keynesianism lets economic efficiency and contradiction of the principle of equality surface. But, in the postwar "long-term prosperity" times, the contradiction of both did not come to the front. Sustained economic growth, the low unemployment rate, the low inflation improved a standard of the life of the people and were able to guarantee the financial fundamental of the welfare fund.

As a result the autonomy of the civil society is left to the nation, and a tendency of the social standardization / well-management by the central bureaucrat has become remarkable. This is so-called "big government". Naturally this situation makes the economical efficiency and cost cut awareness low density, and rather invite the enlargement of the bureaucracy in the central government, and, as a result, non-efficiency and waste come to be outstanding.

The economic recession in 1970s gave a blow in a policy of the social democratic style. The low economic growth invalidated a Keynesianism policy. That made a situation of polarization between the left wing-like the social democracy to persist the same as before and the right wing-like the New Rights to utilize the market mechanism. The Nakasone Administration and the Koizumi Administration were the New Rights aimed at "the small government" and were going to carry out a competition principle thoroughly at the same time. However, as for it, an effective feeling was lost after the Koizumi Administration.

The market competition principle spread the survival for the fittest in the society. As a result the criticism to New Rights was strengthened from the viewpoint of democracy. However the current Japanese situation cannot return in the times of the paternalistic "main group of conservatives" in the LDP.

Possibility that the social democratic style revises Keynesianism again may appear as a counterproposal to the principle of market almighty. The new social democrats take in a thought of communitarians.

It thinks that there "can be the relations that the human being is not tied to others to the human being only through a community because it is impossible". This thought is based on criticism to liberalism /

individualism in defiance of social solidarity. From a viewpoint to attach great importance to a community, the current social democrats accept the "stakeholder capitalism". The stakeholder means "having an interest (stake) by every group (from managers and stockholders to workers and consumers) in economic relations", and, at a point to recognize when the capitalism must respect public good, the "stakeholder capitalism" is located the "shareholder capitalism" that New Rights insists on the opposite poles.

17. 3. Expectation to the DPJ and its Reality

The NHK public opinion poll of 1996 reported as the expectation of the respondents at time to form the DPJ; "I expect the DPJ too much (8%)", "I expect it to some extent (37%)", "I do not expect it (11%)", and "I do not expect it too much (38%)". At a political party approval rating of the same year, it is 30.6% of the LDP, 7.9% of the NFP, 4.8% of the DPJ, 4.6% of the SDP, 2.8% of the JCP, 0.3% of the Sakigake, 27.7% of the independents, and 20% of "DN". "DN" is usually around 5%. It is indicated that the respondents could not make up one's mind. The DPJ is supported by the voters of the anti-LDP and the anti-JCP [Yamada, 2003, 109]. According to the public opinion poll just before the HC election of July 2001, the nearly half of respondents think that the DPJ can take the political power [Kabashima, 2001, 25-26].

We observe the expectation to the change of government by the DPJ; "expecting government party (8%)", "power in the coalition parties (19%)", "keeping watch the government as the opposition party (14%)", and "DN (4%)".

The NHK poll reported after the general election of the HR in 2000. The

support of the DPJ and the LDP by age; the DPJ 33% and the LDP 22% in 20s, the DPJ 34% and the LDP 21% in 30s, the DPJ 31% and the LDP 22% in 40s, the DPJ 28% and the LDP 28% in 50s, the DPJ 24% and the LDP 34% in 60s, and the DPJ 20% and the LDP 42% in 70s. The support to the DPJ exceeded it to the LDP from 20s to 40s (the urban districts in particular).

According to the public opinion poll, the DPJ's support was 17.2% before the general election of the HR in July 2000, but fell to 10% in August. The LDP was the same at a little less than 30%. The independents voted the DPJ in the general election, but came back as independent voter in August. Voting to the DPJ meant the criticism to the government, so the degree of support to tie with the independent voter was not so strong. According to the public opinion poll of the Asahi Shimbun, the DPJ approval rating of June 2 in 2007 was 23% (the LDP 24%), but it was 29% in June 9 (the LDP 23%).

17. 4. Lack of Consistent Policy

How about the policy of the DPJ? The DPJ showed the plan that the public work projects should cancel concretely even if we think about the reexamination of the public works projects on which the DPJ insists, but how can the DPJ go ahead through the maintenance of the social infrastructure by the new public works project for the old model to this in process of the aging and the information?

The DPJ had a hard fight in the farm village in elections. The DPJ had to suggest a new promotion plan of the farm village not only reduce the public works project. One step is not enough for the policy discussion which the DPJ embarked on from the reexamination and the reduction of

the public works project anymore. By the problems of diplomacy, national security, Constitutional amendment, the DPJ did not push forward opinion adjustment. The DPJ was not able to unify opinions within the party by the division of voting to the National Flag and Anthem in 1999.

The DPJ had a dissonance in the party in the important point policy to advocate until the election of the HC in 2007. There is the uneasiness that comes to the surfaces by a public pension plan, increase of consumption tax rate, the range of the right of self-defense, an international contribution, national security treaty, Constitutional amendments and so on. It is necessary for the DPJ to settle national basic problems. It becomes the cause that the DPJ's non-consistent policies are criticized by the voters in the cities where seems that it gets the most votes [Scheiner, 2006, 215].

17. 5. Tasks in Future

The DPJ has some tasks. First can the leaders of the DPJ show the leadership? Second can the DPJ overcome "the conflicts of groups broken up within the party (motley group of member, internal trouble and crash among generations) in the DPJ? It is said that "the party does not have a concept called the management". Third what would the DPJ do to cooperation with another party in the own strategy; joint struggle of opposition parties or original strategy by the DPJ. A joint struggle with the SDP over the election and the NNPP, and the problem of the government design in future may become conflicts in the DPJ, too. Fourth the DPJ must consider the political realignment that rolled up middle-conservatives for coalition government into the vision. Fifth the spread of the DPJ's local organizations are indispensable, too. Otherwise it

is only the election that the DPJ counts on independent voters (being volatile under the political circumstances). Sixth there is a mark called "the party where the women suffrages to the DPJ are few". The approval rating of the women is a little degree from a one-third to a half of the men.

It is often said that the DPJ is made up of "idea and policy". On the meaning of the words, the DPJ has immaturity and weakness on response of the political situation, ability of governance and management, campaign strategy, and inadequate capacity for organization. It stands for the fragility and the infant nature of the party. A strong opposition party is indispensable so that party politics can function the political system and, shows a new alternative to the voters, and an effort to carry out the politics at full strain is necessary. The DPJ should show Japanese people a new future image as the leading party of all the opposition camps in order to get the confidence of the nation.

18. Can the DPJ reconstruct?

keywords: fighting party, three conditions of the restructuring the DPJ, responsibility to look closely into ruling parties

18. 1. Reflection after the General Election in 2005

Seiji Maehara as Party Leader and Yukio Hatoyama as the Chief Secretary were appointed in the DPJ after the general election of the HR in 2005 [Asahi Shinbun, 15. Sep. 2005]. This causes a complete defeat in the general election of the HR in 2005 and is sake of the reconstruction of party.

The DPJ took in small political parties in sequence, and expanded the power since the formation of a party in 1996. The DPJ got 52 seats in 1996, took in three small parties and added to 43 seats in 1998, won 127

seats in the general election of the HR in 2000, merged with the JLP to 137 seats, won 177 seats in the general election of the HR in 2003, and 113 seats in the general election of the HR in 2005. The nature of so-called motley groups is surely strong even if the number of the seats increases. Because the DPJ continued winning in elections, there was not the agreement of course, policy and idea, making of no preparations to unite and act.

Japanese voters judged the DPJ which did not mean to take the political power not to compile an opinion how the DPJ should have coped with the Privatization of Postal Service, and accordingly suffered to lose 64 seats in 2005. Maehara said that they argued thoroughly without postponing an argument and showed a counterproposal by all means, and took the posture to confront the ruling parties on policies in the Diet. Therefore the stance that it was possible to put constant distance to the labor union was put forward even if the DPJ asked for the election in cooperation with it. Then how does the DPJ restrict? There are three conditions for the process of reconstruction

18. 2. The Fighting Party

What are the conditions of the restructure of the DPJ? First the DPJ must switch itself to "the fighting party". Therefore can the executive of DPJ with centripetal force be made up? Ichiro Ozawa, the ex-vice party leader of the DPJ, was requested to be party leader, but it was not able to come true at this point. Hatoyama talked and cooperated with Naoto Kan and Ozawa, and indicated that veteran (not young) politicians should have performed party administration. It was to be aware of hard feeling in the party being left in alternation of generations advancing at a stretch.

Because Hatoyama, an influential person in the party, became the Chief Secretary, he would be thought to strike the proper balance among generations in the party and each group. There were expectations that broke off conflicting emotions in the election of the party leader of DPJ. Maehara arranged Takeaki Matsumoto to the Chairperson of the Policy Research Committee and Yoshihiko Noda to Chairperson of the Diet Affairs Committee because of their ways of the thinking not by age. Maehara put an important point in taking out a counterproposal in important bills.

The former SDP members in the DPJ, who were thought to be excluded out the executive, felt repelled by such personnel affairs. It is the repulsion that removed the Diet members of the former SDP that related the labor union such as the public workers union. Therefore Takahiro Yokomichi, the leader of the former SDP, was cautious whether it was a shift toward the revision of Constitution in the DPJ [Shiota, 2007, ch.9]. And the DPJ does not depend on bureaucrats, and showed the alternative plans which included numerical targets or sources of revenue, but the main problem is hard to understand the DPJ's directionality. Professor Sakano points out that the DPJ has to explain how to realize own policies [Asahi Shinbun, 9. Oct. 2002].

The LDP has exchanges votes and interests mainly on the public works project on farm village area and the construction business, but the DPJ mobilizes the new middle class in the city by the reduction of the public works project. The DPJ puts an important point for the financial reconstructions than business stimulating measures, and chose increase of burden on nation besides. This switch means an epoch-making viewpoint as a left and liberal political party. The DPJ should become the

type of opposition party which did not exist after the war in Japan [Otake, 2003, 4].

18. 3. The Consistency of Policy and Idea in the DPJ

The second condition is the consistency of policy and idea. Can the DPJ try to summarize various arguments in an unbounded state? Party members postponed conflicting problems to be opposed in the DPJ. The argument on the revision of Constitution is one of them, too. Maehara insisted that he should specify Japanese right of self-defense and revise Article 9 of Constitution. Because Maehara's argument is just as one of the LDP, some criticized him in the party. It is necessary to show a thorough argument to the nation to compile the policy of the DPJ. Does the DPJ aim at not only the individual argument but also what kind of politics? It is necessary to make an idea and a course of politics clear. The DPJ insists on doing away with the wastes in the way to use tax, and aims at the effective government, but must consider the politics to spend the expense that is enough for the weak needing help. The DPJ has to be able to argue concretely against the course and policy of the "small (cheap) government" to which the Koizumi Government resorted. The DPJ should show what kind of politics the DPJ aims at the Japanese people.

For politics in Japan, the worst case is the division in the DPJ. There is not a choice except the LDP to voters. It causes a serious problem in Japanese democracy. Therefore the DPJ must unite [Kabashima, 2001, 355].

18. 4. Reform in the DPJ

The third condition is the reform of party administration and

organization. In electing the executive personnel affairs, the DPJ took off the members of the former SDP and the former DSP related with the labor union. It is the calculation that wants to plan a breakaway from the stance dependent on the labor union. However there are a lot of members of the Diet who cannot carry on an election campaign if the labor union does not support the candidate eagerly. The expansion of the local organization and the selection of candidates are problems with which the DPJ has a conflict since 1996, but it is necessary to strengthen the party organization sufficiently when the DPJ thinks about a crushing defeat in the urban districts in the general election of the HR in 2005.

The DPJ must get preparations for the three conditions ready to make it the fighting party by oneself; the unity within the party, the consistency of policy and idea, and the reform of party administration and organization. It cannot be easily settled neither, but it grows essential how the DPJ comes to grips with these problems in political activities. It is hard to fight against the ruling parties with two-thirds seats in the HR, but the DPJ has to takes responsibility for an important role to pursue the ruling parties.

19. Reorganization of the Ministries and the Agencies, and the Role of the Politicians

keywords: Reorganization of the Ministries and Agencies, sectionalism (tatewari gyosei, or vertical administration system), policy evaluation,

19. 1. Central Government Offices Basic Law for Reform

It is the law to present an idea, a policy and an enforcement system when the Central Government Offices Basic Law for Reform promotes the efficiency of reorganization and administration in Japan. First, Prime

Minister by oneself can propose the main contents on the problem to the cabinet meeting, which conventionally the minister of charge to moves the individual policy even if it is an important problem, so as to reinforce Prime Minister's leadership. Second the Basic Law streamlined the administrative structure. The national administrative structure was slimmed down in January 2001 by cutting the number of administrative offices from twenty-one Ministries and one Agencies to twelve Ministries and one Office. Because it became too powerful, as for the Japanese bureaucracy, it is common that there is a thought to have to reduce the power inside and outside the country [Curtice, 1995, 61].

In the democratic nation the politician whom the nation chose should have the final decisive power, but the bureaucrat who grasps information is overwhelmingly more dominant than a politician about the drafting of the policy in Japan. In the agenda setting in various social problems the bureaucrat holds leadership. It is called this situation the "bureaucratic rule (*kanryo shihai*)". It is often discussed whether the bureaucratic leadership which holds with a politician in policy decision in political science and the mass media. In Japan the bureaucrat showed strong leadership in policies of decentralization, deregulation and spending cuts. The bureaucratic rule came to be considered to be an obstacle of the reform. Through the change of government in 1993, the political leadership has come to be insisted on from the latter half of 1990s. Of course the bureaucrat is not opposed to a politician. However in the field of individual policy, the bureaucratic organization is going to maintain vested rights with a lobbyist-politician (*zoku giin*). If the politician who received a mandate in election can not command policy making, the bureaucratic leadership continues [Yamaguchi, 1997].

19. 2. Integrated Ministries and Agencies

The new central government office system started in January 2001. The basic characteristic is the reinforcement of the cabinet function. Japan adopts the parliamentary cabinet system taking responsibility with Diet and Cabinet. The each minister of the Ministry and Agency shares responsibility and authority, and supervises them. The purpose of the Government Ministries Reform is because it was not possible for the governments to deal with the debts of bubble economy burst in measures to the "negative effect" of the bureaucratic vertical administration system (*tatewari gyosei*). On this account it cannot change a principle of allotment and management, but aims at the general adjustment function to plan the authority reinforcement of the cabinet led by Prime Minister. Therefore the Cabinet Office was set up higher in from each Ministry and Agency.

At first some of the Ministries and Agencies which performed a relevant policy were integrated. For example the Ministry of Labor was integrated with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which was in close connection as the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. Related by science, technology, education, the Ministry of Education and the Agency Science and Technology were unified as the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Another characteristic is setting of the Cabinet Office. In the Cabinet Office Prime Minister as the chairperson controls and decides national important policies directly. In addition the Cabinet Office can investigate an administrative procedure, the judicial reform's system to demand a policy evaluation, opinions from the nation, and the reduction of ministries and government offices.

19. 3. Intention of Reform

The first aim of the Ministries and Agencies on reform is establishment of the political leadership. Prime Minister increases his or her involvement and leadership by policy decision. The second is the reduction of negative effects of the vertical administration system. It corrects complexity performed by every conventional jurisdiction of the Ministries and Agencies. The third is open administrative procedures. This can be achieved by adopting a policy evaluation and procedure to express an opinion. The fourth is the reduction of the administrative organization.

By the vertical administration system divided into every jurisdiction finely and conventionally, the decision was made by every Ministry and Agency in the form of the administrative advice, but it was changed to cabinet leadership called the politician's leadership (delegated by the nation). Therefore a general adjustment function should have been enabled. Of course all cannot be settled by political leadership. For example each political party pledged profit instruction and left behind the national burden, and promised an increased budgets and a reduction of taxes. The government needs another policy evaluation to stop evasion and the postponement of such a problem.

19. 4. The Multilayer Characteristics of the Policy Evaluation

Why must the government perform such a policy? What are the grounds? Cannot it do in the private enterprise? Is the policy effective? There is such a problem of check. We think about the utility of expense and effect. Furthermore is it fair to distribute funds? The policy evaluation needs two multilayer characteristics. For example there was the prior policy evaluation for roughly estimated budget demands on the

occasion of the budget. The policy was carried out, but we do not have much interest what kind of effect it brings about. The policy evaluation is carried out in not only the evaluation at the stage of the demand but also middle stage and afterward. The evaluation of the inter-grade judges the progress of the policy, and evaluates a policy including an interruption on the way. This is one of the policy evaluations.

Another multilayer evaluation is the evaluation of the process in the policy period. The Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications uses the independent organization to evaluate three levels of phases and to find an effect and objectivity at the same time as each Ministry and Agency performs it by oneself. The disclosing information is to show the result of the policy evaluation to the nation. That is the policy on the reform of the Ministries and Agencies, but it makes a priori demand by the advice of the administrative hierarchy conventionally.

19. 5. Reflection on some Problems

On the administrative reform called the reorganization of Ministries and Agencies, there are some problems. The first is the reduction of an administrative organization and staff. The integration of Ministries and Agencies and the reduction of capacity in the bureau and the section were carried out, but it is a fact that a huge government office was born by reform. For example it is the debate over the pros and cons of the setting of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport managing in charge of public works project two Ministries and three Agencies (Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transport, National Land Agency, Hokkaido Development Agency, Okinawa Development Agency), and

establishing the huge government office called the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications integrating the Ministry of Home Affairs in charge of public work projects, the Agency of Management and Coordination, the local government and central government offices.

Second even if the political leadership is established by the elimination and consolidation of the Ministries and Agencies and the setting of the Cabinet Office, it is to understand it only after carrying out whether it is really an effect. It is foreseen that the influence of the individual politician as policy specialists, *zoku giin*, is rather strengthened by political leadership.

Third it is emphasized that the policy evaluation is of the importance, but it is the problems how there should be the objective and persuasive technique.

Fourth it is political leadership which should be carried out. The reform is the ability of the politician. It is the greatest problem how the politician's ability is improved.

These problems accompany with another tasks; thorough decentralization, the ideal method of the function to supervise the government by Diet, the change of government, and all that. Of course the political leadership cannot be realized even if a political institutions or laws are changed. If there are policy discussions by the politician, as for the political leadership, the purpose is accomplished [Yamaguchi, 2004, 148].

20. How to realize the Cabinet-led Politics

keywords: Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, the Meeting of the Cabinet Office, Article 4 and 6 of the Cabinet Law

20. 1. Reform of the Central Government Office

On January 6 2001 Central Government Office of Japan was carried out the reorganization of the administrative structure. The aim is to get the system which strengthened the authority and power of Prime Minister and the Cabinet ready to have been considered to be the important tasks of the administrative reform. The posts of Prime Minister's Aide and Vice-Ministers of the Cabinet Secretariat were set up, and the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers were posted in each Ministry and Agency. Furthermore the Cabinet Office was set up above the Ministries and Agencies in rank. This is a general adjustment organization on policy and argument. The Cabinet Office in charge of economy, finance, administrative reform and deregulation, and the Economic and Fiscal Policy, established the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), the Council for Gender Equality, the General Council for Science and the Central Council for Disaster Prevention are established in it, and some private citizens in the Members of each Council.

The CEFP consists of 11 members; Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister in Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy, Minister of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy Trade and Industry, Governor of Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko), two representatives of business community, two university professors. It is the duty that they discuss a total fiscal policy, and the basic compilation of the national budget. This reform was carried out in the Mori Government (2000 to 2001), but it was said that the Mori Government cannot actually manage it even if the system was reformed. However, when the Koizumi Government was inaugurated in 2001, the CEFP has been active for appearance. It is

named so-called "Sturdy Reform (Honebuto no Kaikaku)" that showed an administration policy based on the Structural Reform by Koizumi's neo-liberal way [Takenaka, 2006, 177-181]. The Koizumi government gave the CEFP a central role in policy implementation and consistency maintained and carried through with the basic and sturdy reform program hammered out by the CEFP in 2001.

20. 2. Meaning of the Cabinet Office Setting

The Cabinet Office is the organization for one step upgrading in the equal Ministries and Agencies till now, and it means to have an aim to realize the cabinet-led politics. It is expected the general adjustment of the business that the Cabinet Office extends over the plural Ministries and Agencies. For the policymaking process, it was a procedure called each Ministries and Agency → the Meeting of Vice-Minister of each Ministry and Agency → the Cabinet Meeting" conventionally. By Government Reform the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet Office settle the problem involved among Ministries and Agencies easily. It is conventional premise that the Meeting of Vice-Ministers in which had the approval of project before the Cabinet Meeting, but Reform engages each Minister to execute the policy without passing through the Meeting of Vice-Ministers, and it seemed that it was connected for the cancellation of the vertical administration system in each Ministry and Agency.

The compilation of the budget has been performed till now by the Budget Bureau in the Ministry of Finance. Prime Minister and Ministers influence the other Ministries and government offices and can change the bureaucratic leadership if the Cabinet can shift to the Cabinet Office the right of budget bill. Therefore the political leadership of Prime Minister

who is the top of the CEFPP will be a challenging.

It was expected that the Reform cause the switch of the political technique which the LDP has performed the same time. Thus, also at stage of policy implementation, the influence of the factions and policy specialists were shut out and the leadership of the cabinet established.

20. 3. Discord with the Bureaucrats

However the bureaucratic leadership did not make a great concession for the political leadership easily. The first is that the CEFPP discords with the Ministry of Finance over the budget ceiling on the demand for rough budgetary estimate that the Ministry of Finance has been performed. Considering from the Ministry of Finance, it was decided in it conventionally, and it has been decided in a cabinet meeting after having put informal discussion on the influent politicians in the LDP. When the CEFPP conducts too much at present; it comes to be made criticism. The second is the resistance of each Ministry and Agency against the line of some Diet members close to the Ministries and Agencies or the interest groups oppose the political leadership of the CEFPP. As for the third, each Ministry and Agency shows the plan to be new at a glance, which their contents are of the conventional ones. They express that the bureaucrats are not always cooperative to work with the CEFPP.

In the LDP single-party government era, the policy decision was characterized by a bottom up method. The reason is because each sectional meeting of the Investigation Committee for Policy in the LDP was monopolized by *zoku giin* of the Diets. However in 1993 the policy decision of the Hosokawa coalition government of the non-LDP adopted a top-down method. Ichiro Ozawa who was the key person of the

government showed the leadership. But the high-handed posture of Ozawa caused the repulsion of the coalition partners. The coalition government consisted of the LDP, the JSP and Sakigake which returned it in 1994 re-adopted the old policy decision-style by "consensus" [Nonaka, 2000, ch.4].

20. 4. Reinforcement for the Political Leadership of Prime Minister

The political leadership must lead Cabinet and Prime Minister not the ruling parties and the *zoku giin* of the Diets. However it is not always recognized that Cabinet's leadership is political leadership. The Japanese Prime Minister seems generally that he has legal authority and power. However we understand that it is not always true. From now on, attention will focus on how political reform moves forward together with economic and administrative reform.

It is said to be necessary that the Administrative Reform Council proposed the revisions of Article 4 and 6 of the Cabinet Law. As a result, Clause 2 of the Articles 4 of the Cabinet Law provides that Prime Minister presides the Cabinet Meeting conventionally, and it is added the following: "Prime Minister can propose an item on the agenda about the basic line, the important policy and others of the cabinet". It is thought that the conventional contents is added that it is strengthened the political leadership of Prime Minister in the government more because Prime Minister can propose it to the Cabinet Meeting and decides in it, and commands and supervises each administration department.

However it should be deleted in a certain passage in Article 6 that Prime Minister commands and supervises each administrative department on the decision by the Cabinet Meeting. Prime Minister

cannot overcome the sectionalism of each Ministry and Agency by expurgating this passage. If it is not assumed that "Prime Minister commands and supervises administrative departments", it cannot guarantee the authority and power of Prime Minister at law.

Some insist that the streamlined administrative structure is not insufficient. The reduction of bureaus and sections, and the public employee capacity are carried out, but a huge government office appears in the other side. Even if the whole frame which reforms demand was set, we should evaluate the contents of the reform depending on how to work on. We need reforms more; thorough decentralization, the function to check the Cabinet by the Diets, the change of government system and so on, too. We must think these tasks in the general political reform. If not so, it is the political leadership that comes to intensify only the influence of the individual politicians.

The nation cannot elect bureaucrats, but can elect a politician. The representative of Japanese people plays a key role to perform public policies under the control of the political leadership.

21. Relations between Diet Members and Bureaucrats

keywords: cabinet bill, preliminary review, preliminary decision-making institution

21. 1. Diet Members dependent to Bureaucrats

Each Ministry and Agency which Cabinet leads puts the policy drafted by Diet into effect in the parliamentary cabinet system of Japan. It is Diet member who is drafting the policy and playing a key role of the enforcement fundamentally. Therefore it is found that the bureaucrats are aide with the information of the existing policy. However it is the present

conditions to depend on the bureaucrats for both the drafting of the policy and the enforcement of it greatly. Drawing up a policy, the new policy comes to scarcely function in the past policy, and it is necessary to revise it by a change of the situation. The enforcement result of the existing policy and the analysis of problems are indispensable. Therefore the bureaucrats with the information of the existing policy are aides to the Diet Members [Kawakita, 1998].

When this degree dependent on the bureaucrats is strengthened, it shows a stronger tendency for Diet member to be dependent on information and the bureaucrats with technical knowledge to drafting than the Diet member's drafting the policy. This tendency is remarkable in Japan, and has caused the structure to check judging from the ruling parties whether there is not a problem has Cabinet bills that the bureaucrats make. It is the preliminary review by the certain Diet members of the ruling parties. In the drafting stage of the policy, the priority in the making policy moves to the bureaucrats than the politician in a fact, and the politicians perform just a subsequent check. That is a so-called bureaucrat-led politics (Kanryo Shudo Seiji) [Nippon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1994].

Because Minister, Senior Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Vice-Minister assume the office of the supreme posts in each Ministry and Agency in charge of it in carrying out a policy, a policy is carried out by political leadership in principle. However it is the fact that there are many cases carried out along the bureaucratic judgment that assists law makers with policy matters, issues, and items. There are two reasons for this.

First because there are many issues and items which Ministers must

judge in office for around one year for the first time, Ministers are apt to follow the advices of the bureaucrats. Second Ministers have the bureaucrats to depend on consulting extremely on some of important issues and items in vast numbers. The bureaucrats judge items in the preliminary decision-making system (senketsu shudo) entrusting the bureaucrats. Some Diet members who are outside of Ministries and Agencies come to intervene in jurisdictions as a result that the enforcement of the policy is performed by the bureaucratic leadership, and twisting an original administration duties.

Thus Diet member is drafting the policy and enforcing it in the situation to depend on the bureaucrats. When we think about administrative complexity and enormousness in present condition, it is the unavoidable point to some extent. It is the problem that the bureaucrats should judge and decide instead of Diet member on the viewpoint of own interest for Ministries and Agencies, and it surrenders to outside intervention, and disorder the administrative rule. Diet member finally has decisive power to avoid it, and should control the bureaucrats adequately.

21. 2. Improvement of the Relation between Diet Members and Bureaucrats

Then how should be the relation between the Diet members and the bureaucrats improved? We must think about four better ways.

The first is improvement of the relation between Ministers and the bureaucrats in each Ministry and Agency. It should improve the bureaucratic side. The Administrative Vice-Ministers' Meeting (jimujikan kaigi) starts the consults with Ministries and Agencies to be related to

among the bureaucrats having information of the enforcement situation of the policy before telling information to Ministers. In the first place this Meeting should be discontinued. By this custom Minister is not able to judge the issues and items freely virtually in a stage with the prospect after the Meeting. This becomes the one of the causes the bureaucrat-led decision making. As regards cases discussed in the Diet such as bills, the political issues, and the social subject of concern, the bureaucrats give priority to reporting to Ministers, stand on the judgment, and should do negotiations with the outside person concerned in future.

Judging from a precedent in the past, the bureaucrats determine on case by case basis whether Minister settles in each Ministry and Agency about the individual issue and items because it established it in a rule abstractly. This consideration for decision needs to be reexamined in the past, and Minister should expand the term of settlement from this time substantially. As regards the intervention of *Zoku* Diet member from outside Ministries and Agencies, it is necessary that we should establish the way with which is dealt after telling information to Ministers.

The second is to largely extend an assumption of office period and the number of times of Minister, Senior Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Vice-Minister. When they gain an assumption of the office period and times in the fields of administration with experience, and need not depend on the bureaucrats. It will become the political leadership which Senior Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Vice-Minister make it easy to acquire experience in each Ministry and Agency, and can exert own leadership in the field of administration.

The third is improvement of the preliminary review system (*jizen shinsasei*) to Cabinet bill. Certain Diet members (*zoku giin*) review the

government-sponsored legislations before it is submitted [Inoguchi, Iwai, 1987]. It is a procedure and institution which the ruling parties examine the bill to submit to Cabinet and Diet beforehand. This system checks whether the content of bill fits the policy for *zoku giin* in the ruling parties. The dishonest intervention by the individual Diet member of the LDP is easy to occur in the preliminary review, and each Ministry and Agency waste time for the prior consultation (*nemawashi*) in every individual treatment with enormous effort. If the Diet member wants to check it, he or she should perform it in Diet deliberation which the nation takes notice closely. Then the Diet should get the important place where Diet member of the ruling parties argues with the government over the bill in Diet.

The NSH of the LDP ever simplifies the preliminary review system by the Diet member of the ruling parties, and proposes to reinforce the power and authority of Prime Minister. Cabinet has decisive power of policy, and Prime Minister finally instructs it. In other words Cabinet cannot correct the relations between Diet member and bureaucrat unless the LDP, especially influent Diet members, approves it as far as nothing changes the present conditions in which Cabinet has been put. The executive of the ruling political parties entry into Cabinet as a minister of government in charge, and the LDP acts according to the priority of the policy that Prime Minister decides.

The fourth is to give priority to the decision of the Diet member. The Diet member is not put restrictions with the vertical administration system of the government office, and can give general judgment and is sensitive to the intention of the nation. This is not to be fit for a purpose to the bureaucrats. It is characteristic that the bureaucrats regard a

viewpoint of consistency, continuity, and the fairness in policy. Of course it is the viewpoint that is important when the bureaucrats accomplish enormous administrative tasks. On the basis of decision-making and responsibility by the Diet member, it is essential that the bureaucrats put his or her heart and soul into the servants, and they need in cooperation in each part, reducing a bad point as possible.

The LDP government served to tie between governmental bureaucracy and the nation / the industry / interest groups, but, on the other hand, was not able to perform the leadership to the whole bureaucrat [Sasaki, 1995, 132-133].

22. Bureaucratization of Politicians, Politicianization of Bureaucrats

keywords: administrative reform, bureaucrats-led politics, role which politician should serve

22. 1. Bureaucrat led-Politics after World War II

After World War II "the public servants of the Emperor" was changed into "the public servants of the nation" with the introduction of the nation with sovereign power. The frame of the system of the Japanese governmental bureaucracy switched greatly. In addition the efforts aiming at rationalization of an organization and the management were able to be directed with a slogan called the modernization and the efficiency in the governmental bureaucracy. It has been declared basic aims from "administration by the person to administration by the organization" in the administrative reform which was tried many times after World War II, but post-war public service system do not overcome the pre-war tradition of "bureaucrat-led governance" and "the

bureaucratic leadership", and we recognize that it is necessary for us to be reorganized "the governmental bureaucracy organization" [Nakano, 52-66].

Nevertheless the aim has been blocked by the traditional governmental bureaucracy. Therefore it is argued that the view in search of administrative reform. Backed by a change of society rapidly, we need the administrative roles to carry offer of the public service on the increase, and the democratic and effective administrative structure which the nation expects.

The administrative state, where the administrative power has grown in the 20th century, has developed. Higher economic growth in post-war Japan has been achieved by organizing "the government's convoy system (goso sendan hosiki)" how an administration guides private activity to every industry in Japan by administrative advice subsidy, authorization and sanction, but various negative effects of the bureaucratic initiative come to the front, and deregulation and administrative reforms are pushed forward ⁽⁵⁾ [Muramatsu, 1999, ch.13].

As for the detailed rules, the bureaucrats put a delegated legislation to entrust a government ordinance (from Cabinet) and a departmental order or regulation (from Ministry and Agency) to practical use for enforcement in the present with establishing only abstractly in law. In addition the administrative office advises companies in form called administrative discretion (gyousei sidou) which has little legal grounds. Such a structure produces administration and has the cozy relations among politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, and as result produces corruptions with the specific industry, so deregulation becomes a demanded background. It consists of "the iron triangle (zoku seiji)".

The politicians want to depend on the expert bureaucrats, and the bureaucrats want politicians to carry out the intention of oneself. In each Ministries and Agencies offices, the bureaucrats such as a section manager or the assistant manager having jurisdiction over a concrete problem are the persons in charge of the law making. They prepare for a certain bill and explain it to Diet members. In the Japanese system some Diet members have a close relation with some bureaucrats, and it is easy for *zoku giins* to intervene in administration from it [Iio, 2007, 94, 103].

22. 2. Two points in Administrative Reform

In 2001 the reorganization of government offices were carried out for reinforcement of the political leadership in the decision-making in Japan. The Vice Minister is an assistant of Minister of State in order to set up by the law activating Diet. It was introduced at the time of reorganization of government offices. This is the result in the administrative reform, but some issues are pointed out in it.

First, in the administrative reform, an important point may be left unsolved. The administrative reform gets rid of unnecessary regulation and weakens the power of the government, and it is to let civil society and market economy enlarge. So it is the problem that Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Vice-Minister are interested in maintaining the conventional authority than weak powers of Ministry or Agency.

In addition, as regards reorganization of the administrative structure, the Japanese mass communication is interested in dissolving a vertical administration system or sectionalism and promoting efficiency of it. That promotion of efficiency is not obstructed government's duties. It does not seem that Japanese administration is particularly non-effective compared

it with other countries. It is facts that the number of bureaucrats is few in other advanced democracies. It makes the promotion all the more valuable in the Japanese present conditions reducing the excessive power of the government than enhancing public sectors efficiency.

Second it is a problem of the political leadership. It is to break away from so-called bureaucratic leadership. It is the Diet member whom the nation chose to lead politics. However Diet member shows off his or her many cases that want to display ostentatiously that the political leadership is possible with expertise than the bureaucrats. That is prone to another problem.

Needless to say, even conventional policy decision had political leadership in the post-war Japan. There was enough political leadership after the war when we think about politicians such as Shigeru Yoshida who decided postwar politics, Hayato Ikeda who printed a vision of the income redoubling out, and Kakuei Tanaka who suggested a blueprint of "the Japanese Islands remodeling".

22. 3. Two Problems

The government maintains the informal but close relation with the industry even if there were few bureaucratic numbers in Japan, so policy realization was possible simply. The government was able to use great authority with relatively few bureaucratic numbers [Curtice, 2001, 238].

The bureaucrats should achieve the role different from the politician's. There is the tendency that it regards as political leadership to form a policy in place of the bureaucrats when we watch the action of the Japanese politicians. Politicians want to lead with expertise than the bureaucrats in various cases. If a policy changes, the nation wants to ask

one's life about whether there are what kind of profit and influence. The nation is not interested in such politicians' knowledge. The politicians will be apt to deteriorate politics and exercise distribution of favors or pork barrel politics if he or she meddles with a policy too much. The politician should achieve the role in the directionality, the frame and the vision of the policy so as to lead the bureaucrats.

It is two problems on the administrative reform of the present state of affairs. The one is that the bureaucratization of the politician by this political leadership proceeds. Minister, Senior Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Vice-Minister dispatched in the Ministries and Agencies are "just a guest" to the bureaucrats unless political styles such as the faction dynamics, the number of elected and so on is changed. So the bureaucrat brings up Minister into a spokesman of themselves. Minister, Senior Vice-Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister may become the spokesman of the bureaucrats of Ministry and Agency.

Another is that the fall of bureaucratic morals grows still more intense. The fall of particularly young bureaucrat's morals cannot evade only bureaucratic concrete facing in the trend considered to be it. All the democracies are in a position of needing the bureaucrats. When the power of politicians weakens, "the political leadership that seems to be doubtful" is brought in, we do not expect the guarantee that the present administration system is improved.

We need to shift the center of gravity of the government from bureaucrats to politicians.

Political leadership is a problem of the politician and the political party. There is not a meaning even if we improve an administration system no matter how much unless the political leadership improves. There are

problems in the bureaucrats, but it is how we can show that solutions for the current problems should have in politics.

23. Reforms of Local Government

keywords: reform of the local government, regional system, decentralization

23. 1 Reform of the Local Government Tax and Fiscal Systems

For the source of revenue that local autonomy functions, there are revenue share, distribution of local allocation tax, subsidies and tax grants to local governments from the central government. It was triple reform of the local government tax and fiscal systems to be going to reform in three years until 2005, which moved the source of tax revenue of 3 trillion yen in the local governments from the central government to review local allocation tax grants to local governments instead of reducing a subsidy of 4 trillion yen as the financial funds to adopt regional disparity at the same time [Okamoto, 2006, 188-198].

However the central government let this local reform use it for the means of the financial re-establishment of it, and the devolution or decentralization that the local government reform should have advanced to at the same time was delayed and showed a stronger criticism to enlarging differences between local governments by the reduction of the grant in a contrasting situation. This is the reform of local finance which makes the national to the regional level shift the tax and power. However do the reform let tax revenue and power sources to the local governments transfer actually?

23. 2. Problems in Transfer Tax Revenue Sources

When the Koizumi Administration showed the numerical target called the source of tax revenue transfer of 3 trillion yen to the local governments in 2004, the local governments expected to it very much. In completion of the first grade the government bill in the end of November in 2005 has turned into reduction of the supporting rate. As a result, the content from which a local government advocated in a list of abolition was excluded. As for the discretion, the local independence reform did not progress in this way. Those who involved were disappointed with the local reform. In other words the handover of power on the source of revenue "from the national to the local" that the Koizumi Administration advocated did not progress.

How does Prime Minister Abe promote decentralization? In the policy plan that Prime Minister Abe as Koizumi advocated as candidate President of the LDP, he insisted that the national vitality cannot activate, and he puts the devolution and decentralization. For example, there is a vision of the regional system (do shusei). The regional system abolishes or merges the systems, and it is a trial to install integrated administration of wide areas, and to be called states newly. The national and the local problems are not settled because a regional system of division was introduced. How does the Abe Administration draw the shift process to a regional system of division above all? It needs great energy for the process politically.

23. 3. Reform of the Local Government Systems and Regional System

In 2006 the Local Government System Research Council proposed introduction of the regional system that was a wide area and exemplified

three plans to reorganize to 9, 11, or 13 blocks. The reform pushes forward the transfer of power from the national to the local, the cities, towns and villages. On the other hand the prefectural merger was enabled if there was the decision of the metropolis and local assembly in the revision of Local Autonomy Act in 2004. When its argument spreads to the reorganizing and redistributing of the power of the National Land Law, it conduces to the shakeup equal to establishment of prefectures system in 1871.

In progress of the current reform of the local government tax and fiscal systems, it is given that another argument to shelve the reform of local government tax and fiscal systems to the future regional system for the duration. The reform of the local government tax and fiscal systems is halfway to the aims and policies. The first grade was still over. It advocates a full-scale argument in the second grade and must plan the realization of reform. In spite of the situation, it may be said that recognizes that it is the policy problem that the reform of local government tax and fiscal systems to propose the regional system is low to bloom.

What nothing should already consider is the point where decentralization is confused with the issue of local vitality. We consider how to perform the decentralization and how to regain vitality separately. We must not confuse this point in no principle. The management to create local appeal is not always equal to it with a policy of the central government-led devolution or decentralization. The promotion of the decentralization means that it will change the role of the national-local level fundamentally.

The important point which the government offices of Kasumigaseki

indicate is on the move to the globalization. For example the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries should mainly put on the provision such as BSE counter-measure or the issue of liberalization of farm products. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare should concentrate power on analysis and coping strategy of the information and the measures of many foreign countries by the side-effects of chemical medicine damage and counter-measures of the AIDS, too. We get to grip with the problem that the administration has becomes complicated with globalization more and more. In Japan it is not occupied the appropriate position in the global community if Japanese administrations do not deal with such a problem precisely.

Information about the side-effects of chemical medicine damage, the elimination of all form of cancer destruction and so on are impossible things to be resolve by a local government. Such problems are that the national civil servant should do for national interest.

23. 4. What is the Original Work?

The national government cannot have plenty of room that supports fund and manpower on an original measure of the local government. Kasumigaseki should hurry the breakaway from subsidy distribution duties to the local governments. The promotion of the devolution or decentralization affects the reform of how to put important points of the work of the nation. The issues of the domestic administration should be performed originally without subsidies by the local government.

There is an expression called "the 30% self-government ("sanwari jichi")". While the prefectural systems are the self-government, the system expresses what it cannot exert enough. The model points at a

case having funds which a local government can collect by itself only as for 30%. How does it improve by the reform of the local governmental system ? Even if small municipalities merge and extend a population scale, an evil occurs. In the local government it should be elaborated a plan depending on the characteristic of the administration domain [Shindo, 1998].

The existing local governmental system often disturbs the administrative work. This system is inefficient in the self-government system of the current local unit. Some point out it not to be suitable in the times of information and the globalization. The business leaders generally argue on introducing regional system. However others refute the contention that the regional system leads to reinforcement of the centralized system.

The reform of the local government tax and fiscal systems that the Koizumi Administration left becomes the issue in election in the future. The LDP avoids situations like this. Because the DPJ regards the reform as a policy issue, it becomes the issue of election. Each party competes to obtain the popular will in the times of the manifesto type of election.

24. Japanese Style of Political Leadership

keywords: relation between leader and member, personal style of leadership, energy into the solution

24. 1. What is Political Leadership?

It is an indispensable term to regard influence of the retreat as the leadership. There are leadership studies from a traditional personality theory to pay attention to nature and the characteristic of the individual leader to situation theory to watch the leadership for relations between the leader and the member.

The leadership assembles manners and actions of the member of the group in a gross and performs so-called organizations, and it is in a group total function that is going to maintain a uniformity standard in it more. The leadership must be accompanied with a direction or a value that the group demands. the skill and characteristic needed by a leader change depending on necessity of the situation.

There are the consideration and the making of system (structure) for a main function of the leadership. The consideration softens strains to occur between members, and is a function to create mutual trust and friendly relationships. The making of system is a function to call out a member to achieve a group's aim. The leadership that considerations and functions made with the system are high together, and makes the productivity of the group. In both the situation to a leader that is advantageous and disadvantageous situation, the (accomplishment type of) leadership made with the system is effective. However in the intermediary phase, the consideration type (or maintenance type of) leadership is effective. An action of the leaders is to motivate a member, and therefore the leader must show a route to reach accomplishment being possible and accomplish-ment definitely.

The situation factor of the leadership is important, but the characteristic of the leader must be made much of, too. For example it is the characteristic and the personality which are common to many leaders such as intellectual ability, strength of the self-assertion, and ability for supervision. It is important that the leader can change a leadership style depending on the situation flexibly. As for this flexibility, the individual difference tends more than the situation.

24. 2. Personal Style of Leadership

The political leadership is evaluated in each stage (time / procedural progress) from the presentation of the policy to decision / practice. The evaluation standard of the political leader is in the following the four stages.

First does the leader grasp definitely what problem and policy that he or she should wrestle with precedence are?

Second was the leader able to make a policy he or she was settled, and to carry out the problem and a policy definitely?

Third did the leader show political ability to carry it out?

Fourth were the measures and policies to the problem appropriate?

The leader must explain there should be a meaning in a policy and a practice aim, and a route to policy realization among other things. Of course the methods for explanation are different by the personal style of the leader. With the leadership style of Japanese prime ministers, there are patronage type, coordinator type, top-down type, bottom up type, meritocratic type, consensus builder type, type of the lead from the front, adjustment ability type, autocrat type, and soon.

There is the common necessary condition that there should be of the political leader; First nation's hopeful future, second rich knowledge and deep insights, third concrete ideas, fourth efforts to practice it, fifth policies making ability to results admitted from abroad, sixth responsibility to results.

The political leadership should have intellectual sinew, ability to make a decision, understanding to the procedure, various abilities such as the sociability. The leader can pour energy into the solution of a problem and at the same time must act much than a common person more energetic

acting power to show various ability, and to react to many problems sensitively for the first time in that way. However such ability has individual difference and become high change with experience and aging.

25. Six Cases of Japanese Prime Ministers' Political Leaderships

keywords: light armament, economic growth, privatization,

25. 1. Six Prime Ministers

It is from the next reason that I pick six conservative politicians among the postwar prime ministers. There is a debate over the main group of conservative politics that made the center of the postwar politics in Japan. It is a basic policy of the main group of conservatives in the LDP that the government cooperates with private enterprises are going to cut down the defense expenditures as little as possible (light armament) in the economic growth. However the leaders of anti-main group of conservatives think about a neo-liberal-like policy by economy and the reinforcement of the armaments as the independent nation that it is necessary. The leaders of the main group of conservatives are Yoshida, Ikeda, and Tanaka. The leaders objecting to the main group of conservatives are Kishi, Nakasone, and Koizumi [Shinoda, 1994; Mikuriya, 2003; Kusano, 2005].

25. 2. Yoshida, Shigeru

Yoshida made use of knowledge and experience as the diplomat, and let Japan survive the hard time in the post-war. It is evaluated admirable that he accomplished the judgment to the Japanese Constitution, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the art of negotiations to old Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In Japan he fixed the policies of the main group of

conservatives in the Japan system after the war; in other words, light armament about security of Japan and economic growth by government-led industrial policies. Japan controlled its national defense expenditure while using U.S. army about the light armament and was able to appropriate the saved money to economic growth. Apart from the judgment at the moment, "deadheading on the Security Pact (Anpo Tadanori)" and "one country's pacifism (Ikkoku Heiwashugi)" that he executed determined a direction in the post-war Japanese politics. His leadership is not always reviewed good marks. Kishi, Nakasone, and Koizumi challenge the post-war regime which he established from each viewpoint afterword.

Yoshida is a typical paternalistic conservative. The conservatism considers from the present conditions. He thought that the abstract theory is nothing. He was not a human being of the theory type in this sense, so recognized the base use to U.S. army without being particular about sovereignty or a slogan to be independent, and he performed Japanese security to plan reduction of the defense capacity instead and expanded national economy with the balance.

25. 3. Kishi, Nobusuke

Kishi objected to the Yoshida's way of thought on light armament. Though it is divided the evaluation about the point where Kishi made an effort for the revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 as equal as possible, it is evaluated the positioning Japan in the global community at the point that made a Japanese ideal method clear. He achieved that let Asian diplomacy reopen smoothly, but invited useless confusion by the forcible political technique of the domestic politics. He is one of the

politician types before the war. It is only heterogeneous existence in the postwar democracy. Because Kishi put Japan-U.S. diplomacy in the center of the politics from the situation of the anti-main and anti-Yoshida groups in a conservative camp, it was outstanding delay in the policies such as the social welfare.

Kishi had some characteristics as the political leader are as follows. The first had acquaintances and a source of money from before war. The second is ability as the head of the organization. The third is ability of the superior agonizing reappraisal. The fourth is strong faith to the rebuilding in Japan.

Kishi insisted on Japan continuing as an independent nation. Therefore Japan needs defense capacity to secure security and peace. Japan was indispensable for the friendly relationship with U.S.A.

25. 4. Ikeda, Hayato

Ikeda was a creator of the high economic growth, and devoted his entire attention to the center of the politics to perform an income redoubling plan for cancellation of the political confusion by the disturbance of new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960. He adopted the policy of economic growth and was going to persuade the nation. He developed the characteristic of the main group of a conservatives more and planned improvement of the life of the people at the point and succeeded in it. Therefore he carried through the principle of economic growth supremacy than the problem to divide public opinions such as the security into two. In other words the problem of the politics switched it to "the distribution of economic growth and the result". Ikeda led Japan to the current major economic power in this sense.

As a result of rapid economic growth a pollution issue, an urban problem, and the negative aspects such as metropolitan, and local economic differences caused the acceleration of the economic growth, too. His course was firmly established in the long-term governance of the LDP and the rule of the Ministry of Finance (the bureaucratic-led government).

Ikeda was a person of the efforts. He continued growing up as both a human being and a politician. In addition he placed many bureaucrats as advisers.

25. 5. Tanaka, Kakuei

Although we can evaluate his performance, as for Kakuei Tanaka from a poor village in Niigata, in the point that aimed at the enhancement of rural economy than urban economy faced from the way of thinking of the main group of conservatives which was the income redoubling policy of Ikeda, he made a serious judgment error of those days. Having been going to force a personal desire called "the Japanese Islands Remodeling" to let economy overheat more though economy was overheated in economic policy, it rather brought the economic confusion such as wild price spiral. Even if the infrastructure development and the public works project needed substantially, it produced the negative effect because of the patronage politics and pork-barrel politics in his technique.

He was the symbol of money politics. In other words Tanaka failed with his political style (money-power politics). In addition the pork-barrel politics has made the LDP to depend on the government economically. This political problem left the political fallout from the scandal that did not remain in only in the post-Tanaka era. The money-driven political system was enabled by Japanese economic growth, too. Tanaka gained

"success" by high economic growth, but he failed because he overlooked the possibility that a condition of "success" was lost.

Tanaka had knowledge more than the bureaucrats and the politicians with the executive ability. He could use the influence that was strong in each government office and controlled bureaucrats.

The political technique of Tanaka propelled profit instruction type politics of the LDP politics. He collected funds from the industries and the companies and used it to carry out a purpose. It left "negative inheritance" in the Japanese society.

25. 6. Nakasone, Yasuhiro

Nakasone showed posture to wrestle about the diplomacy in postwar various unsolved problems, and made an effort for the privatization to government affiliated corporations. In the mid-1980s a number of large government corporations were privatized. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) and Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JT) became Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, and Japan Tobacco Inc. in 1985. This was the trial that was going to challenge the main group of conservatives, and it was an opportunity to reexamine of the Japan System after the war. We should evaluate Nakasone as the leader in this respect. He was an extraordinary patriot, but thought that he used U.S.A. in all ways possible while he understood the condition that cannot but collaborate with U.S.A., and refraining from self-assertion. His policy reflects recognition of the realism. However, as result of the policies, he do not succeed besides the privatization of the public corporations affiliated with government. Furthermore, as a result of his economic policy such as deregulation, he is responsible for a

Table 4 Six Prime Ministers' Leaderships in the Post-War Japan

Period	Course of post-war Japan 1	Course of post-war Japan 2	Politics of economic growth 1	Politic of economic growth 2	Challenge of post-war politics 1	Challenge of post-war politics 2
Object	Beginning of the main group in conservatism	Self-diplomacy	Economic growth	Economic development	Reexamination of "the 55 system"	Destruction of "the 55 system"
Prime Minister	Yoshida, Shigeru	Kishi, Nobusuke	Ikeda, Hayato	Tanaka, Kakuei	Nakasone, Yasuhiro	Koizumi, Junichiro
Type of leadership	Autocrat type	Power practice type	Cooperative and persuasive type	Adjustable type	Top-down type	Accomplishable type
Political Characteristic	Main group of conservatives	Independent state, Development of Japan-U.S security treaty	Income redoubling plan	Japan remodeling	Reexamination of post-war Japan	Refuse of main group of conservatism
Policy	Light armament and economic growth	Self-defence, Self-diplomacy	Politics of economic growth	Restructuring of Japan	Reinforcement of Japan-U.S. security treaty Privatization of public services	Expansion of Japan-U.S. security treaty Privatization of postal service
Positive evaluation	Direction of post-war Japan	Promotion of Japanese diplomacy	Settlement of national life	Redistribution of wealth	Try to unsettled problem Change of the main group of conservatism	Conquest of economic crisis Destruction of the main group of conservatism
Negative evaluation	One country's peace	Confusion of public opinion Political style of pre-war politician	Rule by economic bureaucrats of Ministry of Finance	Infiltration of Pork-barrel politics and Money politics	Not Perfect Privatization without government corporations	Danger of theater politics Fall of public services Gap-widening society Lack of measures to reforms

Japanese cause of economic ruin by the bubble economy.

Nakasone was the politician who could show the strong leadership that could carry out administrative reform. It was happy that there was the then political environment where a public opinion supported him for him. However he could not but give up own policy when a public opinion did not support it.

25. 7. Koizumi, Junichiro

Koizumi advocates "restructure without exception" and showed the leadership that should overcome the time when main group of conservatives did not function, but we cannot still evaluate result as he intended at present. But his nature as leader is heterogeneous with the past Japanese prime minister type. He succeeded in giving an impression on it with "the politician who could destroy the LDP inside the LDP". He aimed private companies, business communities and the nation that do not depend on the government. It is privatization of three postal administration businesses till then. But, as his policy result, the deterioration of the public service occurred gap-widening society, and so-called "winners (katigumi)" and "losers (makegumi)" became clear. He has withdrawn from the prime minister without doing means to relieve the result.

Koizumi was based on a full commitment to U.S.A. so that it did not "seem that he had the guiding philosophy of diplomacy". This was possible because President Bush of U.S.A. was a partner. His negative side was outstanding by having deteriorated relation with Asian countries. It is attacked by severe critics that he only consolidated "Japan-U.S. alliance reinforcement, and positive international contribution" after

the Cold War.

The leadership of Koizumi was the style that Japanese people were easy to understand politics and policies, but it comes to simplification of politics instead of the complicated politics, and his technique got into "the dangerous pit" to the Japanese people.

Koizumi was a lone wolf-like politician. It may be said that he showed a new prime minister image. First Koizumi was popular with Japanese people, especially urban incidents. Second he was supported from politicians except the LDP, too. Third he was going to carry out a presidential premier thoroughly. His popular source rose with right and wrong dual composition and played good to confront evil. In effort this strategy won popularity. In addition, he explained it by the words that the Japanese people was easy to understand, operated media skillfully, and put oneself in the advantageous situation. He formed "the style of Prime Minister's rule" like the President whom oneself decided.

Koizumi was the political leader who appeared for the situation that fell into a functional disorder and worked constant to overcome difficult time. However his evaluation is divided whether his policy helped recovery of the Japanese economy or not.

25. 8. Positioning of the Japanese Prime Ministers after War

Is the leadership of Prime Minister realized according to the rule in the Japanese Constitutional? It is assumed that the Cabinet Meeting reaches an unanimous conclusion as well as the pre-war. Though Prime Minister has the power and authority that can replace a minister at the same time, there are really few used examples. Prime Minister Miki tried to decide the dismissal of 15 ministers in confrontation with the intense attack from

cabinet ministers conflicting in policies once, but was able to never carry out the dismissal of the members because Miki wanted to avoid that he would be called "a dictator". It was the adjustment of the Prime Minister who did the attention for various camps that supported the long-term continuation of the government in postwar political system. Some insisted on strengthening the leadership of the Prime Minister by the introduction of the Public Election of Prime Minister System.

The Public Election of Prime Minister System means that the nation chooses the best leader by a direct election. It suggests a presidential system such as U.S.A. He or she cannot become the prime minister if the most of the Diet members support him or her in the current parliamentary cabinet system. Therefore at first he or she must persuade the ruling parties if Prime Minister will carry something out. If he or she is elected by the nation directly, the Prime Minister can carry out a policy without being concerned about support of the Diet members, and it is possible that the strong leadership can put his or her policies into execution in changing times. Japanese people may give authority and position similar to the President with the Prime Minister and am going to, so to speak, guarantee the performance capability of the leadership. That is the reason why Nakasone and Koizumi are advocates eager in the Public Election of Prime Minister System. However, in the theory of the direct election for the Prime Minister, Japanese people may be moved by frustration against present politics of Japan brought feelings of stagnation to the politics in Japan.

26. How to Take Political Responsibility

keyword: responsible cabinet, how to get responsibility, accountability

26. 1. What is Political Responsibility?

The term "responsibility" and "responsible" is used in various meanings. Therefore this term is used in context of morality and law for the action of person, and it is responsible and liable frequently because a person cannot take an action by other methods. We pay attention to duty tied to a specific position and system in the normal meaning in politics and administration. The responsibility has people obliged to practice. The person in a certain position takes responsibility for achieving the duty, and has the object which he or she should explain, and is usually demanded explanation. Furthermore the people in these positions must take responsibility. It is usual that in the organization such as the sections in the government and company, the hierarchy of responsibility exists systematically. Each official and functionary takes responsibility for the boss directly there because each person achieves one's duty. As for the duty the supervision of the subordinates means that the boss in the high rank takes the responsibility of them. It is demanded that this responsibility is explained, and, as for non-accomplishment of the duty, the duty is connected for the responsibility that should be due closely because we must obey "punishment" and "sanctions".

The political use of this term exists in the parliamentary cabinet system. It is sometimes known as the responsible government. By this system each minister is responsible for assembly on collective and individual level. A minister should explain the responsibility in the minister to the assembly by oneself, and means what is ready to answer to the assembly in the correct information about the action that a section of the government which a minister rules over adopted. Therefore a minister oneself must explain the action of the subordinate.

The minister takes responsibility for every thing that the public employee of ministries and government offices performs theoretically, so in practice the minister resigns if the mistake of own ministries and government offices comes to light. Therefore the politician is in a position to need that moral responsibility and legal obligation explain regardless of having or not having. That is why there seems to be clear distinction for cabinet responsibility. It is distinction between the responsibility to explain for reply (answerability) and legal obligation (liability).

The cabinet may have responsibility at all when we think about moral duty. All the mistakes of the ministries and government offices may be always irresponsible, but a minister deserves criticism if he or she does not prevent a future recurrence without taking the measures to heal the misgovernance. As for the cabinet responsibility, the action suitable for the general manager of the organization is not included only it is limited to duty to answer the assembly simply. For the responsibility, it resembles duty and responsibility in the administrative hierarchy that may be responsible for acting that a certain person executes to another person, where what a manager takes responsibility is expected of the guarantee that a subordinate can act even if the action of the subordinate is irresponsible as for the manager personally [Mulgan. 1987, 535-536].

Furthermore, as for the individual ministers, a minister and the cabinet must bear a legal obligation in the assembly though it is not necessarily forced to the resignation when ministries and government offices are unable and negligent. In a fact that the cabinet which is the majority maintains the government in an assembly, it expresses this responsibility practically. In other words it satisfies the requirements of a formal of the responsible government.

Because the thought of the responsible government ties to the use of election and democratic procedures, it carries out a clear application. There are two important advantages in the meaning of the politics of the accountability in the responsible government. With the first advantage it promotes representative democracy by deciding the government to voters considered to be as authority of the high rank more. Therefore this thought expresses that the nation can switch the government by taking responsibility to the nation through the mechanism of the competitive election by voters. The second advantage is a close inspection and supervision to the government. It checks practices of the power of the government and analyzes policies, and has to argue them. This usually means a function of the assembly. As for it, opposition parties are carried out through disputes and questions.

In the parliamentary cabinet system, the responsible government is made solidarity and personal responsibility of cabinet exactness. The collective responsibility is obliged to all cabinet ministers. Because the cabinet takes responsibility to the assembly jointly, and is switched by the assembly, the personal responsibility of minister means that a cabinet minister takes responsibility personally in the assembly for the mistake of his or her ministries and government offices.

However the effectiveness of the responsible government is generally doubted. The way of thinking to take responsibility is about to become meaningless and can hold a simple constitutional principle. For example in the Japan the government is not going to think about joint liability as far as the government party maintains majority rule of the HR. The responsibility of the government which acted by a right viewpoint morally continued being always like a dispute. Because it is assumed that

only the government can judge the best profit of the nation in contrast with accountability, this way of thinking separates the government and the nation about dealing with the question of responsibility which the past cabinets in Japan do not regard as own responsibility on failures of the policy, scandals, and political corruptions or the like. In consequence cabinets and politicians leave the question of responsibility unsettled.

26. 2. Problems over Current Politics in Japan

With a social agreement to catch up with the European and American developed countries under "the 55 system" politicians have formed policies with bureaucrats, but Japan needs new policy decision system because of diversified needs in society at the present. To that end the political reform is indispensable. However the reform discussion has problems. For example a reform bill assuming that we should regulate the action of both excessively appears when the relations of lobbyist-politician and business person-politician become the problem. When the relations of bureaucrats with a politician become the problem, an argument to prohibit the contact of both is given. The pressure group expressing individual profit is weak, and a politician does not pursue local profits, and will it be defined with a true democracy system that there are not competition, cooperation and compromise among the government, political parties, politicians, and bureaucrats? It seems to be a tendency tends to appear "the anti-politics" which may deny politics in political reforms of Japan.

Then what should we do? In the democracies there is two keywords which are common to political reforms. They affect how to get political responsibility. One is the transparency (disclosure). The other is the

accountability.

As for the former a politician employs how many secretaries, pay how much salary, and where a politician and a political party collected political funds from and what used for, or it is to clarify contents how a politician pressured the bureaucrats to work on. It is necessary for debates on political reforms to make these problems open. To that end the maintenance of the law is indispensable. In addition the media should take an important role when it raises transparency of the politics. The intelligence means to be derived from old style of faction-based politics not to report various facts of the politics that "the beat reporter (ban kisha)" of the newspaper publisher can know should put an end. In addition closing practices to share the content informed by the government offices only in the reporter club (kisha kurabu) consisted of major media companies should be made an end.

It is said that accountability does not have the appropriate equivalent in Japanese. We understand that its meaning usually included in accountability only by explanation in Japan, but that is not all. There is consistency in the behavior that a political party and a politician adapt to some extent, and it is important that we can be able to give an umpire to political parties and politicians in election that is responsible. Because the party leader becomes Prime Minister when a certain political party got the government, it is natural that the ruling party should support the government with Prime Minister (a party leader). It should be a cabinet to make the policy of the government.

However it is often that it does not necessarily become so in Japan. The Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the political party and the Chairman of the Executive Council consist of the members of cabinet

perform the political power, support Prime Minister, and remaining cadres are usually in charge of the party business such as the next election preparations. This is common sense in the parliamentary cabinet system in the democracies. In the case of the LDP the executive member of the ruling parties is left in the important post of own party, and takes the action handling the government form outside. That becomes "the dual structure of the power", and the bureaucrats' resistance and sabotage in opposition to the political leadership (cabinet leadership) are, so to speak, outstanding. It happens strange situations that where the LDP supporter called voters supporting candidates of the LDP against the policy of the cabinet is different from voters supporting Prime Minister in the election. Then the function of accountability is reduced to half in Japan.

The accountability means to explain the act of the person and to be responsible at a point meaning the duty that is open in the criticism from other people. As for the accountability the higher rank from the situation watches the lower one, and duty, authority, and function of government are defined as a method to evaluate the performance of a lower rank. Because it functions in context of "the rule of law", the accountability does not mean that we obey authority and the penal regulations that we cannot foresee for a free hand.

It is a term with responsibility because the accountability receives sanctions for the violation not only making the duty to answer and the act of the person clear, and it is necessary to recognize punishment.

The accountability means the limited rule, the effective policy formation, and the democratic and important characteristics. Because a certain system is formed in mechanism and control of the politics to supervise functions and performances of other systems, the accounta-

bility limits the power of government. Policy suggestion is investigated thoroughly and carefully, and improves the quality of public policies because it is guaranteed that a political performance is watched well. When the accountability is accomplished through the competitive election of the fixed period, it becomes a public control system. It means that the democratic rule is practical as for the public accountability.

So the accountability must be careful about effective only in a certain situation as follows.

- The mechanism of monitoring performs strictly.
- The division and department of "the high rank" contact with the information so that it can judge based on knowledge enough.
- An appropriate system is applied in the performance without the real mistake.

The fault of the accountability limits individual judgment and action. We will have to recognize that the insufficient accountability of public employee to a cabinet minister cause political issues, and in other words the bureaucrats denies the needs of government [Heywood, 2000, 145-147].

26. 3. How to Take British and Japanese Styles of Consequence by Comparison

Peter B. Mandelson resigned the minister of the Trade and Industry of the Blair Administration in December 1998. He was one of the influential cabinet ministers for Prime Minister Blair. There were some reasons of this resignation. As the first resignation reason, he got a debt of 373,000 pounds (120 million yen) on the preferential conditions of an exception from a Member of Parliament of the Labor Party to purchase his house in the upper-class residential area of London. He did not report this to the

Parliament. The British Member of Parliament must report a matter to affect profit of the self when he or she registers oneself with a Member of Parliament's list after the Lower House election. When the Member of Parliament must announce financial profit to be concerned with oneself, the benefits expected in the past, the present, and the future must publish by the resolution of the Lower House in May 1974.

This report of profit is listed in the Lower House, and anyone can read regularly to put on the table in the hall of the House and anyone can read regularly. It is thought to be against the Code of Conduct that the Member of Parliament delivers his or her line in the House without reporting his allied profit.

Furthermore Mondelson did not report a debt when the Ministry of Trade and Industry investigated into the profit-sharing of him in summer of 1998. This is the second reason of his resignation. This act was against the Code of Conduct to the cabinet member. The Member of Parliament who lent the money to Mondelson also resigned the Account Chief of Ministry of Finance. The Code of Conduct to the cabinet minister demands that he or she acts without contradiction between personal profit and public duty; if there will be it, he or she is suspected to have the contradiction, and Prime Minister decides the disposal of profit of the cabinet minister. The scandal of the cabinet minister happens over business of non-presentation called the Marconi Case before World War I, and thereafter the Code of Conduct to the cabinet minister established.

There is no end to the doubts over "politics and the money" in Japan. The Recruit Case was one of the postwar largest political corruptions from structured scandals found out in June 1988. This case was the political scandal that politicians, business managers and bureaucrats

were involved, which became the "illegal payoff" to the privileged class clear. From 1985 through 1986, the Recruit Corporation transferred many unlisted stocks to the LDP influential politicians including Prime Minister Nakasone and Diet Members of the opposition parties, high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor, and the managers of the Japanese big companies, and it is the case that let them gain profit on sale after over-the-counter trading for Recruit stocks.

The prosecutors stepped up investigation into the Recruit Corporation in October 1988. Four business managers were arrested in February 1989. Two bureaucrats were arrested in March. Takao Fujinami who was a former Chief Cabinet Secretary and Katsuya Ikeda of the CGP in May received an investigation.

The cabinet ministers and the high-ranking officials that a doubt was held explained "My wife got a stock, or my secretary received it, but I did not know it" to escape his responsibility. Some former cabinet ministers, the undersecretaries, and NTT ex-President, who achieved profit, were prosecuted for the bribery charge. Prime Minister Takeshita resigned in 1989.

The LDP executive officers were mistrusted and ordered the Diet to appear for questioning, but they were not prosecuted. The case terminated without elucidation of the "political crime", and, like postwar other political scandals, "distrust of politics" was left to the nation after all. Politicians appearing for the Recruit Case did not take responsibility, and did not testified about his alleged involvement with this case. It is the behavior of the privileged class that has feels the defect of the morals as the human being rather than political responsibility. The politicians who received stocks should have explained his stance and clarified his

commitment to the result to Japanese people.

It is necessary for us to reconsider what party politics should do in the origin to push forward a political reform in a true meaning. As for the distrust of politics (in other words distrust of political party / politician precisely), it cannot be dissolved in Japan as far as making transparency and reinforcing accountability focuses on political reforms of Japan politics. Therefore we must understand a meaning of the political responsibility sufficiently.

Conclusion

Professor Richardson has once concluded the politics of Japan which is not equal to a pragmatic democratic model such as British political system with the centralization of power [Richardson, 1997, 248]. The leadership and the political issue are because they always came under the influence of de-centralized elements. Though the social structure put together of political actors such as people, individuals politicians, political parties, interest groups, government offices, each ministry post, and local profits, they have formed policies in various ways. He called the politics of Japan the "decentralized bargained democracy". For the sake of specific interests in various political communities where the political actor is concerned it has dealing with other political actors. The deployment of political resources is decided by law, regulation, subsidy, and program, but the measure of the redistribution which one wins and the other loses has not been performed. Therefore the decision which it does not seem that other actors were removed is accomplished.

As a result in the decentralism of the policymaking process, the

individual actors are placed structurally, are limited the sphere of experience and act in it, and mutual compelling force functions. Seemingly there are negotiations-like patterns to occur concerning the interaction among power-seeking actors in the decentralized system. The political responsibility occurs in fragmentary decentralization of power-seeking negotiations and agreements frequently. These elements consist in a macro base in the political system after the war.

However, as for the politics of Japan, political changes become remarkable surely since 1990s. The change of the mutual relations in cooperation, conflict, support, and change among voters, politicians, parties, and bureaucrats seems to "revolutionize" the post-war macrostructure. We can explain the six subjects in the preface of this paper as follows.

First the dissatisfaction of nation to the current political situation demands the reform of the system while affirming Japanese postwar political system through outlook on Constitution generally. Second that confirms by considering the change of the Japanese voting behavior after World War II. In other words the voters have sifted from "the affiliated supporters" to "the independent supporters". It showed a phenomenon to lead to fluidity of the political choice many times. Third the politics of Japan came to become common from a single-party government of the LDP to the coalition governments though the LDP led them. The reform of electoral system that government change is enabled was introduced, but the voters may not expect complete two major political party systems because of the multiparty system. This reason is seen in choosing coalition governments. In addition opposition parties got possible to really aim at the political power in Japan. Does Japan get

possible to, so to speak, grant our times in the change of government that a political party could experience the ruling parties and the opposition parties in turn?

Fourth the relation of bureaucrats and politicians are changing. Does postwar bureaucrat-led politics change for politician-led politics? This is still unclear. However the relations of both cannot but change. Fifth the relations of leaders and followers in "the bottom up type" that the political leadership has been suitable for Japanese political climate were in the mainstream. But, as for the recent voters, there is still a tendency in search of the leadership of "the top-down type (e.g. Koizumi's leadership)" in a blockaded situation of the current political economy, too. The most of nation revise Constitutional articles and clauses, and consequently demand a system to elect Prime Minister directly. Sixth the voters come to criticize politicians and bureaucrats about the political responsibility more and more strictly. The nation refuses in particular the opacity by the problem of politics and money. In contrast politicians, political parties and bureaucrats trend to neglect accountability to nation definitely. We must verify the state of disagreement among them after this.

Note

- (1) I would like to confirm my viewpoint of analysis in this paper. I comment on current politics in Japan led by political actors, but premise a macrostructure-like viewpoint in the background. Professor Kohno emphasizes that the analysis by the determinant of the macrostructure provides partial insights and restrictive predictions [Kohno, 1997, 156-157]. Therefore he explains it when it is necessary for him to inspect incentives, choice, negotiations, and strategies of individual political actors. So he concludes that the framework of microanalysis provides an effective tool and valuable insight.

I give commentary of political actors to explain politics of Japan, but think that the social structure affects each actor into consideration in the background. Needless to say, I do not intend to deny his version at all, but think political actors cannot act without influence of the social structure. I cannot explain politics only in the social structure. However I cannot deny constraints that the social structure gives actors. Political actors should find a meaning in social structure in everyday life. Each scene where a political actor meets with is not a nonstructural vacuum. Of course political actors change the present social structure. They make politics dynamic. That is why, in this paper, I intend to try analysis being aware of macro- and micro-viewpoint.

- (2) Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
- (3) Kabashima, Ikuo, "*Sengo Seiji no Kiseki* (The Track of the post-war Japan)" Iwanami Shoten, 2004, ch.4.
- (4) Abe, Shinzo, *Utukusii kuni he* (To beautiful Country), Bungei Shunjyusha, 2006.
- (5) In addition the competitive strength of the financial, agricultural, construction, airline, and other sectors was relatively weak because they had long been sheltered under "the government's convey system". However all industries, strong or weak, must meet challenges of globalization on their own.

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